

Who will be the 'Principled Principals'?

The determinants of active opposition to corruption

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October 2014



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DLP aims to increase understanding of the political processes that drive or constrain development. Its work focuses on the crucial role of home-grown leaderships and coalitions in forging legitimate institutions that promote developmental outcomes.

DLP's independent program of research is supported by the Australian aid program.

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Executive summary

This paper uses survey data from Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer to examine what determines people's willingness to act against corruption in 71 countries. Recent literature has suggested that when people perceive corruption as pervasive they will experience 'corruption fatigue' and be less likely to engage in anti-corruption activism. Yet this study finds that people's perception of corruption as a growing problem tends to increase their willingness to take action against it. However, when they also perceive government anti-corruption efforts as effective, this reduces their motivation to get involved.

Donor-supported anti-corruption initiatives increasingly seek to support citizens to demand better control over corruption from their governments. Yet we know very little about what encourages people to actively oppose corruption. Few surveys ask about people's willingness to report a corrupt offense or to participate in a protest against corruption. We have found no other studies that examine this issue using the limited survey data available.

Methodology

The paper uses data from the 2012-2013 wave of Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) to test two main hypotheses suggested in the recent literature:

- The more a person perceives corruption to be pervasively practiced in society, the less willing they will be to engage in anti-corruption activism (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). Two measures are used to test this: respondents' perception of the level of government corruption; and how they think corruption has changed over the last two years.
- The more a person perceives their government's efforts to control corruption as effective, the less willing they will be to engage in anti-corruption activism (Bauhr, 2012). The measure used to test this is respondents' ratings in response to the question, 'how effective do you think your government's actions are in the fight against corruption?'

The study focuses on nationally representative GCB samples, using data from 71 countries, and from a total of 77,535 respondents. It examines answers to four of the survey questions – whether or not respondents would be willing to:

- Take part in a peaceful protest or demonstration against corruption
- Join an organization that works to reduce corruption as an active member
- Pay more to buy from a company that is clean/corruption free
- Report an incident of corruption.

The study used logit analyses to examine the determinants of respondents' yes or no answers to these questions. Each logit analysis was run across three different samples: the data from 23 OECD countries, from 48 non-OECD countries, and from those 71 countries combined. The study examined four categories of possible determinants of active opposition to corruption: respondents' perceptions of corruption, their experiences of the state, their resources, and country-level contextual factors.

Key findings

The study finds that people's perceptions of the corruption environment, and how these perceptions interact, significantly affect people's willingness to act against corruption. People's perceptions of corruption becoming more of a problem can increase their willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism. Respondents' perceptions of the level of government corruption do not affect their willingness to engage in anti-corruption activity. However, people across the 71 countries are seven percent more likely to be willing to report corruption when they believe it has 'increased a lot' over the last two years than when they think it has 'decreased a lot' over the same period.

Yet this source of motivation tends to be hampered when people also view government anti-corruption efforts as effective. Interestingly, the perception that the government is effective in controlling corruption has different impacts in OECD and non-OECD countries. When influential, it reduces people's willingness to act against corruption in OECD countries and increases it in non-OECD countries. In the latter, a one-unit increase on the 5-point scale of perceived government effectiveness is associated with seven percent greater odds of being willing to join an anti-corruption organisation, and thirteen percent greater odds of being willing to report corruption.

In non-OECD countries where corruption is more likely to be systemic, perhaps respondents are prone to think that their own involvement is needed to combat corruption; when confidence in the government's efforts are high, they are more likely to believe that it is worthwhile joining the fight. In the OECD setting, on the other hand, as Bauhr (2012) argued, perhaps effective governments are thought to be able to handle corruption on their own.

In examining other categories of potential determinants of anti-corruption activism, the study also found that:

- Younger people, males, and people who come into contact with the state frequently tend to be more willing to actively oppose corruption
- While greater participation in bribery reduces people's willingness to report corrupt exchanges, it does not affect their willingness to engage in the other forms of anti-corruption activism analysed
- Respondents in societies that give greater value to gender equality and the rights of individuals and minorities—societies where women are more fully integrated in the formal workforce—are more likely to see themselves as potential anti-corruption activists
- Yet a country's level of democracy—as measured by the Freedom House Index—has no estimated impact on people's willingness to actively oppose corruption.

Conclusions and implications for future research

The results suggest that a shift of focus might make anti-corruption campaigns more effective. Instead of highlighting government successes in identifying or prosecuting cases of corruption, should publicity focus more on corruption as an increasing problem in society? More research is needed to answer this question.

The initial evidence presented here indicates that while perceptions of the corruption environment matter, their effects on activism are not sequential. Future research could investigate how different factors shape people's perceptions of corruption. What role does the media play, for example? How, if at all, do anti-corruption campaigns shape perceptions of how pervasive corruption is? Do they inspire activism, or discourage it?

Further, the data used in this study only enable analysis of what citizens say they are *willing* to do. It is important to examine the perceptions, motivations and behaviour of those people actually participating in anti-corruption activism. How, for example, do active grassroots anti-corruption coalitions form and evolve?

If civic action is important in reducing corruption, we need to consider not only how people perceive their corruption environment, but how those perceptions are shaped, and what role anti-corruption programmes play in shaping them.

Introduction

Over the last fifteen years, the effort to fight corruption in the developing world has grown exponentially; Michael and Bowser (2009: 1) note that in 2009 almost \$5 billion was spent by international donors on procurements and salaries to anti-corruption professionals involved in dedicated anti-corruption programs, which is 50 times what was spent just six years earlier. As donor interest has peaked and investment has soared, the focus of donor supported anti-corruption initiatives has broadened (Marquette, 2004; Johnson, Taxell & Zaum, 2012; Schmidt 2007). Along with supporting so called “supply-side” anti-corruption interventions, it is very common that anti-corruption initiatives also tackle the “demand-side” as well. Supply-side anti-corruption initiatives aim to target the supply of corruption through the support of reforms and formal institutions that promise to ensure greater government transparency, a reduction in civil servants’ discretion over resources, and harsher punishments for corrupt transgressions (Agarwal and Van Wicklin III, 2012; Klitgaard 1988; Shah 2007). In contrast, demand-side initiatives share in common the goals of widening the socio-political space available for citizens to demand better control over corruption and empowering citizens’ groups to do so (Chene, 2008; Schmidt 2007; Claasen and Alpín-Lardiés 2010; McNeil and Malena 2010). The logic behind these types of initiatives is rooted in the assumption that where political commitment to reform is lacking, “the demands and protests emanating from civil society can induce reluctant political leaders to conduct anti-corruption purges” (William 2000: xvi).

However, as several have noted, programs that simply facilitate an opening in the socio-political space available for citizens to voice their grievances or participate in governing decision-making do not necessarily result in greater accountability (Andrews, 2003; Ackerman, 2004; O’Neil et al., 2007:4-5; Malena et al. 2004). People face varying social, economic and political obstacles to voicing their demands for a more corrupt free environment (Chene, 2008; McGee and Gaventa, 2011). Moreover, even when given the opportunities and able to take advantage of those opportunities, it is not entirely clear that many will choose to express grievances. Based on lessons from Kenya and Uganda, for example, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) argue that in contexts where corruption is systemic and there is a pervasive expectation across society that everyone is engaging in corruption, most citizens will be inclined to “perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges” (7). On the other hand, Bauhr (2012) has argued that when people trust that their government is capable of controlling corruption, they will view their own efforts within civil society to oppose corruption as unnecessary.

In this paper, we offer an examination of the individual and national contextual determinants of willingness to engage in anti-corruption activities—namely reporting corruption, participating in anti-corruption protests, joining an anti-corruption organisation, and paying more for products from a company that is corruption free. Using Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer this paper focuses its examination on what impact perceptions of widespread corruption and government effectiveness in controlling corruption has on willingness to become actively opposed to corruption across 71 countries.

Contrary to the suggestion made by recent literature that when people perceive corruption to be pervasive they will be less likely to engage in anti-corruption activism, we find that a perception of corruption becoming more of a problem tends to ignite the activist spirit. However, we also find that any motivation to get involved in the fight against corruption that stems from the notion that corruption is becoming more of an issue is tamed when it is accompanied with a view that the government’s efforts to tackle corruption are effective. We conclude with some thoughts on how future research can further explore the link between perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption activism.

Voicing demand: resources, political context, and perceptions

In its broadest sense, this paper focuses on who is most willing to use their ‘voice’ to counter corruption. Voice is a concept that has been developed by several in a number of literatures. Expressing one’s voice, as Hirschman (1970), Paul (1992) and many others explain, communicates perceptions of performance, be it to the private or public sector. Hirschman (1970: 30) defines voice as any attempt made to change an objectionable state of affairs, and so ostensibly, ‘voice’ can be conceptualised to encompass a multitude of actions. These actions can be individualised, like reporting corruption, and collectivised, like protesting or becoming active in an anti-corruption organisation (Dowding, et al. 2000). In addition to those activities, we examine the willingness to pay more to a company that is ‘corruption free’, which according to Hirschman (1970), would be an ‘exit’ response, rather than one of voice. The choice to exit, while not always available, is the other way a person can communicate their discontent with an organisation (Hirschman, 1970). Exit is ‘expressed’ as a refusal to engage with the organisation and so it is seen to be an especially viable option when dealing with the private sector. Exit is also a possible response when dealing with government institutions that are not monopolised by the state, like publicly provided education and health services, for which there are private alternatives for those that can afford them. Though the conditions to make exit a feasible option are more limited, like voice, it is also a feedback mechanism.

Demand-side development programming—initiatives that support citizens’ groups’ engagement in the public arena—inherently assume that feedback can have an effect on policy and governance. A World Bank guidance note spells out the expected relationship between citizens actively expressing their voice and development outcomes, “engaged local communities, a vibrant civil society, and a transparent flow of information support poverty reduction by helping to hold governments accountable for delivering better services, creating jobs, and improving living standards” (The World Bank, 2009: 5). In a separate How-To note, the World Bank gives examples of different demand-side programming approaches. In settings where political will and the legal framework to allow citizens to give feedback are weak or non-existent, it is suggested that

demand-side governance efforts focus on highlighting prevailing conditions and pressing for greater access to information and transparency in public expenditure management (Agarwal and Van Wicklin III, 2012). Where the political and legal context is more supportive of citizens expressing their discontent, demand-side programming should focus on promoting investigative journalism, information demystification, and procurement monitoring (Agarwal and Van Wicklin III, 2012).

Demand-side anti-corruption programming does not necessarily assume the presence of an active civil society or an otherwise engaged citizenry. However, this type of programming's effectiveness is thought to hinge upon the presence of both. Yet what is known about peoples' proclivity to use their 'voice' or actively oppose corruption is very limited. Unlike questions of people's direct experiences with bribery, which now appear on many cross-national barometers (Rose and Peiffer, 2012), many surveys do not ask questions about the willingness to report a corrupt offense or participate in a protest against corruption. In our consideration of this issue we did not find any other research that has examined the issue of corruption activism using data from the few surveys that had.

Alam's (1995) theoretical framework on the factors most likely associated with "countervailing actions" against corruption is one of the few papers we found that focuses primarily on the issue of profiling an anti-corruption activist. The activities that we are examining—reporting, joining an organisation, protesting and paying more to ensure a corrupt free product—are all covered by Alam's (1995) more exhaustive list of potential countervailing activities.

Alam (1995) discusses the potential importance of two types of factors to stimulate active opposition to corruption, which are the socio-economic resources of the individual and the political institutional setting. With respect to the first, Alam (1995) argues that an individual's level of socio-economic resources will positively shape their willingness to actively oppose corruption. People with higher incomes can draw upon more resources with which to organise resistance efforts, and can assume risks and costs—be it time, energy, or money—that may come with active opposition, more so than those with less financial security (Alam 1995, 427). A higher level of education can deepen a person's understanding of their rights and their ability to exercise their voice (Alam 1995: 427). This message is consistent with modernization-type ideas, wherein wealth and education interact with each other and are associated with greater opportunities to be informed and engaged in civic culture and political processes (Inglehart, 1977; 1997; Verba, et al. 1995).

Moreover, these expectations are fairly consistent with what is found in some of the more generalised political participation literature. Several studies have found that protest participation and conventional political participation, to some degree, seems to be a privilege of the higher educated and more affluent (see Verba et al. 1995; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1988; Downton and Wehr 1997, 1998; Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon, 2010).¹

Literature on whistle-blowing also suggests that a whistle-blower is more likely to have greater resources and higher levels of education (Brabeck, 1984; Miceli and Near, 1984; Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and Keenan, 1998), and higher levels of education are also positively related to the proclivity to report a crime (Baumer 2002; Carcach 1997; Goudriaan et al. 2006; Hart and Rennison 2003; MacDonald 2001; Zhang et al. 2007; Bennet and Wiegand, 1994). Though whistle-blowing, and crime reporting cast different nets than our more narrow focus on active corruption opposition, its likely that their determinants somewhat overlap as they all capture the willingness of a person to provide discontented feedback to a perceived objectionable state of affairs.

Alam (1995) also emphasises the importance of country-contextual influences on willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism. Intuitively, democratic institutions, which protect human and political rights, are expected to provide a more conducive environment for people to voice their discontent with corruption (Alam 1995: 430). The presence of impartial and efficient judiciary is important for similar reasons; the perceived risk of engaging in peaceful anti-corruption activism is reduced when one is able to rely on an impartial rule of law (Alam, 1995: 430). Finally, a free and competitive media is also seen as important. People will be more aware of corrupt transgressions when media reports on them, and so they will have a greater opportunity to voice their discontent with it when it is publicised (Alam, 1995: 430).

The same contextual influences that Alam (1995) proposes as potentially important in fostering anti-corruption activism are evident in studies from other literatures. For example, Soares (2004) found that the more democratic a nation is, the higher the rate of reporting crimes.² Others have found that when people trust that the legal system will be efficient and impartial, they are more likely to report crimes as well (Bennett and Wiegand, 1994; Goudriaan et al., 2006; Silver and Miller, 2004; Warner, 2007; Morris and Klesner 2010). Similarly scholars that study contentious behaviour have found that democratic countries can facilitate such actions via their legal frameworks, which protect freedoms of speech and other liberties (Dalton et.al. 2010). Intuitively, the opposite would likely hold true in the median authoritarian state that limits political participation and expression. Though, others have found that when political institutions are strong and reliable, individuals may actually

1 Other studies, it should be acknowledged, have demonstrated the opposite; some have found, for example, that in developing nations the wealthier and more educated individuals are less likely to protest (Canache and Kulisheck 1998).

2 It is important to note that while Soares (2004) finds that democracy matters for reporting crimes, ultimately the effect of democracy and the institutional development that comes with it is essentially limited by the level of corruption in society. In other words, the more democratic a nation is the higher the rate of reporting crimes is. However, once the variable for corruption is introduced, the effect of institutional development is dampened in that corruption negatively and significantly affects reporting rates and diminishes the effect of democracy.

refrain from unconventional political action, like protesting, and instead channel their grievances through more 'legitimate' means, such as voting (Machado, et al. 2009).

While instructive, Alam's (1995) theoretical framework overlooks the potential importance of a number of factors. Most glaring to us is its silence on what impact the corruption context, personal perceptions, and experiences with corruption might have on a person's willingness to actively oppose corruption. Recent literature has emphasised the role that perceptions of the corruption context likely has on anti-corruption activism; we review those arguments next.

Potential impact of perceptions

In their insightful article, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) argue that traditional anti-corruption interventions have failed because they are based on a mischaracterization of the problem. Most often seen through the prism of principal-agent theory, corruption is conventionally thought to occur when civil servants have discretion over the provision of a public service and lack accountability. As this perspective emphasizes the rational choices that take place in individual incidents of corruption, corruption is viewed as solvable with policies that can alter these individual-level calculations. Through this view, corruption is predicted to be reduced when 'principals' reduce government officials' level of discretion over services, increase their ability to monitor government officials' actions, and impose harsher punishments on those that get caught for engaging in corruption. Critical of this take on corruption, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) argue that in systemically corrupt contexts corruption is best understood as a collective action problem, instead. From their perspective, the application of the principal-agent theory mistakenly assumes that there will be 'principled principals' in the broader civil society and in positions in power to actively oppose corruption and enforce the anti-corruption reforms that have been passed.

When corruption is systemic and perceived to be the norm and/or the only viable way to get things done, it is far more likely that people will continue to go with the corrupt grain, regardless of the reforms that are passed in the national capital (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2013; Marquette, 2012). As Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) argue, in this context, most citizens will be inclined to "perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges" (7). Through this prism, large protests against corruption—which have occurred on every continent—are indicative of exceptions, rather than rules. When corruption runs rampant, a majority of citizens are likely to perceive such endeavors as dead-end paths to change, rather than as an activity that can have a transformative effect on society.

For Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) collective action theory makes sense of this; it recognizes that peoples' perceptions of others' actions can reduce their willingness to work towards a common goal, even when the collective good will ostensibly benefit everyone if it was reached. Corrupt countries do not remain corrupt because they lack the legal framework or national institutions to fight it, but because people think their own actions to fight or abstain from corruption will not make a difference. From this logic, a perception that corruption is widespread or normal induces a *corruption fatigue*; instead of motivating people to voice their discontent with how pervasive corruption is, people become less motivated to do anything to counter it.

Obviously, the counter argument to this notion is that perceptions of corruption being widespread or on the rise will compel action from those who wish to counter the trend. In other words, these perceptions may instead serve as the motivation for people to engage in anti-corruption civic action. For the sake of simplicity, we state the first main hypothesis we wish to test from the perspective of Persson, Rothstein and Teorell's (2013) logic:

H1: The more a person perceives corruption to be pervasively practiced in society, the less willing they will be to engage in anti-corruption activism.

How pervasive corruption is perceived to be across society is only one dimension of a person's perceived corruption environment. Also held are perceptions of how effective/ineffective the government is in its own efforts to control corruption. What impact do these perceptions have on willingness to actively oppose corruption? Do people tend to react to a perceived ineffective government by taking it upon themselves to engage in a civil society movement to confront corruption? Or are people more likely to be motivated to join in on a fight to control corruption when they feel that their government has made headway in its own efforts?

To the last question, Bauhr (2012) argues, not necessarily. Examining the surveys from a Swedish sample, Bauhr (2012) found that corruption was both perceived to be a marginal problem and something that the political system could control itself. For Bauhr (2012), this high level of institutional trust works to produce a *lack* of civic engagement, as it gives citizens a "(potentially unwarranted) high trust that the government is able to deal with corruption." Taking this argument to its extreme suggests that even when the problem of corruption is made salient, if people think that the government is able to control it, people will see no point in engaging in anti-corruption activities to counter it. Of course, the opposite could instead be true in this case as well. People may feel encouraged by a perceived effective government's response to control corruption to join in on the anti-corruption fight. Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we state the second main hypothesis we wish to test from the perspective of Bauhr's (2012) logic:

H2: The more a person perceives their government's efforts to control corruption as effective, the less willing they will be to engage in anti-corruption activism.

Both Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) and Bauhr (2012) frame their arguments to be context specific. For Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), the negative influence that a perception of widespread corruption likely has on anti-corruption engagement is also a function of living in an environment characterised by systemic corruption. Indeed they found in their interviews of Ugandans and Kenyans—arguably, systemically corrupt countries—that despite moral disapproval of corruption, their interviewees often viewed efforts to fight against corruption as futile and justified their own engagement in corruption as a necessary evil. Similarly, for Bauhr (2012), who examined responses from a Swedish survey, institutional trust hinders civic anti-corruption engagement in a context wherein corruption exists only at the margins. While instructive, both studies do not address whether these patterns hold more generally, across different countries and different corruption contexts. Ultimately, we aim to expand this line of inquiry by examining both arguments across over 70 different countries, using the Global Corruption Barometer’s 2013 survey data. We describe this data source and our key dependent variables next.

Willingness to engage across countries

We rely on Transparency International’s 2012–2013 wave of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) as it included questions to respondents about their willingness to actively oppose corruption. We benefit from its large cross-national reach, and in the aim of focusing on nationally representative samples, we use data from 71 of the 109 countries the survey was administered in, which includes a total of 77,535 respondents.³ Prior to this wave, no other survey has reached such a large sample with questions about active opposition to corruption.

The questions on active opposition to corruption appear towards the end of the survey, after demographic questions and questions about perceptions of and experiences with corruption.⁴ As a result, respondents are asked questions about their proclivity to oppose corruption after the issue of corruption has already been primed.⁵ Six yes/no questions are asked in a battery, wherein the respondents are first told, “there are different things people could do to fight corruption and I am now going to ask whether you would be willing to do any of the following.” The anti-corruption activities are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Activities in opposition to corruption on GCB 2013

1. Sign a petition asking the government to do more to fight corruption.
2. Take part in a peaceful protest or demonstration against corruption.
3. Join an organization that works to reduce corruption as an active member.
4. Pay more to buy from a company that is clean/corruption free.
5. Spread the word about the problem of corruption through social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, YouTube, etc.).
6. Report an incident of corruption.


For the purposes of this paper, we chose to analyze the responses to numbers two, three, four, and six. These activities—taking part in a protest, becoming an active member of an organization, paying more to a corrupt-free company and reporting corruption, arguably all require increased costs to the individual, in terms of time effort, or monetary engagement, relative to activities such as signing a petition or spreading the word through social media. Numbers 1 and 5 do not necessarily require the same level of involvement and personal costs to the individual. Signatures for a petition are often gathered by a person on the street looking for signatories and thus usually require very little effort or time from those who sign. For those with active social media accounts, ‘spreading the word’ online can mean as much as typing one sentence for your social network to read, which involves much less time or effort than taking part in a protest or becoming an active member in an anti-corruption organisation.

As Figure 1 indicates, a majority of our sample stated that they would report corruption (63 percent). Half were willing to protest, a little less than half were willing to pay more to a corruption free company, and about two fifths said they would join an anti-corruption organisation as an active member. A large majority of our sample (79.5 percent) said that they would be willing to actively oppose corruption by engaging in at least one of the four activities. Close to equal fifths of the sample are spread across a five point scale of how many of these activities one would be willing to participate in; specifically, 23 percent indicated that they were willing to participate in all four of the activities, 19 percent in only three, 20 percent in only two, 19 percent in only one, and 21 percent in none of the activities.

³ We excluded 12 countries from our analysis because Transparency International advised us that they were potentially unreliable, and 20 other countries because their samples’ socio-demographic representation were inconsistent with what we expected given other sources of data. The authors can provide a more detailed discussion of the exclusion of each country-sample, if requested.

⁴ Data can be downloaded here: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/in_detail

⁵ In so far as this is systemic priming, across the entire sample, we are not (and cannot be) concerned here with what impact this priming has on our estimations.

Figure 1: Willingness to actively oppose corruption

These percentages of willingness to actively oppose corruption are strikingly high; even in countries where protests are frequently held nowhere near half of the population find themselves joining in. Nevertheless, we believe that these indicators are useful to analyze; although indicating on a survey that you are willing to engage in anti-corruption activism is relatively 'cost' free in and of itself, and thus, not a perfect indicator of whether someone will actually get involved, doing so, at the very minimum, indicates that a respondent sees themselves as similar to those who do engage in these types of activities. In other words, while these questions are likely not picking up on accurate numbers of anti-corruption activists, they are arguably still differentiating between people who see themselves as potential anti-corruption activists and those who do not, and between those that think that such endeavors might be worth their while, for whatever reason, and those who do not.

We also take comfort in the high degree of variation we found across the sample; though a majority of the whole sample indicates that they would get involved in civic action against corruption, clearly not all do, and not in all countries does a majority see such action as worthwhile. To that end, we find large variations of potential activists across countries. For example, only 39 percent of the Hungarian, and 44 percent of the Ukrainian sample indicated that they would engage in any one of the four activities, while over 95 percent of the Sierra Leonean, Kenyan, Cambodian, Bangladeshi, Bolivian and Argentinian samples said they would do so. Less than 4 percent of the Japanese and Hungarian samples could see themselves being involved in all four activities, while over 60 percent of the Senegalese and Cambodian samples were willing to engage in all four activities. Moreover, the spread of countries across these indicators did not reveal any obvious country-level or regional trends. OECD country-samples did not have similar aggregated percentages of willingness to actively oppose corruption, and nor did any other conventional regional or political economy grouping for that matter. For example, roughly the same percentage (6 percent) of respondents from the Belgian and Jordanian sample are willing to engage in all four activities. Similarly, 89 percent of both the Canadian and Ugandan sample would engage in at least one.

Estimation strategy

In the analyses that follow, indicated willingness to report, protest, pay more, and join an anti-corruption organization are our respective dependent variables. As the response options to these questions were yes/no, we employ logit analyses when analyzing their determinants. To account for the multi-level structure of our data—individual-level and country-level variables—each analysis treats countries as cluster variables. Additionally, in all reported statistics and analyses we weight each country-sample with the provided survey weight and incorporate into it a weight to equalise the samples across countries, so as to avoid giving one country-sample undue influence in aggregated statistics. Because of the large size of our individual-level sample, we use a 0.01 p-value as the threshold for considering a relationship significant at the individual-level. Further, because

our country-level sample is 71, we use a 0.10 p-value as the threshold for considering a country-level variable significant. Finally, as standard logit coefficients are difficult to interpret, we transform them and report the more intuitive odds ratios. A significant odds ratio with a value greater than 1.00 indicates that a one unit positive change in the independent variable is associated with an increase in the odds of someone being willing to participate in corruption opposition, whereas a value less than 1.00 indicates it decreases the odds.

Because of the regional breadth of our sample, each logit analysis was run three times, across different samples: the full—71 countries—sample (Table 2), OECD countries' respondents (N: 23 countries) and non-OECD countries' respondents (N: 48 countries). The full results from the latter two sets of models make up Appendix Table 2. We group the possible determinants of active opposition to corruption in four categories—perceptions of corruption, experiences with the state, individual resources, and country-contextual factors. We discuss the measurement of each variable we test, any expectation we have for its impact on corruption opposition, and its actual effect in our analyses next. Summary statistics and details on coding for all of the variables we use in analyses are detailed in Appendix Table 1.

Determinants of corruption opposition

Perceptions

Both Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) and Bauhr (2012) argue that perceptions of corruption are important for determining active opposition to corruption. The GCB includes many questions gauging respondents' perceptions of their corruption environment. To test the first hypothesis of whether a perception of corruption being widely practiced in society negatively impacts willingness to actively oppose corruption—drawn from Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013)—we rely on two different measures or perceptions.⁶

The first captures to what extent a respondent thinks that the government is plagued by corruption, and thus approximates how rampant the respondent perceives the problem of corruption to be in society. We used principal component factor analysis to construct perceived 'government corruption'. The factor draws from the responses to a battery of questions that ask, "to what extent do you see the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption?" The government-related sectors that are asked about are political parties, parliament, military, education, medical, judiciary, police, and public officials. The possible answers range from 1, not corrupt to 5, extremely corrupt. The principal component factor analysis of the responses to these questions formed a single factor with an eigen value over 1.0. The factor ranges from -2.56 to 1.62, with higher values indicating higher perceived levels of corruption in the government.

The second measure is based on a single question in the GCB of how corruption is perceived to have changed over the last two years. To this question respondents can answer on a scale of 1, decreased a lot to 5, increased a lot. Though this is not a measure of how widespread corruption is perceived to be practiced, arguably, if people do tend to suffer from corruption fatigue—wherein a perception of corruption being widely practiced in society negatively impacts willingness to actively oppose corruption—than it might also be true that a perceived notion that corruption is increasing will also hamper willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism. On one end of the continuum in our sample, only 1 percent of Belgian respondents perceive corruption to have 'increased a lot' over the past two years, while, on the other end, 72 percent of the respondents in Nigeria believe corruption has increased.

For Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), a perception that corruption is rampant should be associated with a decreased willingness to actively oppose corruption. However, as noted earlier, it could also be the case that perceptions of corruption being widespread or on the rise will compel action from those who wish to counter the trend. We found no support for the first argument that high perceptions of corruption hamper active opposition; in none of the models of Table 2 (overleaf) is a perceived level of government corruption associated with less willingness to engage in anti-corruption activity. We found some support for the second argument; perceptions of corruption as increasing is positively and significantly related to willingness to report corruption, protest corruption, and join an anti-corruption organisation across the full sample, and is also positively related to the proclivity to protest in the OECD sample and to join an anti-corruption organisation in the non-OECD sample (Appendix Table 2). However, the size of the effect is marginally modest. Using the full sample analysis as an example, and holding the effects of other variables constant (at their means), we find that people are seven percent more likely to be willing to report corruption when they believe that corruption has increased a lot over the last two years, versus thinking that it has decreased a lot over the same period.

⁶ The highest correlation between the three perception measures used is -0.38, which is between "corruption increase" and "government is effective."

Table 2: Logit analyses of activism (odds ratios)

	Report	Protest	Join org.	Pay more
Perceptions				
Gov't corruption	0.94	1.02	1.08	0.92
Corruption increasing	1.07**	1.07**	1.08**	1.04
Gov't effective	1.10***	0.97	1.05	1.03
Experiences				
# of bribes	0.90**	0.98	1.03	0.96
# of contacts	1.18***	1.11***	1.10***	1.10***
Resources				
Female	0.87***	0.85***	0.89***	0.99
Age	0.95**	0.90***	0.92***	0.96
Income	1.02	0.99	0.96	1.04
Education	1.14**	0.93	1.05	1.11**
Urban	1.10	1.10	1.08	1.11
Context				
FH democracy	1.09	1.04	0.93	0.93
% women in workforce	1.01+	1.01+	1.02***	1.01*
GDP per capita	1.00	0.97***	0.97***	0.99
N	58881	58881	58881	58881
Wald chi2	380.33	187.70	272.43	138.88
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.02

Levels of statistical significance are denoted by ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (latter two are applied only to context variables)

Conceivably, a perception that the government is effective in controlling corruption may impact activism in different ways. For Bauhr (2012) a perception that the government is effective at controlling corruption can reduce active opposition; why expend energy and time on anti-corruption action, if the government can be trusted to handle the problem? On the other hand, Kaariainen and Siren (2011) have found that, in relation to crime reporting, when individuals trust the police and believe that they are effective in fighting crime, they will be more likely to report crimes. This finding is particularly instructive for our expectations of how perceptions of government effectiveness might impact willingness to report corruption. To this end, the GCB asks, "how effective do you think your government's actions are in the fight against corruption?" Responses are on a scale that ranges from 1, very ineffective to 5, very effective. Once again, the range is large within our sample; at the low end, less than half a percent of the Belgian, Czech, Ukrainian, and British samples thought their government was very effective, while about 15 percent of the Afghani, Cambodian, and Georgian respondent samples thought so.

Illustrating the importance of context, a perception that the government is effective has different impacts across different respondent samples. Among the OECD sample, it only significantly impacts willingness to protest, and it does so negatively (Appendix Table 2). This negative relationship is consistent with Bauhr's (2012) argument that, especially in countries that experience low levels of corruption, perceptions of the government as effective will be associated with less willingness to engage in anti-corruption civic action. Holding the effects of all other variables constant (at their means), a shift from

thinking the government is very ineffective to very effective is associated with a 17 percent decrease in the odds of an OECD respondent being willing to protest. Interestingly, across the non-OECD sample, where significant, a perceived level of government effectiveness in fighting corruption has the opposite effect. Holding all else equal, only a one-unit increase on the 5-point scale of perceived government effectiveness is associated with seven percent greater odds of being willing to join an anti-corruption organisation and thirteen percent greater odds of being willing to report corruption among the non-OECD respondent sample.

Experiences

Understanding how individual experiences with the state shape a person's propensity to engage in anti-corruption activities is particularly important; studies that assess corruption at a systemic, or country, level provide no understanding of whether, and what types of, experiences with the state push individuals toward continued participation in corruption or toward anti-corruption activism. We test the impact of two measures of experiences with the state. The first is the number of services a respondent has paid a bribe to receive in the last year: As the GCB asks of eight state-services, the scale of this variable was from 0 to 8. While the mean across the total aggregate sample was less than one service bribed, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean sample's means were the highest, at about 2.5 services bribed in the past year.

We expect that the more bribes an individual has paid the less willing they will be to participate in anti-corruption activity. For us, a higher number of services bribed implies more active participation in this type of corrupt behaviour: As Table 2 illustrates, the number of services bribed dampens the odds of only reporting corruption. This holds true in the analyses of OECD and non-OECD samples, as well (Appendix Table 2). Holding all else equal, it is estimated that the odds of being willing to report corruption decrease by 20 percent when a person goes from having to pay no bribes to having to pay the maximum number of bribes (eight). Though the message is rather intuitive from this finding—greater participation in bribery reduces willingness to report those corrupt exchanges—it deserves highlighting that people's participation in bribery does not impact willingness to engage in any of the other forms of anti-corruption activism we scrutinise.

The second experience measure we test is the number of sectors a respondent has contacted. As with the number of bribes paid, we created a measure of the number of services contacted in the last year, which again ranges from 0 to 8.⁷ Across all of the models, more contact with the public sector is found to positively impact activism. Holding all else equal, a shift from a minimum level of contact (0) to a maximum level of contact (8) results in a 26 percent increase in the odds of being willing to report, 22 percent increase in the odds of being willing to protest, 19 percent increase in the odds of being willing to join an anti-corruption organisation, and 19 percent increase in the odds of being willing to pay more for a corruption free product. This robust finding suggests that in any corruption context, those who are in the most frequent contact with the state arguably have more to gain from a corruption free environment and likely feel that they have a greater stake and/or duty to do what they can to fight against corruption.

Resources

Alam (1995) hypothesized that because people with greater socio-economic resources are freer to participate in anti-corruption activity, they will be more likely to actively oppose corruption. People with higher incomes can draw upon more resources with which to organise resistance efforts, and can assume risks and costs—be it time, energy, or money—that may come with active opposition, more so than those with less financial security (Alam 1995: 427). A higher level of education can deepen a person's understanding of their rights and give them confidence in navigating the bureaucracy one has to potentially confront in order to report corruption (Alam 1995: 427). In testing the income and education measures provided in the GCB (see Appendix Table 1 for details on how they are measured), we find that income levels are not significantly associated with any of the dependent variables in any of our analyses. Education, however, positively impacts willingness to report corruption, and pay more for a corruption free product in the analyses of the full sample. Though, our split sample results reveals that the positive impact education has on activism is likely context dependent. Education is not significantly associated with willingness to actively oppose corruption in any of the non-OECD sample models, but is positively associated with willingness to report corruption, join and anti-corruption organisation and pay more for a corruption free product in the OECD sample analyses.

Several writing in the general crime reporting and whistle blowing literatures find that older males are more like to report crimes and whistleblow than women and younger people (see Near and Miceli 1996; Goudriaan, Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta 2006; Bennet and Wiegand 1994 for examples). We also find that women think of themselves as less willing to join in anti-corruption activities, with the exception of paying more for corrupt free products, on which gender has no impact in the full sample (Table 2). In contrast, however, we find that younger people more closely associate with the idea of joining in anti-corruption activism than older respondents. In unpacking the full sample, we find that this particular finding is most representative of the non-OECD respondent sample, rather than the OECD sample (Appendix Table 2). Age is significantly and negatively related to a willingness to protest in the OECD sample and with all of the activism measures in the non-OECD sample.

⁷ These two measures of experiences—number of contacts and number of bribes—have a 0.57 correlation.

Finally, though urbanites likely have greater access to institutions to report corruption to and will, ostensibly, be the primary beneficiaries of campaigns designed to raise awareness about corruption and anti-corruption civic events and organisations, we found no impact of being an urbanite on willingness to engage in anti-corruption activities across any of the models we tested.

Country context

We test what impact different country contextual variables have on willingness to engage in anti-corruption behaviour; doing so allows us to examine whether and how the socio-political environment of a country impacts activism trends at the individual level. The percentage of women in the formal workforce has been used elsewhere as a proxy for a more culturally modern society (Peiffer and Boussalis, 2010). More than a culturally traditional society, a culturally modern society is thought to put greater value on gender equality and the rights of individuals and minorities. It is our expectation that respondents who live in more culturally modern societies will feel more empowered to voice their discontent with an unfair corrupt system.

Consistent with this expectation, we find that the percentage of women in the formal workforce is positively and significantly associated with all dependent variables in the full sample. This positive effect of 'modernity' is reflected most in the non-OECD sample analyses; the split sample results of Appendix Table 2 reveal that the percentage of women working in the workforce is positively associated with all corruption activism dependent variables, bar protesting for the non-OECD sample models, but not any of the OECD sample models. Though, as variation in a variable is needed to gauge what impact it has, we think that the lack of effect found in the OECD sample models is likely due to the fact that across our OECD sample there is little variation in the percent of women in the workforce. The standard deviation of the percentage of women working in the workforce in the OECD sample is only 8.6 percent while it is 18.7 percent and 16.3 percent for the non-OECD sample and the full sample, respectively.

Liberal democracies protect rights to voice discontent with the system, and so we expected that respondents in freer settings would think of themselves as more willing to actively oppose corruption. However, surprisingly, we find that the level of democracy in a country—as measured by the Freedom House index—has no estimated impact on willingness to actively oppose corruption.

Because our country samples are from a range of regions and development stages, we also controlled for a country's GDP per capita. Richer countries are generally thought to not suffer the same types or high levels of corruption that poorer countries do. To the extent that GDP per capita might pick up on different corruption contexts as well, we thought it important to hold this variable constant in estimating the impacts of other variables. With respect to its estimated impact, we find that when significant, GDP per capita is negatively associated with corruption activism. This means that respondents living in richer countries tend to find themselves less willing to engage in anti-corruption activities than those in less developed countries. However, this finding, it should be noted, is indicative of a trend among the non-OECD countries; GDP per capita was not significantly associated with activism in the OECD sample models. Like with the variable percent of women in the workforce, we may not have found any significant association with GDP per capita and activism among the OECD sample because of the relatively lower degree of variation of GDP per capita across OECD countries.

In our reported models we do not test what impact a more conventional national-level corruption measure—like Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the World Bank's Control of Corruption—has on corruption activism. Such measures are based on the perceptions of experts and have drawn many criticisms (Tetlock 2005, Sampford et al. 2006; Olken, 2009; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005, 2010). Criticisms aside, the argument that perceptions of corruption impact the proclivity to actively oppose corruption is an individual level theory that we test using individual level data; it is a respondent's personal perceptions that are thought to impact their willingness to act, not the perceptions that others have of their environment or even the actual corruption environment that exists—even if a measure for the latter actually existed. Moreover, measures like the CPI are highly correlated with GDP per capita and democracy scores, which means that we could not include all of them in the same statistical models. In unreported models, where we included one of these variables at a time, we fail to find a robust or consistent impact of CPI on willingness to engage in the activism dependent variables.

Taken together, an interesting story emerges with respect to the relationship between perceptions of the corruption environment and willingness to engage in anti-corruption activities. First, we do not find support for the first hypothesis tested ('corruption fatigue'); perceptions of corruption being a pervasive problem in government have no impact on any of the dependent variables in our analyses. Instead, we find somewhat contrary evidence. A view that corruption is becoming more of a problem tends to motivate activism. Moreover, when influential, a view of the government as effective in controlling corruption deters activism in OECD countries and encourages it in non-OECD countries. Perhaps, in the latter group, where corruption is more likely to be systemic, respondents are prone to think that their own involvement is needed to combat corruption, and when confidence in the government's efforts are high, they are more likely to believe that it is worthwhile joining in on the fight. In the OECD setting, on the other hand, as Bauhr (2012) argued, perhaps effective governments are thought to be able to handle corruption on their own.

Of the other variables tested, we found most consistently that younger people, males, and people who come into contact with the state frequently tend to be more willing to actively oppose corruption. Interestingly, the degree of personal partici-

pation in bribery seems to have no impact on willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism. Also, respondents in societies wherein women are fully integrated in the workforce are more likely to see themselves as potential anti-corruption activists.

How perceptions interact

Thus far we have considered how two different types of perceptions of the corruption environment impact on anti-corruption activism in isolation. However, as much of what we found so far suggests, how some variables impact upon willingness to participate in anti-corruption activism is contingent upon context and therefore the influence of other factors. This is especially likely to be the case with the impacts that different perceptions of corruption have on willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism. After all, people hold perceptions of many different dimensions of their corruption environment at the same time. In this section we focus on how the different perceptions a person holds interact with one another to impact upon their willingness to actively oppose corruption.

The results of Table 2 illustrated that a perception that corruption is increasing is almost always positively and significantly associated with willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism. The estimated impact of perceived government effectiveness was less straightforward; it was found to be significantly associated with half of the dependent variables in the non-OECD sample analyses, and only one of them in the OECD sample analyses. For the non-OECD sample, perceived government effectiveness was positively associated with willingness to actively oppose corruption, and for the OECD sample it was negatively associated with willingness to protest against corruption. By examining the interaction between these two perceptions we are able to address, for example, whether a belief that corruption is increasing still seems to encourage activism, when it is also paired with a perception of the government as being ineffective, or effective at tackling corruption.

It may be the case that, as Bauhr (2012) argues, when the government is viewed as very effective at controlling corruption, concerns about corruption will not breed the same activist spirit as it does when the government is not viewed as effective. Though that combination of perceptions—a perception that the government is effective and a perception that corruption is increasing—may seem at odds, eleven percent of the GCB sample we scrutinise believe that corruption is becoming more of a problem *and* that their government's efforts to control it have been effective.⁸ Moreover, 33 percent of people who think that their government is effective at controlling corruption also think that corruption has increased in the past two years; 26 percent thought that corruption had stayed the same and 41 percent thought that it had decreased. How do these different combinations of perceptions impact on a person's willingness to actively oppose corruption?

To focus on what impact an interaction of perceptions has on willingness to engage in activism, we estimated new multi-level logit analyses, using the regression models of table 2 as 'base models' and adding to them a 'corruption increasing' and 'government effectiveness' interactive term as another independent variable. Like before, we estimated these models across the full 71 country sample, OECD sample and non-OECD sample. Estimating the impact of an interactive term is not as straightforward as estimating a linear coefficient and an interaction's reported estimated coefficient often does not reveal the true nature of the interactive relationship. For this reason, it is more instructive to 'unpack' the effects of the interaction, which is done by estimating how one of the constituent variables—'corruption increasing', for example—impacts the willingness to engage in an anti-corruption action at varying levels of the other constituent variable—'government effectiveness'. To do this, we used linear combinations of estimators (*lincom* in Stata), which allowed us to test what, if any, impact a perception of 'corruption increasing' has on willingness to engage in activism, at varying levels of perceived 'government effectiveness'. Though we display the full results of all of the interactive models in Appendix table 3, we concentrate here on these 'unpacked' effects, which are summarised in Table 3.

The results of twelve regression analyses are represented in Table 3. The four right columns represent each of the dependent variables for which a regression analysis was run, and the partitioned rows represent the various samples that each of the respective regression analyses were constrained to. Then, three coefficients are displayed for each regression analysis; they signify what estimated impact 'corruption increasing' has on willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism at varying levels of perceived government effectiveness (very ineffective, neither ineffective or effective, and very effective).

Across all of the full sample, the non-OECD, and two of the OECD sample models (protest and join an organisation) we find a consistent story. The impact of a perception of corruption increasing on willingness to engage in anti-corruption protesting is positive and significant when it is accompanied with a perception that the government is very ineffective at controlling corruption. Simply stated, people tend to be more willing to take measures to actively oppose corruption when they perceive that corruption has become more of a problem and that their present government's efforts to control it have failed. Held together, these perceptions serve as motivators, not deterrents, to getting involved in the fight against corruption.

⁸ Precisely, 10.8 percent of our sample thinks that corruption in the past two years has increased a little or a lot and that the government is effective or very effective at controlling corruption.

Table 3: Impact of 'corruption increasing' at varying levels of 'government effective'

		Report	Protest	Join Org.	Pay more
Full	Very ineffective	0.18***	0.16***	0.17***	0.11**
	Neither	0.04	0.05	0.05**	0.03
	Very effective	-0.09	-0.06	-0.07	-0.06
OECD	Very ineffective	0.13	0.18***	0.14**	-0.01
	Neither	0.06	0.09**	0.04	0.02
	Very effective	0.00	0.00	-0.06	0.06
Non-OECD	Very ineffective	0.19***	0.14**	0.18***	0.17**
	Neither	0.05	0.05	0.07**	0.04
	Very effective	-0.10	-0.05	-0.04	-0.09

Levels of statistical significance are denoted by **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Moreover, the results indicate that when it is perceived that the government is very effective at controlling corruption, the perception that corruption is increasing has no impact on willingness to actively oppose corruption. In fact, though not statistically significant at the one percent level, a perception of corruption increasing is usually negatively associated with willingness to engage in anti-corruption activism (four of the negative associations are significant at the 5 percent level) when it is teamed with a perception of the government being 'very effective' at controlling corruption. In other words, when trust in the government's efforts are high, people are generally less likely to find motivation to expend their own energies and time on countering the issue of corruption in a fear that it is a growing problem.

This interactive message further contextualises and clarifies the findings of Table 2, which illustrated that a perceived notion that corruption is becoming more of a problem motivates people to engage in anti-corruption civic action, and the findings of Appendix Table 2, which noted that perceived government effectiveness was positively associated with activism for the non-OECD sample. Moreover, the robustness of this dynamic is striking and deserves highlighting. This 'story' holds to be true in the full sample, as well as the non-OECD sample models, across all dependent variables. Only 'number of contacts' and 'age' have consistent estimated impacts on all of the dependent variables in both the full and non-OECD sample models (see Table 2 and Appendix Table 2).

Conclusion

The aim of any anti-corruption program is to ultimately reduce corruption. The logic underscoring demand-side anti-corruption interventions holds that the potential effects of anti-corruption efforts are inherently linked to their ability to motivate broad sectors of the population to buy into a mentality that actively opposes corruption. We found that perceptions of government's ability to deal with corruption, and corruption as an evolving problem, as well as how these perceptions interact, significantly affect the ways in which and the extent that people are willing to engage in anti-corruption action.

Contrary to the notion that a perception of corruption being pervasive will undermine willingness to actively oppose corruption (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2013), we found that perceptions of corruption becoming more of a problem can work to motivate activism. However, we also found that this source of motivation tends to be hampered by a perception that the government is effective in its efforts to deal with corruption. While we focused on the impact that perceptions have on willingness to actively oppose corruption, we also found that younger people, males, and people who come into contact with the state frequently tend to be more willing to actively oppose corruption. Also, respondents in more 'culturally modern' societies—where women are more fully integrated in the formal workforce—are more likely to see themselves as potential anti-corruption activists.

For anti-corruption campaigns, a strict interpretation of the results from our analyses implies that the focus of anti-corruption publicity should be on how, if at all, corruption might be becoming more of an issue in society, and less on cases that the government has successfully caught or prosecuted. Though we feel that our findings are instructive, the limitations of this study warrants that caution be taken before unadulterated corruption fear mongering be justified. While the GCB data allowed us to take an initial look at how individual level determinants affect corruption activism, the limitations of the GCB dataset and survey research, more generally, prohibit our ability to test a number of other factors that can potentially influence this type of activism, and influence how perceptions effect willingness to engage in activism. For example, the dataset was limited to measuring responses at one point in time, rather than over time. Thus we were unable to analyse how time- in terms of the actions of government or other anti-corruption organisations over time that may lead to possible successes and/or failures in

terms of fighting corruption- affect perceptions, and impact the willingness to engage in activism. Also, several have noted the importance of social capital or networks as influential on the proclivity to report crime (Hawdon and Ryan, 2009, Kääriäinen and Sirén 2011; Black 1976), participate in protests (Schussman and Soule, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; Klandermans, 1997), and be a political consumer (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, 2005). While the GCB is absent of questions that can be used to gauge how a respondent's social network and how social disapproval in engaging in anti-corruption activism impacts upon both perceptions of corruption and willingness to 'fight' corruption, these seem to be potentially very important pieces to the puzzle.

Perhaps more than anything, our findings highlight the need for further research into how perceptions of the corruption environment are formed. Future research should address the role of different factors in shaping perceptions. For example, what role does the media play in shaping perceptions of corruption? And how, if at all, do anti-corruption campaigns shape perceptions of how pervasive corruption is? Are they the source for activism inspiration? Or, are their impacts negligible? Is it possible that such campaigns, in their message framing, actually serve to dampen corruption activism? Lastly, a fruitful line of inquiry would be to extend the discussion beyond what individuals are *willing* to do and further explore the perceptions, motivations and behaviour of those individuals in society, that are actually actively participating in anti-corruption activism. How, for example, do active grassroots anti-corruption coalitions form and evolve?

Though the initial evidence presented here indicates that perceptions of corruption matter, it also signals strongly that their effects on activism are non-linear. We suspect that no less should be expected of how perceptions interact with various anti-corruption strategies on the ground. If civic action is key to reducing corruption, we must not only pay attention to what people perceive of their corruption environment, but how perceptions are shaped, and what role anti-corruption programming is playing in shaping them.

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Appendix Table 1: Construction and sources of measures

Variable	Q #/Source	Notes on construction	Mean	Std Dev.	Values
Dependent Variables					
Report	Q10F	1 if willing to report corruption, 0 if not	0.63	0.48	0,1
Protest	Q10B	1 if willing to protest against corruption, 0 if not	0.51	0.50	0,1
Join Organization	Q10C	1 if willing to join anti-corruption organisation, 0 if not	0.45	0.50	0,1
Pay more	Q10D	1 if willing to pay more for a corrupt free product, 0 if not	0.48	0.50	0,1
Perceptions					
Gov't corruption	Q6A-C, H-L	Factor of perceived corruption of public officials; 1 not at all, to 5 extremely corrupt	0.04	0.89	-2.6-1.6
Corruption increasing	Q1	Past two years corruption changed: 1 decreased a lot, to 5 increased a lot	3.66	1.16	1-5
Gov't effective	Q5	How effective gov't: 1 very effective to 5 very ineffective	2.50	1.10	1-5
Experiences					
# of bribes	Q7BI-8	Number of services bribes given	0.53	1.14	0-8
# of contacts	Q7AI-8	Number of services contacted	2.79	2.00	0-8
Resources					
Female	SEXE	1 female, 0 male	0.50	0.50	0,1
Age	AGE_YRS	1 <25, 2 25-34, 3 35-44, 4 45-54, 5 55-64, 6 65+	3.07	1.57	1-6
Income	INCOME	1 low, 2 medium low, 3 medium, 4 medium high, 5 high	2.58	1.11	1-5
Education	EDUCATION	1 none, 2 basic, 3 secondary, 4 university	2.96	0.86	1-4
Urban	RURAL	0 rural area, 1 urban area	0.58	0.49	0,1
Context					
FH democracy	Freedom house (2012)	Average of civil liberties and political rights score; inversed: higher score indicates more freedom	4.11	1.64	1-6
% women in workforce	World Bank WDI (2011)	% of women working in the workforce	51.0	16.3	14.5-88.2
GDP per capita	IMF WEO (2012)	GDP per capita (ppp), in thousands, current international dollars	13.5	13.6	0.55-54.4

Appendix Table 2: Logit analyses of activism across OECD and Non-OECD samples (odds ratios)

	OECD				Non-OECD			
	Report	Protest	Join org.	Pay more	Report	Protest	Join org.	Pay more
Perceptions								
Gov't corruption	0.94	1.13	1.24***	0.92	0.93	0.96	0.99	0.89
Corruption increasing	1.09	1.13***	1.07	1.01	1.07	1.06	1.09**	1.06
Gov't effective	0.98	0.84***	0.95	1.05	1.13***	1.02	1.07**	1.01
Experiences								
# of bribes	0.86**	1.07	1.10	0.99	0.90**	0.96	1.01	0.93
# of contacts	1.25***	1.12***	1.14***	1.11***	1.15***	1.11***	1.10***	1.11***
Resources								
Female	0.87***	0.91	0.86***	1.08**	0.87***	0.81***	0.90**	0.94**
Age	1.00	0.92**	0.97	1.03	0.94**	0.89***	0.90***	0.94***
Income	0.99	0.98	0.96	1.06	1.04	1.00	0.98	1.04
Education	1.47***	1.04	1.16**	1.32***	1.03	0.89	1.00	1.02
Urban	1.21	1.15	1.19	1.07	1.10	1.12	1.09	1.19
Context								
FH democracy	0.60	0.86	0.72	0.66+	1.18+	1.12	1.01	0.99
% women in workforce	1.02	1.00	0.98	0.98	1.01+	1.01	1.02***	1.01*
GDP per capita	1.01	0.99	1.00	1.01	0.97	0.95**	0.94***	0.96
FH democracy	0.60	0.86	0.72	0.66+	1.18+	1.12	1.01	0.99
% women in workforce	1.02	1.00	0.98	0.98	1.01+	1.01	1.02***	1.01*
GDP per capita	1.01	0.99	1.00	1.01	0.97	0.95**	0.94***	0.96
FH democracy	0.60	0.86	0.72	0.66+	1.18+	1.12	1.01	0.99

Significance: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (latter two applied only to context variables)

Appendix Table 3: Logit analyses including interaction (odds ratios)

	Full Sample				OECD				Non-OECD			
	Report	Protest	Join org.	Pay more	Report	Protest	Join org.	Pay more	Report	Protest	Join org.	Pay more
Perceptions												
Gov't corruption	0.94	1.03	1.09	0.92	0.94	1.13	1.24***	0.92	0.94	0.96	1.00	0.90
Corruption increasing	1.27***	1.24***	1.26***	1.17**	1.17	1.25***	1.22***	0.97	1.30***	1.21**	1.27***	1.27**
Gov't effective	1.40***	1.19***	1.31***	1.21**	1.10	0.99	1.16	0.99	1.47***	1.21**	1.31***	1.28**
Corr. Inc.*Gov't effect.	0.94***	0.95***	0.94***	0.96**	0.97	0.96**	0.95**	1.02	0.93***	0.95**	0.95***	0.94**
Experiences												
# of bribes	0.90**	0.98	1.04	0.97	0.86**	1.07	1.10	0.99	0.90**	0.96	1.01	0.93
# of contacts	1.18***	1.11***	1.10***	1.10***	1.25***	1.12***	1.14***	1.11***	1.15***	1.11***	1.10***	1.11***
Resources												
Female	0.88***	0.85***	0.90***	0.99	0.88***	0.91	0.86***	1.08	0.87***	0.81***	0.90**	0.94**
Age	0.95***	0.90***	0.91***	0.96	1.00	0.92**	0.97	1.03	0.94***	0.88***	0.90***	0.94***
Income	1.02	0.99	0.96	1.04	0.99	0.98	0.96	1.06	1.04	1.00	0.98	1.04
Education	1.14**	0.93	1.05	1.11**	1.47***	1.04	1.16**	1.32***	1.03	0.89**	1.00	1.01
Urban	1.09	1.10	1.08	1.11	1.21	1.15	1.19	1.07	1.09	1.11	1.09	1.18
Context												
FH democracy	1.09	1.05	0.93	0.93	0.61	0.86	0.72	0.66	1.18*	1.12	1.02	0.99
% women in workforce	1.01+	1.01+	1.02***	1.01*	1.02	1.00	0.98	0.98	1.01	1.01	1.02***	1.01*
GDP per capita	1.00	0.97***	0.97***	0.99	1.01	0.99	1.00	1.01	0.97+	0.95*	0.94***	0.96+
N	58881	58881	58881	58881	18284	18284	18284	18284	40597	40597	40597	40597
Wald chi2	388.05	215.61	286.04	153.68	772.28	267.80	378.02	317.04	314.94	299.78	211.87	119.67
Prob >chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.03

Significance: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (latter two applied only to context variables)



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