



# DLP

Policy and Practice for Developmental  
Leaders, Elites and Coalitions

DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

Research Paper 15

## Institutions of Integrity and the Integrity of Institutions:

Integrity and ethics in the politics of  
developmental leadership

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## Abstract

In current debate, many developmental problems are attributed to the failure of leadership and, in particular, to the absence of either 'ethical leadership' or 'integrity in leadership'. But what is 'ethical leadership'? What is 'developmental integrity'? How is it achieved? And what are the conditions for sustaining it? The existing research on these questions is limited, and the primary objective of this study is accordingly to develop a conceptual framework for thinking about integrity in developmental contexts, not only at the level of individual behaviour, but also at the level of institutions. The core argument is that integrity and ethical leadership for development is not simply a matter of defining and enforcing codes of conduct (or of combating corruption). Instead, developmental integrity is the outcome of the interaction between (1) individual integrity (i.e. the moral choices of individuals); (2) institutions of integrity (the moral 'codes' and norms of behaviour, including legal rules); and (3) the integrity of institutions (institutions that are coherent, perceived as legitimate and that effectively promote development). While the research is therefore primarily theoretical and conceptual, it is intended to help policy-makers think clearly about ethics and integrity in relation to developmental issues.

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## Executive Summary

### Context and background

In current debate, many developmental problems are attributed to the failure of leadership and, in particular, to the absence of either 'ethical leadership' or 'integrity in leadership'. But what is 'ethical leadership'? What makes for the integrity of leaders in a developmental context? How is it achieved? And what are the conditions for sustaining it?

The primary objective of this research has been to develop a conceptual framework for thinking about integrity in developmental contexts, not only at the level of individual behaviour, but also at the level of institutions, and especially in the relations between them. By institutions we mean the formal and informal 'rules' that govern social, political and economic relations—ranging from the political system to cultural values.

While the work is primarily conceptual, it will also help policy-makers think about these questions in relation to developmental issues.

The question of integrity becomes especially vexed when rival and competing institutions and normative expectations are in force, and when people are therefore torn between two or more 'codes' of behaviour, without access to a universal ethical system that can resolve the conflict. Accordingly, this project explores the interaction between individual ethics and the institutions that embody social norms.

### Core argument

The key finding from this work is that in order to think seriously about ethical leadership or developmental integrity, it is important **not** to simply focus on codes of conduct, individual behaviour, enforcement mechanisms or even 'picking individual winners'. Rather, ethical leadership and developmental integrity in practice is a function of the more complex interaction of *individual integrity*, the *institutions of integrity* and the *integrity of institutions*.

### Key points

Specifically we argue that:

- There is a dearth of serious analysis about the idea of integrity in development. In order for policy makers to think seriously about integrity it is necessary to make a clear distinction between three closely linked aspects of integrity:
  - ***The institutions of integrity***, which refer to the institutionalised norms and codes of behaviour (both formal and informal) that 'bind' individual behaviour, and shape the context of individual integrity, including that of leaders. Such institutions define the moral boundaries that affect individual behaviour. Policing or auditing agencies and oversight mechanisms are merely one manifestation of the institutions of integrity and do not by themselves produce developmental integrity or ethical leadership.
  - ***Individual integrity***, which relates to the traditional understanding of integrity as honesty; appropriate behaviour ('doing the right thing' according to the norms and rules); or, consistency between words and actions. Individuals do not respond as automatons to the institutional incentives they face. Individual agency matters and leaders sometimes emerge who have transformative effects (for good or bad), e.g. Nelson Mandela or Pol Pot.

- **The integrity of institutions**, which means whether an institution functions correctly; is robust and legitimate; and, is fit for purpose. In the present case that means institutions that promote development. It is an important factor in development outcomes. An institution which does not work or which is haphazardly enforced or routinely evaded has little integrity.
- Understanding developmental integrity necessitates a deeper and more thoroughgoing analysis of both *individual and institutional* issues, and the relation between these issues. In other words, one must investigate the complexities generated by the interplay between an individual leader's choices and behaviour, on the one hand; and the context in which they operate, on the other hand (that is the relationship between agency and structure; or leader and institutions).
- The complexity of these relations is further compounded by the nature of institutional arrangements and leadership processes:
  - The *institutions* that make up this 'structure' may be *multiple and in conflict*.
  - *Leadership* is a *systemic and relational process* with a strong *political dimension*. It involves both the mobilisation of people and resources in support of goals and institutional stewardship that foster the institutionalisation of appropriate behaviours.
- The idea of *congruence* is central to understanding developmental integrity. Developmental integrity depends on whether the institutions of integrity and individual integrity function in such a way as to support the integrity of institutions. Congruence is therefore contingent upon:
  - *Appropriate and agreed rules* that govern political systems and/or organisational culture.
  - *Individual choices and behaviours* that are *consistent* with these rules.
- Congruence allows for the *possibility of differences and disagreement* that arise when stakeholders cooperate and compete with regard to the distribution of resources. However:
  - When these differences are *at odds with institutionalised rules or organisational culture*, individuals and coalitions are unlikely to achieve their goals.
  - When *institutionalised rules or culture no longer provide a useful frame* for making sense of individual actions and interpersonal processes, the institution becomes brittle and fails to provide the needed legitimacy for directing individual actions and interpersonal processes.
- *Institutional robustness and legitimacy therefore results when individual actions (leader behaviour) and interpersonal processes (coalitions) are aligned or congruent with shared institutional goals.*

## Leadership, coalition-building and development

Very frequently in development contexts, institutional arrangements lack congruence. This means that individual leaders may be pulled in different directions by competing ethical frameworks. Therefore, development policy and development programmes must take account of three important implications that flow from this insight:

- Leadership often takes place in the *uncertain interplay* between the individual leader's choices (agency) and the brittle or insecure institutional context within which those choices are made (structure).
- Institutional development is '*path dependent*', which implies that programmes that rely on incorrect assumptions about the institutional arrangements in a specific country or region, or that are naïve about the difficulty of altering institutional structures, are likely to fail.
- Developmental interventions must be *appropriate* to the institutional contexts in which they operate.

Unfortunately, this also implies that there is no set of simple guidelines that will help policy-makers to foster developmental integrity. A *deeper and more thoroughgoing analysis* of the individual and institutional dimensions of integrity is essential for understanding where and how ethical developmental leadership can be enhanced or supported in a specific country or context.

It is also important to recognise that leadership has a strong political dimension and that *power* is therefore a key factor. Different individuals and groups (including 'coalitions') exercise power and seek influence over the system. The 'rules of the game' are therefore frequently contested terrain and partisan (even predatory) interests are usually present.

For this reason fostering *congruence* is a key element of effective leadership, as when this is achieved to the requisite degree, *successful and sustainable development* is more likely to occur.

An important manner in which to achieve congruence is to *build and mobilise coalitions* around appropriate goals and appropriate institutions, even hybrid ones.

- This requires that leaders *sustain dialogue* amongst stakeholders, so that shared goals and practices can emerge through a process of cooperation, competition and consensus-building.
- However, ethical leaders must also manage institutional conflict and divergent interests by *promoting tolerance and openness* in decision-making processes, without expecting that all difference will be resolved.

*Brokering or facilitating processes or coalitions that can align institutions and promote congruence is an important role for leaders, donors or supporters.*

## Leadership and developmental integrity

At the heart of this approach is a 'systemic model' of leadership. This is distinguished from the more common 'agential model' of leadership, which places the responsibility for ethical behaviour or integrity largely on the individual leader (who purportedly controls the behaviour of followers and shapes institutional forms and practices).

By contrast, while recognising that there is always room for manoeuvre by leaders, the 'systemic' model places emphasis on the processes that give rise to developmental outcomes, including the institutionalisation of norms, values and practices and how leaders interact with these. As such, *leadership integrity* in the systemic model is determined, in part, by whether leaders:

- *Encourage inclusive stakeholder dialogue and foster congruence* when setting developmental goals.
- *Develop successful strategies* for balancing institutional requirements, organisational demands and the interests of individual stakeholders.
- *Assess the intended and unintended consequences* of actions taken in pursuance of collective goals.
- *Assume responsibility for, and undertake corrective action* to address strategies that do not promote or that may even undermine collective goals.

Whilst it is recognised that leaders influence 'followers' and others (mostly by providing the appropriate frames for thinking about developmental goals and outcomes), it is also acknowledged that followers influence leader behaviour through complex political processes. These political processes are deter-

mined, in part, by dynamic formal and informal relation of power, which are distributed across various institutional levels. Therefore *politics and power* lie at the heart of the systemic model, and profoundly affect ethical behaviours and developmental integrity.

In the systemic model of leadership, *institutions of integrity* are understood as the product of development paths that may be highly resistant to change. In order to understand the nature of effective and responsible leadership processes, it is therefore important to acknowledge the *historical nature of institutions*, which give rise to the multiple and conflicting institutional constraints and obligations that are simultaneously in force, and that impact on leadership processes.

We argue that the insights gleaned from this systemic conception of leadership can help us to better understand and promote ethical leadership practices that foster developmental integrity.

## Summary of findings

- Developmental integrity is a *complex process* that must be conceptualised in terms of the *political landscape*, in which various actors (with varying degrees of power) cooperate and compete in order to achieve their goals.
- This complex, political processes between actors should not however be incongruent with larger institutional rules and culture, as this undermines the legitimacy of institutions. Otherwise stated, institutional integrity is dependent on the establishment and maintenance of a degree of *congruence* between individuals (agents) and institutions (structures).
- In this regard, *leaders* play an important *sense-making function* in providing appropriate institutional frames for thinking about developmental goals, and for mobilising people and resources.
- Furthermore, *leaders* are responsible for *brokering or facilitating processes or coalitions* that can align institutions and promote congruence. Leaders are also responsible for the consequences arising from coalitions' actions.
- *Developmental integrity*, defined in terms of the systemic model, therefore refers to the ways in which *leadership integrity* gives rise to, challenges, and reinforces the *institutions of integrity*, thereby facilitating *institutional integrity* (i.e. institutional robustness and legitimacy).



## Glossary of key terms

**Elites:** We use the DLP's definition, where an 'elite' is defined as 'the usually very small group of leaders [both political and otherwise] occupying formal or informal positions of authority or power in public and private organizations or sectors, at national or sub-national levels. They generally take or influence major economic, political, social and administrative decisions in those spheres and often also use their power to influence decisions beyond such spheres'.

**Coalitions:** We use the DLP's definition,<sup>2</sup> where coalitions are defined as associations that 'bring together leaders, elites or organizations on a more or less temporary basis to achieve objectives they could not achieve on their own.' The DLP further defines coalitions as being 'short or long term, formal or informal'. To this we add the following: coalitions may also be narrowly based or broadly-based (and hence more or less inclusive or exclusive); vertical or horizontal; and, public or private. We also further supplement this definition with Yahsar's (1997:15) description of coalitions as providing 'the organisational framework for delineating who sides with whom, against whom, and over what. Coalitions bring together groups or institutions with heterogeneous, divergent long-term goals that they are willing to sacrifice for some intermediate, collective goals' (Yahsar, 1997:15).

**Development:** The term 'development' is exceptionally hard to define and is used in a wide range of senses in the literature. Any definition we offer is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to allow the reader to have a better sense of what we are getting at when we speak of 'developmental integrity' or 'developmental context'. Despite these definitional difficulties, Leftwich (2000:17) identifies two broad categories of development definitions, namely outcome and process definitions. One common element that characterises both these definitional categories has to do with changes in societies that improve material wealth or well-being (including changes in economic and political institutions, social values and technological infrastructure). As a working definition we therefore propose development as the processes of social, political and economic change, often deliberately pursued, and associated with or aimed at fostering sustainable economic prosperity, political stability, and social inclusion.

**Developmental Context:** We use the term developmental context to refer to the policies, institutions, stakeholders and interest groups that either promote or hinder development. Of specific importance in this context is the issue of collective action problems. These problems refer to situations in which individual actions are not sufficient to achieve the desired ends (and therefore collective action needs to be mounted); or, situations in which choices that are individually rational will not necessarily translate into benefits for the greater good, and indeed may produce collective irrationality. As such, solving collective action problems involves not only mobilising resources and people, but also ensuring alignment of purpose, so as to facilitate what we will refer to as congruence (see definition below).

**Institutions:** Classically, institutions are understood as the written and unwritten rules, norms, customs and laws that motivate or constrain individual behaviour, and may include (1) 'rules' that allow economic production and exchange to occur, such as contractual relations and their legal recognition; (2) the laws, constitutions and political customs that govern politics, government, finance and society more generally; and (3) unwritten codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, beliefs and customs that govern interpersonal and societal relations. In the context of this paper, the term 'organisation' denotes one type of institution; and, unless otherwise indicated, any references to institutions also include organisations. Conversely, the implications arising from the organisational examples used in this paper are also relevant for other types of societal institutions.

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, the DLP's definitions, which are referenced in this paper, are available at: <http://www.dlprog.org/contents/about-us/our-core-focus/key-concepts.php>

**Developmental leadership:** We use the DLP's definition, in which developmental leadership is defined as 'a political process that takes different forms in different contexts. It involves the capacity to mobilise people (including, but not only, followers) and resources, and to forge coalitions with other leaders and organizations, within and across the public and private sectors, to promote appropriate local institutional arrangements that enhance sustainable economic growth, political stability and social inclusion.' Although this definition of leadership is process-orientated, these processes are steered by individuals. Whilst individual character traits are therefore insufficient to explain the determinants of successful leadership, it must be kept in mind that individual leaders are capable of influencing contextual processes. As such, leadership is understood as involving both systemic and agential elements.

**Ethical leadership:** Ethical leadership should be understood in terms of individual and contextual factors, since both individuals and social processes, and institutional norms and functions, affect the quality of leadership within institutions. In this regard, ethical leadership is contingent on the integrity of leadership processes, understood in terms of the three senses of 'integrity' defined below.

**Integrity:** We think of 'integrity' in three primary senses: (1) the question of *individual integrity* in leadership, which relates to the traditional understanding of integrity as honesty, appropriate behaviour ('doing the right thing') or consistency between words and actions (Palanski and Yammarino 2009); (2) the question of the *institutions of integrity*, which refers to the social norms and codes (the 'this is how we do things here') that 'bind' individual behaviour, including those of leaders; (3) the question of the *integrity of institutions*. In the latter case, integrity is understood as 'correct functioning' and fitness for purpose—in this case institutions that promote development.

**Congruence:** Congruence is defined as 'the ability to accommodate difference and dissensus, without losing [the system's] functional unity or sense of purpose' (Painter-Morland, 2008: 224). Congruence can also be defined in terms of a fairly robust sense of shared identity or institutional 'will' that emerges due to definite institutional dynamics (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 84; 86), and which facilitates a broadly shared understanding of the 'rules of the game' and desirable outcomes. As an example, consider the consensual arrangements of democratic institutions: in such institutions citizens argue and compete (often over the allocation of scarce resources), but they are willing to accept the outcome of the democratic process (even when it is against their own specific interests) provided that the rules of the game were fairly applied. In this paper, we use the terms congruence and coherence interchangeably.

## Introduction

In recent years, development agencies, donors and governments have increasingly sought to incorporate 'ethics' and 'integrity' in development thinking, policy and programmes. However, there has been remarkably little serious research on these questions, and consequently practitioners have largely had to 'make it up as they go along', often in the form of strengthened anti-corruption agencies and increased oversight. While this approach may have had some benefits, it has arguably also had costs, and in our view suffers from the lack of theoretical and empirical work underpinning it.

This paper attempts to contribute to this broader research agenda by formulating a clear conceptual framework for thinking about the role of ethics and integrity in developmental leadership. We do this by critically reviewing the relevant literature on leadership, ethics, integrity and institutions, drawing on a range of disciplines, including ethics (in particular business ethics), leadership studies, economics, sociology and political science. The overarching research question that prompted this study could be formulated as: *how are questions of integrity and ethics relevant to the practice of developmental leadership, and in which ways do they affect developmental outcomes?*

In addressing this question, we draw on the set of conceptual and theoretical tools formulated in the research conducted as part of **The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)**. This includes a *political process* approach to leadership, which implies a focus on both the institutions of leadership and on individual leaders, rather than merely on individuals and the choices that they make. The key questions relate, therefore, to the institutionalisation of good developmental practice.

This inevitably raises the difficult question of *structure and agency*, and in particular how much explanatory weight should be attached to choices made by individual agents, and how much to the contextual factors that impose incentives and constraints on agents. A main premise of this paper is that any sophisticated and helpful account of developmental leadership must grapple with the structure-agency problematic.

It is in order to take account of structural factors that we turn to institutionalist approaches. However, two major shortcomings in this literature, particularly where it is inspired by institutionalist economics, hamper its usefulness. First, little attention is given to the influence of individual agents/leaders on institutional structures, thereby veering towards the opposite extreme as the mainstream literature on leadership. Second, many institutionalist schools of thought adopt a strict rational choice model of human behaviour, in which institutions are seen largely as mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and foster cooperation. Consequently, a reductionist view of institutions emerges, that does not adequately account for the historical contingencies that impact on institutional development and evolution, or the power-plays around their content and design; but, rather sees them as the products of rational institution building (see Offe, 2006:10-12).

The opposite shortcoming applies to mainstream leadership and business ethics literature: here, the focus is largely on the ethical traits of individual agents, as it is believed that such traits are important in reinforcing or undermining ethical behaviour. The recent literature, however, has started to account for systemic influences on leadership processes. Thus, whereas the institutional literature tends to ignore agency and the dynamics of *individual integrity*, the ethics and leadership literatures tend to emphasise agency at the expense of structural and systemic considerations. In constructing our conceptual framework, we are therefore mindful of the necessity of reflecting both on how structural conditions influence individual behaviour, and on how individual choices can transcend these conditions and in turn affect the evolution of institutions. We also attempt to avoid the reductionism and ahistoricity that often

plague rational choice models.

In investigating the role of integrity for developmental leadership, we think of 'integrity' in three primary senses. First, the question of *individual integrity* in leadership, which relates to the traditional understanding of integrity as honesty, appropriate behaviour ('doing the right thing') or consistency between words and actions (Palanski and Yammarino 2009). Second, the question of the *institutions of integrity*, which refers to the social norms, codes and patterns of behaviour (the 'this is how we do things here') that condition and constrain individual actions, including those of leaders (and that define what is considered ethically acceptable). Although these institutions may be consciously constructed, more often institutions emerge from complex historical and political processes (and therefore also reflect past and present exercise of power). Even when institutions are explicitly based on ethical principles, these principles emerge from and are conditioned by day-to-day practices. Our focus is therefore on developing richer descriptions of leadership practices, rather than to try and describe these practices in terms of *a priori* ethical principles. The third sense in which we use 'integrity' is with reference to the *integrity of institutions*. In the latter case, integrity is understood as 'correct functioning' and fitness for purpose, i.e. institutions that promote development. We believe that this acts as an important discipline on our theoretical work since the risk always exists in ethical thought that it neglects the demands of 'the real world' in favour of ethical purism.

In the first section of the paper we briefly review the use of the terms 'integrity' and 'ethics' in developmental contexts in order to provide a sense of current thinking (or non-thinking!) on the issues that we address. In the second section, we review the economic, sociological and political science literature on institutions. The primary insight to emerge from this literature is that 'developmental integrity' cannot be adequately theorised without reference to the historical, political and institutional contexts within which developmental actors are expected to behave ethically. But we also argue that individual agency (and all the complexities that this gives rise to in an institutional setting) needs to be factored into any useful theory of institutions. We then continue to develop a 'complex systemic model' of developmental integrity, in which the interplay between agency and structure is emphasised. In the next section, a critical review of the literature on ethics and leadership is provided. Although attention is given to the dominant agential model, the focus of the review is on the systemic model of leadership, as it accords better with our model of developmental integrity. The specific role that 'systemic leadership' plays in promoting developmental integrity is explored in the final section of the paper.

## The use of 'integrity', 'ethics' and 'leadership' in the development literature

While there are frequent references to 'integrity' in the field of development, particularly among practitioners in funding and support agencies like the World Bank, these references seldom take the form of theoretical or empirical research. This reflects the under-theorised nature of the question.

A search of the World Bank's website returns 26 200 references to 'integrity' and 11 600 references to 'ethics'. However, the very first links reflect the focus on combating corruption—the 'Integrity Vice Presidency' and the 'Office of Ethics and Business Conduct' respectively. The page for the Integrity Vice Presidency's first link is to 'report and allegation' and it also prominently displays a 'Fraud and Corruption Hotline' as well as a banner for a recent 'International Corruption Hunters Alliance' meeting. The Office of Ethics and Business Conduct aims to ensure that 'staff members understand their ethical obligations to the World Bank'. Other prominent links include the Bank's 'Governance and Anti-Corruption' learning programme that offers guidance for "responsible, and accountable public governance in developing countries" and an internal 'integrity day' that focuses on efforts to "enhance development effectiveness while trying to guard against fraud and corruption risks".

While the World Bank was a key partner in the 'World Ethics Forum' conference held in 2005 and at which a new 'Global Integrity Alliance' was proposed, it is notable that most papers and presentations collected in the conference proceedings take the form of speeches, rather than serious analysis. This effort also seems to have faltered, and there is little evidence that it has resulted in a more sophisticated effort at introducing questions of 'integrity' into the development discussion. It remains largely lip-service and expanded policing of development resources.

A review of the use of the terms 'integrity' and 'ethics' together with 'development' in the academic literature reveals a similar dearth of serious reflection on the question of developmental integrity.

A search of Google Scholar for articles in the Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities with both the terms 'integrity' and 'development' in the titles returns only 208 articles, most of which do not in fact focus on the issues we are interested in. Most results use 'development' in a different sense, e.g. 'academic development' or 'employee development'. Restricting the search further with the keyword 'economic' in the title leads to only seven results. Expanding the search for all three keywords to occur anywhere in the article results in a very large number of results (383 000), many of which do deal with development. This indicates that integrity is mentioned frequently in the academic development literature, but it is seldom the central focus of articles. A search on Google Scholar for 'ethics' and 'integrity' produces similar results, although slightly more focused on the questions we are interested in. A search for both 'ethics' and 'development' in the titles of articles produces 1 340 results, but again frequently using 'development' in a different sense. Restricting the search with the inclusion of the keyword 'economic' yields 29 results, many of which are relevant (e.g. Haddad (2005) 'Towards the integration of ethics and economic development: an institutional approach').

A search of the ISI Web of Knowledge produces very similar results to Google Scholar. For example, a search for the topic keywords 'development' and 'leadership' together with either 'ethics' or 'integrity' yields only 72 results.

While this could not be called a comprehensive bibliometric review, these results nevertheless confirmed our view of the under-analysed and under-theorised nature of developmental integrity (a phrase that itself hardly ever occurs) and the urgent need for further research on these topics.

## Institutions, integrity and development

### Introduction

The importance of institutions in shaping developmental trajectories is widely acknowledged within the social sciences. However, as Offe (2006:9) points out, the term is seldom clearly defined and often used in such a way that it would be interchangeable with 'power' or even 'the holders of power', which clearly does not make sense. Some conceptual clarification is therefore in order before we can deploy the concept productively in thinking about the role of 'integrity' in development. Before delving into the conceptual thickets, however, let us start off by defining institutions very broadly as the 'rules of the game' that define the parameters of individual action and the procedures by which collective decisions are made, disputes settled and how power is wielded. While there are of course also institutions that govern private behaviour, we are primarily interested in what occurs in the public sphere, including politics and governance, commerce, etc.

In addition to the problem of conceptual fuzziness, paradoxically, a further problem is that the notion of institutions is frequently used in a very narrow and depoliticised sense. Political scientists often use the term to refer exclusively to the formal institutions of political settlement (parliaments, the presidency, the judiciary, etc.) and neglect the informal institutions embedded in culture and tradition that may have an even firmer hold over individual behaviour (and may come into conflict with the former; see Ekeh, 1975). Economists, on the other hand, often restrict the notion to the rules that regulate economic activities—i.e. institutions that enable markets to develop and trade and commerce to take place, such as enforceable contracts and private property rights (Chang, 2003). Institutions are often seen in neoclassical economics as optimal behaviour by rational economic agents interacting within frictionless markets (Greif, 2006:xiv).

In keeping with our *political process approach* to development and in an attempt to remain sensitive to historical contingency, we argue for a wider view that includes not only institutions directly relevant to economic transactions, but also all institutions relevant to social, political and economic development. These include both the cultural/informal institutions and the formal and legal institutions that shape and constrain individual behaviour. We also consider the role of institutions in shaping the outcomes of political processes, including those that may or may not result in relative consensus about developmental approaches (e.g. state-led development vs. a market-oriented approach). In other words, we are interested in how formal and informal institutions define the 'rules' that govern both economic activity and political contestation, including elite settlements over developmental paths, over the distribution of economic spoils and that affect who participates, how disagreements are resolved, how coalitions form and who 'wins'. Some of these institutions even operate at supranational level and govern interactions between states, and between national elites and international elites (e.g. in international organisations and multinational corporations).

We therefore follow Greif (2006) in considering institutions as interrelated systems of rules (legal or otherwise), beliefs, norms of behaviour and organisations. However, we remain cognisant of the dangers of expanding the definition of institutions so widely that the concept loses analytical value. We also believe that the best way to study institutional arrangements and their impact on political, social and economic outcomes is through an analytical approach to detailed historical case studies that, despite their inductive character, allows one to tease out general insights on institutions. Therefore, while institutions, the contexts within which they operate and the outcomes that they produce differ according to historical circumstances, their study can nevertheless provide generalizable insights applicable in other

contexts.

At this point it is important to draw a distinction between *institutions* as we have defined them ('the rules of the game') and the *organisations frequently referred to as institutions* in both the literature and popular parlance (e.g. public, governmental and political bodies). In this paper, the term 'institutions' is used in the former sense, unless otherwise specified. However, because institutionalised rules and norms (especially formal rules) often become embodied in institutions designed to enforce them, this distinction cannot be rigorously maintained. For example, the rules governing contracts may first emerge as informal customs, become widespread and socially enforced norms, later be codified in formal law and eventually become closely associated with formal bodies (like courts or tribunals) designed to enforce them. These less and more formal institutions often coexist and sometimes come into conflict.

The basic claim of institutional theory is that the institutional arrangements of any given polity profoundly shape the opportunities and incentives facing individuals (Skocpol, 1995; Hay and Wincott, 1998; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002), and most significantly those of leaders and members of elites. Institutions therefore play a big role in shaping both micro-level behaviour and systemic outcomes. Institutions are highly relevant to both the individual decisions of leaders and the elite alignments that we refer to as coalitions (see earlier DLP research).

While historical institutionalist scholars are largely interested in macro-level historical changes that shape institutional and economic structures over time (see David, 2001; Pierson, 2004), the perspective is nevertheless useful to a more micro-level account of leadership and policy settlement that tries to be sensitive to the contextual factors that shape the process. Useful attempts to apply institutional analysis to include micro-level behaviour have been made by Robert Bates and associates like Avner Greif by extending neoclassical and strict rational choice models of individual behaviour with insights from game theory (see Bates et al., 1998). However, as we argue below, rational choice and economic accounts of how institutions shape behaviour have a curious apolitical view of history, in which institutions are essentially reduced to mechanisms for overcoming collective action problems (in the technical sense) and fostering cooperation between self-interested rational actors. These accounts lack a convincing view of power and seldom focus on 'bad' institutions—those that enable parasitic elites to prosper or that fail to foster inclusive development.

Later we attempt to synthesise insights from institutional analysis and the leadership literature in order to offer conceptions of 'ethical leadership' and 'developmental integrity' that incorporate institutional factors.

In order to provide an illustrative example of how behaviour can be shaped by institutional factors in ways with developmentally relevant outcomes, we can turn to Peter Ekeh's (1975) classic article on Africa's 'two publics'. Ekeh argues that in postcolonial Africa a 'primordial public' operates alongside the 'civic public':

In fact there are two public realms in post-colonial Africa, with different types of moral linkages to the private realm. At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual's public behavior. I shall call this the primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless impinge on the public interest. The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand, there is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police, etc. (Ekeh, 1975:92)



When a civil servant (for example) belongs to both these 'publics', his or her behaviour is shaped by rights and duties imposed by both sets of institutions—duties which may be in conflict. There may exist a moral duty to funnel resources towards members of one's own ethnic group, while at the same time the civic law prohibits this. Clearly, this situation may result in 'corruption' or 'mismanagement of public funds' in ways that a simple emphasis on 'law enforcement' or 'accountability' will not resolve. Price (1975:63-82) provides some empirical evidence of this. In his survey of Ghanaian civil servants, respondents were presented with a hypothetical situation in which a family member is among a group of individuals waiting to see him/her. The respondent was then asked whether the family member should be given precedence or kept waiting if other people had arrived before the family member. While 75% of respondents answered that the proper behaviour would be to keep the relative waiting, 80% indicated that the 'normal' behaviour they expected of civil servants was to give the relative preferential treatment and 93% thought the relative would expect to be helped first (*ibid.*:64). Price also found a strong correlation between respondents' estimates of the relative's expectations and their expectations of how a hypothetical civil servant would resolve the role conflict implied by the situation, stronger in fact than with the respondent's own interpretation of legitimate role behaviour (*ibid.*:66). This indicates that Ghanaian civil servants acknowledged the hold of informal ('primordial') institutions over those whose control over public resources derives from the formal, 'modern' institutions of the postcolonial state.

Research conducted during the first phase of the DLP likewise supports the view that institutional arrangements (which differ substantially between countries) affect developmental outcomes (see for example Brautigam, 2009; Grebe, 2009a), but this work needs to be developed into more sophisticated accounts of institutional processes and their role in development. The most we hope to achieve in this paper, however, is to offer some conceptual clarification and, in particular, to assess the relevance of the literature on institutions from economics, political science and sociology for a theory of 'developmental integrity'.

## **Institutionalist economics and historical institutionalism**

As representative perspectives we review the two main strands of institutional theory, known as *new institutional economics* (NIE), differentiated from older institutionalist economics, and *historical institutionalism* (HI). These are rooted in economics and comparative politics respectively. In the economic literature the term 'institutions' usually refers to the non-technological or social features of a society (at a given point in time) that impact on economic outcomes. Institutions influence economic outcomes because they impact on the decisions of economic agents: for example, legal recognition of contracts reduces transaction costs by addressing asymmetrical information (effectively, it restricts the freedom of agents to deceive other agents during transactions and provides a dispute resolution mechanism). In political science and sociology the emphasis is often on states and state-society relations, including such institutional arrangements as constitutions and electoral systems.

However, the approaches share important methodological similarities, including a preference for empirical historical analysis in the form of case studies and tracing social and economic changes over time. It is also worth noting that there has been a great deal of cross-fertilisation between different strands of institutionalist thinking (Hall and Taylor, 1996, cited in Thelen, 2002:92), so a rigorous separation is not possible. New institutional economists usually define institutions as the formal and informal rules that influence behaviour by means of constraints and incentives. Menard and Shirley (2005:1) offer this general definition:

Institutions are the written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environment. These include (i) written rules and agreements that



govern contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) constitutions, laws and rules that govern politics, government, finance and society more broadly, and (iii) unwritten codes of conduct, norms and behavior; and beliefs.

NIE remains rooted in mainstream economic theory in that it retains a core of rational choice theory even though it abandons some of its standard assumptions like perfect information, efficient markets and unbounded rationality. North (2005:21) points out that traditional neoclassical economics explores the efficiency of resource allocation synchronically under the restrictive assumptions of frictionless markets and therefore cannot explain processes of economic change (much less social or political change). NIE therefore expands the domain of economic theory, but does not substitute itself for neoclassical models. It could be argued that institutional economics is a response to criticism levelled from within other social sciences against the tendency of economists to over-simplify human behaviour as 'rational utility maximisation' and ignore social and political factors. While NIE broadens accounts of human behaviour to take into account norms, beliefs and customs and the incentives created by historically-specific institutional arrangements, institutionalist economics nevertheless remains firmly within a rational choice model. Agents are motivated by the incentives created by institutions, and the interest is primarily in institutions that support economic production and exchange. Even though NIE attempts to move beyond the limitations of neoclassical economics, institutions are still largely seen as structures that allow cooperation between self-interested, rational utility-maximisers.

While HI scholars share many of the interests and approaches of NIE, they are less likely to restrict their focus to economic outcomes and are often more interested in social and political institutions *per se*. Historical institutionalism (perhaps reflecting its disciplinary roots in sociology and political science) is also more comfortable with interpretive accounts of history than rational choice theories.

They have also made greater efforts to integrate into their accounts a theory of power and conflict. Jack Knight's *Institutions and Social Conflict* (1992) is perhaps the most important example of this. Moe (2006), however, argues that despite the efforts to deal with power and exploitation, most institutionalist analyses still suffer from a poor *theory of power*. Individuals or groups may overcome collective action problems and cooperate, for example cooperation between bureaucracies and legislatures with differing interests in democratic societies. But this cooperation may nevertheless be 'exploitative' in the sense that it runs counter to the interests of 'outsiders' who do not have the power to compel the cooperating actors to take their interests into account. Argues Moe (2006:32-33):

Indeed, power is so commonly featured in [the literature relying on rational choice reasoning] that it is now easy to believe—as I suspect most scholars in the field do—that power is an integral part of the theory, on a par with cooperation in explaining political institutions. But it really isn't. However much power might be discussed, the fundamentals of the theory have not changed. They take their orientation from the same framework that guides all economic theory: voluntary exchange among rational individuals. They identify the key challenge as one of understanding whether rational individuals will cooperate in the face of collective action problems.

Nevertheless, these efforts by HI scholars to integrate a theory of power, together with attempts by economists like Olson (2000), are important if we are to deploy institutionalist insights in a defensible account of developmental integrity.

Skocpol (1995:105) identifies four processes of note in historical institutionalist policy studies: (1) the establishment and transformation of state and party organisations; (2) the effects of political institutions and procedures and social institutions on the identities, capacities and goals of social groups that become involved in politics; (3) the fit or lack thereof between the goals and capacities of politically active groups

and the historically changing points of leverage created by political institutions; and (4) the ways in which previously established social policies affect subsequent policies over time. The latter process points to the centrality of changes over time in historical institutionalism.

While change in institutions over time is also a central concern for some institutionalist economists (see, for example, North, 1990), the rational choice foundations of NIE makes it more likely that scholars will attempt to model one set of events and the manoeuvres of actors in one institutional setting at a time (Skocpol, 1995:106). As Pierson and Skocpol (2002:1) put it: “Historical institutionalists analyse organisational configurations where others look at particular settings in isolation; and they pay attention to critical junctures and long-term processes where others look only at slices of time or short-term manoeuvres.” A further difference between institutionalists in economics and those in other disciplines is that the former frequently focus on individuals as economic agents, probably out of a desire to keep the scope of behavioural modelling manageable. Later we will reflect more on this tendency during the discussion of game theoretic extensions of institutional analysis. This concern of HI with diachronic analysis is captured in the notions of *path dependence*—the ‘self-reinforcing’ persistence of institutional structures or their change along distinct trajectories and of *critical junctures*—moments of discontinuity and major institutional upheaval (see Collier and Collier, 1991; Collier, 2007; Boas, 2007).

In broad terms, ‘path dependence’ refers to the idea that past decisions constrain present options. In historical institutionalism, it is usually used in the more technical sense of the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes by which behaviour becomes institutionalised and institutions resist change once established (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002:6), characterised by what is called in economics ‘increasing returns’ (Pierson, 2000:252).

This notion of path dependence usually supports a number of key claims: (1) specific patterns of timing and sequence matter in historical events; (2) starting from similar conditions, a wide range of outcomes may be possible; (3) ‘large’ consequences may result from contingent and relatively ‘small’ events; (4) particular courses of action, once undertaken, may be very hard to reverse; and (5) political and social development is often punctuated by ‘critical junctures’ during which the potential for change is greater and which shape the basic contours of social and political life (Pierson, 2000:251). Alternatives that may be open early in the process become increasingly unreachable and unlikely over time. This results in the self-reinforcing character of changes in institutional arrangements. In their classic study of political change in Latin America, Collier and Collier (1991) convincingly argue that large-scale political change (such as democratisation) occurs at such critical junctures, where the possibility of change is greater than under normal circumstances. These changes then become increasingly irreversible over time. Pierson and Skocpol (2002:8) argue that the macro-level interest of historical institutionalism allows it to study *conjunctures*—interaction effects between distinct causal sequences that become joined at particular points in time (Aminzade, 1992)—which gives it a distinct advantage over rational choice-based theories with a more micro-level focus.

Despite this, even HI often draws on economic analyses rooted in a rational choice-free exchange model in which institutions are primarily cooperative structures. Nevertheless, HI is much better than NIE and other economic models at dealing with politics and power. It is also better at dealing with institutional change, making it more useful for our purposes and more applicable to an analysis of developmental integrity. In a later section we draw extensively on complexity and systems theory for our model of developmental integrity. While this connection is seldom made in the literature, historical institutionalism’s focus on path dependence and critical junctures is strikingly similar to certain notions from complexity theory: the self-reinforcing character of institutions reminds one of the ‘self-reproductive’ character of complex systems and the relative stability that may exist in the state of a system for extended periods.

## **'Analytical narratives' and the game theoretic extension of institutional analysis**

The 'analytic narratives' approach applies many of the techniques and explanatory mechanisms prevalent in NIE and historical institutionalist accounts. It is, however, closer to NIE's rational choice foundations and analytic narratives apply rational choice theory and mathematical models (especially models from game theory) to particular historical situations. It then uses these models to test the applicability of general theoretical points in those specific circumstances, hoping that this allows historical case studies to contribute to generalizable social theory. It explicitly grapples with a methodological question that faces all social scientists who attempt historical analysis: how to extrapolate from historically-specific case studies to generalizable theory (Bates et al., 2000:696).<sup>3</sup> This is a question that is of great importance to the DLP, which largely makes use of case study methodology, but seeks to glean from the case studies lessons of wider significance. While analytical narratives have been heavily criticised by Elster (1999; 2000) as over-ambitious deductive history,<sup>4</sup> they rebut this charge by arguing that merely the rational choice component of their theory (which they do not consider a necessary precondition of analytical narratives) is deductive and by aligning themselves with a more general attempt in the social sciences to integrate interpretive and rationalist accounts (Bates et al., 2000:69). Despite its origins in NIE, the analytic narrative approach does address larger questions of political economy such as political order, governance of the economy and polity and interstate relations (Levi, 2002:109). However, in our view its reliance on rational choice theory limits its ability to do so.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to review game theory, but suffice to say that analytic narratives draw on game theory to model individual behaviour in 'games' where the choices are constrained by institutions. Institutions in this view can be seen as 'self-enforcing equilibria that coordinate behaviour' and choices are regularised, stable and patterned because they are made in equilibrium (Levi, 2002:109). An example of such a 'game' would be where economic actors negotiate a contract such as a sales contract. Each 'player' attempts to optimise his/her own position (i.e. an outcome which maximises the rewards to him/her). An equilibrium emerges when each player has adopted a strategy that optimises their position, given the strategies of the other players, so that they do not face any incentive to change their strategy. The outcome realised in this situation is therefore an 'equilibrium solution' to the game.

Particular historical circumstances are then understood with reference to the selection, longevity and transformation of equilibrium solutions that arise in particular times and places. (In classical game theory, each game has a 'solution', which represents the equilibrium state when all participants make decisions aimed at optimising their own position.) While this is then clearly an approach informed by rational choice theory, it is one that is not purely deductive.

However, the application of game theory to political situations that are difficult to describe exhaustively, or in which 'players' cannot be assumed to behave as rational utility optimisers, remains very difficult. Likewise, the influence of power and ideology are difficult to incorporate in such an analysis. While the analytic narrative approach therefore improves upon some of the theoretical weaknesses of NIE, it does not provide a model that can easily be integrated into our theory of developmental integrity.

<sup>3</sup> This question is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we implicitly accept that valid inference is possible from historical evidence, including single case studies that may appear historically specific. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994:5) argue, historical sociology is not incompatible with social science if it is practised in a systematic fashion, seeking to evaluate alternative explanations through a process of valid causal inference. A useful overview of strategies for causal inference in small-N studies is provided by Mahoney (2000).

<sup>4</sup> Elster (2000:694) argues that an attempt at historical explication founded in rational choice theory is bound to fail, because (1) Non-rational emotional motivation is pervasive and (2) we do not know how to construct usable predictive models of emotional decision-making.

## Structure, agency and integrity: do institutionalist approaches help us?

As we argued in the introduction, a theory of developmental integrity (or of 'ethical leadership' in a developmental context) must in some way deal with the structure/agency problem. Since theories of leadership tend to emphasise agency, institutional theory can act as an important corrective. Institutional theory can also help us to think about development in a macro-historical, comparative and systemic way that allows us to extrapolate from specific historical circumstances. When applied in this way, it may also offer pointers and cautions with respect to efforts at promoting integrity in developmental practice by helping avoid ahistorical and simplistic approaches that are not sensitive to the particularities of historical and institutional contexts in different societies.

The challenge is to incorporate insights from institutional theories while formulating a model of developmental integrity in a way that avoids some of the problems associated with institutionalist analysis. The main issues are discussed below.

**Structure and agency:** The question of how much explanatory weight to attach to structural and contextual factors and how much to individual agency is one faced by all macro-historical analysis. A strict rational choice approach, such as that employed in NIE and, less strictly, analytic narratives, essentially evacuates any space for meaningful individual agency, since individual choices are merely rational strategic responses to a situation (that is assumed to be fully describable). Individual decisions are in the final analysis simply optimising behaviour within the constraints of a given institutional arrangement ('rules of the game'). What adherents of this approach would probably see as its greatest advantage—that it can offer coherent and clear explanations for behaviour—is therefore arguably also its greatest weakness. Historical institutionalist approaches that are more interpretive in character avoid this reductionism and in our view allow greater space for individual agency to operate within the model, while nevertheless retaining an interest in macrohistorical and macrosociological processes. An HI analysis of South Africa's democratic transition would therefore focus on the structural constraints and incentives faced by the leaders who negotiated the settlement that resulted in a new constitution, while still allowing us to appreciate the importance of the choices made by individuals like Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk within this institutional context.

HI's ability to incorporate human agency without neglecting the structural and contextual factors that determine the possibilities open to individuals and groups renders it of greater use to the model of developmental integrity that we propose.

**Institutions beyond market institutions:** This paper, and the DLP as a whole, argues for a holistic approach to development that includes a focus on the politics of development. It is therefore essential that any theory of institutions employed must not be restricted to economic or market institutions. Again HI suits our purposes better than NIE, although we can also draw on the extension of rational choice institutional theory in the 'analytic narratives' approach.

**Collective decision-making:** A further potential problem with NIE identified above that persists in analytic narratives is the focus (inherited from neoclassical economics and from game theory respectively) on economic agents as individuals. While it is not excluded in principle, collective action is hard to model using this approach. We would follow Thelen in arguing that "institutions are important not just in how they constrain individual choice or affect individual strategies, but also in how they affect the articulation of interests, and particularly the articulation of *collective* interests" [original emphasis] (Thelen, 2002:92).

**Power:** We argued extensively above that HI is better at integrating *power* and *exploitation* into institu-

tional analysis, but that even in comparative political analysis, institutional approaches still draw substantially on economic assumptions. While we do not purport to fully overcome this problem in our model, we would argue that an analysis of power, and one that can account for parasitic elite behaviour, is essential to any sophisticated account of developmental integrity.

**Temporality:** Again, as argued earlier, HI's incorporation of path dependence and critical junctures allows for a more convincing diachronic analysis than strict rational choice approaches.

It is therefore our view that the HI approach's more flexible definition of institutions, its incorporation of collective action and its model of institutional change over time is more compatible with the notion of 'coalitions' that is central to the DLP's research agenda. Yashar defines coalitions as follows:


...coalitions are defined as alliances among social sectors or groups. They provide the organizational framework for delineating who sides with whom, against whom, and over what. Coalitions bring together groups or institutions with heterogeneous, divergent long-term goals that they are willing to sacrifice for some intermediate, collective goals. (Yashar, 1997:15)

While New Institutional Economics, Historical Institutionalism and analytic narratives do not explicitly deal with questions of developmental integrity, insights from institutional theory can nevertheless contribute to a model of the latter. This is what we attempt to do in the next section. However, before we set out a model of developmental integrity, we briefly review the literature on 'integrity systems' as one of the few areas where the development literature has explicitly dealt with integrity and has also looked at the role of institutions (albeit only formal 'policing' or 'accountability' institutions) in consolidating 'public integrity'.

## **Institutions of integrity in the development and governance literature**

In the world of development practice and scholarship, the term 'integrity' is often used in a sense much more restricted than we do in most of this paper, namely to describe the absence of corruption (i.e. using public power for personal gain in violation of the legal rules). This tendency is reflected in the literature on 'national integrity systems', 'public integrity systems' and 'ethical regimes', terms that are increasingly frequently used by practitioners like development agencies and especially the anti-corruption organisation Transparency International. Institutions are, however, viewed in a relatively narrow manner, usually as formal agencies with the legal power to police abuses such as public auditing authorities, prosecutors and courts. As could be seen from our overview of existing uses of 'integrity' and 'development' (see The use of 'integrity', 'ethics' and 'leadership' in the development literature on page 13), this literature is limited and theoretically weak.

A National Integrity System (NIS) is defined by Brown and Head (2005) as "the broad range of institutions, processes, people and attitudes working to ensure integrity in the exercise of [a] society's many different forms of public power." Originally coined by Jeremy Pope of Transparency International and widely adopted by development agencies, the concept of the NIS is used to propose a 'holistic vision' of institutions that prevent and combat corruption within a society (particularly the public sector). It envisages a series of accountability 'pillars' that support national integrity, including democratic accountability, judicial accountability, a free press, civil society, etc. (Pope, 2000:33-34). The following diagram illustrates the argument:



Source: Pope (2000) *Confronting Corruption: Elements of a National Integrity System*.

Public administration scholars have attempted to systematise this concept and infuse it with greater theoretical rigour, particularly by developing a framework for the assessment of NISs (see Brown et al., 2005). Sampford, Smith and Brown (2005:96) argue that a key aspect of successful NISs is 'coherence' between the various organisations and agencies that make up the system and for a broadened notion of 'mutual' or 'horizontal accountability'. While the original argument for an NIS emphasises that integrity is the collective result of mutually supporting institutions, it provides little detail about the nature of the interactions between components of the system that would have the desired result (*ibid*, 97). 'Mutual accountability' extends the traditional Anglo-European model of 'separation of powers' to describe both constitutional and legal separations between institutions of state and more subtle and informal 'watching and advising' (Sampford, Smith and Brown, 2005:98) as well as forms of interaction other than formal accountability. It proposes a triad of relationship types: *constitutional*, *policy* and *operational* (*ibid*, 99). Sampford, Smith and Brown (2005:104) further cite results from the Australian National Integrity Systems Assessment (Brown et al., 2005) to suggest statutory 'governance review councils' in order to strengthen relationships and ensure on-going coherence and coordination.

Shacklock and Lewis (2006) build on the 'integrity systems' approach (they also use the term 'ethics regimes') and extend the framework beyond a national focus. They attempt to incorporate a dimension of complex human relationships within organisations and argue that the quality of leadership is a critical determinant of organisational integrity and that the latter in part involves the construction of the 'pillars' of an integrity system within an organisation (Shacklock and Lewis, 2006:355). Unfortunately, their analysis adds little of substance to the integrity systems approach described above and does not offer the theoretical integration of 'ethical leadership' (see later section of this paper) and institutional approaches that one might have hoped for.



The integrity systems approach reflects an essentially technical and juridical notion of institutions, largely restricted to formal law enforcement and corruption-combating agencies. It therefore fails to take into account the complex historical nature of institutions. Nor does it offer a theoretical approach that allows for detailed analysis of transformations in institutional arrangements over time. While the idea of 'integrity systems' is undeniably useful to development agencies and public policy practitioners, it does not reflect a deep theoretical substrate and does not offer much in the line of theoretical tools for the analysis of 'developmental integrity'.

## Summary of findings

	Main Premises	Evaluation
<b>New Institutional Economics</b>	NIE usually focuses on economic and market-enabling institutions (contract, property). It uses a neoclassical economic model and rational choice theory to explain individual behaviour within institutional contexts. However, it abandons some of the more unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical models (like perfect information and efficient markets).	While greatly expanding the domain of economic theory, NIE remains focused on economic/market institutions and often neglects political and macrosocial institutions. Owing to its rational choice model, it frequently limits analyses to specific times and places, and to individual actions (as opposed to collective action). It therefore struggles to account for change over time and the rational choice model evacuates all agency, reducing behaviour to rational responses to incentives and constraints.
<b>Analytical Narratives</b>	Analytic narratives grew out of and remains closest to NIE. Its central feature is an application of game theory to modeling individual behaviour.	Game theoretic models often allow for quite elegant explanations of how the institutions that exist in a particular situation influence individual behaviour. However, for all its rigour, this approach suffers from many of the weaknesses of NIE, including a failure to deal adequately with individual agency owing to a strict rational choice approach, a tendency to limit analyses temporally and spatially. It is better able to account for collective action than NIE, owing to game theory's sophisticated models of competition and cooperation.
<b>Historical Institutionalism</b>	Historical institutionalism shares many concerns and methods with NIE, but affords more attention to social and political institutions. Most (though not all) scholars in this tradition abandon strict rational choice theory and adopt a more interpretive approach to historical analysis. As a result, there is a preference for 'path dependence' and diachronic analysis.	The more interpretive approach of most historical institutionalists allows for a stronger temporal dimension, but has the disadvantage of making rigorous modelling of behaviour more difficult. There is more space for individual agency, although there remains a much greater focus on the structural factors that affect outcomes. An interpretive historical approach carries the risks of 'deductive history' and unjustifiable extrapolations.

Integrity Systems	The theory of 'integrity systems' and 'ethical regimes' focuses more narrowly on preventing and combating corruption. It views <i>institutions of integrity</i> as the set of people, organizations, laws, customs, etc. that prevent or punish the abuse of public power. In the classical form it sees the national integrity system as made up of a set of 'pillars', but this has been extended with more sophisticated models of 'mutual accountability' and network relations between institutions.	The integrity systems approach has the benefit of being oriented to the practical problem of public integrity and of formulating a set of clear recommendations for developmental practice. However, its technical view of institutions is restricted and fails to take into account the complex historical, cultural, social and political factors that shape institutional configurations and influence whether they work as expected. It also has a rather shallow theoretical underpinning.
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We therefore argue for an approach to institutions and integrity that incorporates:

- **historical and institutional context**—cultural historical factors that influence what incentives and constraints affect the behaviour of individuals in governments or the private sector;
- **individual agency**—a theory of institutions is required that does not reduce individuals to automata that simply rationally calculate optimal choices based on a rigorously specified set of conditions;
- **a temporal dimension**—what is usually referred to in the literature as 'path dependence', namely an account of institutional evolution and transformation over time, including 'critical junctures' or points in time where qualitatively and quantitatively greater change is possible;
- **collective action**—our view of institutions must not be solely aimed at explaining the behaviour of individuals (and economic agents), but also take account of complex elite alignments, coalitions and political groupings relevant to the development process;
- **institutions of integrity**—by this we mean the institutions (including norms, codes, and ethical principles) that define behaviour as morally acceptable, which in the developmental context usually refers to acting in a non-predatory fashion in the interests development; and
- **the integrity of institutions**—by this we mean integrity as effective functioning, and fitness for purpose, specifically, whether institutions in fact promote or hinder development, including, but not limited to, the market and exchange-related institutions with which institutionalist economics is concerned.



## Developmental integrity

Developmental integrity cannot be understood outside of the political dynamics that govern all processes in the developmental context, including power relations and institutional processes. In this section, we attempt to bring together the insights gleaned from the literature on institutions and some of the literature on leadership and integrity that we explore more fully in a later section. We propose a definition of ‘developmental integrity’ that accounts for the structure-agency dynamic that we have repeatedly argued is a central theoretical problem. It should be noted that this model is somewhat schematic in nature, and is also quite theoretical. Its applicability to developmental practice may seem limited, but we ask the reader to bear with us, because it is our hope that these ideas will crystallise more concretely as our discussion of leadership and integrity progresses in the next section, as well as in the conclusion.

We wish to conceptualise developmental integrity in a manner that can account for integrity

- at the level of *individual agency*;
- at the level of *interpersonal processes*, which gives rise to systemic leadership and institutions; and
- at the level of *political and macro-historical processes*.

In order to do so, we draw on complexity and systems theory, which we believe helps us bridge the structure-agency gap. We therefore propose a complex systemic model in which the *interplay between agency and structure* is emphasised. This implies an analytical shift from the traditional focus on individual entities alone (whether they be individuals or organisations) to a focus on the *relations between various entities*, and the systemic patterns that emerge from these relations and that account for the properties of the system.

### A model of ‘developmental integrity’

#### Institutions, agency and purposive action

Individual agents both compete and cooperate in order to achieve goals such as enhancing their material wellbeing. The agency of each individual allows him/her to choose from a range of possible actions, although these individuals generally face incentives and constraints imposed by pre-existing structural factors such as formal and informal institutions. From the perspective of a complex systemic model of social processes, what is of greatest interest is the intentional and unintentional *concertive or joint actions between individuals* that give rise to patterns of relationships that can be thought of as the ‘structure’ of the system. In other words, structures (including institutions) emerge from individual actions. These emergent systemic structures create opportunities and constrain the behaviour of individual agents through a process of ‘downward causation’ (see Woermann, 2010).

To clarify: individuals make choices at the level of individual agency, but are then ‘rewarded’ or ‘punished’ by the institutions that regulate (but do not exhaustively determine) individual behaviour. Structural or systemic factors therefore promote or undermine certain choices through positive or negative ‘feedback loops’. Over time, these feedback loops reinforce or undermine certain patterns of behaviour, which then become institutionalised in formal or informal rules, norms, policies, laws etc. An example of this process would be when weak criminal justice and disciplinary processes do not punish officials for corrupt practices. Over time, as this incentive structure that rewards breaking the formal rules becomes solidified, a set of ‘corrupt’ institutions emerge that make it very hard to change these institutionalised practices.

However, institutions not only place constraints on individual behaviour, but also provide opportunities for purposive action and, therefore, also create space for meaningful individual actions. For example, the institutions of democratic politics limit the power of individual political leaders (and also political institutions themselves, e.g. through the separation of powers in the American Constitution). However, these very same institutions provide a structure within which individuals can exercise meaningful individual leadership. U.S. President Barack Obama's ability to control his own healthcare legislative initiative was seriously limited by the fact that legislative authority is seated in Congress. However, if presidential power were unchecked, any future president would easily be able to overturn his/her predecessor's legislative initiatives, undermining the certainty that societal actors could have that the law would remain relatively stable. Paradoxically, therefore, the limitation of the President's power to implement policy provides that policy with greater solidity once it has gone through the legislative process.

### Congruence/coherence and institutions

Another important function of feedback loops within this systemic conception of developmental integrity is that they represent the process through which, what we term, 'congruence' or 'coherence' emerges. In the section on the systemic conception of leadership we develop this notion to a greater extent (see Ethical leaders foster institutional congruence / coherence starting on page 35). For now, we can think of congruence as the alignment of expectations and actions of diverse actors within an institutional framework. This does not imply full agreement on normative codes or purpose, but rather "the ability to accommodate difference and dissensus, without losing [the system's] functional unity or sense of purpose" (Painter-Morland, 2008:224). Hargadon and Fanelli (2002) define 'coherence' (which we use interchangeably with congruence) as follows:

Coherence in organizations exists as a social phenomenon in the recursive social interactions between individuals. Group and organizational members come to hold (relatively) aligned interpretations of the world, (relatively) aligned goals, and (relatively) aligned identities because they tend to be surrounded by their own actions... Through the experiencing of actions by participation or by observations, individuals construct, reconstruct, and/or modify the scripts, goals, and identities that make up their relevant schema.

Institutions that reflect congruence therefore,

- may emerge from formal and informal coalitions;
- may be specific to organisations; and
- may operate at the level of political, social, and economic institutions like states and markets.

What this means is that competition over resources and political contestation (individually or collectively) is not necessarily at the expense of the effective functioning of these institutions. However, when institutions lack congruence (as they frequently do, especially in less stable societies), they may break down, come into conflict with each other or fail to provide a structure within which peaceful contestation can take place. In such situations we argue that the *integrity of institutions* (i.e. institutional legitimacy) is lacking, which may undermine developmental outcomes. Conversely, when individual or interpersonal goals do not resonate with the generally-accepted political rules or culture of a given institution, then leaders and coalitions are unlikely to achieve these goals. In other words, *developmental integrity* is also dependent on the alignment of *individual integrity* with the *institutions of integrity*.

## Institutions, agency and transformative leadership

It should, however, be emphasised that a complex systemic model implies that the myriad complex interactions between individuals, sub-systems and systems cannot be exhaustively described in the way that rational choice models such as those described earlier try to do. It is impossible to fully predict the outcome of the competitive and cooperative activities of individuals that give rise to structures at the systemic level and a certain degree of uncertainty is therefore implied by this model. While the notion of congruence helps to describe how both pragmatic and normative structural patterns become reinforced and institutionalised, the irreducible complexities implied by this model mean that collective action problems can never be fully overcome.

It is also important to emphasise that this model does not imply that individual agents are 'imprisoned' or fully determined by institutions. Since the choices of individuals influence the particular form that institutions take, individuals can be important catalysts of transformation (at points in time that HI scholars might term 'critical junctures'). *Individual integrity, therefore, remains of critical importance.* This point is illustrated by historical examples of major transformations flowing from the actions of individuals at critical junctures. A somewhat clichéd, but nevertheless pertinent, example is the role played by Nelson Mandela during South Africa's democratic transition. (Historical examples of nefarious change of course also abound.) We elaborate further on how a systemic perspective on leadership can accommodate such transformational leadership rooted in individual agency in the next section. But any such account must avoid degenerating into the standard agential account of leadership (akin to the 'big man of history' approach), since critical junctures that allow for substantial transformation are few and far between, and in any event reflect opportunities rooted in the trajectory of historical change.

Thus far, our proposed model of developmental integrity has shown how *individuals acting with integrity* can generate, reinforce and transform the *integrity of institutions*. In order for this to be the case, interpersonal processes must effectively bridge the institutional and individual level. This means that these processes must be flexible and open enough to allow for individual actions to have transformative effects on the system, but they must also be ordered enough to allow institutional constraints to filter through to individuals. If these interpersonal processes do not function correctly (i.e. with integrity) blockages occur in the system, which may hamper the effective functioning of institutions.

This model does not differentiate between *institutions of integrity* and other institutions, but does provide an explanatory framework for how *institutions of integrity* can operate effectively in developmental processes. This model also draws on our threefold understanding of integrity, because in accounting for the agency-structure dynamic, the integrity of individuals, *institutions of integrity* (i.e. the existence of structurally and contextually-determined norms and codes), and the *integrity of institutions* (i.e. their effective functioning and fitness for purpose) reinforce one another.

## Leadership and ethics

An important consideration is the role that leadership plays in our proposed model of developmental integrity. Although the role of transformative leaders was mentioned as an example in explaining our model of developmental integrity, it is important to account for a wider conception of leadership in this model. To this end, it is useful to draw on the existing leadership and business ethics literature, in order to identify a suitable understanding of leadership for developmental integrity.

### Overview of leadership orientations

Two broad leadership orientations can be identified, namely the more traditional orientation, which Mary Uhl-Bien (2006: 655) refers to as the ‘entity perspective’; and the less-known orientation (currently gaining prominence), which she refers to as the ‘relational<sup>5</sup> perspective’. In this study, these perspectives will be referred to as, respectively, the *agential* and *systemic* orientations on leadership. Whereas the former perspective focuses on individual leaders and their character traits, the latter perspective extends its focus to also include the structural dynamics of leadership.

#### Agential leadership

With regard to the agential leadership orientation, Uhl-Bien (2006: 65) argues that leadership is treated in terms of the Cartesian dogma<sup>6</sup>, wherein “the ‘knowing’ individual is understood as the architect and controller of an internal and external order.” Translated into leadership terms, this means that leaders can exercise influence and control over followers, and, thereby mobilise people and resources. In this perspective, “organizational [or institutional] life is viewed as the result of individual action” (Hosking, Dachler and Gergen, 1995: x), and it is believed that it is primarily those in the top echelon of the hierarchy who are in position to determine institutional life (see Painter-Morland, 2008: 179). The agential leadership orientation can further be divided into the *normative* view of leadership (i.e. what *should* a leader do?) and a *descriptive* dimension (i.e. what *does* a leader do?) Whereas the normative view focuses solely on the *attributes and personality traits* that define successful leaders, the latter view looks at *empirical examples* of successful leaders, and studies the *behavioural aspects* of these leaders. If we take the example of U.S. President Barack Obama, we can argue that—from a normative agential perspective—his leadership style should be understood in terms of his history and his character traits (possibly as described in his autobiography, *Dreams from my Father*). Furthermore, we would view his leadership position as the causal outcome of the deliberate and systematic choices made by someone who is in control of his own destiny. A descriptive agential perspective would study these choices (and the influence that they have on Obama’s followers), in order to determine the behavioural attributes of successful leaders within the political context.

#### Systemic leadership

In contrast to the agential perspective, the systemic perspective on leadership is more sensitive to the *human and contextual complexities* that influence the leadership process. In this approach, the focus is on both the interdependent and dynamic relations between stakeholders, as well as on the contextual contingencies that impact upon these relations. As such, the systemic orientation starts with processes

<sup>5</sup> According to Uhl-Bien (2006: 654-655), traditional research on leadership defines relationally-orientated leadership in terms of an individual leader’s focus on developing high quality, trusting work relationships. However, in this context, we follow Uhl-Bien (2006: 655) in defining relational leadership as focusing on ‘human social constructions that emanate from the rich connections and interdependencies of organizations and their members.’

<sup>6</sup> The Cartesian dogma reflects a paradigm in which it is believed that we live in a mechanical universe, and that a rational subject can gain certainty with regard to scientific knowledge and truth. According to Fritjof Capra (1983: 59), an “overemphasis on the Cartesian method has led to the fragmentation that is characteristic of both our general thinking and our academic disciplines, and to the widespread attitude of reductionism in science—the belief that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts.”

and not persons; and views persons, leadership and other relational realities as emergent properties<sup>7</sup> of a system (see Hosking, 2007; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Collier and Esteban, 2000). If one were to analyse President Obama's leadership from a systemic perspective, one would take cognisance of the complex, social process that gave rise to his presidency. Important factors in this regard would be US culture, the Democratic Party machinery, an intense desire for change, an overwhelming dislike of the Bush administration, the importance of internet campaigning, the credit crisis, etc. The effects that these contextual contingencies had on the voting public, and other key stakeholders including black Americans, environmentalist, mainstream democrats, a younger generation of well-informed techno-geeks, and disenchanting Republicans would be considered important. These stakeholders not only played a pivotal role in Obama's election, but also in the way in which his campaign unfolded.

Although the President Obama example is useful in elucidating some of the characteristics of the systemic perspective, this example fails to capture the *distributed nature of systemic leadership*. In other words, in this perspective, leadership is often "stretched over the practice of actors within organizations [or institutions]" (Friedman, 2004: 206) and "many of the functions that were traditionally associated exclusively with formal leadership are now shared by members of an organizational [or institutional] system" (Painter-Morland, 2008: 229). What this means is that *the process of mobilising people and resources can only be understood in terms of an institution's systemic functions*. This is not to say that individuals cannot assume leadership roles. The point is rather that different individuals can embody leadership roles at different times, depending on the circumstances (Painter-Morland, 2008).

As an example, consider Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey's (2007: 306-307; 309) distinction between administrative, adaptive, and enabling leadership.

- *Administrative leadership* refers to the activities of individuals who occupy formal managerial roles, and who are therefore responsible for planning and coordinating institutional activities (i.e. they assume a bureaucratic function). As an example, consider a bank manager who has the authority to either approve or reject loans, or an HR manager who has the authority to change remuneration or labour contracts. In both these examples, the individuals derive their power from their position in a certain organisational structure, and very little charisma is needed to successfully perform these jobs.
- *Adaptive leadership*, in contrast to administrative leadership, is an emergent, complex dynamic, "which originates in struggles among agents and groups over conflicting needs, ideas, or preferences; it results in movements, alliances of people, ideas or technologies, and cooperative efforts" (Uhl-Bien et al. 2007: 306). Although adaptive leadership involves people, it is not embodied in people. However, Uhl-Bien et al. still identify it as a leadership dynamic since it is the proximate source of change in an institution. As an example, consider the group of young engineers who lobbied within their Swiss watch company (SMH) for cheaper watches made with new (plastics) technology, as opposed to the old mechanical-style watches. The outcome of this process led to the creation of Swatch watches, which turned out to be key in remaining competitive in an industry that had been placed under increasing pressure by Japanese companies, who, at the time, were taking over a large part of the market with digital watches.
- Lastly, the role of *enabling leadership* is to facilitate the conditions that catalyse adaptive leadership. Enabling leaders also manage the inevitable entanglement between administrative and adaptive leadership. This involves "using authority (where applicable), access to resources, and influence to keep the formal and informal organizational systems working in tandem rather than counter to one another" (Uhl-Bien et al. 2007: 311; see also Dougherty, 1996). The CEO of SMH, the Swiss watch

<sup>7</sup> By 'emergence' we mean that complex systems exhibit properties or structures at the level of the system itself, which emanate from, but are not obvious from, the much simpler interactions and relations between the elements of the system. For example, the interactions between neurons in the brain are relatively simple, but taken together, give rise to complex brain functions like cognition. Emmeche, Koppe and Stjernfelt (1997:83) define it as "the idea that there are properties at a certain level of organization which cannot be predicted from the properties found at lower levels".

company, serves as a good example of an enabling leader, as he was able to facilitate the conflict between the young group of engineers (the adaptive leaders) and their managers (the administrative leaders). His leadership afforded the young engineers the opportunity to create a prototype of the Swatch watch, despite the resistance of senior engineering and design managers.

What the last example shows is that all three leadership types may be present in one institution. However, sometimes one of these types will take precedence over another, and in some cases may even involve a pragmatic reversal of roles between those who occupy positions of authority in the formal hierarchy, and those who answer to them (Painter-Morland, 2008: 224). Furthermore, the example of the group of young engineers lobbying together to achieve a common goal also illustrates the fact that distributed leadership need not only be thought of in terms of the sum of the attributed influence of many different role-players (Wenger, 2000: 231). It is often more productive to view distributed leadership as *joint or concertive action* (Gronn, 2003: 35), especially since this view accords well with the type of leadership that emerges from coalition building. According to Gronn (2003: 35), distributed leadership as concertive action is characterised by the following three features:

- There are collaborative models of engagement that arise spontaneously in the workplace;
- There is the intuitive understanding that develops as part of close working relations between colleagues;
- There are a number of structural relations and institutionalised arrangements which constitute attempts to regularise distributed actions.

Although the goal of leadership in both the agential and the systemic perspective is defined in terms of mobilising people and resources, the way in which this process is seen to unfold varies depending on whether one subscribes to an agent-centric or contextual and systemic view of leadership. Agential and systemic leadership theories therefore also provide different answers to the questions as to who should define and achieve an institution's goals, and how these goals should be achieved. In other words, these two perspectives provide us with a different understanding of what leadership integrity might mean in practice. In the next section, the question of leadership integrity is critically explored in terms of the normative agential perspective, the descriptive agential perspective, and the systemic perspective with the goal of determining which notion of leadership integrity is best suited for the developmental context.

## Defining leadership integrity within the agential orientation

### The normative perspective

Proponents of the normative view of agential leadership treat ethical leadership in terms of *how ethical leaders 'ought' to behave* (Brown and Trevino, 2006: 596). Leadership theories that explicitly articulate the ethical qualities and standards demanded of ethical leaders are therefore common in this orientation. In this regard, *authentic leadership* (Avolio, Luthans, and Walumbwa, 2004; Luthans and Avolio, 2003), *spiritual leadership* (Fry, 2003; Reave, 2005; Fry, Vitucci, and Cedillo, 2005), *transformational leadership* (Burns, 1978), and *servant leadership* (Greenleaf, 1977) are all examples of leadership theories that address the moral potential of leaders. Brown and Trevino (2006: 600) note that these leadership theories define leaders in terms of a genuine care and concern for followers (i.e. the theories are altruistic). In this regard, consider the example of Mother Theresa. Furthermore, integrity plays a key role in these theories in that leaders make ethical decisions and become role-models for others, as is evidenced by the further examples of the Dalai Lama and Nelson Mandela.



The traditional understandings of integrity are most applicable to the normative view of ethical leadership. Audi and Murphy (2006: 6) have identified four writers in the business ethics literature who have attempted to unpack the meaning of integrity (as a character trait embodied by an individual). In this regard, they reference Paine (1997: 335) who defines integrity as “the quality of moral self-governance”; Solomon (1992: 109), who views integrity as ‘wholeness’; Dalla Costa (1998: 191) who equates integrity with honesty in the wide sense of the term; and Gostick and Telford (2003), who attempt to define integrity in terms of a set of consistently displayed characteristics. Audi and Murphy (2006: 6-7) are however critical of these definitions, arguing that integrity—as understood in the business ethics literature—is either conflated with other moral virtues or is so vaguely defined that it “ends up being purely evaluative—useless synonyms for good and bad” (Caldwell, 2004: 11).

Although this view of leadership integrity *highlights the importance of virtuous leaders*, another major shortcoming of this view is that it only accounts for individual integrity. As such, it is unable to provide much insight into whether integrity and ethics are relevant to the practice of *developmental leadership*.<sup>8</sup> Nor does it shed much light on the ways in which ethics and integrity can affect developmental outcomes. This is because the normative agential view of leadership *does not account for the way in which leaders influence, and are influenced by, contextual and systemic factors*.<sup>9</sup>

### The descriptive perspective

Brown and Trevino (2006) make use of a social scientific or descriptive approach in defining ethical leadership. They argue that leadership theories under the normative orientation suffer from an inability to account for what they call the more ‘*transactional or behavioural aspect of leadership*’. In other words, normative leadership theories provide us with little to no insight regarding “leaders’ proactive influence on the ethical/unethical conduct of followers in the context of work processes” (Brown and Trevino, 2006: 600) or the degree to which ethical leaders “explicitly focus attention on ethical standards through communication and accountability processes” (Brown and Trevino, 2006: 600). They conclude that, since ethical leadership must also account for the integrity of leadership processes, leadership theories such as authentic, spiritual, transformational and servant leadership (including their accompanying constructs) are clearly related to, but distinct from ethical leadership (Brown and Trevino, 2006: 600).

With regard to *the integrity of leadership processes*, any useful leadership theory should be able to explain the ways in which leaders help to *create, reinforce or change* an institution’s culture or direction. In other words, leadership theories should be able to account for the ways in which leaders influence the *institutions of integrity* (i.e. the structurally embedded norms and codes that ‘bind’ individuals in organisations and elsewhere). In this regard, Schein (1985)—who is an early proponent of the descriptive orientation—argues that there are five mechanisms that leaders can use to exercise influence on an institution’s culture and direction, namely: attention, reaction to crisis, role-modelling, allocation of rewards, and criteria for selection and dismissal. Sims and Brinkmann (2003: 247-252) employ Schein’s model in order to illustrate how the leadership practices in Enron served to create an organisational culture that was focused on accruing profits at all costs.

- First, the issues that capture the leader’s attention will also capture the attention of the greater organisation, and of the employees. At Enron, executives’ attention was focused on profit, power, greed

8 Developmental leadership here refers to the political processes of leadership that steer institutions, organisations and relations in a society in a positive developmental direction, involving sustainable growth, political stability and inclusion.

9 Apart from the fact that the normative agential view is contextually-limited, Lyne de Ver (2008: 24-25) also notes the following problems: the individualistic, atomistic approach to leadership brings with it a number of issues (including the fact that the focus on leadership traits or characteristics presupposes the existence of a leader); the assumption regarding a leader’s control over outcomes is too strong, and verges on a deterministic view of leadership; the approach assumes an ability to isolate the traits of a particular leader; and, leadership is seen as being embodied by a leader. This view of leadership does not allow for analysing leadership as a political process between leaders and followers.

and influence.

- Second, a crisis tests a leader's true values, and brings these values to the fore. Enron's executives realised that the spectacular growth of the nineties could not be maintained. They responded to the financial downturn by emphasising profitability at all costs. When Enron's behaviour came to light, leaders reacted by shifting blame and pointing fingers.
- Third, role modelling refers to the behavioural example that leaders set in terms of tolerating unethical behaviour. Enron's executives did not set a good example in living the company's supposed values of communication, respect, integrity, and excellence. To the contrary, they broke the law in their use of creative partnerships, or special purpose entities.
- Fourth, rewards signal to others what is necessary in order to succeed in an organisation. The reward system at Enron was premised on a 'win-at-all-costs' focus, and a former Enron vice-president was quoted as saying: "the moral of the story is break the rules, you can cheat, you can lie, but as long as you make money, it's all right" (*ibid.*: 250; also see Schwartz, 2002).
- Last, a leader's decision with regard to whom to recruit or dismiss signals his values to all employees. Kenneth Lay (Enron's founder and president) and Jeffery Skilling (Enron's vice-president and president for six months) had a reputation for hiring the best and the smartest people, who embodied the same beliefs that they were trying to instil, namely: "aggressiveness, greed, a will to win at all costs, and an appreciation for circumventing rules" (Sims and Brinkmann, 2003: 251). Employees who were unable or unwilling to conform to these values, and who did not produce results were humiliated in a public forum and redeployed or fired.

Although framed within a business context (as opposed to the developmental context), this example clearly illustrates the enormous impact that leaders can have on the *institutions of integrity*. Furthermore, when cultural norms and codes serve to reinforce unethical behaviour, this often has a negative impact on the *integrity of institutions*. This is because, in many cases, unethical practices undermine an institution's ability to achieve its purpose.

This latter point is also illustrated by the Enron case: although the ultimate goal was seen as maximising profits, the business culture of doing so 'at all costs' eventually led to the company's downfall. In other words, institutional integrity was undermined, since the company's purpose (i.e. its survival) and its norms and codes (i.e. to make profits at all costs) were *incongruent*. Furthermore, it can also be argued that Enron's leaders wrongly viewed the organisational purpose only in terms of the 'bottom line', instead of in terms of the broader goal of supplying Californians with electricity at reasonable prices. In this regard, the internal organisational goal (i.e. making profit) was incongruent with the goal of the organisation as defined by external stakeholders (i.e. supplying electricity), which also contributed to the company's demise. For a company to survive it must simultaneously hold "in tension the process of responsiveness to the environment on the one hand, and maintenance of integrity of purpose on the other" (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 208)—something that Enron was clearly incapable of achieving.

For the purposes of formulating a notion of developmental integrity, the descriptive agential approach to leadership integrity is more appropriate than the normative agential approach, since the former also *takes the influence that leaders exert on institutional norms and codes into account*. However, the descriptive approach still remains locked within the Cartesian dogma. This is because although the leader's influence on followers' behaviour as well as on contextual norms and codes are accounted for, the impact that contingent events and other contextual factors exert on leadership behaviour is not taken into consideration. As such, the approach remains too agent-centric, since the leader is still presumed to be the architect of an internal and external order.



We believe that in order to fully understand the impact that leaders can have on developmental integrity, one should rather focus on a systemic, as opposed to an agential view of leadership. As will be explained in the next section, such a view of leadership *frames the actions of individual leaders within a larger systemic context characterised by certain constraints and opportunities*, which the individual leaders harness in order to promote the *integrity of institutions*.

## Defining leadership integrity within the systemic perspective

### Ethical leaders recognise that their responsibilities are contextually-determined

Whereas the individual moral agent forms the primary unit of analysis of the agential approach to leadership, the systemic approach is premised on the idea that our identities (and, hence, our sense of right and wrong) emerge within communities of practice.

As an example, consider the case of giving and accepting corporate gifts: whether or not such a practice is deemed unethical is largely dependent on the specific context. Indeed, it is explicitly stated in Heineken's code of conduct that: "The question of gifts... is less clear-cut. Social acceptance of 'corporate gifts' varies from one country to another; making it difficult to lay down hard and fast rules" (Heineken, 2009). With regard to the acceptability of corporate gifts, some companies share Heineken's feeling that individual discretion should be exercised within the parameters of broadly stated ethical principles (such as avoiding gifts that may cause a conflict of interests, impair ethical business relations or jeopardise decisions), whereas other companies bar corporate gifts outright.

What this example shows is that *what 'ought' morally-speaking to be the case* (the normative dimension) is, *in part, determined by a consideration of what is the case* (the descriptive dimension). In other words, our sense of normative propriety is influenced by our contexts. This is further illustrated by the fact that, in 1962, it was viewed as proper and correct for Belgian women to obtain permission from their husbands before opening a bank account. However, not only are our ethical considerations formed in practices, but our practices themselves must be subjected to critical normative appraisal. This is because there is no *a priori* (or external) ethical vantage point against which we can measure the 'rightness' of our actions; and because our practices influence who we become and affect others (see Preiser and Cilliers, 2010; Morin, 2007). Therefore, it was only by challenging the status quo that Belgian women were able to overturn this highly sexist and discriminatory practice and thereby start to dismantle the patriarchal society. What this example shows is that—despite being unable to appeal to a universal conception of the Good—our decisions and actions need not be morally arbitrary or relative. Rather, responsible thought lies in being able to provide good arguments for why we pursue a certain course of action, or why certain established practices need to be overturned in the name of ethics.

Since both formal and informal leaders typically occupy positions of power (and are therefore capable of exercising a large degree of influence on the *institutions of integrity* and the *integrity of institutions*), it is a primary function of leaders to engage in responsible thought and to *guide the 'process of becoming'* (i.e. the process by which an institution's or collective's identity evolves, or is constituted, through the establishment of shared meaning). In this regard, Wenger (1998: 191) argues that systemic leadership 'nurtures community', and that in this role systemic leadership "is deeply ethical because it is the process of belonging to a community which is constitutive of identity." However, it must also be noted that—since institutional identity is the *outcome* of the irregular, non-linear<sup>10</sup> patterns of stakeholder

<sup>10</sup> Unlike linear phenomena where the system is the additive result of its components, non-linear phenomena occur due to novel and often surprising (re-)configurations of the system's components (Dyke and Dyke 2002). In practice, non-linearity means that systems cannot be 'compressed' or represented without discounting some of the complexity. A good example of non-linearity at work is the recent revolution that took place in Egypt. No one could have predicted the events that unfolded in Egypt in early February 2011. What makes this example so fascinating is that it demonstrates the distributed nature of leadership and power. The leader (former president Mubarak) failed to appease the masses, and mass mobilisation spontaneously emerged due to an intuitive under-

interactions within a specific institutional setting (Painter-Morland, 2008: 223)—leaders cannot exclusively determine or control institutional identity (as the agential orientation assumes). Thus, one of the paradoxes of systemic leadership is that of *hierarchy-participation*. Although the influence of all role-players is, in principle, taken into consideration, not all role-players have equal power or carry equal weight. Systemic leadership relies on the principle of mutuality (especially given the distributed nature of leadership); yet, it is also clear that the process is asymmetrical in that influence and power shifts as people assume different roles and responsibilities at different times (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 212).

### **Ethical leaders attend to emergent institutional narratives and sensitise institutional role-players to the effects of their actions**

Since complex systems are characterised by nonlinear effects, the effects of our decisions and actions can never be fully determined in advance, and no single individual can control outcomes. In other words, within this context, “[n]o one person has the knowledge or the overview to be a leader: leadership qualities of competence, judgement and decision-taking are needed throughout the [organisation]” (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 207; see Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998; Wheatley, 1999; Stacey, 1996; Senge, 1997; Bennis 1999).

This reinforces the point that the integrity of leadership processes is not driven exclusively by a single leader, but must be conceptualised as “an on-going direction-finding process, which is innovative and continually emergent” (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 208). In this regard, individual leaders have an important *sense-making function*. This is because, if leaders are not willing to engage in dialogue and take cognisance of the emergent themes that arise from the complexity that defines institutional behaviour, or if leaders are only willing to attend to “those aspects that ‘fit’ some preconceived picture” (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 91), then leadership strategies are doomed to fail. However, if leaders “can guide those narratives, or even attend to them, purposive intervention regarding the selection among adjacent possibilities has a much better chance of achieving fruition” (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 91).

In other words, ‘emergent institutional narratives’ are the shared meanings or ‘stories about ourselves’ that emerge from a continuous and complex process of dialogue and interaction in an institution. No single participant is the ‘narrator’, or director of the process, but leaders have an important role in guiding the process, so that the shared meanings arrived at are appropriate and inclusive (i.e. congruent with institutional rules and norms).

In this regard, leaders also have the responsibility of sensitising institutional role-players to the effects that their actions have on stakeholders. These role-players should be encouraged to accept *accountability* for their actions. However, due to the fact that agents are constituted within a network of relations, accountability should primarily be understood in terms of accountability *towards* others, rather than accountability *for* wrongdoing (Painter-Morland, 2008: 225). The latter notion of accountability is premised on the idea that we can fully control the outcome of our actions, and therefore amounts to a form of ‘blame responsibility’. Being accountable towards others, however, implies a form of ‘obligation responsibility’, since to fail to act appropriately is to fail someone. Institutional failure should, therefore, be viewed in terms of a breakdown of stakeholder relationships, rather than only in terms of those interactions where “intentionality, recklessness, or negligence can be established” (Painter-Morland, 2008: 225–226).<sup>11</sup>

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standing amongst the Egyptian people that they had reached a critical juncture in their history. The public thus cohered around the issue of democracy, despite religious, gender, age and cultural differences.

11 The notion of accountability developed here exacerbates, rather than resolves, ‘the problem of many hands’ (i.e. the inability to pinpoint individuals in wrongdoing, due to fact that the unethical action is the consequence of many individual inputs and impersonal institutional processes). However, if we view the phenomenon of distributed agency as a consequence of complexity, rather than a problem to be solved, the only meaningful conclusion to draw is that we need to find new ways of dealing with corporate and institutional wrongdoing and other issues related to accountability and breakdowns in integrity. The understanding of ethical leadership developed in this paper should not serve as an excuse for wrongdoing, but should rather strengthen our commitment to ethical behaviour (Woermann, 2010).

The above two arguments are interdependent: leaders will only be able to draw awareness to the effects that institutional actions have on stakeholders if they take note of the larger, emergent institutional identity, and the way in which institutional identity and narratives affect others. In this regard, consider again the example of SMH's CEO, Ernst Thomke. Despite resistance from management, he understood that the actions of the young engineers (i.e. lobbying for cheaper watches) were indicative of customer needs. By taking cognisance of emerging organisational narratives, the CEO was capable of facilitating change which was to the advantage of the organisation's customers, and which restored Switzerland as a major player in the world wristwatch market. Although not normative in nature, this example goes some way in illustrating the importance of aligning organisational goals with the needs of stakeholders. In other words, this example illustrates the importance of nurturing institutional congruence or coherence.

### **Ethical leaders foster institutional congruence / coherence**

Through showing a preparedness to attend to institutional narratives, to engage in dialogue, and to remain sensitive to stakeholder needs; and, through encouraging other institutional role-players to do the same, leaders can help to foster *institutional congruence*, defined as "the ability to accommodate difference and dissensus, without losing [the system's] functional unity or sense of purpose" (Painter-Morland, 2008: 224). Congruence is the product of aligning internal and external stakeholder expectations and actions with institutional or cultural norms and codes, in order to foster institutional purpose. As an example, consider the case of gender coalitions in Egypt and Jordan. Those coalitions that achieved the most success in bringing about changes in gender perceptions were able to frame women's issues in terms of existing cultural contexts, instead of appealing to Western precedents. In other words, the coalitions achieved their purpose (transformation of gender perceptions) by taking account of both the stakeholders (including religious organisations) and the local Egyptian and Jordanian contexts within which they were operating, including established cultural, religious and political institutions.

Another example concerns the abortion debate. The pro-abortionists are only able to gain ground by respecting cultural norms and codes. As such, the issue is not framed in terms of pro-death, but rather in terms of pro-choice arguments (whereas anti-abortionists offer pro-life, as opposed to anti-choice arguments). From these examples, we see that issues framed within societal norms and codes (even when offering a radical challenge to these norms and codes) are more likely to gain traction, due to the fact that these frames cohere or are congruent with the norms and values of society and its institutions. It is important to note that congruence is not a superficial or retrospective experience of institutional 'sameness'. Rather, it is the outcome of experimentation and contention, and allows systems to draw from the full range of talents, skills, and perspective that diverse stakeholders have to offer (Painter-Morland, 2008: 224). Although preferring the term 'coherence' over that of 'congruence', Lissack and Letiche (2002: 84) provide further insight into what congruence/coherence might mean:

- "It implies a *shared meaning and signifying apparatus* of some rigor and sustainability" (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 84);
- It *demand robustness*, which is a feature of systems "whose behaviour results from the interplay of dynamics with a definite organizational dynamics" (Jen, 2001);
- It "is about *people and circumstances being powerfully linked to one another*" (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 84);
- "*It is enabling*, which means that people in [institutions] who 'cohere' demonstrate a shared and thereby more powerful 'will'" (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 84);
- It "*includes and confronts emergence*—emergence understood in terms of the prospect of an ever-increasing and nondelimitable possibility space" (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 86).

To further illustrate the idea of coherence/congruence, consider the (less controversial) case of wearing seatbelts. In Western Europe wearing seatbelts in the front seats (and, to a lesser extent, in the backseats), or wearing helmets when riding motorcycles, is considered a good thing. Over time, these practices have become institutionalised—both through formal laws, but also through the behaviour of road users. As such, these practices are today considered to be relatively durable and standard. In Vietnam, however, these practices have not—as yet—become the norm. In other words, a critical mass has not ‘cohered’ around these issues, and wearing seat belts and helmets has not emerged as common practice, although in the future, this might well become the case.

What is important in this example is that congruence/coherence is defined as an emergent phenomenon, and not a description or label for a static state of affairs. As such, Lissack and Letiche (2002: 86) argue in favour of *experienced coherence*—defined as “a social cognitive field of ongoing possibility and emergent event(s)” —as opposed to *ascriptive coherence*, which is “a pointing after-the-fact to the supposed single significance of circumstance.”

### **Ethical leaders manage institutional conflict and promote tolerance and openness**

In order to foster congruence/coherence, leaders should not only attend to emergent institutional narratives, but should also promote the constructive handling of institutional conflict. Since congruence is not the same as consensus, disagreements and conflict will arise. However, such conflict should not be allowed to degenerate into something negative, as this will undermine the *integrity of institutions*. Therefore, another fundamental paradox of systemic leadership is that of unity-diversity: systemic leadership “works with the unity of purpose, but with a diversity of ideas and interests, so that conflict is inevitable” (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 212). In order to successfully deal with conflict, leaders should not only encourage open dialogue and participation, but should also exercise, and encourage role-players to exercise self-reflection. Self-reflection means being prepared to challenge one’s own convictions and presuppositions (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 209). This is only possible within a setting wherein *openness and tolerance* is practiced, and where the latter is understood as the acceptance of human complexity and of “the rights of others to express different or even opposite choices, convictions, and ideas” (Morin, 1999: 54).

Two further paradoxes of systemic leadership emerge from this point, namely that of *creation-destruction* (Marx and then Schumpeter) and *discipline-creativity*. With regard to the first paradox, developing new perspectives often means destroying old processes and practices, which in human terms can be painful. One way to mitigate this process is to *nurture trust* (and tolerance), so that creativity can grow in a ‘climate of generativity’ (Collier and Esteban, 2000: 213). However (and with regard to the second paradox), whilst leaders should encourage creativity and new ideas, these ideas must be managed in a disciplined manner as not all ideas can be implemented. Therefore, leaders should ensure that new ideas are broadly aligned with institutional purpose. If this is not the case, the actions of individual role-players can serve to undermine the *integrity of institutions*, and hence the *institutions of integrity*.

From the above discussion we see that, although leaders are incapable of acting as architects and controllers of an internal and external order; they can, nevertheless, exert an important influence on institutions through heeding (and when necessary challenging) their contextually-defined responsibilities; through attending to emergent themes, remaining sensitive to the needs of stakeholders, and facilitating the process of becoming; through fostering normative congruence by showing a preparedness to engage in dialogue and thereby promote the coherence of identity and action (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 84); and, through managing institutional conflict by creating tolerant, trusting, and disciplined environments. The above leadership functions serve to reinforce *institutional resilience*—defined as “the

flexibility of response to stress and the capacity for learning, self-organization, and adaption at multiple scales" (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 82)—and therefore the *integrity of institutions*.

The picture of leadership integrity to emerge from this discussion is vastly different to integrity as defined within the agential orientation. Indeed, Lissack and Letiche (2002: 87) argue that whereas traditional organisation science is about integrity, the focus should now shift to coherence, as the term integrity does not capture the realities of complex organisations and institutions, defined in terms of ongoing social processes. As such, they offer the following comparative analysis between coherence and integrity:

Coherence is not integrity. While integrity (seemingly) describes the (possible) characteristics of a closed system, coherence is typical of an open system. Integrity implies stability; coherence implies resilience. Coherence welcomes resonance. Integrity is threatened by it. Integrity stares down emergence, coherence embraces it. Integrity is an application. Coherence is a transient state. Integrity invites judgment and measurement. Coherence can be spoiled by the very act of judging or measuring it (Lissack and Letiche, 2002: 88).

At this juncture, it may be useful to briefly summarise the insights that this discussion holds for understanding ethical leadership in the developmental context.

## Summary of findings

	Agential Leadership		Systemic Leadership
<b>Main Premise</b>	Leaders are the architects of institutions and control followers.		Leadership is viewed in terms of an institution's contextually-determined structural dynamics.
	<b>Normative perspective</b>	<b>Descriptive perspective</b>	
<b>Characteristics</b>	Focuses on the character traits of successful leaders, in order to establish what successful leaders <i>ought</i> to do.	Focuses on the empirical determinants of successful leadership, in order to establish what successful leaders <i>do</i> .	Focuses on the contextual contingencies that give rise to successful leadership. Leadership is viewed as a distributed phenomenon.
<b>Examples</b>	Analysing President Obama in terms of his history and character traits.	Analysing President Obama's in terms of his choices and his behavioural attributes.	Analysing President Obama in terms of the complex social processes that gave rise to his presidency.
<b>Implications for understanding leadership integrity</b>	Leadership integrity is framed in terms of moral self-governance, moral wholeness, honesty, consistency, and other virtues.	Leadership integrity is framed in terms of the influence that leaders have on the ethical conduct of followers, and the degree to which leaders explicitly focus attention on ethical standards through communication and accountability processes.	Leadership integrity is framed in terms of contextually-determined responsibilities, emergent institutional themes, and normative congruence.
<b>Examples</b>	Moral heroes such as Mother Theresa, Nelson Mandela, and the Dalai Lama.	The role that Enron's leaders played in eroding the company's corporate culture through their behavioural example.	Forming a coalition to challenge and transform gender perceptions in Jordan and Egypt through framing women's issues in terms of the local context and culture, and through considering powerful stakeholders.
<b>Evaluation</b>	Highlights the importance of <i>individual integrity</i> , but does not consider the role of integrity in achieving developmental outcomes.	Highlights the influence that leaders have on the <i>institutions of integrity</i> . Doesn't account for the impact that systemic structures and contingencies have on leader behaviour.	Defines leader behaviour in terms of non-linear dynamic stakeholder interactions; systemic opportunities and constraints; and emergent institutional narratives. Highlights the influence that leaders can have on the <i>institutions of integrity</i> , and the <i>integrity of institutions</i> .

Given these findings, we conclude that the systemic perspective on leadership accords well with the DLP's understanding of leadership as "a complex political process, involving interactions not only with other 'leaders' but also with followers, in very different institutional contexts framed by often quite specific social, political and economic arrangements" (DLP 2008). In fact, Collier and Esteban (2000: 209) explicitly define systemic leadership as *a relational and hence political process* based on "mutual influencing, bargaining, [and] coalition building" (Barker, 1997: 351). The emphasis on the complex, political, and processual nature of leadership is at loggerheads with the agential perspective, in which leadership is conflated with a leader; and in which the leader is construed as a formally-constituted locus of control. As such, leadership in the developmental context is best understood in terms of the systemic leadership orientation.

Furthermore, in considering the issue of integrity, the systemic understanding of leadership also best serves the purposes of this study, as the emphasis is on the *interplay* between *individual integrity*, the *institutions of integrity* and the *integrity of institutions*. In other words, within the systemic orientation, integrity is conceptualised both in terms of agential and systemic considerations. This strengthens our conclusion that systemic leadership supports developmental integrity. In the final section, the specific implications that systemic leadership holds for developmental integrity will be unpacked in more detail.



## Conclusion: Leadership integrity for the developmental context

We have argued that integrity in development is recognised as an important dimension, but that it is an under-theorised concept. We attempted to glean from the literature on institutions the most important and relevant insights for a theory of 'developmental integrity'. These insights are that *historical and institutional context matter*, that a focus on institutional and structural factors *should not remove the space for individual agency*, that one must take into account change over time, that one should incorporate *collective action and a systemic focus*, and that *both institutions of integrity and the integrity of institutions matter*.

We also attempted to develop a model of developmental integrity that incorporates insights from systems and complexity theory. This allowed us to incorporate a focus both on structure and agency through a process perspective that identified 'feedback loops' that link the individual and systemic levels. 'Congruence' or 'coherence' was also identified as a theoretical anchor point that can help us conceive of concertive/joint action, institutional integrity and meaningful individual action (including transformative leadership) within the constraints of institutional structures.

However, this model can only be understood and operationalised when we formulate a sophisticated account of leadership that also bridges the structure/agency dichotomy by drawing on the systemic perspective on leadership. We further draw on the DLP's conception of leadership as a complex, political process:

Developmental leadership is the *process* of organising or mobilising people and resources in pursuit of particular *ends or goals*, in given institutional contexts of *authority, legitimacy and power* (often of a hybrid kind). Achieving these ends, and overcoming the collective action problems which commonly obstruct such achievement, normally requires the building of *formal or informal coalitions* of interests, elites and organisations, both vertical and horizontal. [Our emphasis] (Lyne de Ver, 2009:8)

In the remainder of this concluding section we attempt to integrate our model of developmental integrity and a complex, systemic understanding of leadership, anchored around the concept of congruence. We also formulate some preliminary implications for development policy and possible directions for future research.

### Power, coalitions and the importance of establishing congruence amongst role-players

Although leadership implies the exercise of power, the traditional notion of leaders and followers (which assumes that power derives only from formal authority and flows uni-directionally) is untenable in a complex system. In the developmental context, we see that there are many centres of power (both formal and informal), that power relations are not static (although they may be relatively stable over time) and that power is often distributed or dispersed across levels. This means that leaders can only fulfil their central function of mobilising people and resources towards achieving goals if they are able to draw on this '*systemic*' power—for example, by *building coalitions* in which disparate actors align their efforts. For this leadership process to have integrity, coalitional alignments must be congruent with appropriate institutional mechanisms such as codes, norms, policies etc. If leadership processes run counter to institutions they are much less likely to succeed.

In order to illustrate this point, consider the example of the Red Army Faction (RAF) or the Baader-Meinhof Gang, as it is more popularly known. This group existed between 1970 and 1998 in West Germany, and was regarded as a violent, left-wing terrorist group. Despite being active for almost twenty years, and despite the upheaval caused by their numerous operations (including thirty-four deaths),



the group was unable to mobilise much support for its goals, which were aimed at undermining what they deemed to be a fascist state. In the end, the coalition disbanded and many of its leaders were imprisoned. What this example shows is that the goals of the coalition were incongruent with the larger institutional culture of Germany at the time; and, contrary to its expectations, it was not able to catalyse a change in overarching institutions through transformational leadership. Consequently, the RAF remained a fringe movement.

Compare this example to the example of the construction of German motorways or *Autobahnen*. Although the idea for the construction of motorways was first conceived of during the early days of the Weimar Republic, the project did not progress far beyond the planning stages due to lack of financial resources and political support. However, just days after the Nazis took over, Adolf Hitler wholeheartedly embraced an ambitious motorway construction project. This project contributed significantly to Germany's post-World War I economic recovery effort. Even more importantly, however, the motorway project served to create national unity and strengthen centralised rule. Adolf Hitler was, therefore, able to harness systemic resources like political will and capital—i.e. resources not under his personal control, but requiring coalitions to mobilise.

### **Responsible leadership: stakeholder dialogue, goal-setting and congruence**

Leaders will often have to grapple with the question of whether and when coalitions are necessary. This is an important question since establishing coalitions is a time and resource-intensive exercise that has opportunity costs. Often it may be possible to achieve goals through other, less time and resource-intensive avenues. Building coalitions requires '*stakeholder buy-in*', and must therefore be formulated and 'sold' by leaders. Simultaneously, however, leaders should recognise that *end goals must emerge through a process of collaboration, competition and compromise* between interests and stakeholders. To not take stakeholders into consideration is to violate leadership integrity and can have systemically detrimental effects (as was seen in the case of externally-imposed structural adjustment programmes in Africa). For this reason, leaders should encourage dialogue among stakeholders. This dialogue is important in

- allowing goals to be established that reflect a true *alignment* between stakeholders and interests ('buy-in');
- *fostering congruence/coherence*;
- providing the opportunity for individual leaders to *purposively contribute* to the transformation of institutionalised norms and behaviour.

In this regard, consider the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC). The TRC, which acted as a court-like restorative justice body, played a pivotal role in South Africa's transition to a democratic country by allowing the public (especially the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations) to participate in formulating a new set of values for post-apartheid South Africa. Although leaders such as Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk were pivotal figures in the democratisation process, and the new Constitution expressed new formal political institutions, the TRC process contributed to fostering a necessary degree of congruence around the new institutional arrangements.

Despite the emphasis on processes in our systemic model of developmental integrity, *actual end goals and the consequences of action remain important*. Leaders must, as stated earlier, accept accountability for the effects that their actions have on all stakeholders, including those they are not formally accountable to, and even when these effects are not fully predictable. This is perhaps one of the most difficult implications of ethical leadership, but if our decisions and actions were merely the outcome of calculable

programmes, leadership responsibility would be an empty term. It is exactly because we cannot fully know the consequences of our actions that we are responsible (for an overview of this argument, see Grebe, 2009b). Assuming responsibility requires that we develop successful *strategies*, which the complexity theorist Edgar Morin (2008: 96) defines as 'the art of working with uncertainty'. Therefore, although calculation is both useful and necessary, "strategy is called for as soon as the unexpected or uncertainty arises, that is to say as soon as an important problem appears" (*ibid.*, p. 56). An important part of developing successful strategy concerns balancing institutional requirements, organisational demands and the interests of individual stakeholders. In complex systems where interests compete with one another, resources are limited and effects not fully predictable, this is a difficult, though crucial task.

Therefore, in evaluating the integrity of end goals we must take into account:

- *how these goals are established* (inclusive stakeholder dialogue, the fostering of congruence); and
- *the potential consequences of the goals* (i.e. taking responsibility for both the intended and unintended consequences of actions taken in pursuit of them).

When negative, unintended consequences arise, or—in the words of Morin (2008: 55)—when our actions “fly back at our heads like a boomerang”, we are *obliged to attempt to correct them*. This is a hugely important (and oft-neglected) point in the developmental context: examples abound of Western developmental and foreign aid organisations that did not accept accountability for the negative consequences arising from well-meaning actions. An example in this regard concerns micro-financing in Nicaragua. Official enthusiasm and general ‘hype’ around micro-finance caused a sudden flood of available finance. This meant that some organisations lowered their lending conditions, and even took over the debt obligations of other micro-financing companies with more stringent conditions. However, when the worldwide financial crisis struck, many borrowers defaulted on payments and, coupled with the economic situation in Europe and the US, it resulted in a serious reduction of available finance. Many small businesses experienced cash flow problems, which—in numerous cases—led to bankruptcy. As a result, many Nicaraguans today have more debt and are poorer than they were before the introduction of micro-finance.

This argument again highlights the importance of recognising the contextual nature of leadership responsibilities. Leaders must learn to critically ‘*read and engage*’ in contexts, as this is the only way in which one stands a chance of correcting actions with unintended negative consequences. In this regard, it is useful to consider the following citation from the post-structural philosopher, Jacques Derrida (1999: 67):

I would assume that political, ethical and judicial responsibility requires a task of infinite close reading. I believe this to be the condition of political responsibility: politicians should read. Now to read does not mean to spend nights in the library; to read events, to analyse the situation, to criticize the media, to listen to the rhetoric of demagogues, that's close reading, and it is required more today than ever. So I would urge politicians and citizens to practice close reading in this new sense, and not simply to stay in the library.

The above analysis shows why individual agency cannot be removed from an understanding of leadership for developmental integrity. Indeed, history provides us with countless examples of both ethical and unethical leaders who have changed the fate of entire nations. The examples of Nelson Mandela (who contributed substantially to reconciliation in deeply-divided South Africa) and his African neighbour, Robert Mugabe (whose leadership seriously harmed Zimbabwe's economy and socio-political development) illustrate this point. However, despite the fact that personal leadership qualities cannot be

discounted when analysing leadership practices, the influence that these leaders exert can only be understood in terms of the contextual factors (including the effects of stakeholder interactions, power relations and systemic opportunities and constraints) that impact upon leadership dynamics. In other words the incorporation of a systemic orientation to leadership into our model of developmental integrity allows us to account for both agency and structure, and crucially, the interplay between these two dimensions.

## Implications for Development Policy and Practice

According to the systemic model for development defined in this paper, *leadership integrity* is determined, in part, by whether leaders can:

- *provide appropriate frames* for thinking about developmental goals, processes, and programmes;
- *form coalitions* to achieve developmental goals. Within these coalitions, leaders are responsible for *encouraging inclusive stakeholder dialogue* and *managing conflict and divergent interests*;
- *develop successful strategies* for balancing institutional requirements, organisational demands and the interests of individual stakeholders;
- *assess* the intended and unintended *consequences* of actions taken in pursuance of collective goals; and
- *assume responsibility* for, and *undertake corrective action* to address strategies that do not promote or that may even undermine collective goals.

Taken together, these five aspects of responsible leadership help to promote successful and sustainable development, and should be incorporated into our thinking about developmental goals, processes and policies. However, these four aspects also presuppose the existence of institutions of integrity (as, here the goal of responsible leadership is to reinforce or challenge the norms and rules that legitimise our institutions).

Very frequently, however, institutional arrangements in developmental contexts lack coherence. This means that individual leaders may be pulled in different directions by competing ethical frameworks.

Therefore, development policy and programmes must further take account of the fact that:

- Leadership often takes place in the *uncertain interplay* between the individual leader's choices (agency) and the brittle or insecure institutional context within which those choices are made (structure).
- Institutional development is '*path dependent*', which implies that programmes that rely on incorrect assumptions about the institutional arrangements in a specific country or region, or that are naïve about the difficulty of altering institutional structures, are likely to fail.
- Developmental interventions must be *appropriate* to the institutional contexts in which they operate.

Compounding the challenges of responsible leadership in developmental contexts is the related issues of *politics and power*: different individuals and groups (including 'coalitions') exercise power and seek influence over the system. The 'rules of the game' are therefore frequently contested terrain and partisan (even predatory) interests are always present.

Unfortunately, these realities imply that there is no set of simple guidelines that will help policy-makers to foster developmental integrity. A *deeper and more thoroughgoing analysis* of the individual and institutional dimensions of integrity is essential for understanding where and how ethical developmental leadership can be enhanced or supported in a specific country or context.

## Summary of findings

- Developmental integrity is a *complex process* that must be conceptualised in terms of the *political landscape*, in which various actors (with varying degrees of power) cooperate and compete in order to achieve their goals.
- This complex, political processes between institutional actors should not however be incongruent with larger institutional rules and culture, as this undermines the legitimacy of institutions. Otherwise stated, institutional integrity is dependent on the establishment and maintenance of a degree of *congruence* between individuals and structures (institutions).
- In this regard, *leaders* play an important *sense-making function* in providing appropriate institutional frames for thinking about developmental goals, and for mobilising people and resources.
- Furthermore, *leaders* are responsible for *brokering or facilitating processes or coalitions* that can align institutions and promote coherence/congruence. Leaders are also responsible for the consequences arising from the coalitions' actions.
- *Developmental integrity*, defined in terms of the systemic model, therefore refers to the ways in which *leadership integrity* gives rise to, challenges, and reinforces the *institutions of integrity*, thereby facilitating *institutional integrity* (i.e. institutional robustness and legitimacy).

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