

'Islands of integrity?'
Reductions in bribery in Uganda
and South Africa and lessons for
anti-corruption policy and practice

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Summary

This paper sets out lessons from a mixed-methods study that identified and explored 'positive outlier' cases of bribery reduction in challenging governance environments. It discusses the two cases the research examined in depth: a 50 percent reduction in bribery in Uganda's health sector while in other sectors bribery rates increased (2010-2015); and an almost 15 percent reduction in police-related bribery in South Africa's Limpopo province while in other provinces it reduced by less than four percent (2011-2015). The findings suggest the importance of disrupting corruption patterns and of unintended consequences for anti-corruption policy and practice.

Most studies of exceptional development progress select cases to examine based on their positive reputations. This study identified previously unrecognised positive results by scrutinising quantitative sector-specific bribery patterns. It used statistical analysis to identify 18 potential 'positive outliers', desk research to eliminate false positives, and then fieldwork to verify and explore two selected cases.

The research found that in South Africa, the impressive reduction in police-related bribery appears to have been localised to Limpopo province as a 'benign side effect' of a wider anti-corruption intervention and work to improve service delivery. Limpopo police were unsure if they were among the targets of the high-profile anti-corruption activities, so probably avoided asking for bribes for fear of being caught. In Uganda, a targeted anti-bribery intervention seems to have reduced bribery in the health sector: bribery patterns were directly affected by the Health Monitoring Unit's push to name and shame offenders.

In both these cases, interventions disrupted corruption patterns by making it more difficult, unacceptable or undesirable for front-line workers to seek bribes. While the research covers only two cases and two sectors, it suggests that anti-corruption approaches that disrupt corruption patterns and networks can work up to a point. Neither of these cases seems to have been a complete 'success', and it is unclear how long the lower bribery rates will last.

Unintended consequences were found in both cases. In Uganda, these consequences were negative: lower morale among health workers, lower citizen trust in the sector; and arguably less capacity for informal payments to provide workarounds for structural flaws in the health system like chronic lack of supplies. In South Africa, the bribery reduction was itself an unintended or unanticipated outcome of a seemingly unrelated policy.

However, unintended consequences – welcome or unwelcome – receive little attention in anti-corruption academic and policy debates. This is a significant gap. For example, without knowing much about when and why benign side effects may have occurred, policy-makers cannot learn how they might be able to support them in future.

This study's three-step method could be used to find more 'positive outliers'. But the research and policy community will need to grapple with some difficult and potentially politically challenging questions to understand better what may work in anti-corruption.

Introduction

If a policy-maker were to set out to understand how not to design a successful anti-corruption programme, they would have a wide range of sources on which to draw. Titles such as ‘Why do so many anti-corruption efforts fail?’ (Persson et al., 2013) abound. (See also, for example, Heeks, 2007, 2011; Mutebi, 2008; Batory, 2012; Johnston, 2012; Brata, 2014).

But if that same policy-maker wanted to find out how to design a successful programme, the choice would be much more limited. They could only draw on mainly historical studies of developed countries (e.g. Klitgaard, 1998; several chapters in Heidenheimer, 2001; Rothstein, 2011; Mungiu-Pippidi & Johnston, 2017; Rotberg, 2017), and single-country case studies where the contexts are so unique that cross-national, comparative lessons are often difficult to disentangle (e.g. Georgia—Di Pippo, 2014; Hong Kong—De Speville, 1997; Mauritius—Kuris, 2013; Rwanda—Bozzini, 2013).

Outside these, there is little literature on successful anti-corruption reforms in challenging governance environments (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015 is a notable exception). Indeed, it can be hard to imagine where anti-corruption ‘success’ can come from, particularly at the national level, in environments where corruption permeates many aspects of economic, political and even social life.

Yet we are not sure if the lack of evidence of ‘successful’ reforms means anti-corruption interventions do not work or if it reflects other issues. There is a long-standing challenge in the field with respect to measuring corruption using the most commonly reached for measurements of corruption. Perceptions-based national-level indices like Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index or the World Bank’s Control of Corruption sustain heavy criticism regarding their ability to approximate reality (Andvig, 2005; Bukovansky, 2006; Knack, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2006; Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Heywood & Rose, 2014; Heywood, 2015; Andersson, 2017). The measurement gap has limited our ability to reliably spot reductions in corruption, much less attribute reductions to specific reform efforts.

Attention has also overwhelmingly been paid to analytical frameworks that are often too broad and too focused on the macro level, potentially distracting us from what is working at a more micro level. Over the past three decades, there has been a preoccupation with examining corruption at the nation-state level. So we have limited understanding of how reforms affect different types of corruption, corruption occurring across different sub-national localities and sector-specific corruption dynamics (Andersson, 2017; Heywood 2017, 2018).

Finally, the literature on anti-corruption policies may suffer from the same bias towards failure said to exist in the policy analysis literature overall. As McConnell points out, ‘Some shortcomings or failings permeate virtually all policies’ (2010: 346), and the decision to frame a policy as a success or failure is often political, rather than the result of ‘neutral’ policy analysis (see also Bovens & t’Hart, 2016).

All of this has led us to ask: Are there hidden stories of anti-corruption success in otherwise systematically corrupt environments that we have not yet found because we lack the tools, or even the inclination, to uncover them?

In contrast, a growing literature in development studies considers cases where performance has been better than expected in a poor governance environment. These cases have been labelled ‘islands of integrity’ (Peiffer, 2012), ‘positive deviants’ (e.g. Andrews, 2015), ‘pockets of productivity’ (e.g. Leonard, 1991), ‘pockets of effectiveness’ (e.g. Roll, 2011), ‘islands of excellence’ (e.g. Therikildsen, 2008) or, in our case, ‘positive outliers’ (see also Donaldson, 2008).¹ These cases include well-performing public sector reforms (e.g. Tendler, 1997; Andrews, 2013, 2015); effective institutions or organisations (e.g. Roll, 2011; Naazneen et al., 2014); and impressive individual leaders who foster and implement progressive policies (e.g. Leonard, 1991; Melo et al., 2012). All these cases stand out as successes against the odds in the context of an otherwise extremely challenging governance environment.

Studies of these cases seek to understand which factors facilitate and foster the often surprising successes achieved. In Andrews’ words, the shared puzzle is to appreciate how it is that ‘some agents find better solutions to problems than their peers even though they have similar resources as their peers and face similar challenges and obstacles’ (2015: 198). Focusing on what works, as opposed to what does not, is said to require a shift in the thinking that usually occurs in governance studies. As Pascale, Sternin and Sternin argue, this approach involves ‘awakening minds accustomed to overlooking outliers and cultivating scepticism about the inevitable “that is just the way it is”’ (2010: 3). The hope underlying a focus on potential developmental success cases is that actors working in similarly challenging governance environments can harness the lessons identified, to effectively scale them up to achieve an even greater impact (Ochieng, 2007: 458).

Our research identified and examined Uganda’s health sector and South Africa’s police sector as positive outliers in bribery reduction. It involved a novel three-stage methodology that combines quantitative and qualitative methods.² We classify both cases as ‘positive outliers’ because their respective sectoral bribery rates reduced far more than expected, given the rate of change in bribery experienced by other sectors in the same countries over the same period.

¹ This project uses the term ‘positive outlier’ because the statistical methodology used to identify cases of surprising success relies on statistically significant outlying observations.

² An in-depth description of the method can be found in Peiffer and Armytage (2018). See also Peiffer (2012).

The paper starts with an overview of the research methodology, and follows this with a summary of each case study. We then discuss the first of two substantial findings emerging from a comparison of the two cases: the role of disruption as a key factor in the reduction of bribery. We tease out lessons in light of current debates in the field, about principal-agent theory in particular. We then discuss unintended consequences—another feature of both cases—in terms of both negative consequences (Uganda) and 'serendipity' (South Africa). We highlight how this issue is a significant gap in anti-corruption academic and policy debates, before concluding the paper.

Methodology

Most studies of exceptional developmental progress select cases based on their perceived reputations for being effective (Leonard, 1991; Grindle, 1997; Owusu, 2006; Roll, 2011; Melo et al., 2012; Andrews, 2013, 2015; Naazneen et al., 2014). However, by relying on reputations alone, these studies miss the opportunity to examine impressive cases that have yet to be recognised or to gain a reputation for success (Peiffer & Armytage, 2018). In contrast, our three-stage methodology begins by scrutinising quantitative sector-specific bribery patterns, and, in doing so, identifies sectors where bribery is recorded as reducing significantly but where the sectors may not yet have reputations for the reduction experienced. To the best of our knowledge, this project represents the first application of the positive outlier approach to investigations of bribery reduction.

In the first stage of the methodology, we identified potential positive outlying sectors as statistically significant outliers using simple regression analyses based on sector-specific bribery rates in over 100 countries. The sector-specific bribery rates were constructed from Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), a governance-focused household-level survey that asks about people's experiences of paying bribes in multiple sectors. The GCB has been conducted almost annually since 2003 and in its most recent 2015 wave it surveyed people in 119 countries (Transparency International, 2018). Our analyses focused on changes in sector-specific bribery rates across the 2009, 2010/11, 2013 and 2015 waves.³

Our analyses identified 18 statistical 'positive' outliers, including Uganda's health sector and South Africa's police sector. In all 18 cases, given how bribery rates had changed in all other sectors in the same countries over the same period of time, the bribery reduction recorded in the GCB, associated with the identified potential positive outlying sector, was deemed statistically improbable, or, in other words, surprising and unexpected.⁴

Our analyses in stage one showed that, in the case of Uganda, because the specific bribery rates for all other sectors in the country increased between 2009 and 2013, bribery in the health sector was also expected to increase by 11 percent. According to the GCB, however, bribery in the health sector unexpectedly reduced by 5 percent over this period. Our analyses suggest that there was an estimated less than 0.01 percent chance of this size of a reduction in bribery occurring.

Similarly, from 2013 to 2015, the GCB recorded an impressive 25 percent decrease in bribery to the police in South Africa. Given how bribery patterns had changed in other sectors over the same period of time in South Africa, it was estimated that there was a less than 5 percent chance of police bribery reducing to this extent in the country.

The purpose of the second stage of the methodology was to vet the cases identified in the first stage. This was important because errors in the quantitative data may have led to our analyses identifying false-positives as outlying cases. A false-positive in our study would be a country-sector that, according to the GCB, experienced an unexpected and impressive reduction in bribery in theory but not in reality. We had the resources to vet five cases—Uganda's health sector; South Africa's police sector; Indonesia's health sector; Mongolia's land sector and Sierra Leone's education sector⁵—and did so through three activities: a review of relevant news and journal articles and grey literature; consultations with experts familiar with each of the five country-sectors; and, when comparable data existed, triangulation of the reduction in bribery documented in the GCB with data from other regional barometers that ask citizens about their experiences with paying bribes to different sectors—such as Afrobarometer.

This process enabled us to home in on the cases for fieldwork where we were most confident we would find a 'true' positive outlier, and an interesting political reform story. We narrowed our focus onto the two most plausible cases emerging from the vetting process: Uganda's health sector and South Africa's police. Our literature review and discussions with experts did not uncover any evidence to suggest that bribery had not reduced in these two cases. In addition, in both countries/sectors, we triangulated the data with Afrobarometer; this data documents the reduction in bribery over a timeframe similar to that in the GCB.

3 We restricted our analyses to nationally representative samples and excluded data from GCB waves prior to 2009 because there was little information available on the quality of the samples and many samples appeared too small to be trusted as reliable representations of the population (e.g. N below 500).

4 A full list and details of the full methodology, including the results of the analyses conducted and the outliers identified, vetted and researched, can be found in Peiffer and Armytage (2018).

5 The selection of the five cases chosen reflected additional criteria—specific to our project—including whether the country was eligible for official development assistance (a stipulation of our research grant) and whether conducting further research in these countries was feasible given how difficult, expensive and/or potentially unsafe it may be to eventually conduct fieldwork in each potential case.

The third stage of the methodology involved in-depth qualitative fieldwork, which was conducted in South Africa in August and September of 2017 and in Uganda in September and October of 2017.⁶ The fieldwork was driven by two aims: first, to conclusively confirm or refute that bribery had reduced in the sector, as indicated by the GCB; and second, to identify the likely causes of the bribery reduction.

In-country fieldwork primarily involved in-depth semi-structured interviews. In both Uganda and South Africa, we conducted five weeks of fieldwork and held thirty to fifty interviews in each country with key personnel, academic experts and, in some cases, service users. We relied partially on snowball sampling, starting with the contacts of the extended research team developed through activities in stage two. In South Africa, this process uncovered a pool of primarily expert respondents whom we used to provide suggestions and introductions to sector practitioners. In Uganda, though the snowball sampling uncovered a significant number of respondents, many of the medical professionals interviewed were identified through unscheduled visits to health facilities. In both cases, we interviewed academics and researchers, relevant government representatives and journalists. However, a majority of interviews were conducted with practitioners in the sectors.

Summary of the two case studies⁷

Our field research across the two cases depicts two very different narratives about why bribery reduced in each. In South Africa, our research suggested that the impressive reduction in police related bribery was likely largely localised to one province, as the result of an indirect policy intervention. In contrast, in Uganda, bribery reduction in the health sector appears to be the result of a direct anti-corruption push in the sector.

South Africa

In South Africa, we began our research at the national level following our analysis of GCB data that identified the police sector as a potential positive outlier. However, it was survey data from Afrobarometer, which can be disaggregated by province, that pointed us in the direction of Limpopo province, which saw the most dramatic decline in police bribery. Specifically, Limpopo's provincial police-related bribery rate reduced by almost 15 percent between when the nation was surveyed by Afrobarometer in 2011 and 2015, while, on average, the police-related bribery rate for the other eight provinces reduced by less than 4 percent over the same time period. In addition to the recorded provincial reduction in bribery over the 2011 to 2015 period, Limpopo residents also believed that corruption had reduced among the police. In 2011, according to Afrobarometer, more than half of those surveyed in Limpopo said that 'most or all police are corrupt'; in 2015, that figure had nearly halved (28 percent). In fact, by 2015, people in Limpopo were the least likely in the country to judge the police as being mostly or all corrupt.

Our research in police-related bribery reduction in Limpopo highlighted the role of a seemingly unrelated national government anti-corruption intervention in the province. From 2011 to 2015, the national government invoked Section 100(1)(b) of the Constitution, which mandates the national government to intervene to fulfil a provincial government's obligations when it is clear that the latter will not or is not able to do so (Munzhedzi, 2014). The national government claimed it was forced to invoke Section 100(1)(b) because the province was bankrupt; Limpopo was almost R2.7 billion in the red at the time of the intervention (Uwizeyimana, 2014). The national government effectively took over provincial departments—Treasury, Education, Transport and Roads, Health and Public Works—but, interestingly, for our research, not the police (Seopela, 2012: 8).

In addition, the intervention also required South Africa's Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI, also known as 'the Hawks')—whose mandate it is to target organised crime, economic crime, corruption and other serious crimes—and the Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT)—an executive-controlled institution tasked with dealing with serious cases of corruption—to probe allegations of corruption in the provincial departments under scrutiny (DPCI & ACTT, 2013). The intervention and the associated anti-corruption push received a high level of national and local media coverage (Uwizeyimana, 2014). By the end of the intervention, the ACTT alone had filed 43 corruption cases that were directly related to the intervention (DPCI & ACTT, 2015). However, the total impact was likely wider. In 2014, the Premier of the province, Chupu Mathabatha, claimed that nearly 300 people had either been charged with or faced corruption-related charges as a result of the intervention (Mathabatha, 2014: 22). Official figures may also underestimate the extent of the overhaul as many officials avoided scrutiny and prosecution by resigning their positions (DPCI & ACTT, 2013).

Interviews with several officials involved with and/or deeply familiar with the intervention suggested that, even though the intervention and its associated anti-corruption push did not target the police directly, it is likely to have significantly reduced the willingness of the police to engage in bribery. This is because anti-corruption investigations and arrests were highly visible during the intervention, and especially so for the police in Polokwane, the capital of the province: police based in Polokwane

6 Our funding allowed for up to two cases for in-depth qualitative fieldwork.

7 This section provides summaries of two full case study papers published separately (South Africa: Peiffer et al, 2018; Uganda: Peiffer, Armytage & Marquette, 2018).

interacted directly with national anti-corruption officials as these officials registered all corruption cases in Polokwane's only police station (DPCI & ACTT, 2015). In the words of one police official there was "... a lot of hype around [the intervention]. There were a lot of initiatives from the Special Investigations Unit, from the Police Joint Chiefs, on that, so obviously [the intervention] created some awareness, so people became a bit more intent that they wouldn't accept or solicit bribe..." (Interview, August 2017).

Moreover, several interviewees suggested to us that there was a high level of uncertainty among the police about whether they were being or would be targeted by the anti-corruption drive. Though visible, the mandate and scope of the intervention—which was limited to the provincial departments targeted—was likely not widely understood. Taken together, our research suggests that the intervention, while not directly targeted at fighting police corruption, indirectly caused many police officers to act with caution; the police may have avoided engaging in bribery for fear of being caught by the misunderstood intervention's unprecedented anti-corruption activities.

Uganda

Our analyses of GCB data in the first stage suggested that bribery in the health sector in Uganda began to surprisingly decline in 2010. According to the GCB, the bribery rate for health services had halved for service users between 2010 and 2015, while the bribery rates associated with all other sectors included in the survey had increased over the same period of time. Unlike the South African case, our research on the reduction in bribery in Uganda's health sector points to a direct anti-corruption intervention that, among other activities, targeted bribery in the sector across the country. Established by President Museveni in 2009, the Health Monitoring Unit (HMU) is a highly visible institution that has wide-ranging power to monitor and evaluate the performance of health facilities and investigate and arrest health workers who have committed crimes (including bribery and other forms of corruption). It has embarked on a nationwide series of financial and medical supply auditing. In addition, it actively works with the courts to prosecute the health-care related crimes that it uncovers (HMU, 2014).

The HMU's highest-profile work involves carrying out unannounced investigations in health facilities, either through random selection or in response to specific complaints of health worker misconduct, including complaints of requests for bribes (HMU, 2014: 15; Kajuba, 2017). The tone of these investigations is important for understanding why it is that the HMU likely reduced bribery in the sector. Observers have described the HMU's investigations as 'militaristic'-style raids (see Baez-Camargo & Kamujuni, 2011: 27; Baez-Camargo, 2012: 3). Based on a strategy of catching health workers 'red handed' and publicly 'naming and shaming' those caught, the HMU's arrests of health workers are often accompanied by TV and radio coverage that captures national headlines.

The Unit boasts an impressive list of claimed achievements, such as recovering stolen medicines worth more than US\$ 30 billion (equivalent to US\$84 million) and many billions in stolen health supplies and equipment (Musinguzi, 2017). It has also registered the arrests of over 600 health care workers and health care worker 'imposters' (Kajuba, 2017; Musinguzi, 2017). The current director of the HMU, Dr Jackson Ojera, claims that 250 of those arrested have been prosecuted, and that there have been 100 convictions, 14 cases acquitted and 42 cases dismissed, with hundreds of cases still pending in courts (Musinguzi, 2017).

Our research shows that the HMU can almost certainly claim notable success when it comes to fighting bribery as well. Interviews with several health workers and others familiar with the sector indicated that, as a result of the HMU's activities in the sector, health workers had become more cautious of engaging in bribery. Many health workers described being more alert and scared to engage in bribery because they feared being caught, and especially publicly 'named and shamed' by the HMU. In the words of a municipal health worker, from the Western province, '*Even here they were arresting some people. It was covered in the media, it is always covered in the media. You need to be careful... You really need to take some measures to avoid such nasty habits*' (Interview, October 2017).

In Limpopo, South Africa, it is likely the case that an intervention had an indirect impact on bribery patterns among the police, whereas in Uganda, bribery patterns in the health sector were directly affected by the HMU's purposeful push to name and shame corrupt offenders. While the two cases present what seem like very different narratives for why bribery surprisingly reduced, the next sections discuss shared lessons around the importance of disruption and unintended consequences for anti-corruption policy and practice.

Disruption as a factor in reducing bribery

Anti-corruption efforts share the principal aim of disrupting corruption patterns by making it more difficult, unacceptable or undesirable to engage in corruption. In this context, disruption is said to introduce instability, at least for a period of time, where corrupt networks and patterns are broken up (Lawson, 2009: 79). The underlying hope of strategies that aim to disrupt seems to be that a disruptive event will take the shape of a 'critical juncture', where the window of uncertainty caused by disruption can give way to new patterns of behaviour that can sustain long-term reductions in corruption (Capoccia, 2016). For example, Lawson explains that it is sometimes hoped that disruption 'may allow aggressive anti-corruption agencies to consolidate their own positions before the window [of instability] closes' (2009: 79).

Principal-agent theory has inspired most contemporary anti-corruption initiatives (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Lawson, 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Marquette & Peiffer, 2017). Using this lens, disruption can be achieved by targeting opportunities to engage in corruption (i.e. reducing the monopoly of power or discretion) and/or disrupting incentives to engage in corruption (i.e. making the perceived costs of engaging in corruption outweigh the perceived benefits of engaging in corruption) (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Bardhan, 1997; Klitgaard, 1988). In 1988, Robert Klitgaard famously articulated this thinking as a simple equation: corruption = monopoly + discretion - accountability ($C=M+D-A$).

In line with the latter variable (accountability), our research into the reductions in bribery detected in Uganda's health sector and South Africa's police sector showed that bribery patterns in each were disrupted because anti-corruption policies instilled fear among sector workers that they could be monitored, caught and punished for engaging in bribery. People engage in bribery when they think they have a certain degree of impunity; disruption can make it either clear that the impunity they thought they once enjoyed is absent (at least for a period of time) or raise some uncertainty about whether the impunity they believed they enjoyed is absent. Many police officers likely avoided engaging in bribery during the intervention in Limpopo because they feared they might be under the scrutiny of the intervention. According to a police official, *'There was a fear factor from Section 100 [intervention]. There were a lot of activities and clampdowns that were localised. They weren't necessarily orchestrated, but the anticorruption vibe was there. It's a perception that I might be caught'* (Interview, August 2017). In this case, the disruption—in the shape of the national government's intervention—likely introduced uncertainty among the police about whether they could engage in bribery with the same degree of impunity that they had previously enjoyed.

Section 100(1)(b) of the Constitution stipulates that the national government can intervene to take control of provincial agencies. As the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) is a national agency, the intervention would not have been an appropriate vehicle for investigating police corruption. However, as noted earlier, several interviewees suggested to us that police officers in Limpopo likely did not understand that the intervention could not focus on the police. Uncertain about whether and to what extent the intervention was targeting the local SAPS, the police in Limpopo are believed to have avoided engaging in bribery so as not to be swept up by the intervention's anti-corruption drive.

Similarly, in Uganda, our research suggests that bribery patterns were disrupted because health workers became fearful that they would be caught, publicly exposed and prosecuted as a result of the HMU's anti-corruption activities. To this end, a doctor described the disruption to bribery patterns caused by the HMU's tactics: *'Yes, when someone is caught they will probably show it—maybe in the television, papers, yes. So now you don't want to get caught'* (Interview, November 2017). Unlike in South Africa, where the police were uncertain of whether the intervention's mandate would include scrutinising police corruption, in Uganda health workers are well aware that the HMU is directly targeting corruption in the sector. Likely as a result of the publicity the Unit's investigations attract and orchestrate, the HMU's presence in the sector is highly visible, also reflecting its impressive reach; most of the health workers we spoke with had worked in facilities that the HMU had visited. Several knew of colleagues whom the HMU had arrested. Therefore, in this case, disruption to bribery patterns is the result of a perception that the degree of impunity for engaging in bribery has reduced, which is based on evidence of a direct crackdown on corruption in the sector.

In both cases, disruption as an anti-corruption strategy worked to reduce front-line bribery. In the Ugandan case, where the intervention was direct, evidence emerged from the interviews that at least some health workers might support the HMU's work, despite the fear its activities generate. A municipal health worker said, *'We need it. It also helps us to check ourselves. At time they go on excesses [sic], but the system is ok. That monitoring is ok'* (Interview, Western Province, October 2017). According to a senior nurse, *'Yes, I think [the HMU] is doing good, and even because of that monitoring from above it could be the cause why the bribery reduced.'* Her junior nursing colleague claimed, *'It encourages you to do your work responsibly and timely knowing that [the HMU] may come'* (Interviews, Mbarara, October 2017). A clinician said, *'In my opinion, I think they are doing good, because...there are patients who can't really afford much...sometimes they are being forced to pay. Yeah, I think it is a good system.'* Another clinician in his hospital agreed, saying, *'I think it's really good, because it is discouraging bribery, and I think all patients should be treated the same, whether rich or poor. In any state they come in, I think they should be treated equally'* (Interviews, Entebbe, October 2017).

However, the literature on disruption as a strategy suggests we should expect a rather mixed picture. As much as the principal-agent theory-inspired anti-corruption policy literature emphasises the utility of disruptive strategies, critics question the sustainability of relying on these types of disruptive strategies alone.

Some research shows that, when principal-agent theory-inspired approaches are implemented, they manage to disrupt patterns of corruption for only a short period of time. Examples might include concerted but temporary attempts to monitor and enforce anti-corruption statutes, or discrete—and sometimes dramatic—anti-corruption purges (Robert, 2003: 6; Della Porta & Vannucci, 2007; Rothstein, 2011).

Rothstein, for example, warns that disruptive events—short of institutional revolution—may 'not convince enough agents that continuing their corrupt practices are no longer a viable option and the likely result is that they system will not reach the crucial "tipping point" but slide back into its old practices of systemic corruption' (2011: 246). Zaliznaya claims that most principal-agent disruptive strategies have not eradicated corruption but instead witness a reconfiguration and adjustment of corruption patterns, as a reaction to the disruption caused (2013, 2014: 196–197).

The argument here is that temporary disruption of corruption patterns may be relatively easy to achieve, but in many cases corruption will, in the long term, find a way to reconstitute itself. Taking inspiration from the natural world, McKittrick explains, 'In drawing a pattern of corruption (loosely used here as a generic term for a wide variety of things) might it not be possible to trace not only the obvious shifts and transformations but also a pattern of *energy*? What happens when the obstacles are placed in a particular area of corruption? Is the result an alternative pattern?' (1957: 511, emphasis in original).

Indeed, in both cases, the long-term impact of the disruption that led to bribery reduction is questionable. In South Africa, the intervention in Limpopo targeted high-level corruption problems in the province and was not targeted at local police. The intervention has since finished, with the national government's exit from the province covered extensively in the popular media (e.g. news24, 2015). While the disruption to the province was unprecedented, as was its likely impact on police bribery, we should have few expectations that it will have reshaped the incentives or interests police have to engage in bribery in the long term. The intervention likely disrupted bribery patterns by putting a temporary lid on the problem; to the best of our knowledge, the 'window of uncertainty' the disruptive intervention opened was not used to address the issue on a more foundational level.⁸

The functionality perspective on corruption highlights at least one reason why many principal-agent theory-inspired disruption strategies fail to address corruption on a more foundational level. The functionality perspective on corruption emphasises that corruption can serve many social, economic and political functions for those who engage in it (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Khan, 2004, 2006; Navot, 2014; Marquette & Peiffer, 2017; Osrecki, 2017). Accordingly, corruption can be controlled when the functions corruption serves are fulfilled in another (non-corrupt) way; when this occurs, actors should find few reasons or incentives to engage in corruption. Through this lens, disruption that addresses corruption on a more foundational level is likely to come about only when the specific functions that corruption fulfils are addressed.

Our research into Uganda is instructive here. According to several of our respondents, and as observed in other research on the sector, bribery in Uganda is largely a response to the low pay health workers receive and therefore functions to supplement very low government salaries (see also Xu et al., 2006; Thornton, 2012; Ayebazibwe, 2013). Doctors in the country are reported to earn on average USh 700,000 (US\$245) a month (Mwesigwa, 2015), while nurses earn as little as USh 400,000 (\$100) a month (Dispatch, 2017). In contrast, accountants in the country earn on average USh 2.4 million (\$650) and civil servants on average USh 3.8 million (\$1,000) (Mwesigwa, 2015). The disruption to bribery patterns caused by the HMU's activities did not aim to address this underlying function of bribery in the sector.

As a consequence of the HMU's impact in deterring bribery, it may be the case that the nature of informal payments in the sector has shifted, as health workers, reluctant to engage in bribery, still look for ways to supplement their income. Some of our health worker respondents claimed that, while bribes were requested less frequently, gifts—in the form of an informal payment—from patients to staff were systemically expected across the sector. To this end, speaking of the patients he worked with, a doctor noted that, *'They were already of the mindset that everything [health workers] do, [health workers] ask for money or [the patients] should give money. So after you done something you would expect someone giving you money. You are like no, no, no, I don't need money. Maybe [the patient] appreciates you... So the people want to know that they say, we need to do this to get services a bit faster'* (Interview, Kampala, September 2017).

Health workers distinguished between accepting gifts (often called 'appreciation') from requests health workers made for bribes (see also Thornton, 2012). Gifts may be freely offered by a patient as a thank you for good service and may be given either in advance or after a service is received. Health workers tended to describe bribery as occurring when a demand was made from a health worker before a service was provided. In practice, however, the tacit understanding between patient and healthcare worker, in many situations, is that 'gifts' are needed to secure good service (ibid.). It may therefore be the case that,

⁸ It has to be said that, without the methodology developed for this research, it is unlikely the intervention's impact on police bribery would ever have been uncovered. If policy-makers were not aware of it, they can hardly be blamed for not having done anything with regard to sustainability.

while the HMU has effectively disrupted bribery patterns, it has done little to address the expectation that informal payments are generally required to receive healthcare. The HMU's activities may have only reconfigured the social circumstances under which informal payments are made in the sector.

Moreover, a logical extension of the functionality perspective also questions the sustainability of principal-agent theory-inspired disruptive strategies that fail to address the functionality of corruption. If fear of being held accountable subsides, and because the perceived need to engage in corruption will persist, it is expected, from a functionality lens, that corruption will be once again used as a mechanism to solve problems (Marquette & Peiffer, 2017). In the case of Uganda's financially vulnerable health workers, if the fear of being 'named and shamed' by the HMU diminishes, it is expected that health workers will use bribery to help fulfil their financial needs (see also Maniple, 2011: vi). In this vein, the founder of the HMU described the HMU's efforts as only a '*stop gap measure*' (Interview, Kampala, October 2017). If the current HMU strategy is sustained, it will be equally important to assess whether it is able to disrupt bribery patterns in the same way as it has seemingly done so far, or whether, in pursuit of the strategy adopted, corruption patterns adjust, unintentionally.

Unintended consequences of anti-corruption approaches

The concept of 'unintended consequences' is one of the oldest in political theory and policy analysis. Thomas Aquinas, for example, wrote in the 13th century, 'Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention' (Summa Theologica, II-II, Qu. 64, Art. 7). In the 20th century, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote, 'Everybody has always known... that the consequences of our actions always end up by escaping us' (1960, cited in Vernon, 1979).

In international relations, unintended consequences can also be referred to as 'blowback'—a metaphor for unintended consequences of foreign policy decisions first used in work coming out of work on the CIA's 1950s overthrow of the Shah of Iran, covered extensively in Johnson's book of the same title (2004). It is used in all sorts of policy analysis literature: on ethnic conflict (DeVotta, 2004), drone warfare (Hudson et al., 2011), terrorism (Bergen & Reynolds, 2005) and the war on drugs (Gootenberg, 2010), for example, but also the support for LGBT+ rights (Hill, 2009), emerging technology (Lin, 2010), information warfare (Feaver, 1998) and international trade (Capling & Nossal, 2006), to highlight just a few.

Interestingly, the concept features rarely in the literature on corruption/anti-corruption. As Osrecki points out, 'Although corruption and anti-corruption have a long history as research topics in the social sciences, little is known about the unintended side effects of anti-corruption measures in organizations' (2015: 337). This seems to be a major gap in the literature, given that anti-corruption is—at its heart—about forcing those with the power to abuse their positions for their own private gain to give up this power and to be accountable for their actions. History has shown this to rarely be a peaceful or uncontested process; indeed, a recent book by Nigeria's former Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, is titled *Fighting Corruption is Dangerous* (2018). In anti-corruption, there is a high potential for 'blowback'.

Merton is one of the most important scholars in the field, with his 1936 paper on 'unanticipated consequences'.⁹ For Merton, unanticipated consequences are about errors that come about when policy actors have not considered all of the likely impacts of their policies, either because they lack necessary information or because they refuse to consider information. As he explains, 'This may range from the case of simple neglect (lack of systematic thoroughness in examining the situation) to pathological obsession where there is a determined refusal or inability to consider certain elements of the problem' (Merton, 1936: 90). Fine writes about 'latent failures', where 'the problem that is targeted may have been settled, but perverse effects stem from the changes... [w]hether this is a function of an absence of adequate information, a narrow vision resulting from ideological blinders, or the impossibility of tracing our action through a complex social system' (2006: 7–8). Perri 6 (2010) tells us that the principal causes of unanticipated consequences are a) ignorance of facts (rather than just uncertainty); b) error in assessing the facts that are known; c) 'interest blinding people to risks'; and d) 'self-defeating prophesy', where a policy-maker is warned about a potential consequence but then takes avoidance action that ends up leading anyway to the foreseen risk in the end (Perri 6, 2010: 45).

While our research in Uganda shows how the HMU has been effective in reducing bribery, the specific tactics the Unit has used for targeting low-level corruption are controversial. As early as 2010, the HMU's work was said to be 'humiliating', lowering staff morale (Kiapi, 2010). Recently, members of the Uganda Medical Association (UMA)—consisting of doctors and other health workers from across the country—went on an unprecedented nation-wide strike, lasting over a month and bringing the already weak health system to its knees (Musinguzi, 2017; Okiror, 2017). The 'wanton arrest of doctors by

⁹ De Zwart (2015) brings Merton's 1936 work back into current policy analysis debates, flagging particularly the importance of distinguishing between *unintended* and *unanticipated* consequences. This distinction is important, he explains, because unintended consequences can be the result of things that could never have been anticipated, whereas unanticipated consequences put the ball well and truly in the policy-maker's court. Scholars must consider whether or not the consequences were anticipated but ignored (for good or for bad) or were unanticipated and came as a result of sloppy work, owed to ideology or simply could not have been anticipated, given the complexity and the circumstances. How we judge policies comes down, in no small part, to which of these is the case. We are unable to say conclusively whether the impacts we observed in our research, in Uganda in particular, are unanticipated or anticipated; however, we feel the distinction is important to note.

the State House Health Monitoring Unit' (Lule, 2017) is said to have been at the heart of the UMA's strike. Along with better pay and working conditions (Ainebyoona, 2017; Mpindi, 2017), the UMA demanded that the government disband the HMU and use the already established Medical Council to deal with complaints (Lule, 2017). One interviewee, for example, talked about being 'exposed in the media while your children are watching you, your relatives are watching you' (Interview, Western Province, October 2017). The HMU's naming and shaming approach has been singled out for its harassment of health professionals, further demoralising Uganda's already vulnerable health staff and, potentially, contributing to brain drain in the sector (Lule, 2017).

For Uganda, negative effects resulting from the HMU's approach, particularly naming and shaming, include reductions in staff morale and in citizen trust in the sector (see also Baez-Camargo & Kamujuni, 2011; Baez-Camargo, 2012; Thornton, 2012). Whether or not this is likely to contribute to the HMU's stated goals around improving service delivery, at least in the short term, is questionable. Although our interview data does suggest that at least some health workers think the HMU is doing a 'good job', its staff are also referred to as 'spies'. In the end, the two observations are not mutually exclusive. You can feel demoralised by certain aspects of a policy and still support it. In a system where little works, people may admire something that does work, even if the methods used are controversial.

However, there is at least one more possible negative consequence of the HMU's approach. Osrecki's (2015) work on unintended consequences and anti-corruption reminds us of the principle of 'functional deviance', where 'deviance is broadly understood as the violation of a legitimate order' (Osrecki, 2015: 345, emphasis in original). Adapting work by Luhmann (1964) on 'brauchbare Illegalität', or 'useful illegality', functional deviance refers to the idea that

formal organizations are dependent on a variety of actions that are hard to transform into formal rules, mainly because formal rule making is bound to fully explicable, mutually consistent, legally flawless and steady procedures. Insofar as organizations are confronted with highly complex environments, a tight 'work-to-rule' compliance regime would significantly restrict the organization's adaptability to the various, inconsistent, and rapidly changing demands of multiple costumers or clients. In short, the argument is that behavior that deviates from the formal or legitimate order of a social system can be functional, where 'functionality' refers to the system's adaptability to an ever-changing and uncontrollable environment (Osrecki, 2015: 345–346).

Osrecki points out that principal-agent approaches typically allow for what he calls 'socially optimal' levels of corruption, where the costs of anti-corruption do not outstrip the costs of corruption, citing Anechiarico and Jacobs' (1996) book as the classic study on this. The latter's case study of public administration and corruption control in New York City makes a compelling argument for a new discourse on corruption control. While making it clear that 'corruption is not harmless', they argue that we need to connect corruption control strategies with interest in government effectiveness: clean government that is ineffective as a result of overzealous anti-corruption initiatives is not a win for citizens (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996: 193).

However, Osrecki explains that anti-corruption scholars and policy-makers tend to argue that the costs of corruption are always greater in the long term, and so we end up with 'zero tolerance' approaches always being seen as better in the long term (Osrecki, 2015: 343). Informal ways of working that break the rules of a system—that may look to an outsider like corruption—emerge and exist in response to the brokenness of systems that are unable to respond to the needs of the public. Nas et al. write about 'beneficial corruption', which in a structurally inefficient system exists 'as a means of attaining the desired outcome' (1986: 110). They argue that, 'The idea of beneficial corruption does not imply that these activities should be considered legitimate, but rather that they provide a net increase in social welfare. What is implied is that there must be a serious structural flaw for any corrupt act to lead to increased welfare' (ibid.: 111).

In the corruption literature, there is often reference to 'need vs greed' (Plummer & Cross, 2007: 238; Bailey, 2008; Marquette et al., 2011: 10; Bauhr, 2017), but 'need' may not always refer to financial need; sometimes it can be about finding ways to work around broken systems. 'Work-to-rule' behaviour, where no one ever breaks formal rules no matter what the circumstances, is, Osrecki claims, 'a frightening scenario for practitioners...[but] in the principal-agent vision of anti-corruption it became something of an ideal to strive for' (Osrecki, 2015: 344). As we argue elsewhere, '[I]t might be the case that without the loss of state resources to corruption, there would eventually be improved service delivery; to those individuals who need to access them today—for themselves or their family—that is scant consolation' (Marquette & Peiffer, 2017: 8).

It is hard to imagine a system with more structural flaws than the Ugandan health system. In one famous case that unfolded during our research, a nursing assistant was arrested following a high-profile raid by the minister of health herself, who went to a health clinic disguised in a burqa and revealed herself when she allegedly was asked for a bribe for a service that should have been given freely (Ng'ang'a, 2017; The Independent, 2017). The nursing assistant, however, who had only just returned to work from maternity leave, told reporters that she did not ask the minister for a bribe, but rather for US\$ 5,000 (less than US\$1.50) for a diabetes testing stick, because the hospital had run out of its government-provided stock. Regardless, she is due to be put in front of the Anti-Corruption Court (Ainebyoona, 2017).

The nurse assistant's request for money to cover the diabetes stick is the perfect example of functional deviance; without using informal payments to adapt to a system unable to keep medical supplies in stock, the outcome is not improved service delivery; rather, it is patients simply not being tested for diabetes. This is not bribery, and it is not rent-seeking; it is simply

covering the costs of finding the testing stick outside the clinic. Stopping informal payments to cover the cost to medical workers of finding necessary supplies will not make testing sticks miraculously appear. The worst thing that can happen, Osrecki argues, is that we do not differentiate functional deviance from rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in sub-optimal outcomes in the name of anti-corruption (Osrecki, 2015: 343; see also Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).¹⁰ In other words, the worst thing that can happen, in our Ugandan case, is that health workers' fear of punishment for little more than adaptability in the face of a broken system means they begin to 'work to rule', which then means patients are more likely to die unnecessarily from undiagnosed, treatable diseases like diabetes.¹¹

De Zwart points out that policy-makers are actually very good at weighing up potential consequences, and so scholars should consider if they have done their job well but have decided that any negative effects are worth it to avoid worse ones, from either action or inaction, because most policies 'entail a choice with political or moral significance as in certain policy decisions' (De Zwart, 2015: 287). Peters similarly explains, 'Reformers appear terribly naïve so that they would not understand just what they are doing, but generally these reformers [simply have] to make difficult choices in complex situations' (2007: 23).

This is very relevant to our research. Health workers demanding bribes from patients is not a 'victimless crime'. It may well be that the HMU (including President Museveni, who has supported it) was perfectly aware of the possible negative effects of tackling corruption in this way but decided that the potential costs were worth it.¹² As De Zwart reminds us, 'Social scientists, eager to speak truth to power, should consider the possibility that those in power may know the truth, yet let bad things happen anyway because they fear worse' (2015: 295). We have no evidence that these consequences of the HMU's work were anything but unanticipated; they should be anticipated from now on.

Our South Africa case study tells a very different story about unintended/unanticipated consequences but has no less potential significance for future anti-corruption research and policy-making. In South Africa, we did not find an anti-police bribery intervention that led to unintended/unanticipated consequences: the bribery reduction is itself an unintended or unanticipated outcome (probably both) of a seemingly unrelated policy.

Unexpectedly, the police in Limpopo likely responded to the national government's separate intervention by reducing their engagement in bribery. And, as we have seen, survey data suggests that, as a further unanticipated/unintended impact, citizens noticed, becoming far less suspicious of the police. Perri 6 calls this type of scenario a 'benign side effect', which he claims is quite common: 'Not infrequently, governments—or at least, lucky ones—undertake a policy for one reason and find that its implementation turns out to be useful for other goals' (2010: 53). Of course, bribery reduction within the police probably would have been very welcome if policy-makers had only had the methodological means to identify it.

In writing about anti-poverty programmes, Klitgaard tells us, 'In policy circles, we have become perhaps too accustomed to think that all unintended results must be perverse; in science we are much more tolerant, and indeed we are fond of thinking about serendipity, good things that happen as the unanticipated outcomes of trying our hardest' (1997: 1963). This is important because it reminds us that unintended consequences can be welcome as well as unwelcome.

However, the field gives little—if any—attention to studying these welcome unanticipated/unintended consequences. Therefore, the corruption/anti-corruption literature is likely limited in its ability to reflect on some potentially important policy lessons. For example, without knowing much about when and why such benign side effects may have occurred, we are unable to begin to predict when they may happen again or what factors could be put in place to facilitate them.

The methodology we used in our case study research provides one way to identify potential hidden positive outlying cases. As a reminder, we were able to research only two cases in depth out of eighteen identified potential positive outliers; by applying the methodology and researching more of the identified cases, or by finding other ways to identify other potentially hidden positive outliers, we may be able to stumble upon and better understand more instances of serendipity. Research on such cases would hopefully be able to help policy-makers better anticipate when and why serendipity can occur, and thus achieve better sustainability of the effects when it does happen. Our case study research adds empirical strength to the call to bring more unintended consequences thinking into anti-corruption research. It is a clear gap that needs to be filled—both to take advantage of serendipity and to avoid disaster.

10 Some may argue that a key challenge is differentiating between a genuine request for payment to cover a lack of supplies and a manufactured one in order to justify a demand for money. It is a challenge, of course, but acknowledging this does not improve service delivery—particularly in an immediate sense. Further research both on health systems and governance, as well as changing social norms, is likely to be essential for improving corruption in the sector in the longer term.

11 In interviews with health care workers in Uganda, the issue of lack of supplies came up as often as low salaries. It seems to be a source of great distress for the workers, especially older staff, who claimed that things used to be much better before decentralisation reforms in the 1990s. Our research was unable to look into this further, but it is worth flagging, especially as the HMU's remit also includes investigating problems with supply chains.

12 Anechiarico and Jacobs point out, with regard to their case study, that 'No accurate assessment of corruption is possible; therefore, it has been possible to argue that corruption would be worse without current efforts and that more resources are needed. Cost, efficiency, and effectiveness are submerged by the imperative of corruption-free government' (1996: 193).

Conclusion

We identified Uganda's health sector and South Africa's police as 'positive outliers'—sectors that have experienced statistically unexpected reductions in their bribery rates. As we have shown, in these cases bribery has successfully been reduced—as a result of a targeted anti-bribery intervention in the case of Uganda, or as a 'benign side effect' of a wider anti-corruption intervention and measures to improve service delivery in South Africa. But we have also shown how these cases are not simple 'success' cases; they exhibit aspects of failure as well.

Rothstein warns us of the tendency of policy-makers to look for a 'magic key' to solve the problem of corruption: 'if only we could find the magic key (the "entry point") and change this institutional device, we would be able to advise policy makers on [anti-corruption]' (Rothstein, 2011: 107–108). Whether or not this is a fair description of all policy-makers, we were uncomfortable calling our case studies 'success cases', because of our concerns about sustainability and potential unintended consequences—and the 'blowback' we saw in Uganda in particular. However, we were equally uncomfortable calling these 'failure cases', because they did succeed—whether by intention or by default—in reducing bribery quite dramatically in short periods, and, in South Africa, even reducing perceptions of corruption in Limpopo by impressive levels. In these cases, disruption in particular had, with several important caveats, some 'magic key' properties.¹³

McConnell (2010) provides one framework for policy analysis that could be helpful in cases when neither success or failure is clear. He makes a strong argument for seeing policy analysis in terms of many dimensions and outcomes, rather than as either 'success' or 'failure'; in real life, cases are rarely one or the other, and even successes can have negative (unintended/unanticipated) consequences and outcomes. A policy can be deemed successful if 'it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually universal' (McConnell, 2010: 351). A policy is a failure when 'it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent' (ibid.: 356–357).

In other words, a policy that achieves its objectives may still be a failure if it attracts considerable opposition. You can have successful politics alongside unsuccessful programmes, where leaders' reputations are enhanced and the public are happy, but with a programme that does not actually deliver. The latter, McConnell points out, is particularly the case with so-called 'wicked problems', such as anti-corruption: 'They demonstrate that government is trying to deal with the problem and responding to popular concerns', and this can project a degree of 'success' even if the policy does not actually fix the wicked problem (McConnell, 2010: 358). In the Uganda case, at least, whether or not the HMU is seen as a 'success' in the long term is likely to depend on how the government reacts to opposition (e.g. raising staff salaries, and whether it tackles the real problems in the health system), corruption and systemic failures at the top, not the bottom, of the system.

In the past few years, there have been several calls to rethink corruption research (e.g. Gevurtz, 2007; Sidwell, 2011; Kaufmann, 2012; Wedel, 2012; Gore et al., 2013; Ackerman, 2014; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2014; Huwae, 2015; Baez-Camargo & Passas, 2017; Mungiu-Pippidi & Kossow, 2017; Kang, 2018; Muir & Gupta, 2018).¹⁴ Heywood (2017, 2018) writes of the tendency for anti-corruption research and policy to focus too often at the nation-state level without specifying the type of corruption being addressed, calling for more attention on 'focus and locus'. He argues, 'if we are to address corruption for the purposes of effective policy, we need to disaggregate into different types, as well as different levels and locations in which it occurs' (Heywood, 2017: 39). Anechiarico and Jacobs argued over 20 years ago that, '[T]he new [anti-corruption] discourse should also recognise that not all corruption is created equal...A systematic effort to prioritize corruption according to its negative consequences for society and government legitimacy would produce a hierarchical list of targets at which corruption controllers could aim' (1996: 194–195). Khan's (2017) research suggests the need to consider the political and technical viability of anti-corruption approaches, especially 'in contexts where levels of development and political arrangements do not yet allow the effective enforcement of formal rules'.¹⁵ As we argue elsewhere, 'This call to researchers builds on what is common knowledge in the field, which is that different types of corruption likely have different drivers and consequences, anticipated or otherwise' (Peiffer et al., 2018a: 9).

Anti-corruption interventions are complex, highly political and unlikely to produce simple, linear narratives of success and failure. While our research covers only two cases and two sectors, our positive outliers suggest that approaches to anti-corruption that manage to disrupt corrupt patterns and networks can work up to a point. Whether this initial success is sustainable, whether it leads to better service delivery outcomes for the public, whether it is politically viable, it is too early to say for sure.

But what the research does point to is the need for the anti-corruption research and policy community to grapple with some difficult and potentially politically challenging questions to be able to develop a better understanding of what may work in anti-corruption. These cases were complex interventions with complex and, in some ways, contested outcomes: a simple narrative of success and failure does not capture this complexity. While these cases are indeed statistically significant positive outliers, they also show why we need to contextualise and problematise the 'positive' in 'positive outliers'.

13 One issue with the methodology is that it is likely to flag potential positive outliers that show in the data but have not yet had time to be recognised through observation; 'real time' cases, in effect. This may mean that sustainability may be a question that arises with any case study regardless.

14 This is an updated list based on Heywood (2018): 94.

15 See also <https://ace.soas.ac.uk/379-2/>.

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