



## Annotated Bibliography

# Service Delivery, Legitimacy, Stability and Social Cohesion

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The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) is an international research initiative based at the University of Birmingham, and working in partnership with University College London (UCL) and La Trobe University in Melbourne.

DLP aims to increase understanding of the political processes that drive or constrain development. Its work focuses on the crucial role of home-grown leaderships and coalitions in forging legitimate institutions that promote developmental outcomes.

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## About this annotated bibliography

In aid programming, improving basic services – including health, education, water and sanitation – is sometimes assumed to increase the legitimacy of state institutions and to improve social cohesion and stability. But does this intuitive 'common sense' hold up to scrutiny? Do local populations actually find their state more legitimate if clean water starts coming out of their taps? Do social relations improve and become more stable once basic infrastructure needs like roads, rubbish collection or public lighting are met? Can better services improve stability in conflict-affected areas?

To find out, this annotated bibliography identifies academic and more policy-oriented literature about the relationship between service delivery on the one hand, and state legitimacy, social cohesion and social stability on the other hand. It brings together relevant literature that considers these potential relationships at different levels (from local to national), and across a wide variety of services. This literature covers a range of low- and middle-income countries, but particular attention is paid here to fragile and conflict-affected settings. The key outcomes or effects of interest – that is, the effects of service delivery on legitimacy, social cohesion and/or stability – have been conceived and measured in numerous ways in the literature. A broad interpretation of these concepts is applied to capture all potentially relevant literature. The full methodology for compiling the bibliography – including search terms and inclusion criteria – is outlined in the Appendix.

## About the authors

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## 1

## Key findings

Over the past two years, there has been increasing recognition that past assumptions about the relationship between service delivery and broader peace and state-building goals have limited empirical foundation. This has prompted a lively, ongoing debate about what a new theory of change about the contribution of service delivery to these goals could look like, and what in turn this means for aid practice on the ground. This annotated bibliography indicates that only a small and inconsistent body of literature is available to inform these debates. Few studies rigorously trace the impact of service delivery on legitimacy, stability, or social cohesion. At the same time, in aid practice, limited work has been done to monitor and evaluate the impact of service delivery beyond human development outcomes.

### Service delivery and state legitimacy

There is emerging consensus that the received wisdom that more and better services can automatically improve state legitimacy does not hold. Widely-cited studies have made the case that a number of social and political but also service-specific factors interrupt any linear relationship between services and state legitimacy.<sup>1</sup> In particular, there is a degree of convergence around the view that processes (how things are done and decisions made) matter more than outcomes (what decisions are made and what services are provided). This is particularly true of processes that build relationships between states and societies, enable participation in service delivery, or offer fair dispute resolution. Perceptions of equity, distributive justice or fairness in decision-making may matter for legitimacy more than expansions in access (Mcloughlin 2015; Mallet et al. 2015).

Rigorous cross-country evidence shows no straightforward link between perceptions of services being provided and perceptions of the state's legitimacy.<sup>2</sup> Relations between the state and conflict-affected populations may be improved on the ground through service delivery, but that is not equivalent to increased state legitimacy (see, for example, Godamunne 2015). Starting points, specific to each context – including citizens' expectations of state services, or their overall perceptions of the fairness of the state and its treatment of different groups – influence how and whether services are significant for its legitimacy.<sup>3</sup>

There has been a long-standing focus in the service delivery literature on the potential for non-state service provision to do harm to state-building processes where they detract from building state capacity or where non-state actors accrue legitimacy in lieu of the state.<sup>4</sup> This debate is ongoing, and it is influenced to a degree by ideological and normative perspectives on the role of the state. There is mixed evidence for and against the view that non-state provision undermines state legitimacy,<sup>5</sup> but overall few rigorous empirical studies actually inform our understanding in practice.

### Service delivery and stability

The literature on the relationship between service delivery and stability is also limited. One strand of it has focused on the role of poor quality service delivery in generating or exacerbating grievances towards the state, and how these grievances can fuel acts of protest or dissent towards it (see, for example, Akinboade, Mokwena & Kinfaack 2013). Exclusion from service delivery is considered a significant, and often overlooked, source of grievance in conflict-affected communities (see Bleck & Michelitch 2015). This literature highlights the priority that communities themselves place on basic services in their everyday lives and, therefore, the value of service delivery in normalising and stabilising life in post-conflict situations.<sup>6</sup>

As with legitimacy, the role of non-state service provision features prominently in discussions of stability. A fairly small but consistent body of literature has highlighted that service delivery can be among the core strategies that non-state actors hostile to the state use to control populations and ensure their own continued support and survival (see Grynkeiwich 2008). In this way, service delivery is increasingly recognised as a political tool in contestations between competing groups vying for authority (see Jolliffe 2014 and Hilsenrath 2015).

1 See for example: Ndaruhutse et al. (2012); Mallet et al. (2015); Mcloughlin (2015).

2 Research by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium is ongoing, but findings from the first round of surveys are summarised in Mallet et al. (2015).

3 One illustrative case is Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg & Dunn (2012).

4 See Batley and Mcloughlin (2010) for a review of these debates.

5 Contrast, for example, the findings of Jaglin et al. (2011) with those of Sacks (2012).

6 See, for example, Bleck & Michelitch (2015).

Overall, there are no rigorous evaluations of the impact of (aid to) service delivery on stability, perhaps partly because of monitoring difficulties.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, deeper questions and doubts have been raised about labelling service delivery interventions as stabilisation, or indeed as anti-terrorism, particularly in the health sector where leading experts have argued human development should remain the primary goal (see Gordon 2012).

## Service delivery and social cohesion

The relationship between service delivery and social cohesion in fragile and conflict-affected states is the least explored of the three outcomes of interest to this review. Studies on this topic tend to focus on equity and inclusion in the delivery of services, and how this affects wider inter-group relations (see Järvinen 2013). Others focus on how processes of consultation on service design implementation or monitoring change social dynamics. It is sometimes argued that building community-level institutions around services can help bridge social divides and strengthen social cohesion. Nevertheless, there is only isolated evidence of this in practice.<sup>8</sup>

Overall, the assumed positive contribution of equitable service delivery to social cohesion does not appear to have a strong basis in evidence.<sup>9</sup> The expectation that service delivery interventions can improve social cohesion is considered ambitious by some, not only because of the broader social dynamics and processes of competition that influence social cohesion, but also because such intangible and long-term outcomes are intrinsically hard to measure.<sup>10</sup>

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7 See Grove (2008) for a monitoring tool.

8 This was the logic behind community-driven development in post-war Liberia. See Fearon, Humphreys & Weinstein (2009).

9 As argued by a recent rigorous review; see Babajanian (2012).

10 As King (2013) concluded in her review of evaluations of community-driven development programmes.

## 2

## Key literature

Key literature is listed in alphabetical order below. The authors' abstracts are included where appropriate, and additional findings relevant to the themes of this bibliography are also summarised.

## 2.1 Service delivery and legitimacy

[Baird, M. \(2010\). \*Service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states. Background Paper, World Development Report 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank.\*](#)

This paper draws on the existing literature and several case studies. It argues that successful delivery of basic services can contribute to broader political legitimacy and stability. Donors, government and non-state actors can create a virtuous circle of improving services, increasing public expectation and growing will to avoid violent conflict. However, service delivery improvements should also address the inequities created by conflict. A key lesson is to nurture strong leadership committed to security, justice and equity. The paper argues CDD (community-driven development) programs have proven to be effective at delivering services quickly in fragile and conflict-affected states, while also improving local governance and state legitimacy. However, a lot depends on: "(1) the simplicity and transparency of the budget mechanisms for getting money down to communities; (2) the quality of the processes for making decisions and monitoring progress at the local level; and (3) how well the CDD programs and processes can adapt to fit with the emerging local government architecture. Over the longer term, issues of financial sustainability also need to be addressed." (p. 32).

There is "ample evidence that governments, non-state actors and donors working together can achieve a lot in terms of delivering services and improving social outcomes in FCA states. As people benefit from services, their expectations for the future improve; they are more willing to put aside violence and recognize the legitimacy of the state. However, this virtuous circle can easily break down, if the stresses of conflict situations overwhelm the capabilities available. In particular, governments can quickly succumb to the pressures to favour certain groups in providing access to basic services or to siphon off resources for political or personal gain. And donors, in the rush to get things done, can be tempted to bring in short-term technical experts, with limited local knowledge, and to work outside government budgets and processes. Local talent is quickly attracted away by the high salaries of international agencies, and weak governments struggle to manage the multitude of donor-funded programs. Later on, funding often dries up ... Services start to decline, and the population questions the commitment and capacity of the government to meet their needs." (pp. 32-33).

[Barma, N., Huybens, E., and Viñuela, L. \(2014\). \*Institutions taking root: building state capacity in challenging contexts. Washington DC: World Bank.\*](#)

This volume presents case studies of successful institutional development from Lao PDR, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Timor-Leste. The conclusions echo the widely-held assumption that institutional success or 'embeddedness' depends on institutions accruing both legitimacy and capacity. It makes the case for a two-way relationship (a 'virtuous circle') between these elements: the capacity to perform core functions and deliver results is one of the main ways institutions can earn legitimacy and become resilient, and earning legitimacy in turn enables institutions to deliver better results. Legitimacy is defined and measured as satisfaction with an agency's performance, and therefore considered synonymous with it. The cycle of positive reinforcement between legitimacy and performance occurs when visible results attract the support of citizens and political elites. It is claimed that, in some cases, this not only strengthens the legitimacy of a local government agency, but the legitimacy of the state as a whole. In this way, satisfaction with services is uncritically assumed to have an automatic effect on the legitimacy of entire regimes, though no evidence is presented to demonstrate that this chain of effects occurs, or how or why it might occur.

[Brinkerhoff, D.W., Wetterberg, A. & Dunn, S. \(2012\). \*Service delivery and legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected states: Evidence from water services in Iraq. Public Management Review, 14\(2\), 273–293.\*](#)

Authors' abstract: "In fragile and conflict-affected states, governments must rebuild three core governance functions: provision of security, service delivery and political participation. We unpack the connection between service delivery and legitimacy, using a staged model of legitimization, in which progress on the governance functions forms the basis for value-based legitimacy; behavioural legitimacy may, but does not necessarily, follow. With data from Iraq, we explore the role of water services

in laying the groundwork for legitimacy. The analysis underscores the complex, non-linear relationship between service delivery and increases in trust and legitimacy, and the process's sensitivity to starting points. Nascent governments can build legitimacy by improving service delivery; however, gains are contingent and often fragile."

[Brix, H., Lust, E. & Woolcock, M. \(2015\). \*Trust, voice, and incentives: Learning from local success stories in service delivery in the Middle East and North Africa\*. Washington, DC: World Bank](#)

Authors' abstract: "This report examines the role of incentives, trust, and engagement as critical determinants of service delivery performance in MENA countries. Focusing on education and health, the report illustrates how weak external and internal accountability undermines policy implementation and service delivery performance and how such a cycle of poor performance can be counteracted. Case studies of local success reveal the importance of both formal and informal accountability relationships and the role of local leadership in inspiring and institutionalizing incentives toward better service delivery performance. Enhancing services for MENA citizens requires forging a stronger social contract among public servants, citizens, and service providers while empowering communities and local leaders to find 'best fit' solutions. Learning from the variations within countries, especially the outstanding local successes, can serve as a solid basis for new ideas and inspiration for improving service delivery. Such learning may help the World Bank Group and other donors as well as national and local leaders and civil society, in developing ways to enhance the trust, voice, and incentives for service delivery to meet citizens' needs and expectations."

[Carpenter, S., Slater, R. & Mallett, R. \(2012\). \*Social protection and basic services in fragile and conflict-affected situations: A global review of the evidence\*. Working Paper 8, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium \(SLRC\). London: ODI.](#)

This review synthesises and assesses the available evidence on social protection and basic services (health, education and water) in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Some assumptions common in international aid are not supported by robust evidence: one is the notion that social funds and community-driven development "can improve social cohesion and state-citizen relations, thus reducing conflict" (p. ix). Their gendered impact has also not been evaluated sufficiently. Both interventions have had both positive and negative impacts on social cohesion and violence in Afghanistan, northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and the Philippines. Another assumption is that "there is a causal link between service provision and improved state legitimacy and/or state-citizen relations" (p. ix). Empirical evidence on the relationship between service delivery and state-building is scarce – in particular on using services to build states and achieve stability.

- The link between people and the state determines what outcomes social protection programmes have on stability, specifically on state-citizen relations and citizens' perceptions of the state. Evidence confirms the significant challenges for international aid to services in ensuring conflict sensitivity and conflict mitigation, while sustaining access and equity. For example, a narrow emphasis on universal primary education may drive the resurgence of conflict if it does not purposefully include disaffected groups such as disempowered youth or ex-combatants.
- There is 'substantial evidence' of individuals, households and communities maintaining and using their agency and resilience to access services (p. viii). Conversely, often informal strategies to access basic services can be harmful: "they compound the informalisation of society and service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected situations" (p. 82). This makes sectoral coordination and national policy coherence more difficult.
- Non-state provision may limit the development of government capacity and weaken institutions, if no particular action addresses this. Non-state providers of health and education services are often vital sources of resilience, but their effectiveness and long-term impacts are understudied. Evidence is also unclear about whether conflict increases or decreases the level of non-state provision of basic services.

[d'Errico, M., Kozłowska, K. & Maxwell, D. \(2014\). \*Surveying livelihoods, service delivery and governance: Baseline evidence from South Sudan\*. Working Paper 21, SLRC. London: ODI.](#)

This report discusses survey data from 797 households (March-April 2012) in South Sudan's Jonglei and Upper Nile states on people's livelihoods, access to and experience of basic services, and perceptions of governance. The data suggest that even though access to services is poor, "this is not significantly correlated (with a few exceptions) with perceptions of the state" (p.35). However, the survey "did not ask many questions about perceptions of security, which appear from initial qualitative fieldwork to be significant in determining satisfaction with the state" (p.35).

[Denney, L., Mallett, R. & Mazurana, D. \(2015\) \*Peacebuilding and service delivery\*. Briefing Paper. Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research \(UNU-CPR\).](#)

The question of whether better service delivery creates more legitimate and peaceful states is far from settled. Better understanding of this relationship – its plausibility as well as the causal mechanisms through which it might occur – matters not only conceptually, but also because of the substantial international investments made each year in service delivery in conflict-affected areas (approximately USD 20 billion in 2013). Aid that aims to improve services to increase state legitimacy



often treats services “as technocratic processes of linear progress”, rather than deeply political and contested change (p. 2). Strengthening state capacity is not just about improving technical know-how, but also improving citizen experiences through better relationships and the creation of communications channels such as grievance mechanisms and platforms for exchange of opinions or information (p. 5). The authors suggest a focus on the ‘how’ of service delivery, the wider performance of the state, conflict-sensitive service delivery, and realistic expectations.

Further research is needed in particular on:

- The important role that grievance mechanisms appear to play in positive experiences of service delivery and perceptions of the state, to identify the triggers for increased state legitimacy. Specifically, more knowledge is needed about the various forms of these mechanisms, “whether some are more effective, how people use them and how this changes over time” (p. 7).
- How people understand channels of responsibility for both good and poor performance in service delivery, as well as the extent to which poor performance affects the durability of peace.
- Comparisons of the different kinds and sources of legitimacy that service providers (state and non-state) accrue from service users.

[Fernando, P. & Moonesinghe, S. \(2012\). \*Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Sri Lanka\*. Working Paper 6. SLRC. London: ODI.](#)

This paper draws on a review of key literature and a series of consultations with policy makers, practitioners and academics. In particular, it examines how the actions of and interactions between state, non-state and private actors, as well as individuals, households and communities shape processes of service delivery (and receipt) and determine livelihood outcomes (in conflict-affected situations). It asks whether or how the delivery of basic services, the provision of social protection and the implementation of livelihood programmes can contribute to state-building in Sri Lanka; and what power dynamics and political processes support livelihoods and underpin decisions about delivering basic services and providing social protection in Sri Lanka. It notes that: “Implicit throughout the conflict period was the idea that the state should support livelihoods by providing basic services and social protection. It could also be argued the LTTE implicitly subscribed to this view by establishing a quasi-state. However, this statecentric attitude has also led to a system of political patronage that has been carried over into the postwar period.” (p.vi)

[Godamunne, N. \(2015\). \*The role of social protection in state legitimacy in the former conflict areas of Sri Lanka\*. Report 6. SLRC. London: ODI.](#)

This paper examines people’s everyday encounters with the state bureaucracy in Sri Lanka and how these affected their perceptions of the state. It focuses on the areas affected by the war, where the state continued to provide basic services, even during the height of the fighting. The paper argues that: “... while social protection plays an important role in building state-society relations through the engagement of citizens with state officials, state legitimacy is the effect of a highly complex process... perceptions [of the state] are largely influenced by men and women’s expectations and experiences about what the state should deliver and how it delivers” (p.vi).

[Goodstein, J. D. & Velamuri, S. R. \(2009\). \*States, power, legitimacy, and maintaining institutional control: The battle for private sector telecommunication services in Zimbabwe\*. \*Organization Studies\*, 30\(5\), 489–508.](#)

Authors’ abstract: “Drawing directly on Stinchcombe (1968, 1983) we study the interdependence between power and legitimacy in state organization contests for maintaining institutional control. We focus on postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa and the dynamics between the Zimbabwean state and Econet Wireless Zimbabwe, a start-up private firm that challenged the state’s rights to monopoly control over the telecommunications sector during the period 1993-1998. Our findings show that in contexts such as postcolonial settings, states use their power to dominate institutional sectors and maintain institutional control. We find as well that states can attempt to reinforce the legitimacy of their use of power and coercion through (1) securing critical property rights and embedding these rights in the state bureaucracy, and (2) calling on other ‘centers of power’. Finally, our study highlights the ways in which states and challenging organizations engage in various strategies of institutional work to maintain and disrupt, respectively, existing structures and practices of institutional control.”

[Hamilton, A. & Svensson, J. \(2014\). \*The vicious circle of poverty, poor public service provision, and state legitimacy: a view from the ground in Sudan\*. \(Seminar Paper 772\). Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.](#)

Authors’ abstract: “Using data on the quality of service delivery in Sudan, we show that poverty is a significant correlate of public services access and that those without access are significantly less likely to trust government institutions tasked with service delivery and participate politically. Inequality in access further erodes trust and participation – leading to a vicious circle from bad services to lack of provider accountability. Our results are consistent with recent macroeconomic models of a vicious circle between poverty and state legitimacy. We add to this by documenting that people’s views about the state depend on how the state treats them.”

[Jayakar, K. & Liu, C. \(2014\). Universal service in China and India: Legitimizing the state? \*Telecommunications Policy\*, 38\(2\), 186–199.](#)

Authors' abstract: "This paper examines the contrast between China's and India's universal service policies as manifestations of the two states' differing self-conceptualizations and legitimation strategies. We examine the timeline of universal service policies in the two countries, differentiating between the territorial, demographic and layered dimensions of universal service. The analysis reveals many similarities between the two countries, as well as some differences primarily related to the mode of funding universal service programs and the lead China has taken in deploying informatization services. We identify some of the proximate causes that resulted in these policy decisions. But in addition, we also examine how universal service policies are related to contrasting models of state legitimation."

[Kooy, M. & Wild, L. \(2013\). \*Tearfund WASH service delivery in South Sudan: Contributions to peace-building and state-building\*. London: ODI.](#)

This report notes that key features of the context in South Sudan shape the entry points and opportunities – and the constraints – for supporting peace-building and state-building efforts as part of WASH programmes. "Firstly, conflict and insecurity in the region have been largely driven by marginalisation and perceptions of ethnic, regional and other disparities. Access to water and sanitation services has not in itself been a major source of conflict; instead, there may be minor and localised competition in terms of how communities (and who within them) access water points. Secondly, state-building processes have been uneven; in some areas, there is greater stability and greater potential for local collective action. Thirdly, the predominance of non-state providers in the WASH sector has meant that few citizens view the state as a provider of services." (p. v)

[Krasner, S. D. & Risse, T. \(2014\). External actors, state-building, and service provision in areas of limited statehood: Introduction. \*Governance\*, 27\(4\), 545–567.](#)

Special issue introduction: "This article introduces the themes and arguments of the special issue. While virtually all polities enjoy uncontested international legal sovereignty, there are wide variations in statehood, that is, the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability of the state to make and implement policies. Areas of limited statehood are not, however, ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood. We specify the conditions under which external efforts at state-building and service provision by state and non-state actors can achieve their goals. We focus on the extent to which external actors enhance the capacity (statehood) of authority structures in weak states, or directly contribute to the provision of collective goods and services, such as public health, clean environment, social security, and infrastructure. We argue that three factors determine success: legitimacy, task complexity, and institutionalization, including the provision of adequate resources."

See [special issue contents](#).

[Mallett, R., Hagen-Zanker, J., Slater, R. & Sturge, G. \(2015\). \*Surveying livelihoods, service delivery and governance: baseline evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda\*. Working paper 31, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. London: ODI.](#)

This paper synthesises the findings of the first round (2012/13) of the SLRC's panel survey of 9,769 households across five countries. It examines people's livelihoods, their access to and experience of basic services, and their perceptions of government. It finds that an individual's overall satisfaction with a service depends heavily on quality, not simple presence. For example, factors strongly and positively associated with higher overall satisfaction include satisfaction with the availability of medicine or with the number of teachers (p. vi). Respondents' self-reported satisfaction with basic services is generally quite high, although households do not necessarily access high-quality services (p. v). Individuals' perceptions of the government are strongly influenced by the presence of grievance mechanisms and possibilities for civil participation – even if these are not effective. Overall, respondents in the DRC, Nepal, Pakistan, and Uganda (but not in Sri Lanka) "have overwhelmingly negative perceptions of local and, particularly, central government" (p. vi). Between 4% (Pakistan) and 36% (Uganda) "felt the central government cared about their opinion" (p. vi). At least two-thirds felt the priorities of local government never or almost never reflected their own, except in Sri Lanka and Uganda. There is "no simple relationship between access to services and people's perceptions of the legitimacy and performance of government" (p. vi). Access to a service is largely irrelevant to an individual's overall satisfaction with a service or an individual's perceptions of the government.

[Mandefro, F., Noor, M. & Stel, N. \(2012\). \*Service delivery and state legitimacy: Multi-stakeholder processes in water and sanitation in Ethiopia\*. Working Paper 2012/44. Network for Peace, Security and Development. Maastricht: Maastricht School of Management.](#)

Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) are the focus of this research in Ethiopia, which aimed to understand the nature of cooperation between multiple state and non-state actors to improve and deliver basic services. It asked how such cooperation affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state institutions involved. Two MSPs established to work on water and sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery were assessed.

The MSPs – made up of state, civil society, donor, and private sector actors – were found to have some effect on the legitimacy of the state institutions involved in the process. This was attributed not only to MSPs' effect on service delivery (output), but also to the initiation and governance (input and throughput) of the MSPs.

Local people in both case studies considered water service delivery primarily the responsibility of the state in general and of the woreda/district governments in particular. Through the MSP structures and processes at different levels (regional, local and grassroots), and particularly the grassroots level, citizens were able to directly participate in and influence WASH service delivery decision making.

Such processes increased community members' sense of belonging to local government, and this has improved the legitimacy of participating state institutions. Over-publicising the contribution of dominant non-state MSP initiators undermined the legitimacy of state institutions.

[Maxwell, D., Santschi, M., Gordon, R., Dau, P. & Moro, L. \(2014\). \*Livelihoods, access to services and perceptions of governance: An analysis of Uror and Nyirol counties, South Sudan. Report 3, SLRC. London: ODI.\*](#)

Excerpts from authors' abstract: This report is based on qualitative fieldwork in Uror and Nyirol counties, Jonglei state, South Sudan and a household survey by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and SLRC in 2012. Together these studies comprise a baseline analysis of livelihoods, access to social services and people's perceptions of participation and governance. In general, the provision of social services does not appear to particularly influence people's perceptions of the state and state legitimacy. Security was the primary demand directed at the government by respondents. Security was described as the key condition for improved livelihoods and service delivery. The degree of insecurity, and the perceived lack of fairness in the means of providing security, are the main factors affecting people's perceptions of the state in the two counties. There is a need for improved delivery of basic services and social protection in the visited areas, though the prevalent insecurity meant that these issues, and their impact on perceptions of governance, were not at the centre of most respondents' attention.

[Mcloughlin, C. \(2015\). \*When does service delivery improve the legitimacy of a fragile or conflict-affected state? Governance, 28\(3\), 341–356.\*](#)

Author's abstract: "Received wisdom holds that the provision of vital public services necessarily improves the legitimacy of a fragile or conflict-affected state. In practice, however, the relationship between a state's performance in delivering services and its degree of legitimacy is nonlinear. Specifically, this relationship is conditioned by expectations of what the state should provide, subjective assessments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects of provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the state, and the characteristics of the service. This questions the dominant institutional model, which reduces the role of services in (re)building state legitimacy to an instrumental one. A more rounded account of the significance of service delivery for state legitimacy would look beyond the material to the ideational and relational significance of services, and engage with the normative criteria by which citizens judge them."

Legitimacy is socially constructed, and therefore depends at least partly on local norms by which users judge services individually and collectively, in addition to processes and outputs. The relationship between a state's performance in service delivery and its legitimacy is conditioned by several factors:

- users' shifting expectations of what the state (including different levels of the state) should provide;
- subjective assessments of equity in the allocation and processes of services among groups, and perceived respect for users;
- relational aspects of delivery – whether how services are organised and managed builds bridges between the state and social groups;
- attribution – how easily people can credit or blame the state for service delivery performance, although perceptions of local delivery may not affect overall assessments of the state's legitimacy;
- the technical characteristics of particular services and sectors, such as the scope they offer for visibility, tangibility, shared vs. diverse experiences among a community or geographic area, and available information vs. subjective assessments about service quality;
- the relative importance conferred on particular services in specific contexts – for example, health services may be highly valued, or a service may cater to a ruling party's main constituency.

Ndaruhutse, S., et al. (2011). *State-building, peace-building and service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states: Literature review. Final report.* Reading, UK: Practical Action, Save the Children, CfBT Education Trust.

"This literature review aims to summarise the key literature on service delivery and its links to state-building and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) ... specifically ... (i) different ways of accessing and delivering services, and (ii) accountability mechanisms within service delivery and how these impact perceptions of legitimacy and expectations for services." (p. 6)

The effect of service delivery – positive, negative or neutral – on wider state-building and peace-building depends on whether service delivery is exclusive or inclusive, who delivers services and to which groups of people. Across the four sectors of education, health, water, and sanitation, the review finds significant diversity in citizens' expectations about the role of the state as service deliverer:

"Different types of provision (state versus non-state) may have a different impact on legitimacy", due to visibility (p. 47). Across education, health, water, and sanitation, "the state plays a role in setting policy, writing legislation, monitoring standards and/or in delivering services" (p. 45). In education, there is some state involvement in most countries affected by fragility or violent conflict, so the provision of education is likely to increase state legitimacy. In health, greater contracting out leads to less direct visibility for the state: this may not inhibit state-building, but the risk is there (Eldon and Waddington, cited p. 45). However, in both education and health, public sector salaries are also very visible, which can increase the state's legitimacy and thus advance state-building and peace-building (Goldsmith, cited p. 45). Equitable service delivery is important for legitimacy (p. 47). "Providing more inclusive access to services gives a positive perception of the state but it may also increase expectations and demands for services leading to unmet expectations" (p. 46).

More evidence is needed on the following, for example (pp. 44–47):

- the conditions that would guarantee service delivery makes positive contributions to peace-building and state-building;
- citizens' expectations – what they are, how they vary, how they are formed;
- the short and long routes of accountability and whether a balance of the two is needed to build legitimacy most effectively;
- whether non-state provision has a positive or negative impact on the legitimacy and visibility of the state;
- whether providing inclusive services leads to increased and unmet expectations.

Ndaruhutse, S., et al. (2012). *State-building, peace-building and service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states. Synthesis research report.* Reading, UK: Practical Action, Save the Children, CfBT Education Trust, December.

The research question examined in this one-year research project is: How does the fulfilment of people's expectations for services relate to their perception of the legitimacy of the government? "Research and analysis from fieldwork in Nepal, Rwanda and South Sudan provide the following headline findings:

- *Context is critical.* Expectations vary across different contexts, both between countries and within a country, and as a result the relative importance that service delivery plays in contributing to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy also varies.
- *Expectations are dynamic.* There is no single set of expectations. Citizens' expectations change over time. As a result, building and maintaining legitimacy is likely to be a layered process as the state responds to these changing expectations.
- *Who should deliver services?* In situations of limited capacity to deliver, the state would do better to outsource quality service delivery than deliver poor quality services. Where the state has capacity to provide oversight, the role the state plays in coordinating and regulating service delivery is more important for state legitimacy than who delivers the services.
- *How should services be delivered?* The way in which services are delivered is critical for doing no harm to wider state-building processes and can contribute to building state legitimacy. The research identified four important areas for focus:
  - Equitable service delivery can make a positive contribution to state legitimacy. Inequitable delivery can undermine state legitimacy and therefore state-building efforts.
  - Good public financial management, monitoring of government services and investments, and anti-corruption measures can build confidence in the state.
  - Empowerment of citizens and their active involvement in accountability mechanisms that are not politicised can help to build social cohesion and contribute to state legitimacy.
  - Whilst access is a more immediate priority than quality where citizens have no access at all to services, as soon as citizens have some access (even if it is basic), their expectations rapidly change to include quality as well as access and cost. This implies that there may be a sequencing of expectations from access to quality. This happens rapidly and in the early stages of a country's development path."

[Newbrander, W., Waldman, R. & Shepherd-Banigan, M. \(2011\). Rebuilding and strengthening health systems and providing basic health services in fragile states. \*Disasters\*, 35\(4\), 639–660.](#)

Authors' abstract: "The international community has compelling humanitarian, political, security and economic reasons to engage in rebuilding and strengthening health systems in fragile states. Improvements in health services and systems help to strengthen civil society and to restore legitimacy to governments. Effective engagement with fragile states to inform the design of health programmes and selection of interventions depends on donor coordination and an understanding of health system challenges. Planning requires consideration of allocation (services to be delivered), production (organisation of services), distribution (beneficiaries of services) and financing. The criteria for selecting interventions are: their impact on major health problems; effectiveness; the possibility of scale-up; equity; and sustainability. There are various options for financing and models of engagement, but support should always combine short-term relief with longer-term development. Stakeholders should aim not only to save lives and protect health but also to bolster nations' ability to deliver good-quality services in the long run."

[Paudel, S.B., Upreti, B.R., Acharya, G., Tandukar, A. & Harvey, P. \(2015\). \*Health services and users' perceptions of the state in Rolpa, Nepal\*. Working Paper 36, SLRC. London: ODI.](#)

Even though Nepal's government health services have improved since the end of the Maoist insurgency in 2006, pressing challenges remain. These include physical access to healthcare, and limited health post opening times and supplies. Respondents see government-run health services as being of poor quality, and note the lack of monitoring of private services. The central government's lack of regulation and monitoring leads people to perceive that it is not committed to their health. Respondents are more disappointed with central government than with local government.

[Sacks, A. & Larizza, M. \(2012\). \*Why quality matters: Rebuilding trustworthy local government in post-conflict Sierra Leone\*. Washington, DC: World Bank.](#)

Authors' abstract: "A broad consensus has emerged among practitioners and researchers that failure to build accountable and legitimate institutions is a critical risk factor associated with vicious circles of repeated violence. Despite this consensus, very few studies have tested the extent to which local government performance and decentralized service provision shape citizens' beliefs toward political authorities. This paper contributes to fill this gap by examining the antecedents of trustworthy local government authorities in a post-conflict and fragile setting, Sierra Leone. Taking advantage of a unique longitudinal survey, the National Public Services, it examines the impact of subnational variation in local government performance on citizens' beliefs about the trustworthiness of local government authorities. To test the hypothesis, it uses multilevel models to exploit variation over time and within and across subnational units in Sierra Leone. The results suggest that improvements in the quality of decentralized service delivery, as well as perceptions of local councillors' honesty, are positively associated with perceptions of local government officials as trustworthy political authorities. These findings speak to the possibility that local service provision can play a role in shaping the relationships between citizens and the state and in overcoming the root causes of fragility and conflict."

[Stel, N., de Boer, D. & Hilhorst, D. with G. van der Haar, I. van der Molen, N. Douma & R. Herman Mostert \(2012\). \*Multi-stakeholder processes, service delivery and state institutions: Service provision and the legitimacy of state institutions in situations of conflict and fragility. Experiences from Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian territories\*. Synthesis report. The Hague: Peace, Security and Development Network](#)

This study explored arrangements between multiple state and non-state actors for the governance and implementation of basic services in fragile situations (Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian territories), and considers how they can contribute to the legitimacy of state institutions. The study found modest indications that the multi-stakeholder process (MSP) contributed to state legitimacy in only four of the 12 MSPs studied. In other cases, improvements in delivery and governance of services or in relations between stakeholders were not attributed to state institutions, often because they were not sufficiently visible or beneficiaries were not being told about their role (p. 11). While stakeholders' involvement in MSPs at times led them to grant greater legitimacy to specific state institutions and representatives, this never related to 'the state' as a whole (p. 11).

The study finds the following determinants are important for the impact of MSPs on state legitimacy:

- Stakeholders based their perceptions of state legitimacy not on objective outputs, but on how they saw "these outputs and the manner in which they were achieved" (p. 13).
- Legitimacy based on local stakeholders' needs is more durable than legitimacy based on imported standards such as 'good governance'.
- Lack of accountability and transparency were key MSP weaknesses identified by stakeholders. MSPs that improved state legitimacy "all had high levels of mutual accountability and strong communication and information sharing" (p. 12).

- A state institution's visible involvement in an initiative plays a key role in stakeholders' appreciation of why the state deserves partial credit for funding, mobilising partners, providing material or advice.
- State visibility "also requires the right distancing, support and positioning of the other stakeholders involved (especially NGOs)" (p. 12). Weaker stakeholders are easily overpowered and "in fragile contexts, state institutions often fall into this category" (p. 12).
- There is a legitimacy threshold: "...stakeholders need to have enough faith in the state to take the trouble to voice their demands and expectations because only then state legitimacy can develop" (p. 11).
- The gap between state and non-state capacity, particularly at the local level, is significant. Because "respondents consider the follow-up of development projects [to be] a state responsibility", state legitimacy is undermined if a service is unsustainable (p. 13).

Policy notes (including lessons) are available as follows: [Multi-Stakeholder Service Provision and state Legitimacy in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. Experiences from Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian territories](#); and country-specific notes on [Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal](#) and the [Palestinian territories](#).

[Stel, N. & Ndayiragije, R. \(2014\). The eye of the beholder: Service provision and state legitimacy in Burundi. \*Africa Spectrum\*, 49\(3\), 3–28.](#)

Authors' abstract: "State legitimacy – particularly its alleged potential to counter state fragility – has received increasing attention in academic and policy literature concerned with African development. Service provision can substantially influence such state legitimacy. Services, however, are mostly provided by a multiplicity of (state and non-state) providers. This article therefore specifically explores how joint service delivery by multiple providers shapes the attribution of state legitimacy in Burundi by means of two qualitative case studies. Empirically, the article demonstrates, first, that the process of stakeholder interaction, rather than the output of this process, most distinctly shapes state legitimacy and, second, that there are substantial variations in legitimacy attribution by different stakeholders and for different state institutions. Epistemologically, the article suggests three specific challenges that merit attention in further empirical investigation of state legitimacy in fragile settings: the diversity of people's expectations; the artificiality of state/non-state distinctions; and the personification and politicization of state institutions."

[Van de Walle, S. & Scott, Z. \(2011\). The political role of service delivery in state-building: Exploring the relevance of European history for developing countries. \*Development Policy Review\*, 29\(1\), 5–21.](#)

This study considers the development of public services in Western Europe between the 17th and 19th centuries, and identifies the role they played in three key state-building processes.

- *Penetration* – "establishing the presence, authority and visibility" of the state or ruling powers (p. 10). Public services were an important instrument for state penetration, including into remote areas. They contributed to the coercive, contested establishment of state control over alternative sources of authority.
- *Standardisation* – establishing a standard for administration or service delivery that applied to the entire polity in the establishment of bureaucracies, tax collection, justice, schools, telecommunications, public infrastructures, and armies. It played a role in creating the imagined community of the nation, including national languages. Standardisation led to a "homogenisation of the population and its experiences" (p. 13). In turn, this facilitated exchange, mobility and equity.
- *Accommodation* – "reconciliation or settlement, generally between elites" (p. 12). Accommodation helps explain why penetration and standardisation encountered relatively limited resistance. In particular, the provision of public services and public employment became a tool "to buy loyalty and to make disloyalty expensive" (p. 12).

The distribution of public resources is not just about equity. Public services and employment have an instrumental function for "pacification, buying loyalty and power-brokering" (p. 13). Paradoxically, this may bind together undemocratic elite pacts that end up advancing democracy. Similarly, groups deemed disloyal or treacherous to the polity can be removed from public employment. However, like other acts of standardisation or accommodation, this may decrease public capacities by weeding out expertise.

The article highlights the following points in relation to public services as a means of building state legitimacy:

- Efficiency may not be the best principle for public service design, since state-building is not straightforward, technocratic or apolitical. Ahead of efficiency and impartiality, "[a]s long as the legitimacy of the state is contested, loyalty needs to be created" (p. 16). So raising state visibility or pacifying an aggrieved group might mean establishing more health centres than strictly necessary, or buying off local elites with public jobs.
- The tension between nation- and state-building and the closely related dynamic of nationalism requires attention. The destruction of existing allegiances, assimilation, and political socialisation poses the risk of fostering extreme nationalism.
- The push to centralise and monopolise service provision may also mean the destruction of effective and efficient local services and public goods.

## Non-state provision and legitimacy

[Allouche, J. \(2014\). The role of informal service providers in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. In E. Weintal, J. Troell & M. Nakayama \(Eds.\) \*Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding\*. London: Earthscan.](#)

Current debates on state-building “are flawed because they employ a European and Weberian conception of state-building premised on the conception of the state as a legal personality, an ordering power, and a set of formal arrangements that institutionalize power. This conception is not well adapted to service delivery and state-building in most contemporary post-conflict situations, because it does not take informal governance and service provision into account” (pp. 31-32).

Predominant donors’ conceptions of state-building focus “on creating the security and stability needed to control the territory and to lay the basis for international and regional trade. This often leads to a very centralized state, and causes state-building policies to deal with reconstruction and service delivery in a way that views informal institutions and providers as resisting state authority and the formalization of its institutional power” (p. 32).

Alternative models of state-building focus on reconstruction, the informal sector and regulatory governance, and the important role of non-state providers in delivery. Informal provision of services may or may not be a challenge to state legitimacy; often it is usually due to an absence of state delivery of services. “[A]s soon as the state conceives service delivery as a tool for establishing legitimacy, reconstruction becomes highly political” (p. 35). Groups aligned with the state may use service delivery as a weapon against a real or perceived challenge to state authority or to existing political settlements (e.g. in territories subject to ethnically constructed tensions).

In Zimbabwe, following independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwean leaders used service delivery “as a tool of state legitimacy and as a weapon against competing forms of governance” (p. 34). Water and sanitation service delivery was essential in establishing the credibility of the ruling political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The new Mugabe government nominated district administrators for rural water supply and sanitation, which gave it formal influence over even the most remote local authority. The majority of rural communities felt they had the same rights as urban elites and were part of nation-building. As a result, “service delivery, especially in rural areas, became a successful tool of state-building” and legitimised the ruling party (p. 35).

[Batley, R. & McLoughlin, C. \(2010\). Engagement with non-state service providers in fragile states: Reconciling state-building and service delivery. \*Development Policy Review\*, 28\(2\), 131–154.](#)

Authors’ abstract: “The OECD questions whether non-state services in fragile states may delegitimise the state in the eyes of citizens, arguing that ‘state-building’ depends on governments’ engagement in service management. This article reviews the available evidence to identify what types of engagement are feasible and most likely to contribute to service delivery, or not to damage it. It considers the capacity requirements and the risks associated with state intervention through policy formulation, regulation, contracting and mutual agreements, and concludes by identifying ways of incrementally involving the state, beginning with activities that are least likely to do harm to non-state provision.”

- In most low- and middle-income countries, non-state actors play an important role in delivering services. In fragile and conflict-affected states, the roles that only states could play tend to be indirect: policies and dialogue on service provision; setting and enforcing regulation through minimum standards (e.g. licenses, accreditation, safeguards for users); contracting (out or in); and collaborations between state and non-state providers through joint financing and mutual agreements.
- Many studies have focused on state capacities to manage relationships with non-state service providers, but non-state actors’ willingness and capacity is important too. Similarly, while non-state provision of services can pose a risk to state legitimacy, states’ poor handling of non-state provision can pose a risk to service delivery. The nature of the non-state sector and the relationships between state and non-state providers are not driven primarily by technical considerations. Rather, they are shaped by history, ideology, power, and public and private agencies’ capacity.
- Governments may be reluctant to enter into dialogue with non-state providers and to recognise them as legitimate, because this acknowledges that government no longer has the monopoly of donor support for service delivery. Yet, reaching such a political agreement is required for effective engagement by states.
- Contracting that is separate from, or bypasses, governments can fail to address accountability to local government and communities, to build state capacity, and to align with state priorities. However, in some fragile states, such arrangements may be the only feasible ones, due to the technical and financial demands of contracting.
- Informal local agreements involving joint financing or collaboration may build on existing trust between state and non-state providers, or providers and recipients. Such informal mutual agreements require less capacity, and may avoid the tensions implicit in formal contracting. However, any scaling-up of such agreements will depend on slower replication.

[Bay, E. \(2015\). \*Provision of services by civil society actors in situations of fragility\*. Background Paper. 2015 State of the world's volunteerism report: Transforming governance. Bonn: UN Volunteers program.](#)

Excerpts from author's abstract: "Although the state retains responsibility for providing basic services, the limitations it faces in fragile situations call for alternative models of service delivery [involving n]on-state actors [...] There are however still unanswered questions [...] on the effects on the development of state when non-state actors, including civil society and volunteers, are taking up some of these responsibilities, with concerns in particular with regards to the legitimacy of the state and to the development of its own capacities. Also, non-state actors form a highly heterogeneous group, with varied forms, functions, capacities and legitimacies. Engaging in fragile contexts, be it with the state or with non-state actors is inherently complex, and requires careful and continuous assessments of actors, dynamics and potential unintended consequences."

Volunteers, and civil society more broadly, can make several contributions to delivering services effectively in fragile states:

- They can complement the action of the state, by meeting those needs the state fails to meet and by helping extend the reach of government services, particularly in remote areas. Some contributions arise based on circumstances. For example, during humanitarian crises, first responders are typically members of the affected community. In other cases, volunteers' contributions are routinely integrated in state approaches to service delivery. For example, in the decentralised education sector in Nepal, community involvement has led to students' higher performance, school accountability, and greater resources allocated. However, civil society's involvement does not automatically lead to good results. Limited capacities, and fragmentation in the absence of central coordination, can cause problems. Civil society cannot replace government in those roles.
- They can build social capital and support social inclusion. Civil society actors can play a major role in transforming how people relate to the state but also to each other, in societies marked by division, exclusion and mistrust. Volunteerism "posits that everyone has something to contribute" and offers opportunities to do so (p. 6). Volunteerism can help rebuild social cohesion and the social capacity to cooperate for the public good, thus contributing to inclusive politics.

[Bukenya, B. \(2013\). \*Are service-delivery NGOs building state capacity in the global South? Experiences from HIV/AIDS programmes in rural Uganda\*. Manchester, UK: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre \(ESID\).](#)

Author's abstract: "Service-delivery NGOs are often attacked for abandoning the pursuit of 'alternative development' in favour of 'technocratic' and 'depoliticised' forms of development. Yet some commentators argue that these organisations, through their 'technocratic' interventions, can in fact have progressive impacts on political forms and processes. In this paper we investigate this debate through the lens of state capacity building in the global South. Primary research into the 'Mini-TASO Project', a programme by Ugandan NGO TASO to support government health workers and hospitals in improving HIV/AIDS service delivery, reveals that NGOs can have a constructive impact on four aspects of state capacity – bureaucratic capacity, embeddedness, territorial reach, and legitimacy. The paper finds that within its project areas TASO strengthened the bureaucratic ability of government hospitals to deliver HIV/AIDS services, made people living with HIV (PLHIV) visible to the state, increased the state's embeddedness within society through co-production, and enhanced state legitimacy in the eyes of beneficiaries, due to increased accessibility to life-saving services and improved patient-provider relationships. However, the impact of the programme on the infrastructural reach of the state in rural Uganda was not sustained beyond its implementation. The overall conclusion of this paper is that service delivery by NGOs is not merely a technical activity: it can actually be an avenue for building more effective states."

[Grynkewich, A. G. \(2008\). \*Welfare as warfare: How violent non-state groups use social services to attack the state\*. \*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism\*, 31\(4\), 350–370.](#)

This article is grounded in military perspectives on security, counter-terrorism and armed action, and the fact that some non-state violent groups provide social welfare to the local population. Case studies of the Tupamaros (Uruguay), Hamas (occupied Palestinian territories), and Hezbollah (Lebanon) confirm that such groups benefit in three ways from providing services:

- Their "activity challenges the legitimacy of the state by highlighting governmental failure to fulfill the social contract" (p. 363).
- Their social welfare organisations offer an alternative entity for the population to be loyal to.
- This loyalty "allows groups to trade needed services for recruits, support, and sympathy", including funding, food, supplies and intelligence, while decreasing the number of government collaborators and informants (p. 363).

Governments have chosen to act in a variety of ways against non-state groups' ability to provide services. In Uruguay, the state militarily isolated the guerrillas from their resource base, which severely degraded or eliminated the Tupamaros' social welfare activities and undermined their legitimacy and base of support.

Social services provided by Hamas and Hezbollah are vital to the local population, and shutting them down would provoke a humanitarian crisis. Social welfare can create lasting loyalties, and forcibly stopping non-state social services could backfire.



Most states confronted by non-state violent groups that provide services lack the capacity to expand their own social welfare. This is typically compounded by economic problems, and this means successful displacement would typically require outside assistance.

Constituencies may punish their governments, through lower support or mass protests, “for aggressive counterterrorism policies” (p. 364). This is particularly likely if state policies lead to increased hardship for civilians because non-state social welfare has been removed.

There are very few cases where the state has used a displacement strategy and the non-state group has survived or flourished; possible examples are the Israeli group Kahane Chai and the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo. Conversely, there are very few cases where the state has chosen not to displace and the non-state group has been extinguished through military means only – a possible example is Peru’s Shining Path. Cases where a displacement strategy was associated with the demise of a group are also quite rare – the Tupamaros is one example. The most numerous cases are where the state does not use displacement and the non-state group survives or thrives – examples include Hamas, Hezbollah, and Pakistani groups Jamaat-ul-dawa and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

[Jaglin, S., Repussard, C. & Belbéoc’h, A. \(2011\). Decentralisation and governance of drinking water services in small West African towns and villages \(Benin, Mali, Senegal\): The arduous process of building local governments. \*Canadian Journal of Development Studies\*, 32\(2\), 119–138.](#)

Authors’ abstract: “This article analyses the development of decentralised water services in small West African towns and villages by focusing on the nature and dynamism of local project management arrangements. The paper will show how the capacity and legitimacy of local government has been undermined by competition with other forms of governance that focus on users’ committees or small private operators. It suggests that the pluralism in management approaches resulting from this accumulation of project-based models is not conducive to sustainable development and regulation of water services in small towns. Longer-term learning processes and alliances are required to craft workable co-production arrangements between strong local governments and other actors based on consistent coordination and regulation mechanisms.”

[McCullough, A. \(2015\). \*The legitimacy of states and armed non-state actors: Topic guide\*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.](#)

Extracts from key messages, pp. 1-2: “Non-state groups gain legitimacy through a range of strategies. Those include filling perceived gaps in state performance (e.g. Al Shabaab in Somalia, and MILF in the Philippines).”

“Donor interventions are likely to have impacts on perceptions of legitimacy of various actors. These impacts may not always be intentional.”

- “Interventions which deliver services separately to state channels can challenge a state’s legitimacy. In Zambia, citizens who thought the state had little to do with service provision were less likely to pay tax... [T]he impact of delivering services separately to the state is dependent on citizens’ expectations of what the state should provide.”
- “Humanitarian work which involves delivering basic services outside state channels often requires negotiation with non-state actors, thus providing them with legitimacy. Al Shabaab capitalised on this opportunity in Somalia by requiring that all NGOs get its approval to operate in areas it controlled.”
- “Interventions which aim to work with formal and informal governance structures can also weaken those structures’ legitimacy if they don’t meet people’s expectations.”
- “Where expectations about the level of vertical inclusion are low, more inclusivity can risk undermining stability. In Iraq, it was found that the redistribution of services to previously excluded groups in the post-war period diminished the state’s overall legitimacy gains.”

[Rusca, M. & Schwartz, K. \(2012\). Divergent sources of legitimacy: A case study of international NGOs in the water services sector in Lilongwe and Maputo. \*Journal of Southern African Studies\*, 38\(3\), 681–697.](#)

Authors’ abstract: “Since the 1980s international development activities have increasingly been transferred from government organisations to international non-government organisations (INGOs). In this article we argue that the trend for NGOs to increasingly undertake government-funded tasks leads to conflicts between the different sources on which the legitimacy of the NGO is based. In particular considerable friction may exist between output and normative legitimacy. Output legitimacy relates to the degree to which an organisation is able to achieve specified results. These results are supposed to coincide with specific performance indicators stipulated in project proposals. Normative legitimacy is based on values (as stated in the vision or mission of the organisation) on which the organisation is founded. We find that INGOs have an incentive to emphasise output legitimacy over normative legitimacy. Secondly, we argue that in response to this friction, NGOs are driven to actively ‘create’ legitimacy by organisation presenting projects as being ‘successful’. Thirdly, we contend that this friction may also affect the approach developed by INGOs for specific projects. This approach will focus on those activities, target

beneficiaries and select areas, which are seen as offering the greatest potential for a successful project. These arguments are developed by focusing on two water services projects undertaken by an international NGO in Lilongwe, Malawi and in Maputo, Mozambique. Fieldwork for developing the two case studies was undertaken from November 2008 to February 2009 (Lilongwe) and June 2009 to November 2009 (Maputo)."

[Sacks, A. \(2012\). \*Can donors and non-state actors undermine citizens legitimating beliefs? Working Paper 140, Afrobarometer. Ghana, Benin and Cape Town: Centre for Democratic Development \(CDD\), Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy \(IREEP\) and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation \(IJR\).\*](#)

Author's abstract: "This paper addresses the conditions under which donor and non-state actor service provision is likely to undermine or strengthen citizens' legitimating beliefs. On the one hand, citizens may be less likely to support their government with quasi-voluntary compliance when they credit non-state actors or donors for service provision. On the other hand, the provision of goods and services by donors and non-state actors might strengthen citizens' confidence in their government and their willingness to defer to governmental laws and regulations if citizens believe that the government is essential to leveraging and managing these resources. The author assesses these competing hypotheses using multilevel analyses of Afrobarometer survey data. The sample, drawn from a continuum of developing societies in Africa, allows for analysis of associations between donor and non-state actor service provision and the sense of obligation to comply with tax authorities, the police and courts. The findings yield support for the hypothesis that the provision of services by donors and non-state actors is strengthening, rather than undermining, the relationship between citizens and the state."

## 2.2 Service delivery and stability

[Akinboade, O. A., Mokwena, M. P. & Kinfaek, E. C. \(2013\). \*Understanding citizens' participation in service delivery protests in South Africa's Sedibeng district municipality. International Journal of Social Economics, 40\(5\), 458–478.\*](#)

Authors' abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to discuss citizen participation in public service delivery protests in the Sedibeng district municipality of South Africa. The municipality consists of three local municipalities: Lesedi, Emfuleni and Midvaal. A structured sample of 1,000 respondents was used in the study. The descriptive and inferential statistics approaches were applied to understand the root causes of the protests. Overall, the average level of satisfaction with public service delivery is quite low. Service delivery protest participants opine that doing so is the only way of getting things done in the municipality. The overwhelming opinion of respondents is that the councillors are unresponsive. Public service delivery in Sedibeng municipality must improve so that citizens' confidence in municipal governance can rise. Sedibeng municipality should urgently improve the socio-economic conditions in the communities and should prioritise crime prevention, job creation and development for young people. Health care delivery is important to long-term residents. Government should ensure that all allegations of corruption and maladministration are speedily and transparently dealt with, without fear or favour. Originality/value: Studies that provide insight into citizen participation in public services delivery protests in Africa are very few and so this study makes an important contribution to our understanding of this important field."

[Bleck, J. & Michelitch, K. \(2015\). \*The 2012 crisis in Mali: Ongoing empirical state failure. African Affairs, 114\(457\), 598-623.\*](#)

Authors' abstract: "In 2012 Mali faced a crisis disrupting nearly twenty years of democratization – a coup and rebel insurgency. This article investigates policy priorities amongst rural Malians living on the border of state and rebel-controlled territory during the crisis. While academic and policy-making communities have focused largely on Mali's recent and sudden regime and territorial breakdown, the villagers defined the crisis in terms of their unmet needs for public services and infrastructure amidst high food and water insecurity. Concern for the sudden "juridical state" breakdown – the collapse of the democratic regime – was trumped by the focus on long-term "empirical state" breakdown. Using recent Afrobarometer data on diverse dimensions of empirical statehood, we show that the problem of rural neglect emphasized by seminal scholars is persistent not only across Mali, but also across many African countries. The tendency of academics and policy makers to focus on the immediate or more volatile political problems of the coup and rebel insurgency facing the Malian state, while important, risks understating and underestimating the power of slow-moving crises of daily life that are more important to rural citizens."

[Gordon, S. \(2012\). \*Health, conflict, stability and statebuilding: A house built on sand? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7\(1\), 29-44.\*](#)

Author's abstract: "Increasingly, the purpose of third party health interventions in fragile states has become linked to statebuilding agendas in order to build government through health programmes. However, there is only limited data to support the efficacy of such an assumption. Indeed, this approach may instead invert the desired outcome of social legitimacy and undermine the rationale for which it is intended. This paper examines the strategic response from donors vis-à-vis the objective of statebuilding, and concludes that new research is required. It concludes that until there is empirically based evidence of the benefits of health interventions for statebuilding, the goals of health interventions should remain fixed primarily on improving health indicators instead."

[Grove, N. J. & Zwi, A. B. \(2008\). \*Beyond the log frame: A new tool for examining health and peacebuilding initiatives. Development in Practice, 18\(1\), 66–81.\*](#)

Authors' abstract: "How do we move from identifying ethical principles to enhancing development practice? How can donors and NGOs move beyond the reporting of technical outputs to explore less tangible aspects of their health projects: contributions to rebuilding trust, promoting social cohesion, and enhancing good governance at community level? This article considers these questions in relation to health and peace-building activities in conflicted settings. It describes difficulties facing practitioners and donors seeking to undertake health and peace work, in particular focusing on the lack of appropriate tools for screening, monitoring, and evaluating projects. It critiques the logical framework, a tool commonly used in project planning, monitoring, and evaluation, and considers it alongside a new tool, the Health and Peace Building Filter, which has been designed to reflect on health programming in fragile or conflicted settings. The authors argue that such tools can help to move us beyond focusing on inputs and outputs to examining processes, relationships, and the indirect consequences of aid programmes."

[Hilsenrath, P. \(2005\). \*Health policy as counter-terrorism: Health services and the Palestinians. Defence and Peace Economics, 16\(5\), 365–374.\*](#)

Authors' abstract: "Counter-terrorism and health policies converge in the complex world of Middle East politics. Hamas, labelled a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States and Europe, is also a major participant in the health sector of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Hamas gains important legitimacy and political support with its social services. Palestinian policies directed at these services can be part of a counter-terrorism strategy as long as violence is part of the Hamas agenda. This paper describes the Palestinian health sector using cross-sectional bivariate regressions. It then discusses the role of stronger public institutions to help thwart terrorism and promote peace and prosperity in the region."

[Jolliffe, K. \(2014\). \*Ethnic conflict and social services in Myanmar's contested regions. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.\*](#)

Extracts from author's summary:

"With aid commitments on the rise, Myanmar has the potential to greatly strengthen the delivery of health, education, and other social services. However, while it is established practice for aid agencies to back state-led development strategies, this presents complications in some of Myanmar's conflict-affected areas where ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and associated networks have been the primary social service providers for decades. At the same time, aid interventions in social sectors have significant potential to contribute to peacebuilding. In particular, coordination and collaboration efforts between state and EAO-linked service providers could improve the quality of service provision, while also supporting the war-to-peace transition. These 'convergence' efforts demonstrate a key contribution to the peace process that could be enhanced by international aid actors through both peacebuilding and mainstream development funds.

"In some conflict-affected areas, confidence in the peace process is being actively undermined by the conflict-insensitive expansion of government service delivery, as well as internationally implemented projects. At the same time, EAO-linked services face severe funding cuts as donor priorities shift.

"Encouragingly, though, 'convergence' efforts have led to collaboration towards a wide range of mutually-beneficial goals between state and EAO-linked service providers, demonstrating significant potential for peacebuilding. Tangible improvements in access to services that enhance relations between conflicting parties can build confidence in the peace process and address grievances among conflict-affected populations and EAOs. Improved relations can also contribute to the establishment of social sector institutions conducive to peace in the long-term."

[Wheeler, V., Graces, S. & Wesley, M. \(2006\). \*From crisis response to state-building: Services and stability in conflict-affected contexts. Discussion paper. London / Australia: Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI / Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University.\*](#)

This paper includes discussion of the role of service provision in promoting stability, the contribution and limits of humanitarian action within this and some potential policy responses to possible gaps in service delivery during the winding down of a crisis response. These are social protection programmes, community-driven development and contracting non-state actors. On the latter, the authors note that:

"Ideally, non-state actors operate within a policy framework developed by the state; work in close association with local government officials; have a direct contract with the state; and provide information in ways which feed into state systems. Recruiting staff and developing expertise in policy-setting and contract management may take on a higher priority. [...] Non-state actors must be directly accountable to the state, and the state must have the capacity to hold them to account. [...] In post-conflict settings, it will be important to ensure that the state's role in service delivery is clearly communicated (p.10).

The paper notes that service delivery can act as a peace dividend, increasing communities' interest in maintaining peace, but that unmet expectations of better living standards can lead to discontent and sometimes unrest (p.8).

[Zivetz, L. \(2006\). \*Health Service Delivery in Early Recovery Fragile states: Lessons from Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique and Timor Leste\*. Arlington, Va., USA: Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival \(BASICS\) for the United States Agency for International Development \(USAID\).](#)

Extracts from author's summary:

"This case study explores some key themes in the emerging literature on service delivery in fragile states in light of the health sector experience in four early recovery countries: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Timor Leste. The analysis considers the various impacts of foreign assistance on state stewardship of the health sector and the programming implications. The investigation starts with state effectiveness and legitimacy.

Findings point to the importance of and structural impediments to donor harmonisation in re-establishing health services in a post-conflict context. UN coordination in all four countries was constrained by state avoidance strategies, a spike in aid flows that were out of sync with emerging government capacity, and, in Cambodia and Mozambique, an emphasis on highly visible but largely unsustainable infrastructure projects that were limited by the absence of a planning framework. Harmonisation and alignment of aid systems and accountability requirements were enabled through joint frameworks, common approaches, and trust funds that offered direct budget support that strengthened government systems, accountability, and a common policy framework in Afghanistan and Timor Leste.

Overall, accountability requirements by the various donors, coupled with their concerns that their efforts receive clear attribution, and the establishment of project-based fragmented assistance to the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector in all countries [...] served to draw capacity out of the civil service. [It also] set up a two-track system that has significantly undermined central and, more particularly, provincial capacity and authority to regulate service delivery.

"Capacity-building efforts have been limited by a restricted focus on skills building rather than power sharing and particularly a lack of control over resources.

"Promising approaches to support state stewardship include: contracting with NGOs in Afghanistan and Cambodia; equity funds in Cambodia; civil service performance-based reform in Afghanistan; sectoral plans [...] and budget support."

## 2.3 Service delivery and social cohesion

[Babajanian, B. \(2012\). \*Social protection and its contribution to social cohesion and state-building\*. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit \(GIZ\).](#)

Extracts from summary: "There is a dearth of research studies providing empirical evidence on the impact of social protection policies and instruments on social cohesion and state-building. [...] The effectiveness of social protection transfers (benefit value, coverage, and poverty impact) is likely to influence the success in tackling various dimensions of deprivation and improving livelihood outcomes such as food security, access to services, and social participation. At the same time, the provision of income support alone is not sufficient for uprooting social exclusion; policies must address structural factors that generate deprivation and vulnerability. Incorporating rights-based elements in the design and implementation of social protection interventions can contribute to greater empowerment and social inclusion. The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) cash transfer scheme in northern Kenya was successful in introducing rights education and enhancing the ability of community groups to claim priority public services (p.5).

"Social categorical targeting in fragile states can exacerbate social divisions and inequalities by including specific groups and leaving out others (e.g. in Sierra Leone and Liberia). Poverty targeting can create social divisions and negatively affect state-society relations due to two factors: the selective nature of targeting, and the potential for corruption and mismanagement. Poverty targeting can be difficult to implement in the contexts of widespread poverty and poor governance (e.g. the Social Safety Net in Sierra Leone). It is possible to offset some of the negative effects of targeting by designing and enforcing institutional arrangements for transparency and accountability." (p.6)

[Fearon, J., Humphreys, M. & Weinstein, J. M. \(2009\). \*Development assistance, institution building, and social cohesion after civil war: Evidence from a field experiment in Liberia\*. Working Paper 194. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.](#)

Authors' abstract: "Can brief, foreign-funded efforts to build local institutions have positive effects on local patterns of governance, cooperation, and well-being? Prior research suggests that such small-scale, externally driven interventions are unlikely to substantially alter patterns of social interaction in a community, and that the ability of a community to act collectively is the result of a slow and necessarily indigenous process. We address this question using a randomized field experiment to assess the effects of a community-driven reconstruction (CDR) project carried out by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in northern Liberia. The project attempted to build democratic, community-level institutions for making and implementing decisions about local public goods. We find powerful evidence that the program was successful in increasing social cohesion, some evidence that it reinforced democratic political attitudes and increased confidence in local decision-making procedures, but only weak evidence that material well-being was positively affected. There is essentially no evidence of adverse effects."

[Holland, J., Ruedin, L., Scott-Villiers, P. & Sheppard, H. \(2012\). Tackling the governance of socially inclusive service delivery. \*Public Management Review\*, 14\(2\), 181–196.](#)

Authors' abstract: "Despite conventions, laws and policies, service delivery in many countries remains poor and fails to reach socially excluded groups. With 'supply side' governance constraints often deemed intractable, many donors support 'demand side' accountability processes for better service delivery. When it comes to social and gender-based exclusion, the weaknesses of purely demand side accountability approaches become clear. This article draws on case study research in Nepal to examine social accountability processes that work on both sides of the supply–demand divide and consider their likely contribution to socially inclusive service delivery and to challenging deeper institutional norms that sustain social exclusion."

[Hurrell, A. & MacAuslan, I. \(2012\). The political implications of cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. \*Shaking up the social system. Public Management Review\*, 14\(2\), 255–272.](#)

Authors' abstract: "Following success in Latin America, cash transfers are rapidly gaining currency as a principal tool for social protection in Africa. Pilot projects abound, but are often conceived and evaluated without much attention to the political and social implications of targeting, of payment systems, and of introducing cash into poor communities. These implications can be profound, and must be considered in designing cash transfer programmes. Using examples from Oxford Policy Management's evaluation and design work in Kenya, we discuss effects on the political and social fabric of in particular (1) targeting, (2) payments systems and (3) the overall process of cash transfers. First, who is targeted, how and who targets can radically alter local power relations, and this can have national consequences. Targeting divides communities into recipients and non-recipients, and this has consequences for social relations. Second, different payment systems create different requirements for civil registration, possibilities for fraud and opportunities for connectedness. These requirements and opportunities all have potential to change citizens' relationship with the state with far-reaching political implications. Finally, because of these effects, implementing a system of cash transfers (even a pilot project) is not an apolitical policy intervention and in fact will influence quite profoundly relationships between individuals within households, within communities and within the broader polity. This has an effect on the development direction of the country in question. We ask whether this should be the donors' role, and suggest greater engagement with national and local political actors in planning, designing and implementing cash transfer programmes."

[Järvinen, Z. \(2013\). Promoting inclusive local governance and service delivery in post-withdrawal Iraq. \*Journal of Peacebuilding & Development\*, 8\(3\), 75–80.](#)

This briefing discusses the importance of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality service delivery as a crucial means to promote social cohesion and sustainable peace and development in Iraq. It highlights the role of accountable, transparent and effective subnational governance as a key measure to improve service delivery at community level. It promotes programme strategies that are strongly locally driven, participatory and inclusive. It introduces a particularly promising approach for development practitioners to consider: the Local Area Development Programme, an interagency multi-year programme led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq since 2007. Through its emphasis on achieving strong buy-in and commitment from the government, activating local ownership, and institutionalising participatory, gender-sensitive and pro-poor mechanisms for improved planning and implementation at subnational levels, the programme offers a fresh approach to improving service delivery in fragile and post-conflict-affected states.

[King, E. \(2013\). A critical review of community-driven development programmes in conflict-affected contexts. London, UK / Waterloo, Canada: International Rescue Committee / Balsillie School of International Affairs](#)

"Community-driven development or reconstruction – CDD/R programmes – that empower local communities to directly participate in development activities and to control resources to do so – aim to improve socio-economic well-being, governance, and social cohesion at a local level. While CDD/R is context-driven, it is generally implemented as a standard model." (p. 3)

- Rigorous impact evaluations of programmes in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Aceh (Indonesia), Liberia and Sierra Leone, and interviews with practitioners, policymakers and academics, find that the record of CDD/R in conflict-affected contexts is mixed and, overall, disappointing in reaching its ambitious goals.
- As currently designed, implemented, and evaluated, CDD/R is better at generating more tangible economic outcomes than social changes related to governance and social cohesion.
- CDD/R has been plagued by a panacea-type approach to goals and a generalised theory of change that is unrealistic.
- Issues for CDD/R programming include: the relatively short timeline of CDD/R projects, the small size of block grants, their limited reach, restrictions on what CDD/R can aim to do, the limitations of social infrastructure, the quality and intensity of social facilitation, conceptualising communities in ways that often are not meaningful to participants, and how existing institutions are built on and how they relate to the state.

Lange, S. (2008). The depoliticisation of development and the democratisation of politics in Tanzania: Parallel structures as obstacles to delivering services to the poor. *Journal of Development Studies*, 44(8), 1122–1144.

Author's abstract: "Local democracy and the involvement of local communities in the provision of social services are central issues in the local government reforms that are presently being implemented in many developing countries. At the same time, institutions that run parallel to local authorities, such as social funds and various user-committees, are established to improve accountability and participation. By focusing on actual political processes rather than administrative, legal and fiscal aspects of decentralisation, this article traces the breakdown of two development projects in Tanzania to the existence of parallel structures. It suggests that user-committees and social funds should be integrated in local authority structures to avoid fragmentation of participation and to enhance local democracy."

Nthomang, K. (2008). Botswana's Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) and the challenge of sustainable service delivery to San communities: The case for a cultural development (CD) approach. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 23(1), 37–60.

Author's abstract: "San communities consistently speak of the negative impact on well-being due to poor provision of essential services, social dysfunction and dislocation caused by culturally inappropriate government policies and programmes. The paper examines underlying factors that contribute to the Sans' continued dependency on government of Botswana programmes meant to empower them, in particular the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP). It attempts to unravel the often unquestioned institutional assumptions that construct, entrench and perpetuate San dependency on government programmes. The paper argues that it is not only dependency that is of concern, but also the more fundamental problem found in programme philosophies that negate the contribution of culture to the development process. Apart from drawing on the practical experience of the author, the paper is based on an empirical study done in one San settlement in Botswana. [...] the paper makes a case for the adoption of a cultural development (CD) approach that promotes indigenous knowledge and culture in the development process."

Schaeffer, M. (2013). *Ethnic diversity, public goods provision and social cohesion: Lessons from an inconclusive literature*. Discussion Paper. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

Author's abstract: "Over the last two decades there has been a growing debate on the supposedly negative relation between ethnic diversity, public goods production and social cohesion. Despite the amount of evidence, existing in-depth qualitative reviews conclude that the literature is inconclusive. Advancing upon their work, I conduct a quantitative review of over 480 empirical findings from 172 studies. Rather than seeing the huge literature as consisting of an incomparable mass of studies, I argue that the diversity of the literature allows us to analyse the robustness of the general association (does it hold for the comparison of Nepalese villages and European countries alike?) and the conditions under which it is more likely to appear. Accordingly, the review fine-tunes the conclusions we can draw from the existing evidence by noting that the debate has generally produced slightly more confirmatory than confuting evidence. But more importantly, this tendency for validating findings increases considerably under certain conditions: (1) inquiries from regions of the world with rather salient ethnic boundaries, (2) analysis of small-scale neighbourhood contexts and (3) a focus on trust related sentiments or public goods production as outcomes. A rather problematic result of the review is that discipline matters: In comparison to findings published in political science or sociology journals, a considerably larger percentage of findings that are published in economics journals are confirmatory. I conclude by suggesting that interdisciplinary work is necessary and should focus on the conditions under which ethnic diversity is a significant predictor of public goods production and social cohesion."

- The variations in the social salience of ethnicity make the fairly large amount of confuting findings "hardly surprising" (p. 21).
- Ethnic diversity "probably makes a stronger impression" at the local level of neighbourhoods than at the national level, suggesting that "the tendency for confirmatory results in neighbourhood studies might be a function of salience" (p. 22).

## Appendix: Methodology for compiling the bibliography

The inclusion criteria for this annotated bibliography were:

1. relevance to the topic
2. as a minimum quality, a clear description of the research methodology; or the source being of high quality, such as a peer-reviewed academic journal, or a major international organisation, bilateral aid donor, NGO, or policy-oriented institution.

The search syntaxes presented below are the final versions run and used, at the end of an iterative process during which different search syntaxes were tested. The tests ensured that the references identified were those most relevant to the topics of this rigorous literature review while being limited enough in numbers to be usable in the allocated 18 days.

The first versions of each search syntax were deliberately very broad, and were then refined and narrowed down. For example, the first search in the Scopus academic database on the relationship between service delivery and legitimacy called up any references published since 2005 in any social science that had words based on "service\*" and words based on "legitim\*" anywhere in the reference title, abstract, or keywords. This first search brought up 1,978 results. Narrower variations were then tested, until the final version of the search syntax brought up a manageable number of references while still being as open as possible and bringing up references relevant to this literature review. The final syntax requested that the reference be in English, and that "service\*" be in the reference title, while "legitim\*" could still be anywhere in the title, abstract, or keywords. This final search syntax brought up 270 references, which were then examined individually for potential inclusion (see details below).

### Searches in academic literature

The searches for academic journals and books were conducted in the Scopus database (<http://www.scopus.com/>).

```
(TITLE ( service* ) AND TITLE ( deliver* OR provid* OR provision ) AND TITLE ( aid OR assistance OR relief OR donor* OR reconstruct* OR development OR humanitarian* ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004 AND ( LIMIT-TO ( LANGUAGE, "English" ) ) AND ( EXCLUDE ( SUBJAREA, "BUSI" ) OR EXCLUDE ( SUBJAREA, "COMP" ) )
```

### Legitimacy

```
(TITLE ( service* ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( legitim* ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004 AND ( LIMIT-TO
```

```
( LANGUAGE, "English" ) )
```

=> 270 references examined

### Social cohesion

```
(TITLE-ABS-KEY ( service* ) AND TITLE ( cohesion OR "social cohesion" OR cohesive OR cohesiveness ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004
```

=> 58 references examined

```
(TITLE ( service* ) AND KEY ( cohesion OR "social cohesion" OR cohesive OR cohesiveness ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004
```

```
(TITLE ( service* ) AND TITLE ( belonging OR togetherness ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( deliver* OR provid* OR provision ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004
```

```
(TITLE ( service* ) AND TITLE ( trust OR collective OR collaboration OR cooperation OR co-operation OR sharing OR solidarity OR civic OR participation ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( deliver* OR provid* OR provision ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "developing countries" OR africa* OR asia* OR pacific OR "Latin America" OR "Central America" OR caribbean OR "Middle East" OR "North Africa" OR "Former Soviet" OR "post-soviet" OR cis OR "Central Asia" OR "Eastern Europe" OR balkans OR south OR global south OR "low-income countries" OR "middle-income countries" ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004
```

```
(TITLE ( service* ) AND TITLE ( interdependence OR interdependency OR inter-dependence OR inter-dependency OR "social relations" OR network OR networks OR "social capital" OR interaction OR interactions ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( deliver* OR provid* OR provision ) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "developing countries" OR africa* OR asia* OR pacific OR "Latin America" OR "Central America" OR caribbean OR "Middle East" OR "North Africa" OR "Former Soviet" OR "post-soviet" OR cis OR "Central Asia" OR "Eastern Europe" OR balkans OR south OR global south OR "low-income countries" OR "middle-income countries" ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND
```

PUBYEAR > 2004

( TITLE ( service\* ) AND TITLE ( inclus\* OR includ\* OR exclus\* OR exclud\* OR marginalis\* OR discrimin\* OR disadvant\* OR inequal\* OR unequal OR divide\* OR equal\* OR equit\* OR sensit\* OR "social inclusion" OR "social exclusion" OR "economic inclusion" OR "economic exclusion" OR participat\* OR participation OR participatory OR participant OR stigma\* ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004

### Social stability

( TITLE ( service\* ) AND TITLE ( stable OR stability OR stabilise OR stabilize OR stabilisation OR stabilization ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004

( TITLE ( service\* ) AND TITLE ( harmony OR co-existence OR coexistence OR "status quo" OR compliance ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004 AND ( EXCLUDE ( SUBJAREA, "COMP" ) OR EXCLUDE ( SUBJAREA, "MATH" ) )

( TITLE ( service\* ) AND TITLE ( ( conflict\* OR tension\* ) AND ( prevent\* OR mediat\* OR mitigat\* OR management OR managing OR resolution OR resolv\* OR solv\* OR interven\* ) ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004

( TITLE ( service\* ) AND TITLE ( resilien\* ) ) AND SUBJAREA ( mult OR arts OR busi OR deci OR econ OR psyc OR soci ) AND PUBYEAR > 2004 AND ( LIMIT-TO ( LANGUAGE, "English" ) )

### Searches through Google

Targeted searches with advanced search syntax were conducted in Google. All these searches included only documents published since 2005.

intitle:service OR intitle:services AND (intitle:deliver OR intitle:provide OR intitle:provision) AND (intitle:aid OR intitle:assistance OR intitle:relief OR intitle:donor OR intitle:reconstruction OR intitle:development OR intitle:humanitarian) filetype:pdf

intitle:service OR intitle:services AND intitle:jordan OR intitle:jordanian OR intitle:jordanians OR intitle:Hashemite OR intitle:amman filetype:pdf

intitle:service OR intitle:services AND intitle:lebanon OR intitle:lebanese OR intitle:beirut OR intitle:beyrout filetype:pdf

### Searches on specific websites

Dozens of websites of governmental bodies, international organisations, NGOs and policy-oriented institutions were also searched, manually and/or through Google searches.

Websites searched for general references included:

- [3ie](#)
- [Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action \(ALNAP\)](#)
- [Africa Power and Politics \(APPP\)](#)
- [African Development Bank – Publications](#)
- [Asian Development Bank – Publications](#)
- [Center for Global Development – Publications](#)
- [DFID – Research for development \(R4D\)](#)
- [Effective states and Inclusive Development Research Centre](#)
- [European Commission – Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection](#)
- [European Commission – International Cooperation and Development](#)
- [Governance and Social Development Resource Centre](#)
- [Health and Education Advice and Resource Team](#)
- [Institute of Development Studies – Publications](#)
- [Inter-American Development Bank – Publications](#)
- [Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law](#)



- [ODI – Publications](#) (in particular the programme on “[Achieving sustainable governance transitions](#)”)
- [OECD – iLibrary](#)
- [Oxfam International – Policy & Research](#)
- [PreventionWeb](#)
- [Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium \(SLRC\) – Publications](#)
- [UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs \(UNDESA\) – Publications](#)
- [UN Development Programme – Research & Publications](#)
- [UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction \(UNISDR\) – Publications](#)
- [UN Research Institute for Social Development \(UNRISD\) – Publications](#)
- [UN Women – Publications](#)
- [UNHCR – Publications](#)
- [United Nations University – Publications](#)
- [USAID – Reports & data](#)
- [World Bank – Publications](#)
- [World Bank Independent Evaluation Group](#)



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