Developmental Leadership in the Philippines: Educational Experiences, Institutions and Networks

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Executive summary

This paper discusses findings from research that explored how higher education has supported – or not – the emergence of developmental leaders and the formation of networks among leaders in the Philippines. Its findings nuance and perhaps question the perennial emphasis on human capital as an outcome of higher education. For those who go on to be changemakers, the formation of both bonding and especially bridging capital (networks with people from diverse backgrounds) are highly significant for successful leadership of democratic reform and pro-poor movements.

The **key research questions** addressed by the study are:

- What are the main features of the educational experiences of development leaders, from their perspectives?

- In their views, to what extent and how has their education generated the knowledge, skills and attitudes that facilitate developmental leadership, as manifested in key periods and movements in national development? What were the roles of pedagogy, the curriculum, institutional selectivity, school ethos, values and the hidden curriculum, mobility (if relevant), extracurricular activities, and student (dis)empowerment?

- To what extent were the networks formed during their education influential in later life and drawn upon in political and social movements? How and when were these networks formed, and how is their influence expressed?

- Were particular institutions central to individual and network development? If so, what characteristics do they share and what was the nature of their influence?

- What were the barriers to the above?

Three reforms/movements with developmental aims were selected as lenses through which to explore these questions: the Public Sector Procurement Reform Act of 2003, the Mindanao Electoral Reform (2012-present, and the related Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro 2014-2016); and the Gawad Kalinga social movement (1995-present).

The initial phase of the study involved an historical-political analysis. The two periods of fieldwork took place in October 2014 and February 2015 and included 53 interviews, 41 of which were with key actors in the reforms/movements. The interviews focused on their involvement in the movements, their educational experiences (especially of higher education), and how these were related, for example through the development of attitudes and skills or the formation of networks during study.

This study has uncovered highly complex relationships between education, family background, politics and religion, which combine in a range of ways to determine positioning as a leader of reform. The findings confirm the close links in the Philippines between family, wealth, and membership of political elites, which mean that education is rarely seen as uniquely determinant of attaining a leadership position. However, participants all saw their own education as having played a significant role in their trajectory to becoming a leader, albeit sometimes in unexpected ways. They also view education in the future as potentially having a key role in the country's development as a peaceful, unified and prosperous nation, and they gave advice on what kind of higher education was needed for development in these directions.

Among the **key findings** were the following:

- Educational experiences are necessary but not sufficient factors for attaining leadership roles. Navigating the Philippines' elitist system requires a mixture of talent, determination and opportunity.

- Extra-curricular activities and political activism were far more significant than the formal curriculum and pedagogy. Activities such as leading student councils and running student newspapers provided valuable political leadership skills, and enabled future leaders to share and discuss different conceptions of development and reform. Technical skills learned during their education were a basis for some leaders. For others, their involvement in political movements provided the bedrock for their commitment to social and political issues.

- Religion played an important motivating role in different ways. For some interviewees, the Catholic or Muslim ethos of charity helped form their public service values; for others, their experience of Muslim marginalisation drove them to work for reform.

- The study did not find much evidence that networks formed during higher education provided a springboard for action, Rather, emerging leaders were able to draw on a whole range of educational and other networks as they navigated elite positions and powerful roles.

- This finding generated the key theoretical framework for the study – of social capital, in particular 'bridging' and 'bonding' capital. Higher education was for many of the leaders their first opportunity to mix with people different from them-selves and to create new kinds of networks through these relationships (bridging capital).

- Some educational institutions contributed less than others to the perpetuation of predatory elites. These provided more opportunities for social mixing, across class, ethnicity and religion, and for activism.

A **key implication** of these findings is that the purposes of higher education need to be seen 'in the round', beyond the current emphasis on teaching and learning, The skills and knowledge developed through the curriculum may be important (to human capital formation, for example). But at least equally important are the opportunities extra-curricular activities provide to develop bridging capital, leadership skills, and motivation for public service. The importance of research to inform government policy and the potential of HE institutions as sites for advocacy and social engagement also came through very strongly in the findings. Policy needs to nurture all the functions of universities and ensure their institutional autonomy.

Access to the wide-ranging opportunities that HE provides needs to be distributed equitably across the system for potential developmental leaders. Less elitist admissions and tuition fee policies are prerequisites. Firstly, broadening participation by providing opportunity in elite education to those who cannot afford tuition fees either for higher education or its earlier feeder stages would be a positive step. Concrete policy initiatives are already in progress in the Philippines to promote greater access to higher education, but creating more opportunity at the bottom of the highly-stratified system will not be enough. So, secondly, attention to quality throughout the system could help to release the exclusive hold on power of graduates from elite institutions.

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Perspectives and aims

This report sets out the findings of a one-year study of how higher education has – or has not – supported the emergence of developmental leaders[1] and the formation of networks among leaders in the Philippines. To do this, the study used a similar approach to that of an earlier DLP-funded case study on Ghana.[2] The Philippines study placed additional emphasis on the influences of pedagogy and student mobility; the impact of ethnic and religious divisions in a conflict-affected society; and the political economy of how individuals' educational development and social capital might be translated into national development.

This report first contextualises the study in the political development of the Philippines, focusing (as the study did) on the post-Marcos era and the transition to it. It outlines the educational development of the Philippines, and the three reforms chosen to act as different illustrations of intended development of the Philippines. The report then sets out the research methodology and timeline.

As might be expected, the findings on the relationship between education and developmental leadership in the Philippines are shaped profoundly by the political and educational contexts. These intersect with religion, oligarchical elites, and entrenched gaps between rich and poor to shape and reinforce a highly stratified society and education system. The report discusses the findings in relation to the broad question of how education has the potential to perpetuate or interrupt these development problems and cycles of inequality, through leaders' experiences of it.

Any research on developmental leadership will need to explore the role of national leaders in the promotion of economic and social development, and the links between the emergence of this leadership and the achievement of development goals in a specific society. Contrary to what is found in most development studies literature, which is more focused on economic and political structures, developmental leadership literature acknowledges the importance of human agency as a significant causal factor of social change (Leftwich, 2009). Doing research on national leaders requires going beyond the mere description of their material situation and objective interests, and trying to understand the dialectical relation between these determinants and individuals' reasons for political action (Hay, 2002). Individuals take part in public affairs and collective action not only to defend their private interests, but also to defend their view of what the aims of development should be and of which principles should govern their society (Inglehart, 1990; Zald, 2000). The discussion of the findings thus begins with the notions of development espoused by the three reforms and by their protagonists.

The study focuses primarily on higher education. However, particularly in such a stratified system, experiences in earlier phases of education to a large extent dictate the institution that people attend, and their place within it. We therefore include discussion of earlier phases as important shapers of the nature and impact of higher education experiences.

The key research questions addressed by the study are:

1. What are the main features of the educational experiences of developmental leaders, from their perspectives?

2. In their views, to what extent and how has their education generated the knowledge, skills and attitudes that facilitate developmental leadership, as manifested in key periods and movements in national development? What were the roles of pedagogy, the curriculum, institutional selectivity, school ethos, values and the hidden curriculum, mobility (if relevant), extracurricular activities, and student (dis)empowerment?

3. To what extent were the networks formed during their education influential in later life and drawn upon in political and social movements? How and when were these networks formed, and how is their influence expressed?

4. Were particular institutions central to individual and network development? If so, what characteristics do they share and what was the nature of their influence?

5. What were the barriers to the above?

6. How do these compare to the findings of the case study of Ghana?

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1   DLP, in one of its background papers, defines developmental leadership as "the process of organizing or mobilizing people and re- sources in pursuit of particular ends or goals, in given institutional contexts of authority, legitimacy and power (often of a hybrid kind). Achieving these ends, and overcoming the collective action problems which commonly obstruct such achievement, normally requires the building of formal or informal coalitions of interests, elites and organizations, both vertical and horizontal." (Lyne de Ver, 2009: 9)

2   See http://www.dlprog.org/publications/higher-education-and-developmental-leadership-the-case-of-ghana.php

The key and intriguing findings in response to these questions are that educational experiences are necessary but not sufficient factors for attaining leadership roles. Navigating a highly elitist system is a mixture of talent, determination and opportunity. Extra-curricular activities and political activism were far more significant than formal curriculum and pedagogy. Service learning, leading student councils and running student newspapers provided valuable political leadership skills. In such activities future leaders share and discuss different conceptions of development and reform. While technical skills learned in education were a basis for some leaders, for others the People Power movement and experience in underground political movements provided the bedrock for conscientisation[3] and solidarity. Religion played a diverse but important role. The Catholic ethos of charity underpinned values for some, whereas for others the experience of Muslim marginalisation was the motivation for reform. Higher education, then, was only one factor in determining which concepts of development particular leaders espoused and which reform movement they joined – or initiated.

The generation and use of networks cut across these complexities. It was less that HE networks formed a springboard for action and more that emerging leaders were able to draw on a whole range of educational and other networks as they navigated elite positions and powerful roles. This finding supported the key theoretical framework for the study, of social capital, in particular bridging and bonding capital.[4] Some educational institutions were less reproductive of existing predatory elites[5] than others, providing greater opportunity for social mixing across class, ethnicity and religion as well as activism. These were rather different from the findings from the DLP-funded Ghana study, which demonstrated the remarkable influence of particular inclusive institutions and the formative experiences and networks developed there by those who went on to be leaders. Ghana is a very different case, not least in its patterns of development and its colonial history, but given the parallel methodologies it is worth summarising the key findings here as a comparative reference point:

> **Key findings from the Ghana study included:**
>
> - A quality education – at both secondary and higher level – has been an important factor in the formation of developmental leadership in Ghana
> - During their education, the leaders gained developmental leadership qualities (including core values, key characteristics and technical skills)
> - Education has helped create shared values among the leaders, facilitate social integration and increase social mobility
> - Higher education was critical to both the emergence of reform coalitions in Ghana and to their success in bringing about economic, political and media reforms
> - The University of Ghana at Legon and elite secondary boarding schools (one in particular) were key institutions nurturing these attributes and facilitating network formation.
>
> (http://www.dlprog.org/publications/higher-education-and-developmental-leadership-the-case-of-ghana.php)

This report will flesh out the findings of this study, and show how they lead to certain recommendations about higher education and the role it can play in different trajectories towards development.

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3   Conscientization is defined by the Freire Institute as 'The process of developing a critical awareness of one's social reality through reflection and action.' http://www.freire.org/component/easytagcloud/118-module/conscientization/ See Freire (1970).

4   Bonding (or exclusive) social capital connects individuals and social groups who are like one another in important respects, and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups. On the other hand, bridging (or inclusive) social capital connects individuals and social groups who are less like one another, and tends to include people across diverse social cleavages. (Putnam, 2000)

5   Predatory leadership can be regarded as the opposite of developmental leadership and it is characterised by "an extreme form of autocratic rule, accompanied by institutional decay, failure or deficit, and corruption, and with adverse economic and developmental consequences." (Bavister-Gould, 2011: 2).

2

Political, social and economic development of the Philippines

Country overview

The Philippines (officially, the Republic of the Philippines) comprises 7,107 widely dispersed islands located in the archipelago between the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea in South-eastern Asia. The Philippine islands are home to 107 million people. Its location on the Pacific Ring of Fire makes the Philippines extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, especially earthquakes, cyclones, and volcanic hazards. Indeed, it is ranked as the third most disaster prone country in the world. In November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan struck the central Philippines, affecting more than 14 million people across 46 provinces and leading to more than 6200 deaths. Rebuilding homes and livelihoods remains a priority and a political issue.

In the 16th century the Philippines was colonised by the Spanish and, after being ceded to the United States of America in 1898, it became a self-governing commonwealth in 1935. It gained full independence in 1946, after World War II and Japanese occupation. Democracy in the Philippines gave way to military rule in 1972, under long-time president Ferdinand Marcos, and was restored in 1986 by the "People Power" Revolution. Post-Marcos representative democracy has managed to stay relatively stable until the present day, despite the episodic military coups, popular mobilisations, and remaining armed conflicts (*see* Political timeline below).

The Philippines is a lower middle-income country and the 39th largest economy of the world. One third of its workforce is occupied in the agricultural sector, and the economy benefits significantly from the remittances of the Filipinos working abroad. In the last three years the economy in the Philippines has posted very high growth rates (>6%) and has achieved a substantial reduction of unemployment (7%). Despite these positive trends, unemployment in the country still affects roughly 20% of the workforce, 25% of the population falls under the poverty line and inequality of income is among the highest in East Asia (43 points in the Gini Index). (Statistics from World Bank, 2015.)

Long-term and persistent challenges to economic and social development in the Philippines include a fragile peace and order situation; climate change and natural disasters; patronage, corruption and low fiscal capacity; extreme poverty and inequitable benefits of growth; strained infrastructure and lack of income-earning opportunities.

Political timeline

1933	US Congress recognised the independence of the Philippines.
1946	The Philippines became independent of US sovereignty. Manuel Roxas y Acuña elected as the first president of the new republic.
1947	US awarded military bases in Philippines.
1951	Peace treaty signed with Japan.
1953	Ramon Magsaysay elected president.
1957	Carlos P. Garcia elected president.
1961	Diosdado Macapagal elected president.
1965	Ferdinand E. Marcos elected president by a big majority
1969	Ferdinand Marcos re-elected President
1972	President Marcos declared entire country under martial law, suspended parliament, arrested opposition politicians, imposed censorship. Opposition leader Senator Benigno Aquino arrested.
1976	Major earthquake and tsunami killed 8,000 people at Mindanao.
1981	Martial law lifted because of upcoming three-day visit by the Pope.

1983	Opposition leader Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino returned from exile and was assassinated on arrival at Manila International Airport; Aquino's widow Corazon led the "People Power" protest movement.
1986	Marcos declared winner of presidential election, beating Corazon Aquino amid charges of fraud; demonstrations erupted; "People Power" Revolution (EDSA); Marcos fled to Hawaii; Aquino declared president and formed a new government.
1989	US assisted Philippine government forces to suppress attempted coup.
1992	Endorsed by Aquino, her Secretary of Defense Gen. Fidel Ramos won presidential election. Philippine congress rejected new treaty with US. Subic Bay naval base and Clark Air Field returned to Philippine government, ending American military presence in the Philippines.
1996	The government of Ramos agreed to greater autonomy for southern island of Mindanao. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ended guerrilla war with the government. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued its campaign.
1997	Economy damaged by Asian financial crisis.
1998	Former movie actor Joseph Estrada elected president.
2000	On charges of corruption, the lower house impeached Estrada.
2001	Following suspension of impeachment proceedings, mass street protests took place (EDSA II); military withdrew its support for Estrada. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency.
2004	Presidential election. Arroyo narrowly defeated his closest rival, Fernando Poe (actor and friend of Ex-President Estrada), taking 39.5% of the vote to Poe's 36.6%.
2005	A taped conversation surfaced of President Arroyo and an election official during the 2004 elections, implying she influenced the official election results. Calls for her resignation and demonstrations followed soon after. In September 2005, Congress voted down the filing of an impeachment against Arroyo.
2006	President Arroyo declared state of emergency in response to coup rumors.
2007	Former President Joseph Estrada convicted of plunder, the first such conviction in the history of the Philippines.
2010	First automated national elections in the Philippines. Benigno "Noynoy" Simeon Cojuangco Aquino III elected president and sworn in at Manila's Rizal Park on June 30, 2010.
2011	More than 1,000 people died after Typhoon Washi struck Mindanao; entire neighborhoods swept away; tens of thousands forced into shelters.
2013	Typhoon Haiyan decimated central area of the country; over 6,000 killed; millions lost homes; major international aid effort.
2014	Government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed peace accord, ending four decades of fighting.

Source: Authors' elaboration from timelines.ws and worldatlas.com

(Note: Rodrigo Duterte's assumption of the presidency in 2016 is not within the scope of this study.)

Post-Marcos political settlement

Since independence, the Philippines has had a tumultuous experience with democracy, which was interrupted when President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law in 1972. Ferdinand Marcos ruled the Philippines for 20 years. His presidency ended in 1986 when the "People Power" Revolution (also known as the EDSA Revolution) forced him out of office and into exile. People Power demonstrations began in 1983 and culminated in protests in Quezon City from 22-25 February 1986. The demonstrations were a response to the government corruption that proliferated under Marcos. The People Power movement reflected the strong culture of political participation in the Philippines. Civil society in the archipelago has long been "relatively politicised (at least compared with countries in South Asia such as Bangladesh and India), with close links existing between political parties and political positions and many NGOs (Lewis, 2013: 43)".

The "People Power" movement in the Philippines saw traditionally elite political families, excluded from Marcos's authoritarian rule, lead popular movements to challenge the political settlement that Marcos established. Illustrating the strong anti-Marcos sentiment, members of the upper levels of society became key figures in the People Power movement, despite the possibility that they would lose out financially: more equitably distributed income would reduce their own financial wellbeing.

In 1986, the critical turning point came when key factions of the military joined forces with the popular movement led by Corazon Aquino. The final day of the People Power protest marked both the end of the Marcos' rule and the emergence of a democratic form of government, headed by the new president, Corazon C. Aquino.

Corazon C. Aquino's success in the election was considered by some citizens to be merely the replacement of one group of elites with another. Moreno (2006: 96) maintains that 'it seems […] clear that the events of February were not consciously intended to bring about change in the social structure, the traditional concentration of power and wealth in our society; rather they were aimed at freeing us from a political system that had become corrupt, exploitative, and oppressive.'' While those involved in the People Power movement may have expected the protests to bring positive changes, economic and political decline as well as social instability continued (Villanueva, 2010).

Other elite groups have unsuccessfully tried to challenge this political settlement. Many of the attempted military coups of the late 1980s and 1990s are examples of challenges to the dominant political settlement, which were successfully beaten back (Hedman, 2006). One interesting example of these challenges is the brief presidency of the quasi-populist Joseph Estrada (1998-2001). Estrada was ousted from the presidency under accusations of corruption by a mobilised urban middle class that presented itself as "People Power II", in clear reference to the democratic revolution against Marcos.

After nearly a decade under Estrada's successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010), pressures for change surfaced once again with the election of Benigno Aquino III to the presidency in 2010. He was the son of former president Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), and a member of a dynasty known for its vast landholdings and business empire. Yet he won the country's first automated and computerised election, free of the allegations of fraud that were prevalent in previous electoral contests (Sidel, 2014). Benigno Aquino promised good and clean governance as a recipe for poverty reduction, but problems of corruption, patronage and poverty remain.

Oligarchical democracy, patronage and corruption

Most of the political decisions and economic activity in the Philippines are dominated by a relatively small group of elites. Their control of institutional structures and electoral contests has led to the definition of the political system in the Philippines as an "oligarchical democracy" (Sidel, 2014). Apparent democratic institutions and processes coexist with a massive concentration of material resources and power that is used to defend the elites' economic and social position (Winters, 2011).

At the local level, the rule of families has modified or even replaced formal state institutions. Hite (2012: 2) points out that "[i]n the Philippines, political and financial affairs are funnelled through channels of patronage politics – neighbourhood and clan-based political groups that offer unregulated financial services in return for political allegiance." Regardless of class origin, Filipinos typically align themselves with dominant clans for the purpose of gaining access to power (Gutierrez et al., 1992).

The Philippines inherited the US system of checks and balances between Congress, the president and an independent judiciary. In principle, this should have prevented the concentration of power. However, weak party discipline and the prevalent influence of powerful family dynasties in Congress makes it easy for these families to block structural reforms that affect poverty and inequity levels (Anderson and Hipgrave, 2015). This is the case for the agrarian reform, for example, which has often been blocked by landowning Congress members and their representatives, with substantial consequences for poverty and inequity in a country where most of the poor are based in rural areas (Llanto and Ballesteros, 2003). The resistance to higher taxation on wealth is another example of political blockage achieved by elites in Congress. It has resulted in the Philippines having one of the lowest tax revenue ratios in the region, at just 12% of GDP in 2012. The state's weak fiscal capacity has undermined all the political efforts to improve public services and extend social rights among the poor in the Philippines (Anderson and Hipgrave, 2015).

Vote buying and political patronage is common in the Philippines, often to the detriment of investment in pro-poor policies and public service delivery (Khemani, 2013). The prevalence of patronage in Philippine politics means that politicians rely on money for political survival. This has often resulted in the entrenchment of corruption in government agencies. A recent corruption scandal involved the alleged misuse by several members of Congress of their "pork barrel", a discretionary fund that is supposed to be spent on priority development projects at the local level. For the same reason, politicians are also very susceptible to vested interests when deciding on political reforms (Chua et al., 2013).

Conflict and political violence

The Philippines has a long history of conflict, including religious, ideological, territorial and clan disputes. For the past 40 years, armed groups have remained active. These groups include separatist Muslim movements in the southern Philippines (Mindanao) and the communist New People's Army, which is more generalised throughout the country. Negotiations were successfully completed with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996, and peace processes are well underway. The recent Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), signed on 27 March 2014, is a negotiated political settlement between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This aims to establish a new entity to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It is hoped that greater autonomy, self-determination and power-sharing will bring more lasting peace and democracy to the region.

While significant institutional gains have been made on indigenous people's rights, the struggle over ancestral lands continues to be a primary source of conflict in indigenous people's territories. There are approximately 110 ethnic groups in the Philippines, and 15% of the population is regarded as indigenous. Many indigenous peoples' ancestral lands contain the few remaining deposits of land-based natural resources, inviting competition with forestry and mining (UNDP, 2010). Indigenous peoples have resisted encroachment on their ancestral lands, resources and culture, and for this have been accused of rebellion or terrorism.

The deeply embedded nature of oligarchical structures explains how diverging patterns of local political economy structures have given rise to large regional inequalities and a wide range of religious, linguistic, ethnic and social cleavages. These divisions are reflected in ongoing conflicts. Poverty incidence and conflict are closely associated in the Philippines: poverty rates are higher in conflict-affected provinces (42%) than in the others (22%) (Chua et al., 2015).

Poverty, inequality and unsustainable economic development

The Philippines has had a disappointing record of economic growth and social development since Independence in 1946. On average, over the last few decades it has experienced lower economic growth, lower poverty reduction, and higher inequity than comparable countries in the region. The incidence of poverty has been reduced from over one third (34.4%) in 1991 to just over one quarter (25.2%, including 10 million women) in 2012. Yet this poverty rate is still well above the 17.2% that would have enabled the Philippines to reach the MDG 1 target on reducing poverty by half between 1990 and 2015 (UNDP and NEDA, 2014).

Today the Filipino economy's current GDP growth rate is the second highest in Asia, but the economic boom appears to have only benefited a few elite families. There are wide disparities in income and quality of life across regions and social groups in the Philippines. Income inequality in the country is the highest among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ADB, 2015), and a huge segment of citizens remains vulnerable to poverty, malnutrition, and other problems that belie the country's apparent growth.

While the country is abundant in natural resources, these remain unavailable to poor groups, or are degraded, leading to social exclusion and insecure land tenure. Social inequities are rife and impact indigenous people, fishing communities, women and the informal sector the most (UNDP, 2015). In the 2013 *Human Development Report*, the Philippines scored 0.418 in the Gender Inequality Index, reflecting inequalities in labour market participation, political representation, and access to health services.

The economy of the Philippines is characterised by extreme dualisms. Roughly one quarter of the workforce is in industry or manufacturing and three quarters is in agriculture or forestry, or in services. While a few of the service jobs are in high paying areas, for the most part services are still dominated by low productivity and often marginal jobs. The exploitation of natural resources is historically closely connected to rent seeking and elite rule. Other huge sectors of Filipino industry (such as banking, telecommunications, and property development) are also almost entirely monopolised by a few elite political families, most of whom have been in power since the Spanish colonial era. And despite wide-reaching government reforms since the 1980s, those industries remain effective oligarchies or cartels that vastly outperform small businesses. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for roughly 99% of Filipino firms. However, those SMEs only account for 35% of national output - a sharp contrast to Japan and South Korea, where the same ratio of SMEs accounts for roughly half of total output (Yap et al., 2013). This translates into far fewer high-paying jobs at the local level and exacerbates the huge income disparity across the country.

Rapid and unmanaged population growth is also contributing to persistent income and human poverty in the Philippines. Population growth and fertility rates are both higher than those of other countries in the region, and have fuelled rapid urban population growth, overseas labour migration, and unprecedented environmental degradation (UN, 2015). Governments have generally avoided taking strong measures to curb the birth rate for fear of antagonising the powerful Catholic Church, but the current administration (at time of writing) managed to get a law passed in parliament making contraception more widely available. The inability of households to freely manage their fertility has affected women and children the most, as indicated by compromised nutrition, health and education achievements (UN, 2015). The country's biodiversity, considered a global resource, is under severe threat from population pressure, over-exploitation, and pollution.

Despite recent economic growth, it is evident that widespread corruption, clientelism and state capture by local elites have disappointed many of the expectations for inclusive development in the Philippines, making this country a rich case study for developmental leadership research.

3

Educational development of the Philippines

National context for education

The Philippines has possibly one of the most extensive education sectors in the world. It has about 60,000 primary and secondary schools (DepEd 2015). There are more than 2000 higher education institutions (HEIs) and 452 State University College (SUC) satellite campuses, with roughly four million enrollments (CHED, 2015). As in other developing countries, a premium is placed on education as a route towards a 'better life'. With more than a hundred million people and a young population (median age 23.4), government policies have focused on ensuring that the education sector provides the needed skills for development. Poverty alleviation and empowerment are recent drives inherent in government programs that aim to improve access to education among the poorer populations. Despite this, there is still a significant outflow of skilled (and unskilled) Filipino workers from a country unable to provide proper and adequate jobs for most of its population. Foreign remittances amounted to about USD 27 million in 2014 and 1.6 million Filipinos were working overseas (legally) during the same year.

The Philippines' institutions reflect the impact of more than 300 years of colonisation by Spain and the USA. Under Spanish rule, the Philippines was mostly converted to Christianity. Most of its educational institutions, including the top schools and universities, are inherently sectarian. This is not surprising given that more than 86% of its 100 million-plus population are Catholic, making it the only Christian-majority nation in the ASEAN region. The country's educational system is also distinctly American and much teaching is done in English. But the desire to improve the quality of learning and give students better access to quality education has been reflected in recent initiatives in educational policy.

Three agencies focus on education and training in the Philippines. The Department of Education (DepEd) covers basic education (i.e. primary and secondary) while higher education is under the auspices of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). Technical and vocational training is managed by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).

The intersection of socio-economic status, religion and politics is evident in education, where the elites usually enter the private schools in Manila (or in larger cities within the country), most of which are essentially Catholic/Christian schools. Appointment to the DepEd's ministerial post is also one of the most coveted, given the institution's strong and broad influence in society. For 2015, the Department received PHP 367.1 billion from the PHP 2.606 trillion national budget, making the department one of the top budget recipients among the various government agencies. With a high incidence of poverty in a cash-strapped country often plagued by natural calamities, it is evident how the role of education can be critical in a developing country like the Philippines. Whether for mitigating economic or natural disasters or entry to the labour force, education is often seen as the 'magic bullet' that the poorer population hope will offer a better future.

Education in the Philippines

Prior to Spanish colonisation, education in the Philippines was mostly confined to informal teaching of children by their parents or by tribal tutors. During colonisation, the country was converted to Christianity and education was then religion-oriented and was widely considered elitist. The Education Decree of 1863 established improved access to education and required that each township should have at least a primary school, and a school supervised by the Jesuits for male teachers. The teaching of Spanish was also compulsory. But despite a more liberated approach and provision of free primary education, education at that time was still considered lacking (Deped, 2015).

After American rule was established in 1898, the Malolos Constitution guaranteed free and compulsory primary education. With the Schurman and Taft Commissions in 1900, education in the Philippines was secularised and a free public school system was established. English was introduced as a medium of instruction. The secondary school level, supported by the government and others, was institutionalised in 1902 by the Philippine Commission, while the country's state university, the University of the Philippines, was established in 1908.

Since the 1863 Education Decree, there have been various reorganisations of education. In 1982, the Education Act created the Ministry of Education and Culture and Sports, which was later renamed the Department of Education, Culture and Sports in 1987. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) was formed in 1994, followed by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) in 1995.

The Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001 (Republic Act 9155) instituted what is now the current Department of Education (DepEd), with the redefinition of roles of the field offices under the Department. Formal and non-formal education and alternative learning systems are currently handled by the Department of Education. Some of the affiliated institutions with the Department include the Teacher Education Council, the Early Childhood Care and Development Council, the Literacy Coordinating Council and the National Council for Children's Television. Currently, there are close to 50,000 primary schools and more than 13,000 secondary schools in the country. A significant proportion are private schools, particularly in secondary education (Table 1). The dropout rate for primary education is 6.81% (for 2013) and 7.82% for secondary education (for 2012).

Table 1. Number of primary and secondary schools by school type in the Philippines, 2014

	Public schools	Private schools
Primary education	38, 648	10, 561
Secondary education	7, 976	5, 420

Source: DepEd (2015)

Given the large numbers of private institutions, it is worth noting that while some private schools are philanthropic in orientation, others are strictly for-profit organisations. In some cases they are owned by members of the Filipino elite and can be seen as part of a wider net of influence and income.

The Creation of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) was part of the trifocalisation of education under the Congressional Commission of Education (EDCOM) of 1992. Among other things, CHED's role is to monitor and evaluate the performance of higher education institutions (HEIs), to rationalise programs and institutions of higher learning, and set standards, policies and guidelines for the creation of new ones (RA 7722, p.7).

CHED is also mandated to ensure that higher education institutions are accessible to all who wish to attend, particularly for those who are unable to afford it. To improve access to higher education, State University Colleges (SUCs) have been established as public HEIs created by the Philippine Congress and funded by the national government. The Higher Education Modernisation Act of 1997 warrants the power and duties of the governing board of the State University Colleges (SUCs). SUCs include the University of the Philippines, which has seven constituent universities throughout the country, the Polytechnic University of the Philippines based in Manila, and the Mindanao State University in the southern part of the country. However, despite the aim of improving access to HE, the creation of SUCs has met with some criticism; it has been claimed that the government does not give them sufficient funding and that some elected officials promote their creation to further their own political interests.

Local Colleges and Universities (LCU) also serve to improve access to HE in the country. The LCUs are public HEIs run by local government units (LGU). One such example is the *Pamantansan ng Lungsod ng Maynila* (University of the City of Manila), also the country's oldest LCU and operated by the City of Manila. Local government units have increasingly opted to form LCUs to offer poorer families in their constituencies access to higher education. Some local community colleges also eventually attain university status if they are able to increase their curricular offerings. For instance, the Makati Polytechnic College founded in 1972 was accredited as a fully-fledged college in 1987 (Makati College) and had attained university status by 1990 (*Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Makati*). Highly urbanised cities are better equipped to finance their LCUs, as in the case of the University of Makati in the country's financial district in metropolitan Manila. There are about 100 LCUs throughout the country.

There are also special HEIs which offer programs related to public service such as the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), National Defense College (NDC) and the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP).

Private HEIs are either sectarian or non-sectarian institutions governed by the Corporation Code. Sectarian private HEIs are mostly non-stock, non-profit institutions owned by religious institutions while non-sectarian private HEIs are owned by private bodies. Most private HEIs are non-sectarian (roughly 80%) and have wider reach, distributed throughout the country. About 88% of HEIs in the Philippines are in the private sector and they tend to be smaller than public HEIs (Table 2).

The most recent statistics show that there are about 2300 HEIs in the country. Regional distribution of HEIs, undergraduate and graduate enrolment and thesis grantees are highest in the National Capital Region (NCR, also known as Metropolitan Manila), while the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) lies in the lower range (Table 3).[6]

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6   This table demonstrates the contrast between these regions, which is relevant to this study given that ARMM is the focus of one of the case study reforms.

Table 2. Number of institutions and students by type of HEI in the Philippines, 2014

	Public HEIs	Private HEIs
Number of HEIs	656	1699
Students enrolled	1,540,000	2,020,000

Source: CHED (2015)

Table 3. Number of institutions and students in higher education by selected regions in the Philippines, 2014

	National Capital Region	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
Number of HEIs	342	69
Undergraduate enrolment	698,854	58,285
Graduate enrolment	71,424	4,338
Thesis/dissertation grantees (2010-2014)	63	1

Source: CHED (2015)

Voluntary non-governmental accreditation is encouraged by CHED to aid its regulatory functions of the numerous HEIs. On top of this, CHED maintains quality by assuring and maintaining the integrity of the accrediting process. Accredited agencies for the regulatory control of programs include the Federation of Accrediting Agencies of the Philippines (FAAP), the umbrella organisation for the Association of Christian Schools, Colleges, Universities Accrediting Agency Inc (ACSCU-AAI), the Philippine Accrediting Association of Schools, Colleges and Universities (PAASCU), and the Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities Commission on Accreditation (PACU-COA).

The Accrediting Agency of Chartered Colleges and Universities in the Philippines (AACCUP) has 111 SUCs as institutional members while the Association of Local Colleges and Universities Commission on Accreditation has 25 colleges and university members.

Accreditation follows the levels prescribed by CHED, ranging from institutional candidacy through four levels (CHED Memorandum Order1, 2005 pp.4-5).

- Candidate Status - for institutional programs where preliminary visits were made and are certified by the accreditation networks as able to acquire accredited status within two years

- Level I accredited status - programs which are granted initial accreditation after a formal visit by the accreditation network. This initial accreditation level is effective for the first three years

- Level II re-accredited status - programs which have been re-accredited by the accreditation network after a second round of formal survey visit. This level of accreditation is effective for another three to five years as recommended by the accrediting agency

- Level III - programs that are re-accredited following additional guidelines set by the network. Re-accredited programs must satisfy the first two following criteria and two others: (i) high standard of instruction; (ii) highly visible community extension programs; (iii) highly visible tradition of research; (iv) a strong faculty development, as evidenced by appropriate budget allocation, among others; (v) credible performance by its graduates in national licensure examinations for the past 3 years; (vi) existence of working consortia with other educational institutions or agencies; and (vii) extensive learning resource facilities

- Level IV accredited status- programs of this level are considered of very high academic quality and comparable to foreign institutions. This level of accreditation requires programs to have proven track records in research; quality teaching and learning; community service and international linkages.

Accredited programs are given administrative and financial control, authority to revise their curriculum and authority to provide new courses in line with their level of accreditation. Level IV accredited status gives an institution full autonomy over its programs for the duration of its accreditation. Institutions can also offer new programs allied to existing level IV courses under this status. Public HEIs are guaranteed autonomy in terms of curricular and academic standards, and for them accreditation determines their share of the budget for such institutions (CMO No.1, 2005, p.7).

The 'elite' HEIs in the country are the top-ranking University of the Philippines (UP), the University of Santo Tomas (UST), Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU) and De La Salle University (DLSU) (QS university rankings, 2015). All but UP are private HEIs with a strong Catholic orientation that is defined and reflected in their curricula, and this is not surprising given the considerable size of the country's catholic population. The UST also has the oldest university charter in the Philippines and in Asia, and is proud of its strong Catholic orientation and influence having been host to four papal visits. Outreach and immersion programs are also characteristic of the three private HEIs. For instance, the ADMU works closely with communities through its immersion program which sends students to experience the realities faced by marginalised sectors of society where "(i)n the spirit of the common good and preferential option for the poor, students will be genuinely moved to render action in living out a faith that does justice" (ADMU, 2016). The effects of similar programs in other HEIs are designed to encourage students to be more 'conscious' citizens who will engage other sectors of society to encourage sustainable practices. The strong connection, for instance, between the ADMU and the poverty alleviation and nation-building movement Gawad Kalinga (GK), where some (if not most) of the immersion initiatives have involved engagement with GK communities, is revealing of how such extracurricular programs can have an effect in subsequent community service involvement (and leadership) beyond university.

For UP, despite the lack of a religious overtone in the curricula, the more differentiated role of extracurricular activities is reflected through active student/academic organisations and fraternities. Despite criticisms of the latter due to physical abuses that are sometimes the result of their 'initiation' rites, the often influential connections developed within this group encourages active membership beyond the actual time spent at university. The General Education (GE) program of UP also serves as the essence of UP's liberal education where students are expected to achieve a "broad perspective that would enable them, outside their own field of specialisation, to engage with issues and realities of their own times (…)" (UP GE Task Force, undated). The GE program instituted in 1958 aimed to "humanize the specialization gaining ground in the University" where courses in the humanities and social sciences, logic, maths and sciences, among others, were offered. The university's GE program has since undergone two major revisions, in 1986 and 2001. In 1986, it introduced interdisciplinary courses such as Science, Technology and Society (STS). The university refers to the influence of its curricula in producing students who can offer "responsible leadership for the nation, or community" (UP GE Task Force).

Educational policies

Given the perceived significance of education for advancement, the government has focused on helping those who most need access to education by increasing education's share of the 2015 national budget. Educational aid of PHP 7.9 billion is channelled through study grant programs for poverty alleviation and financial assistance programs for students. More than 54,000 students are said to have benefited from CHED's financial assistance program.

Various initiatives also focus on improving quality, access and equity in education. Examples include the Expanded Tertiary Education Equivalency program, the Ladderised Education program, *Iskolar ng Bayan* act, the Open Distance Learning Act, the 4Ps program, the K to 12 program and the IP and an education access program for unemployed Muslim young people.

Improving access in higher education

Given the issue of access to higher education for some members of society, widened access to HE services is made through non-conventional modes such as the Expanded Tertiary Education Equivalency and Accreditation Program (ETEEAP) and the Ladderized Program (LEP). The ETEEAP was enacted in 1996 through Executive Order 330 mandating the CHED as the authority responsible for its implementation. Through the ETEEAP, pertinent job experience and non-formal training, among others, can count towards the awarding of an academic degree. In line with this program, the Commission works with other agencies such as TESDA and the Department of Labor and Employment. Other government agencies give the Commission technical support for the framework operationalisation of accreditation and equivalency. As of 2010 there had been 7,240 recipients of the programs and there were about 100 deputised ETEEAP HEIs in the country (CHED, 2015).

The Ladderized Program, through Executive Order 358 signed in 2004 is a unified national qualifications framework implemented by CHED and TESDA that allows smoother transition between the TVET and HE sectors. This program serves as "equivalency pathways and access ramps" to those who can't complete a conventional higher education course of study. Some of the frameworks in this program include a national system of credit transfer, a system of enhanced equivalency and accreditation of prior learning. Close to 1,300 disciplines are covered under the LEP.

A recent initiative in higher education is the Iskolar ng Bayan (Scholar of the Nation) Act promulgated under Republic Act 10648 of 2014. This policy aims to democratise access to education by offering the top ten public school graduates in each cohort higher education scholarships and admission to their choice of SUC.

This initiative is meant to improve access to the higher education sector, especially for the underprivileged. The Open Distance Learning (ODL) in Higher Education, under RA 10650 of 2014 also aims to improve access to higher education by institutionalising ODL in HEIs throughout the country. Under this Act, the University of the Philippines Open University is to provide expertise to CHED in the development of ODL. Parties that provide appropriate materials and support services to the advancement of Open Distance Learning will be eligible for tax exemptions.

Additional policies to improve access in education

Patterned after the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs of Latin America and Africa, the Philippines' CCT program (also known as the *Pantawid Pamiliang Pilipino* program or 4Ps) also aims to improve education access alongside health and nutrition among the poorest of the poor. One of the conditions set by 4Ps is that "children beneficiaries aged 3-8 must enrol in school, and maintain an attendance of at least 85% of class days every month". Families are then eligible to receive subsidies of (i.e. for education) PHP 300 per month per child for every 10 months. A maximum of three children per household may be registered under the program. The program's lead agency, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) identifies qualified families for the 4P initiative through the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction.

 The 4Ps cover 17 regions, operating in 79 provinces and 1484 municipalities. As of 2015, the program has enlisted close to 4.5 million households of which over half a million are indigenous households. The program also covers over 11 million school-age children (aged 0 to 18) (Official Gazette 2015). A total of PHP 13.23 billion in education subsidies was paid to eligible households covering January to August 2015. High compliance rates were also recorded during the same period, with school attendance rates of 96.89% and 92.74% for children aged 6-14 and 15-18 respectively (Official Gazette 2015). The government also allotted PHP 2.5 billion (for 2015) under the SUCs' budget to help more than 40,000 beneficiaries of the 4Ps program to enter higher education. In 2013, the DSWD teamed up with DepEd to launch mobile 'carton classrooms' equipped with learning resources which aim to reach poorer families. However, the program is marred by irregularities, as reported by the Commission on Audit (COA). Duplication of names was found in 4,433 households in 2012. Some beneficiaries of the 4Ps program were found to have presented two identification cards with different numbers, and grants of more than PHP 50 million were given to about 7,782 households not included in the list of beneficiaries (Punongbayan and Ronda, 2014).

The K to 12 program, under the Enhanced Basic Education Program aims to upgrade the country's basic education by increasing the number of years of compulsory education from 10 to the internationally accepted standard of 12. This initiative was institutionalised in 2013 under Republic Act 10533. The K to 12 program requires at least a year of kindergarten education and 12 years of basic education (primary and secondary levels). While it is too early to fully evaluate its impact, it has been criticised for placing increased an financial burden on poorer households and causing a massive displacement of labour because children are entering the labour market two years later. It has also been criticised for draining the resources of an already overstretched education system. Before it was launched, the education system was already short of 100,000 teachers, more than 150,000 thousand classrooms, 13 million chairs and 151, 084 premises lacked water or sanitation facilities. Some groups have filed cases in the Supreme Court demanding a halt to the K to 12 program.

The *Madrasah* (Islamic Education) Basic Education Program for Muslim out-of-school youths and adults aims to upgrade Muslim basic education in the country through supporting Arabic Language and Islamic Values Education (ALIVE) in public schools; supporting a standard Madrasah curriculum in private Madaris; and supporting Arabic Language and Islamic Values for Muslim out-of-school youths and adults. The program received more than PHP 700 million from the 2015 national budget.

The ARMM continues to be one of the poorest regions in the Philippines. It is the only region where more than half of its population is living in poverty (55.8% in 2012) (NEDA, 2015). The Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) is also the lowest in the Philippines. For instance, at secondary level, NER is 33.7% compared to the country's overall rate of 61.2% (Symaco, 2014). The region is also beset by corruption; budget is paid to 'ghost' schools and their employees, and schools abandoned because of conflict are often still listed as 'active'. However, the plight of the Muslim Filipinos has come to the fore in the recent peace talks around the proposed *Bangsamoro* development plan.

In addition, the Philippines' Response to Indigenous People's and Muslim Education (PRIME) program, launched in 2011 in partnership with the Australian government, aimed to developed culturally sensitive and appropriate educational resources for both groups. It has since provided access to education to more than 31,000 Muslim and 75,000 indigenous people (DepEd, 2015).

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Chosen reform areas

The dissolution of the authoritarian Marcos regime and the advent of the "People Power" movement in 1986 were considered to be critical turning points in democratic reform and formed the backdrop for this study. We concentrated on post-Marcos reforms that promoted participatory democracy and good governance. We selected reforms that engaged diverse actors (for instance, government officials, church leaders, civil society), interest groups and ideologies, that occurred at different times, and that were spread across geographic locations in the Philippines. The aim of this approach was to avoid a myopic or exclusionary view of social and political networks.

We mirrored the Ghanaian case study by choosing three particular reforms and mapping key individuals and organisations associated with them. Through historical analysis of key political, educational, economic and democratic changes, three complementary areas were chosen: the Government Procurement Reform Act, the Mindanao Electoral Reform, and the Gawad Kalinga social movement. Unlike in the case of Ghana, these reforms (or, in the case of Gawad Kalinga, social movement) are relatively recent and implementation is ongoing by key actors involved in their formulation. They are also embedded in wider social and political changes. Inevitably, this selection process narrows the focus and excludes many significant actors. It is also evident that it may not be possible to generalise the observations derived from this selection of reforms and actors to developmental leaders in the Philippines, and certainly not to leaders in general.

Key Reform 1: Public Sector Procurement Reform (2003)

The Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs), have been the centerpiece of the national reforms to combat corruption and promote good governance in the Philippines. The GPRA was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 10 January 2003 and became effective on 26 January 2003. The first set of its IRRs was approved by the President on 18 September 2003 through Memorandum Order 119 and was deemed effective on 8 October of the same year. The Philippines has a long history of government corruption and has suffered from a lack of transparency in government procurement processes (Kang, 2002). The reforms aimed to reduce opportunities for graft and corruption; harmonise the procurement system with international standards and practices; and promote transparency, competitiveness, and accountability. In the words of President Arroyo, the objective of these reforms was "to address the public emergency born out of the pervasive malady of graft and corruption that has long plagued the government procurement system, impaired public service efficiency, and stunted national capacity for economic growth." (President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cited by Campos and Syquia, 2006:26)

The initial driving force to enact the PRA comprised a coalition of actors with a range of ideologies, but dominated by the liberalism of state bureaucrats and international aid agencies (Rodan and Hughes, 2012). This coalition embraced a standard contemporary liberal critique of corruption as rooted in state capture by narrow interests and maladministration by officials; the solution, it suggested, was better governance through more transparency and accountability within which competitive market forces are central (World Bank, 2000). From a liberal perspective, corruption in procurement contract awards, and corruption more generally, is the result of flaws in institutional governance structures that obstruct market competition and distort prices. A competitive, transparent, fair and efficient public procurement system is seen by these approaches as one of the pillars of anti-corruption and good governance reforms (Grindle, 2004), with significant effects on sustainable economic growth and development (Kaufmann, 2009).

Early public procurement reform initiatives can be traced to Benjamin Diokno (*interviewed*), a US-trained economist who in 1998 was appointed Secretary of the Philippines Department of Budget and Management (DBM). With help from USAID procurement experts, DBM conducted an analysis of the problems of the government's procurement system and prepared a draft omnibus law that would address these. In early 2000, Diokno and USAID successfully concluded a fairly substantial Technical Assistance (TA) program for the DBM's budget reform programs, which now included procurement reform. Among the first tasks of the TA team was helping the budget reform task force (BRTF) rekindle the procurement reform project. Ed Campos and Teresa Taningco (USAID program manager for the TA team, *interviewed*) were officially assigned to the task force and became core members (Campos and Syquia, 2006).

Ed Campos[7] was a key actor in the approval of the public sector procurement reform in the Philippines. He was a Filipino national trained in the US who had worked in different positions for the World Bank in the areas of public sector

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7   Sadly, Ed Campos died in December 2013, otherwise we would have interviewed him for this study as a key respondent.

management, institutional reform and governance. Campos was seconded to the USAID program as senior strategy adviser for public sector reforms at the DBM. While at the DBM, and later while seconded to the Asian Development Bank in Manila, he managed to put his prominent position in international organisations and his connections among the Filipino elites at the service of the passage of the landmark procurement reform. Even when the government changed and the administration and Parliament had new officials, his presence facilitated the link between national actors and the donors and played a critical role in making this reform happen.

By the end of 2000, the resulting parliamentary bill prepared by the BRTF was endorsed by the Lower House. However, at this time the whole country was focused on the impeachment of President Joseph Estrada due who faced massive corruption charges. The Estrada scandal and concerns of senators about an imminent election resulted in the 11th Congress being concluded before any further progress could be made. In May 2001, Estrada stepped down from the Presidency. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was declared President on a platform of good governance and anticorruption with the support of many of the civil society groups that had clamored for Estrada's impeachment. This favoured the progress of the procurement law through the new 12th Congress.

Emilia Boncodin, who was Undersecretary of DBM under the previous administration, was appointed as the new Secretary of DBM by President Arroyo. This was instrumental in resuming the push to get the omnibus procurement law passed. One of the first actions taken by the new secretary was to reactivate the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) to give greater official impetus, support, and political cover for reform work in public procurement. The GPPB was co-chaired by the DBM Secretary and Dante Canlas (*interviewed*), Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and included the secretaries of all major spending departments. The GPPB mandate was to recommend procurement policy reforms and to oversee their implementation. In order to work on preparing a new overarching proposal of reform, the BRTF convened a new technical working group participated, among others, by officials from the DBM, the Government Procurement Service, the Department of Public Works, and the Commission on Audit.

Once the new procurement reform proposal was ready, it was necessary to build an advocacy coalition of governmental and non-governmental actors that could create momentum for the reform in Congress. The TA team, under the leadership of Ed Campos, decided to form an NGO specialised in procurement issues and tasked primarily with training and monitoring. Procurement Watch Inc. (PWI) was launched in February 2001 with the sole mandate of fighting corruption in public procurement. Though its original purpose was to focus on monitoring and training, it became clear early on that advocacy would be its primary role until the law had been passed. Another NGO, the Transparency and Accountable Network (TAN), was also brought into this coalition. TAN was a network of 20 NGOs formed during the tenure of President Estrada as a reaction to corrupt practices in public administration. TAN agreed to prepare a manifesto supporting the passage of a new procurement law and invited PWI to become a full member of TAN. PWI managed to gain support from the most influential catholic group in the country, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. Despite the formal separation of church and state in the Philippines, the influence of catholic groups on government and the Legislature remains strong. The private sector was also involved through the Philippine Contractors Association. GWA, a media group with extensive experience in political campaigns, was contracted to manage a media strategy that included targeted use of AM radio, TV shows, news releases in print media and an advertising campaign (Campos and Syquia, 2006).

The strategy in Congress started by identifying strong sponsors of the law in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congressman Rolando Andaya, Jr. (*interviewed*), Chair of the Appropriations Committee, offered to co-sponsor the bill and defend it during the Floor debate. Congressman Andaya was a 34-year-old second-term legislator who was still not caught up in the traditional politics of the House and saw active sponsorship of high profile bills as a good vehicle for maintaining his popularity within his district. He had been appointed Chair of the powerful Appropriations Committee in part because of his very active participation in the impeachment hearings and, in part, because his father was the longest standing chair of the committee and was well respected by his colleagues for his ability to manage budgetary politics. In Senate, the main consideration was to find an influential figure from the opposition who would see the bill as a valuable addition to his or her CV that could be parlayed into votes later. Senator Edgardo Angara (*interviewed*) was the person approached by the TA team. Senator Angara was one of the most senior and most seasoned members of the opposition, and after the post-Estrada elections became its de facto leader. As he agreed to be the main sponsor of the bill, others in the opposition decided to support it. On 10 January 2003, almost two years and six months after the various versions of the Procurement Reform bill were submitted to Congress, President Arroyo signed the Consolidated Procurement Reform bill into law as Republic Act No. 9184. Its full title is "An Act Providing for the Modernization, Standardization and Regulation of the Procurement Activities of the Government and for Other Purposes".

The GPRA consolidated and standardised procurement rules and procedures for all national government agencies including government—owned and/or controlled corporations and local government units. They apply to procurement of goods and services, including infrastructure projects and consulting services. Among the changes introduced by the GPRA, it is worth mentioning five: the use of the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS) to promote transparency and competition; the adoption of open and competitive bidding in all levels of public procurement; the professionalisation of procurement officials; the inclusion of penal clauses and civil liability; and the institutionalisation of civil society participation

in all stages of the procurement process to improve transparency. This final reform is probably the most salient innovation of the GPRA and a landmark social accountability achievement for the Philippines. Social actors were incorporated onto the Bids and Awards Committees (BAC) responsible for awarding public sector contracts with the specific aim of making procurement processes transparent and accountable to civil society.

The vision was that GPRA would address the lack of transparency and competition, eliminate collusion and political interference and lessen the delays in the procurement process. However, despite the recognition of GPRA by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank as world-class legislation, controversies continue to haunt the Philippine procurement system (Pascua, 2013). While on paper the reform created a procurement system that conformed to international best practice, serious weaknesses in the system of implementation has undermined it. There is continuing widespread corruption in day-to-day procurement practices (Senate of the Philippines, 2008). It seems that the modernisation of the procurement system and the incorporation of BAC observers have curbed administrative and bureaucratic forms of corruption. However, it is less clear whether it has also effectively combatted more severe and structural forms of corruption such as those associated with nepotism, patronage and state capture by oligarchical powers.

Considering the anti-corruption aims of the reform, its broad scope, the diversity of international and national actors involved in its formulation and the sophisticated advocacy coalitions built for its approval, the public sector procurement reform is a very relevant focus of study for this research on developmental leadership in the Philippines. The list of actors interviewed for this reform includes:

- Three active and two inactive officials from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).

- High-level representatives from the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN), the Coalition Against Corruption (CAC), the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), PhilGEPS and the Commission on Audit (COA).

- Two members of the 12th Congress.

- Two retired officials from USAID office in Manila.

- Two university experts on good governance and corruption.

- A former president of the University of the Philippines

- A national broadcast journalist.

Key Reform 2: Mindanao Electoral Reform (2012-present) / Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014-2016)

In 2010 President Benigno Simeon Aquino III's administration began to pursue peace in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), one of the most volatile regions in the country. The ARMM comprises five provinces and spans 95,000 square kilometers (De Castro, 2013). It is where the majority of the Philippines Muslim population resides, including the Muslim secessionist group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Among Aquino's reform efforts was his attempt to mitigate election fraud and promote democracy through a voter re-registration program and cleansing of the voter list. Electoral reform was considered to be a crucial part of support for democratisation and good governance in the ARMM.

This reform was particularly important in Mindanao owing to the prevalence of violence and intimidation during elections (VERA Files/Asia Foundation 2011). There were also problems with voter mobilisation and de-mobilisation as means to steer election outcomes. In addition, the computerisation of voting in 2010 brought new challenges to the electoral process, namely fictitious or "ghost" voters – as well as whole ghost communities. Against this backdrop, a voter re-registration and election-monitoring program was implemented in July 2010. Aquino's first step was to solicit Congress to postpone the 2011 election of regional officials (Co et al., 2013). A set of interim officials was appointed while the president initiated the reform. In addition to mitigating the problem of fictitious voters, consultations were conducted among "stakeholders and citizen groups on governance issues, representation, and peace and development in the region" (ibid). It was not just the Aquino administration that was involved in this reform, but also local groups in Mindanao including the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), the Citizens' Collation for ARMM electoral reforms, and the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society.

During the planning of our research and identification of respondents, it became clear that it was difficult to disentangle electoral reform from the broader question of the Bangsamoro[8] peace process and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed on 27 March 2014. After 17 years of negotiations, this signing consolidated agreements by the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The agreement addresses the Bangsamoro aspiration for self-governance, defining the structure and powers of the Bangsamoro entity that will replace the ARMM. It also sets out the principles, processes and mechanisms for transition until the regular election in 2016 for the

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8   The Bangsamoro people are the original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands who have identified themselves as Bangsamoro.

new entity. The new Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is to undergo a process of popular ratification by the qualified voters in the proposed core territory. The Bangsamoro Government will have a parliamentary form of government, held as demo-cratic "because all members of Parliament will be elected as representatives of the Bangsamoro people". The election of Bangsamoro officials is scheduled for 2016, following the establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority in 2015. It can be seen that free and fair elections will be crucial to the legitimacy of the new government. Ending electoral violence is part of the aim to end all violence between the Moro Liberation movements and the GPH.

The CAB and BBL are naturally contentious, and the negotiations difficult and continuing. The scope of legislative powers, the degree of subsidiarity, the administration of justice, the degree of fiscal autonomy, control over resources, land and property rights, taxation, the future of business and trade - all are controversial. In particular are the religious issues of whether Islamic Banking and Finance and Sharia law will apply to all, or only to Muslims, and indeed only to Muslims who freely adhere to this, with the protection for Muslims who do not. There are identity questions of whether the 'Bangsamoro' means an ethnic or religious group, whether it is ascribed or is self-ascription, and who is entitled to vote (with questions of residency). One third of the adults of the current ARMM are illiterate, with a literacy rate parallel to parts of Africa, and there are concerns about how they will access programs and know their rights. Other questions relate to independence of the police and Islamic armed forces, with questions about the constitutional right to raise and deploy arms.

Bangsamoro communities are not heterogeneous, with diversity in ethnicity and belief. Racially, people define themselves predominantly as Moro, with the dominant religion as Muslim. Minority groups in the region include Christian groups who would be concerned about their status under the new agreement. In general, the people of the region have suffered sustained disadvantage, and part of the CAB is to improve and develop the health, education and livelihoods of Bangsamoro communi-ties. Cultural recognition and development is also an aim for many, so that there is greater awareness of Bangsamoro history and Muslim contribution to Filipino development.

Educationally, the draft BBL recognises the rights of the indigenous peoples to free education at elementary and high school levels, and also the right to education through the establishment of a tribal university system that will address the higher education needs of the indigenous cultural communities in the region. Proponents of the CAB forecast that Mindanao's economic growth will accelerate, and that the agriculture and fishing sectors will benefit first, with industry picking up later. Clearly, the costs of war are expected to disappear (between 1970 and 1996 the government spent PHP 73 billion on warfare). The Comprehensive Agreement details the 'normalisation' process that conflict-affected communities in the proposed Bangsamoro will undergo to return to a peaceful life and pursue sustainable livelihoods free from violence and crime. Normalisation is to include redress for unresolved grievances. It would seem that education in the region will have a key role in both economic development and in helping prevent reoccurrence of conflict.

It can be seen that this is a very complicated web of reform: peace is not only needed between the government and the MILF but between warring families, often affected by traditional concepts of vendetta and revenge. Families that have private armies are part of the election violence and intimidation. Self-determination is not just about political independence but a particular type of independence, predominantly Islamic rather than Christian/Catholic, and this sets up issues around conceptions of national unity.

Interviewees occupied varied positions in relation to these reforms and aims. Roughly two-thirds were Muslim, with origins or residence in Mindanao; one third were from a Christian (Catholic) background, and/or from central Philippines. Muslim respondents occupied a spectrum that ranged from those who had or have direct involvement in Moro independence movements through to academics promoting Islamic thought and recognition for Muslims. Non-Muslims were active in the peace process and the promotion of a transparent and non-corrupt democracy for the region - and elsewhere. All would cast themselves as advocates, differing not on the final goal of peace and democracy but on the means of achieving this and/or their own place within the struggle. Interviewees included:

- Electoral reform leaders, being those involved in leadership of the *Commission on Elections* and of the *Parish Pastoral Council on Responsible Voting* (an extensive voter education program in Mindanao, using a range of innovative techniques);

- The Chair and other leaders of the government *Peace Negotiating Panel;*

- Leaders within the *National Commission on Muslim Filipinos* (aiming to find a greater place for Muslims in the Filipino community);

- Leaders in the Moro independence movements (*MILF and MNLF*);

- Leaders in the *Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy* (which aims to help Muslims find their voice in the demo-cratic arena and support inclusive peace processes, human rights and good governance, and Bangsamoro economic development);

- Academic influencers in *Islamic Studies departments*, including advocates for women's empowerment;

- Director of a key movement *Literacy for peace and development* in ARMM. (More than 80% of the 63,714 learners involved in the project from 2011-2013 were women).

Many of course had cross-cutting roles. Some were both part of a government peace panel and lectured on electoral reform. Those who had held academic positions in law or economics had been co-opted onto peace commissions and panels as experts in, for example, Islamic Law and were then further engaged in research on the peace process. Adult literacy concerns and efforts were not confined to literacy organisations. Critically, lifelong involvement in underground, protest and radical movements was recognised when leaders were being appointed to peace negotiations.

Key Reform 3: Gawad Kalinga (1995-present)

Gawad Kalinga (meaning 'to give care') is a social movement aimed at alleviating poverty, focusing specifically on helping the 'poorest of the poor' in urban slums and remote rural communities or those affected by natural disasters. It should be noted that GK is not a reform embodied in legislation; rather it is an organised social movement that works toward a range of development goals, aiming to "share prosperity, to democratise governance, to promote sustainable development, to transform and preserve Philippine identity and culture, [and] to inspire youth" (Rodriguez and Lacandula-Rodriguez, 2009: ix). In some ways it works in parallel to government with some of the same developmental aims but working within a defined moral agenda reflected in its ethos and broad-based participatory approach. GK quantifies its primary goal as to "end poverty for five million by 2024" (Gawad Kalinga Annual Report 2012).

GK's roots are in the charismatic Christian organisation Couples for Christ (CFC) established in the early 1980s. Its first activities under its own name were in December 1995, and consisted of a youth camp and work on housing and community development in the Manila slum Bagong Silang. GK has been a stand-alone organisation since 2003 and parted entirely from CFC in 2009 (Villanueva 2010). Its early programs included a religious outreach camp for young people involved in gangs and out-of-school youth. It then extended into community rehabilitation efforts. GK maintains a Christian discourse (not surprising in a country where Christian faith plays a key role in all walks of life) and many of its individual leaders, including founder Tony Meloto, are very open about their faith; even so, GK is now considered a non-religious group focused on poverty alleviation and nation-building (Cagantas, 2013). It works in all communities, including Muslim communities in Mindanao. Tony Meloto has maintained a strong Catholic identity for himself and for the organisation but has been critical of the more superficial aspects of Filipino Catholicism and of its political nature. In an interview he said: "This country has too much religion, not enough faith…and religious doctrine in schools promotes charity rather than equality."

Currently, Gawad Kalinga is active in virtually every province in the Philippines, across more than 2,000 communities. Its own estimates suggest that it has helped 60,000 families.[9] The management structure is relatively flat but with a charismatic front man in Meloto (often known as 'Tito' (Uncle) Tony). It has a small team of national leaders (*two interviewed, along with Meloto*) and a prestigious Board of Trustees (*four interviewed*); 16 Area Coordination Teams work on the ground (*two leaders interviewed*). In the project team's fieldwork with GK, virtually every GK leader interviewed, including Tony Meloto and GK Executive Director Luis Oquinena, was dressed in a GK t-shirt. The GK office headquarters is small and basic and in a humble neighbourhood. This is not what might be expected from an internationally successful NGO with a high profile and high financial turnover, especially in such a status-conscious country, and even these surroundings are an improvement on previous offices and are only occupied because they are donated rent-free. For GK, it is always important that image and action match the message.

GK works with and recruits volunteers and workers from many different organisations, corporate, governmental and third sector, and its staff have been noteworthy as 'crossover reformists' who cross boundaries between state and civil society (Lewis 2013). They are considered pioneers in the multi-sectoral approach (Graham 2014). GK's practical collaborations include work in 2007 with the Department of Education, the Pag-Ibid Fund, and local government units to implement an affordable housing program for more than 90,000 teachers and Department of Education employees (Department of Education, 2014). The Department of Education engaged in this initiative to improve teachers' welfare.

Construction of housing is often the starting point upon entry into a community, and the distinctive, colourful GK houses quickly change the environment of a GK community. This 'housing first' approach is based on the need for dignified shelter and security, with this then extending into a wider plan contextualised in Philippine realities:

To spur institution-building, Gawad Kalinga communities are supported by a seven-point on-site community development program: (1) site and shelter development; (2) community organisation/Kapitbahayan and values transformation; (3) community-based health program; (4) child and youth development; (5) economic productivity; (6) environment; and (7) a Mabuhay/welcome program. They posit that only a holistic program that develops the individual, family, and community will succeed in building strong institutions in the Philippines. Only organised, principled, and economically and environmentally sustainable communities can survive and withstand the vagaries of Philippine politics, poverty, inequality, and social exclusion (Villanueva 2010: 238-239).

A significant part of GK's work beyond building houses is in the construction of communities and neighborhood associations, including the provision of values education and leadership development programs. GK has developed a curriculum and delivers modules on good governance and health education.

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9   See http://www.gk1world.com/our-scale

GK's work on building values within a community generally starts with the men (Graham 2014). The logic is that as men are often the root of social problems (if they are abusive, or dependent on drugs or alcohol, or involved in crime, or indeed if they feel disempowered by unemployment or poverty) then changing their values will improve the lives of everyone. This reflects local gendered roles and values: a survey of the beliefs of GK community residents had as number one 'the mother takes care of the family' and as number six 'the man tries to provide for the family' (Gawad Kalinga Annual Report 2014).

Work in urban slums was a starting point and ongoing priority for GK but it also works extensively in rural communities. The 'Enchanted Farm' is a model and GK flagship for rural development, and includes enterprises in producing market-ready luxury goods with locally-grown ingredients, education projects including the 'Village University' which emphasises locally-relevant experiential learning, and community development activities which emphasise GK values. It is also a magnet for international celebrities who help to raise GK's profile and fundraising potential (Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie were rumoured to be expected when we were there). Disaster relief has been an area where GK's ability to mobilise resources, volunteers and action has been impressive. It was instrumental in rebuilding communities after Typhoon Haiyan in 2014, recruiting 1,751,518 volunteers for disaster relief in that year.

As many respondents were quick to emphasise, within the Philippines GK works with virtually everyone, yet in a heavily networked society it also manages to be dependent on or closely affiliated with no-one. Its interaction with the HE sector goes back to its early roots in Ateneo de Manila, an old and elite private Catholic university. A number of institutions, including highly prestigious universities such as Ateneo and De La Salle, have links with GK which include student placement in GK communities as part of their community service agenda. GK's strategic planning is informed by research conducted in collaboration with HE institutions, including a Community Impact Assessment Survey which collects data from approximately 60,000 households.

GK has become an international organisation and Meloto describes GK as "a global movement for poverty reduction" (Meloto 2009: 6, cited in Brillantes and Fernandez, 2011: 24). Fundraising initiatives and activities take place across the Global North including, for example, USD 1 million raised in the US for GK's rebuilding efforts in communities affected by Hurricane Haiyan. Within the Philippines, many GK volunteers are recruited from abroad, including France. The GK model is now used in a range of other countries, including Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Cambodia, and its feasibility is being tested in other countries. Among its international accolades are the Ramon Magsaysay Foundation Award in 2006 (known as Asia's Nobel Peace Prize (Gawad Kalinga Annual Report 2014) and the Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneurship in 2012 (Gawad Kalinga Annual Report 2012).

Tony Meloto has been named as 'the most trusted man in the Philippines' by Readers Digest.[10] The growth and reach of GK, along with its ability to work with government while keeping them at arm's length, are impressive. The values base of GK is remarkably consistent in the discourse used by interviewees in this study and is carefully guarded. As a GK trustee and auditor from the private sector noted: "You spend a hundred years to build a reputation and one incident can destroy it overnight, so that's why we focus a lot on making sure that transparency, accountability, good governance is in place."

While not a legislation-based reform, Gawad Kalinga (GK) was selected as a focus for this study because of its developmental aims in eradicating poverty, fostering active citizen participation, collaboration and cooperation among government actors, business leaders, and civil society (Brillantes and Fernandez, 2011). It was also chosen because it has had tangible impact in the communities where it works as well as attaining national and international legitimacy, while the wider Philippines context is largely characterised as stagnating and fraught with corruption. It achieves this within a challenging context through thoughtful leadership and management of its activities and profile in order to maintain a 'clean' image in a context where much politics is less than clean. Ultimately, it gets things done where others struggle to do so. Part of this is a careful navigation of cross-overs between state, private sector and civil society; between the religious and the secular; between the local, national and international dimensions of its work; and between independence and compromise.

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10   See http://www.talibanews.com/articles/filipino_komunidad.html). Meloto and, by implication, GK are not without their critics. Social media reports from the University of Hawaii Centre for Philippine studies recently labelled Meloto 'sexist' with a 'colonial mentality' and also accused him of being elitist. He 'jokes' (with a remarkably straight face) about the beauty of the women of the Philippines as a resource and as a way of attracting men to the country. He has also, allegedly, suggested that Filipino men need Western role models (http://globalnation.inquirer.net/123509/racism-sexism-and-the-curious-case-of-gawad-kalingas-tony-meloto). He has published strongly worded personal answers to these accusations (http://www.gk1world.com/ArticleViewer. aspx?ID=151997). Questions were also raised during fieldwork by two informants about GK's role in accomplishing what government cannot: does their neutrality and refusal to engage politically in a partisan way legitimize government failures and corruption? As many charities do, do they enable the status quo to prevail by doing the work of the state in its stead? Our concern in this study was not to evaluate GK but to understand its workings and how education influenced the individuals and coalitions that have galvanized it.

5

Methodology

The methodology of the study was primarily qualitative. The initial phase involved an historical-political analysis of the national case, in order to identify suitable movements or reforms on which to focus in the subsequent analysis. This was done through an intensive literature review and discussions with experts from and on the Philippines. We chose the three reforms from the post-Marcos era, outlined above, in order to reflect this democratic developmental phase of the Philippines and to maximise opportunities to interview respondents actively involved.

For each reform, a longlist of individuals involved was generated to inform the shortlist of relevant interviewees. However, in this highly networked and particularistic society we also relied heavily on the contacts of our local researcher (Lorraine Pe Symaco) who had excellent access through her own networks to national elites. In addition to the interviewees identified through the literature review and Lorraine Symaco's extended networks, further interviewees were identified during the fieldwork period through 'snowball' techniques. In order to ensure depth of understanding, and to build on growing insight into each reform or movement, three members of the team took primary responsibility for the interviews within one case each: Oscar Valiente focused on Procurement, Lynn Davies on Mindanao Electoral Reform, and Michele Schweisfurth on Gawad Kalinga.

An interview protocol was designed for the primary interviews to explore aspects of key individual leaders' backgrounds and educational experiences (see Appendix A). The interviews took between 45 and 90 minutes and were usually arranged at the place of work of the interviewee. Three interviews were carried out through Skype, and all the face-to-face interviews (with the exception of one which took place at the GK 'Enchanted Farm' in a rural area approximately two hours outside the city) took place in Manila. Transport around Manila – a notoriously congested city – meant that a maximum of two interviews per fieldwork day for each team member were possible. The two periods of fieldwork took place in October 2014 and February 2015. Key institutions, including elite higher education institutions the University of Philippines, Ateneo de Manila and de la Salle University, along with the Development Academy of the Philippines (created specifically to prepare leaders and high-level civil servants) were also visited and key actors interviewed. These interviews were supplemented by discussions with informants from, for example, the Asia Foundation and the Australian Embassy, who provided context and their own views as well as additional contacts. In all 53 interviews were conducted. Of the primary interviews with key actors in each of the reforms, 41 were recorded with permission and transcribed for thematic analysis. We were fortunate to secure interviews with elite individuals and they were remarkably open on most subjects, and seemed genuinely pleased to be the subject of study. It is of course inevitable – as with all interviews – that self-presentation is subjective and may have included an element of 'wishful thinking'. However, as interviewers we sensed that people were reflecting honestly and where contradictions surfaced this was a product of competing imperatives in their own lives, such as wanting to avoid being embroiled in politics but needing to engage in order to achieve their goals.

All but one primary interviewee consented to be recorded and while confidentiality was offered, most interviewees did not request it. However, as this was not consistent, quotes in the report are generally not attributed to particular individuals in the findings section, except where the identity of the respondent is important or it is not feasible to conceal it, and where they have given permission to be identified. Quotations are attributed to interviewees through codes that include their name initial, their role in the reform and gender markers (f-female, m-male).

The initial qualitative analysis was conducted by the individual responsible for a particular reform. These analyses were compared across the three reforms in order to generate shared codes and to gain a national overview. To this end we exchanged analytical notes and categories and had extensive discussions at team meetings in Glasgow, Manila and Birmingham. The emergent themes and categories were tested with local informants during and outside of the interview process. In the findings, we aim to present both the general findings and to note differences across the reforms which reflect their differing origins, goals and actors. Theory was data-generated, but where this resonated with existing concepts, such as Putnam's bonding and bridging capital (2000), we draw on these.

Interviewees were often reluctant to engage with questions about their networks and so our original intention of conducting a systematic network analysis has not been realised. The interviewees' reluctance was explained in a range of ways but one compelling explanation is the regular reference to 'people power'. Elite networks in the Philippines have blocked as much as facilitated development, and have often worked in self-serving ways. Developmental leaders were happier to talk about mass movements than about personal networks and coalitions, although these evidently played some role. Data on educational backgrounds of the respondents also revealed remarkably little overlap in terms of institutions attended, and within particular

reforms, few of the interviewees firstly or primarily knew each other through education. This was somewhat surprising in the light of the intersection of an elitist education system with wider power networks, and also in the light of the findings in Ghana (Jones et al., 2014), but this drives home the particularities of the Philippines context. It also emphasises the differences between our respondents and some of the other actors at work on the political scene. As the findings below will elaborate, while the networking *within* these movements was not influenced strongly by shared educational experiences, the other networks developed among 'batchmates' proved important in later life, both in terms of gaining allies but also in working across a wide range of individuals and groups in complex reforms, and dealing with potential adversaries. These networks would be too dissipated to map using the data we gathered.[11]

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11   Some connections were drawn using publicly available knowledge but these are not included in the public version of this report.

6

Findings

This study has uncovered highly complex relationships between education, family background, politics and religion which combine in a range of ways to determine positioning as a leader of reform. The findings confirm the close links in the Philippines between family and membership of political elites, which mean that education is rarely seen as uniquely determinant of attaining a leadership position. Instead, education mostly reproduces existing dynasties and networks of influence. However, participants all saw their own education as having a significant role in their trajectory to becoming a leader, albeit sometimes in unexpected ways. They also view education as potentially having a key role in the country's future development as a peaceful, unified and prosperous nation and had advice on what kind of higher education was needed for development in these directions.

We start by discussing findings on the theme of **development**: how leaders conceptualise development and good governance and how they assess the contribution to these aims of the reforms they were involved in.

We then discuss **leadership**: how the interviewees grew into their roles, and how this intersects with gender, ethnicity, and family privilege. This section also reflects on styles of leadership and personal motivations for engaging in significant developmental roles.

The third theme is the development and role of **networks** in the process of change: how leaders describe the importance and dynamics of coalition building and their strategies for collective action.

Finally, we discuss the role of **education** in all of these, from the perspectives of the interviewees and our overall observations of the Philippines context.

Development

In order to interrogate the role of education in developmental leadership, it is necessary first to explore the nature of the kinds of 'development' which leaders envisage and which they think their own leadership can promote. This varied considerably across the three reform movements, with different ideological conceptions. Participants in the interviews did not always talk openly about their ideologies and political affiliations, but in most of the cases these can be inferred from their own understandings of the final aims of the reforms, the social problems they are trying to address and the way these reforms will achieve their goals. The aims of each reform are summarised in Table 4.

- The Public Sector Procurement Reform (PSPR) is a policy reform that aims to promote economic growth by making public sector expenditure more efficient. The modernisation of procurement systems in the public sector - through the standardisation, professionalisation and centralisation of procurement procedures – is supposed to eradicate opportunities for corruption and avoid the waste of public resources associated with corrupted practices.

- The Mindanao Electoral Reform (MER) aims to promote representative democracy in the ARMM by mitigating election fraud through a voter re-registration program and cleansing of the voter list (a process which will be part of the workings of the new Bangsamoro entity and parliament). It also aims to tackle election violence and intimidation, again part of a wider drive to mitigate conflict. The embedding of MER in the peace process and in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) means that many of the participants saw themselves as more involved in the latter than in specific election processes; so the reform in the discussion will be termed MER/CAB.

- The Gawad Kalinga movement (GK) aims to promote sustainable development by eradicating poverty and by preserving Filipino identity through participatory democratic structures and practices that operate in parallel to the official ones.

Table 4. Aims of the reforms/reforming movement selected for this study

Reform/movement	Public Sector Procurement Reform	Mindanao Electoral Reform/Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro	Gawad Kalinga movement
Transformational aims	Economic growth Efficiency Modernisation (ICT) Anti-corruption Social accountability	Democracy Peace Pro-poor development Self-determination Muslim advancement National unity Anti-corruption	Eradication of poverty Filipino identity Participatory democracy Effective and efficient communications

While there are substantive differences, we can see common threads in the ideals of each initiative – tackling power abuses and corruption, and the need for public education. Yet to explain their divergences, and before examining any relation to education, it is necessary to look at the sources of their underpinning ideologies.

Sources and drivers of development ideologies: international and national

Conceptions of development have international as well as national or individual provenance. The PSPR is part of a wider public sector reform initiated during the presidency of Maria Corazon "Cory" Aquino with the aim of reducing national debt and public deficit through the rationalisation of public expenditure in a number of departments, through fiscal measures to raise public revenues and through the privatisation of state enterprises. The large public debt inherited from the authoritarian regime made democratic governments more reliant on conditional lending from global financial institutions and official development assistance. As a high level authority in national economic planning pointed out, these international organisations imposed their own conditions, mostly associated with public sector reform, for continued financial support of the Filipino government. The influence of these international organisations was not limited to setting the agenda of priorities; they participated actively in the formulation of the reforms, especially in the PSPR. International organisations such as the World Bank provided technical support for the design of the PSPR based on international best practice in procurement. Government officials were invited to attend international meetings to learn what could be achieved through procurement reform. All the government officials interviewed for this study saw the influence of international actors as very positive for the PSPR. In fact, for many of these officials one of the final aims of the PSPR was to make the Philippines more respected at the international level and more attractive to international capital. They are fully aware that the image of the Philippines as a corrupt country makes it difficult to convince foreign capital to invest in its economy.

One reason why the PSPR is presented as a successful reform is because it was recognised by international organisations. One of the technocrats responsible for the implementation of the reform stressed how important it was that institutions like the World Bank had described it as a global role model: "When the WB recognises the work you are doing, you know that you are going in the right direction."(R, PSPR government, f).

The Philippines moved from receiving lessons from other countries to being portrayed globally by the World Bank as an example of international good practice in procurement. The Philippines has since hosted delegations from other countries (for example, Sierra Leone, Indonesia and Bhutan) interested in learning about the experience of PSPR; the Filipino government has received awards at the international level for its technical capacity in procurement. Those involved in the reform see the PSPR as one step forward in the process of modernisation of the country. "Some other countries have probably gone ahead of us, but now we are modernising." (D, PSPR government, m).

In contrast, GK, while having international connections and a growing global influence, is very much a Filipino institution and describes itself so. Not only does it have preservation of Filipino culture as one of its goals, it celebrates patriotism and Filipino independence in a diverse range of ways: for example, encouraging the production of luxury goods using local raw materials (instead of exporting these for processing at a higher profit for producers); explicitly incorporating positive Filipino values into their ways of working, including 'bayanihan ' (meaning co-operative work); and a primary concern for the development of 'our' human capital. The evolution of the GK model has been from the ground upwards 'without a blueprint' and so has self-consciously evolved in response to local and national needs. The GK rhetoric around their global relationships is more about GK influencing the wider world than the other way around.

The MER/CAB would have global backing for their ideals and aims but, like GK, the drivers are internal. Reform tackles the complex intermix of a quartet of aspirations: peace; self-determination; pro-poor uplift; and democracy. Concepts of national development among the participants recognised the need for all these to be addressed in order for the Philippines to prosper, but focused on specific aspects according to their positioning in the reforms. For some, development was centrally *Bangsamoro* development and self-determination, the advancement of Muslims in order to gain equal recognition and greater resources. Reform in this sense includes, for S. (government peace panel, m), the 'actualisation' of a halal way of life, both in terms of a wide range of aspects - food, dress, the provision of prayer rooms - but also Islamic banking and finance. This means the incorporation of aspects of Sharia law, and the Koran being manifested in the new basic law. Development, then, is about economic and financial development, but including structures such as halal certification and economic development acting side by side with social development in education and religious advancement.

However, those who emphasised autonomy and Muslim concerns also recognised the need for inter-faith dialogue and work – and were active in these fields. Development for them was about national unity. For E. (NCMF, m), the peace process "is the opportunity for Muslims to be part of the larger cause", cementing the place of Muslims in the bigger national community. So development is seen not as not separatism or segregation, but greater equity and a joint forging of peace. Respondents and the organisations they represented recognised this, for example citing how the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos has a Bureau on Peace and Conflict Resolution (PBCR).

For others in MER/CAB, democracy was the key to development. The Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), which was represented by or referred to among our participants, stresses that the current elements of the continuing struggle

for self-determination – a just peace, human rights, credible elections, capable autonomous government and equitable development – are all hallmarks of a functioning democracy for Filipino Muslims. Here is where a global positioning does come in: PCID aims to contribute to the global discourse on Islam and democracy as well as internal struggles, and it wants to support the global position that Islam and democracy are compatible.

Conceptions of good governance

In spite of differing ideals of what development means for the Philippines, there are some common threads across the three reforms. These relate to good governance in terms of transparency, anti-corruption and efficiency. Good governance for MER/CAB related to political power-sharing between central government and the new Bangsamoro government, but also efficient and transparent use of power. For H. (PPCRV, f), elections are symbolic as well as real, representing "how people live their politics". Electoral fraud and violence represent an obstacle to renewal of the country. The efforts therefore are about technical means and physical machinery for clean elections together with widespread voter education about their rights. Leadership training should include respect for human dignity, not buying votes or even lives. It was significant that electoral reform is cited up front as fundamentally pro-poor, as it is the poor who are 'bought'. Poverty is seen as an obstacle to democracy, with votes determining "whether you get a good government or a corrupt government". Electoral reform is, for this group of respondents, a highly political venture which seeks to undermine power abuses and illegal continuation of dynasties in positions of dominance.

The PSPR, on the other hand, is understood essentially as a technical administrative reform that will produce efficiency gains and will benefit the whole society without challenging current structures of power and wealth, and without creating more tensions between social groups. One of the most celebrated aspects of the reform is its technical nature, considered very important in order to gain support and avoid political resistance. Improving governance and tackling corrupt practices through technical administrative reform is seen as a panacea in a country where political unrest and conflict have been a constant in recent decades. "We cannot do revolutions all the time" (V, PSPR non-government, m). Reforms like the PSPR are seen as substitute for traditional methods of political contestation and civil disobedience. If modern and efficient structures of good governance are put in place, no more bloody revolutions against authoritarian and despotic governments will be necessary. The aversion to conflict among the promoters of the reform is very clear in the role reserved for civil society. Social movements are co-opted as valuable partners in the implementation of the reform. Social activists get full-time jobs working for social accountability networks funded by international organisations, and they also get their positions in governmental advisory policy boards representing the civil society. The role of these civil society organisations is not to question the aims and the logic of the reform but to ensure its effective implementation. They are observers responsible for bringing in the local community and ensuring the legitimacy of the policy. "Procurement Watch [civil society organisation] is not a watchdog. It is more like a training entity, making sure that everyone understands the project." (T, PSPR non-government, f).

Liberal concepts of good governance have dominated the formulation of the PSPR. For these ideologies, the design flaws in the institutional architecture of the public administration are the main explanatory factor behind corrupt and antisocial governmental practices. In liberal concepts of good governance, individual virtue is basically the emerging result of a clear and coherent system of rules and incentives. Eradicating corrupt practices is less about culture and moral values and more about the development of good governance structures. The adoption of information technology (IT) is one of the key aspects of the modernisation of procurement procedures in the Philippines.

> "IT was really the Trojan horse. The problems are behavioural, the way we do business in government. We need different rules and structures. If you do no follow the rules you do not get any money. Procurement is a corruption-prone area. The solution is just transparency and capturing the data properly, publishing the data, therefore damping the behaviour you are trying to sneak away. By digitalising procurement procedures you put a digital footprint that allows having a Big Brother eye on all." (M, PSPR government, m).[12]

This expresses the idea that corruption would not exist if effective accountability systems were able to force politicians to listen to their constituencies and make the best decisions for the majority of people. This liberal conception is sometimes combined by PSPR respondents with a more traditional discourse on the moral fibre of individuals and personal values. We asked participants about the effectiveness of the procurement reform in eradicating corrupt practices. Despite not being directly interrogated about the ethical dimension of their own practice, some of the interviewees referred to their own ethical practice in government to underline the importance of individual values to prevent corruption. One argued that they would never be involved in corrupt political practices because the feeling of guilt would not allow them to sleep at night. For others, not succumbing to temptation is directly related to the values they acquired from their parents and from their catholic education. In other cases, communitarian explanations seem to be more important. "Your only wealth is your name. Your reputation precedes you." (D, PSPR government, m).

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12 We did not directly ask about individual behaviours, although some interviewees volunteered their own positions.

In contrast, GK's starting point is a moral agenda, and every respondent made that clear both in terms of the organisation's view of successful development and in terms of their own motivations for joining. On the other hand, while contrasting this with their development, several respondents acknowledged the need for efficient systems, communications and account-ability within an increasingly complex organisation:

> "Every time we think about something we need to make sure that 200 others understand it and then 4000 other volunteers to make it happen on the ground. So turning 20 degrees to the left was a lot easier when there was just three of us." (I, GK senior leader, f)

Similarly, for MER/CAB, it was not just those working in election reform that stressed the fight against corruption. Reform was also cited as being about tackling bureaucracy, inefficiency, tardiness and employees with fake credentials: this was bracketed with discrimination and "lack of programs to cater to the Muslim minority" (E, NCMF, m) as part of the history of disadvantage. Abuses of power and privilege are the stumbling blocks to good governance and equity.

The difference between the three groups of respondents might be summarised baldly as whether good governance leads to moral virtue or moral virtue leads to good governance. The question for the study is of how and where learning occurs.

Educational influence

Finally then in this section, we turn to the question of the impact of education on the formation of ideologies of development and good governance. Any centrality of education is initially difficult to determine (see further discussion in the Education section below). One aspect that needs to be stressed is that most of the PSRP leaders completed their post-graduate studies abroad and/or they undertook some form of training with international organisations. In fact, many of the PSRP leaders studied in the US and some of them received some form of training in Japan, two of the most influential international powers in the area. Maybe, as a result of that, many of them seem to be very comfortable with the idea of borrowing policy solutions from developed countries and international organisations. Also worth noting is the aversion of the PSRP interviewees to political conflict and their preference for technical policy recipes. Many of them joined government as high-level technocrats and they prefer to be valued for their technical competence rather than their political capital. In contrast, MER/CAB respondents, while having sometimes studied or worked abroad, would want to be valued for the political competence, experience and ideals forged in the Philippines – often in underground or resistance movements.

However, participants saw a role for education for others in pursuing their own ideals of development and governance. Many MER/CAB respondents talked of attempting to drive change through their efforts in education in its broadest sense. This may have been voter education, as discussed; adult literacy classes, particularly women's 'enlightenment' or empowerment; being part of curriculum change at school level by, for example, removing stereotyping of Muslims; and at HE level, in terms of promotion of Islamic Studies. Another respondent was putting effort into the reform of Mindanao State University, improving access for poorer students and establishing dormitories for girls as well as for boys. This was also part of moving away from the concentration of higher education in Manila. Participants talked less of their own education in relation to their ability or desire to effect change at specific points, except in terms of the expertise they had attained in subjects such as law, and around values and experiences in community and outreach work while in school or HE. 'On the job' training, either in the military or in underground movements in the Marcos era, combined in complex ways with knowledge and skill acquired in HE.

One specific knowledge area of importance for some of those with an Islamic background was expertise in extremism, and they were able to lecture on this and/or appear on the media to warn of fundamentalism. This activity was not directly implicated in reform, but was a key background factor that enabled the push for peace and for inter-faith dialogue. In a different way, religious education also had an influence on the conceptions of good governance of some of the PSPR people. Participants with a Catholic background, although recognising the influence of governance structures on individual behaviours, placed more emphasis on the importance of moral values and individual responsibility in avoiding corrupted practices in government.

Education is present in the formation of ideological conceptions of development and good governance, but it is also the object and inherent component of these paradigms. Any conception of development and good governance implies a particular notion of the knowledge and the pedagogy that are most valuable for society. Reforms such as the PSPR, which are guided by liberal ideas and the aspiration of modernisation, will see education and training as part of their enlightening strategy of making governmental and non-governmental actors aware of the technical superiority of their institutional design. For MER/CAB reformers, education plays an important role in the peace building process by facilitating the dialogical negotiation of identities, the recognition of "the other" and the healthy reproduction of the values and the knowledge of the different communities. Finally, the GK activists aspire to the emergence of new forms of conscience and socially responsible practices by the de-colonisation of knowledge and the generation of new spaces for mutual learning, personal recognition and countercultural production.

Becoming a leader

Individuals decide that they will or will not take part in processes of change for very different reasons. These decisions are influenced and constrained by personal circumstances and structures of opportunity. Among these mediating factors are factors such as age and stage of life, gender and family responsibilities, economic stability, social status, trust in reform partners and working conditions. This study seeks to find out when and how developmental leaders decided join this process of change. Were they aware of the implications of their decision? How do they assess their decision today? How much choice did they actually have in joining a movement or becoming a leader in it? How did their education influence the opportunity and the decision to join this reform?

This study is not concerned with unpacking the typologies of myriad different types of leadership (democratic, moral, assigned, ascribed, collaborative) but with exploring journeys into a place where a person could begin to exert power. It is necessary to look at the whole of that journey before isolating education.

Participants had diverse trajectories into leadership. One pathway was rising through the ranks to military leadership. Another was rising through the Church, taking on positions of responsibility and pastoral care. In some cases, leadership came after a substantial career shift and a sense of 'calling' in a particular direction.

Participants across the three areas often mention family origin and family circumstances as a key factor in their decisions. In the case of PSRP leaders, most of them cite their partners in their decision to join government, not only because of the financial implications for the family, but also because they shared networks and knowledge of the professional field. Many of the partners of these leaders studied in the same universities, were also involved in extra-curricular activities or student activism, and they also work for government. Family origin also was important in their decision to join government. "My father already was a politician and at very young age I knew that I wanted to serve the country." (B, PSPR government, m). In other cases the influence was not so direct but very explicit: "My parents were teachers for the government. They told me that if you want to become rich do not go to the government." (C, PSPR government, m). However, in some cases participants did not take the advice from their relatives. "Mom had plans for everyone. She was business sector minded but I think she accepted me after all." (A, PSPR government, f)

A history of family leadership was often crucial for ARMM leaders as well, setting up expectations for subsequent generations to take on the role, however young they were. As one respondent from the ARMM reform noted:

> "...people were already asking information and that knowing where I came from and the history that my grand-father had already laid out, there was also an expectation from students, not necessarily only from Ateneo, to give me an opportunity to speak and lead." (T, congressman, m)

People talked of familial 'grooming' for leadership – examples were that from great grandfather onwards there had been a Senator in the family, or a mayor undefeated for the lifetime of four presidents. Political families would actually be deliberately united by marriage. There could be a temporary switch, in that 'kids of the privileged class' became revolutionaries, but then they eventually joined the government and the establishment. Conversely, a family leadership trajectory can be attained in one generation: the participant who rose to leadership from humble beginnings through self-study in law has passed on his mayoral position to his son, and his granddaughter is also a councillor.

For a number of high-level leaders within GK, their involvement in GK and the leadership trajectory within it was unconventional, the result of a profound change of direction and an almost spiritual turnaround, a kind of 'calling' towards the moral agenda of GK. Tony Meloto, for example, was working for the private multinational corporation Proctor and Gamble, and another member of GK management and the board had the same trajectory. Two junior leaders in GK used the same term: a 'quarter life crisis' – to describe this turning point. "Really", enthused one female GK leader, "I used to be so much of a planner. I had my life planned out for the next six years at least when I left P and G, but really GK just crumbled whatever plans I had…GK gives credibility and conviction to the work…it gave me an opportunity to harness my core". In one extreme case, a female Muslim GK coordinator went from active involvement in underground movements in Mindanao to joining and ultimately progressing through GK: "So, I realise, Ok, maybe this is what our God gave me and I need to see, to study what is Gawad Kalinga, maybe this is something new, this is different." This sense of mission, along with the skills they brought from their lives in other sectors, fueled a fast trajectory to higher levels of leadership within the organisation.

For developmental leaders of the PSPR the decision to join the government and the public sector was a key moment in their trajectories. They are highly educated professionals with great opportunities to make money in the private sector and many have experience in economic sectors such as banking, fund management, corporate law or IT. Their experience in the private sector allowed them to understand some of the challenges the country was facing, but they could do nothing to help the country from the private sector. For them, joining the government or working for civil society organisations was an opportunity for personal realisation. In the private sector, "there was no passion in my job" (A, PSPR government, f); "I realised that the private sector was not for me" (V, PSPR non-government, m). Working in government or a civil society organisation is not just a job: "it is also personal, a passion […] You work in your personal time." (V, PSPR non-government, m). They had to renounce the economic benefits of the private sector but they seem satisfied with this choice. In fact, public-private

partnerships (PPPs) had made return to the private sector easier and offered them the opportunity to capitalise on the experience and knowledge developed during their time in government. "I am working now in a PPP administering a US government grant for public procurement." (A, PSPR government, f).

Other participants worked for a university before joining government. As explained by one national leader, there are certain structures and practices that facilitate links between the most prestigious universities and government. "We have the US system, you do not lose tenure when you go to government. […] We are not political, we join as technical experts. We do not have political ambition. We are there just to lend our knowledge and do the best we can." (B, PSPR government, m).

Some of the leaders interviewed had always wanted to work for government, but others only realised that they wanted to do this kind of job once they had joined the government. One participant noted that the government works for many more people than just the middle class: "… in the Philippines, we have the poorest of the poor, when you are in government you deal with that sector." (A, PSPR government, f). The reasons for staying in government vary, but many leaders have their own rescue narrative where their participation in government can make a difference in the future of the country. "After I joined government I realised that there were few of us who really care and I could see many in government who just wanted to take advantage of the people you were supposed to help…I can help more if I stay here." (C, PSPR government, m). These rescue narratives are also present among those who were successful professionals abroad and decided to return to the Philippines. "During martial law I went to the US with a fellowship. When the change arrived I had the opportunity of staying and being a small fish in a big pond or [to] come back and make a difference." (B, PSPR government, m)

Participants refer not only to a personal willingness to contribute to national development but also to the circumstances that influenced this decision. "I think everybody wants to give back, to contribute to society and people just get lost because all the pressures that we go through, we need to have a financial stable income…" (A, PSPR government, f). Even in the case of participants that always wanted to take part in public issues, they had to wait until being offered the opportunity to join governmental bodies "I am an activist. I always felt that I wanted to be involved in issues for my country… and then in 2001 I was offered the opportunity." (V, PSPR non-government, m). In a similar vein: "I wanted to go for non-profit, so the […] opportunity presented itself and I just grabbed it." (T, PSPR non-government, f). Of course, these opportunities are not offered randomly. Professional prestige and recognition play a significant role in being offered a high level position in government or in the not-for-profit sector: "I was not invisible by this time." (T, PSPR non-government, f). Similarly, "there was a moment that certain opportunities and skills converged". (M, PSPR government, m). Only in some cases did participants argue that they had no choice but to join the process of change. For example, a civil society activist identified two circumstances that led him to get more involved in public affairs; the protests against the Estrada administration and his own participation in networks of protesters: "I was pulled in by the circumstances." (V, PSPR non-government, m). In a very different sense, one government official talks about how she came to be in charge of the implementation of the reform: "I was there when we had to implement the law." (A, PSPR government, f).

Gender issues arose in leadership style and positioning. A. (from a highly political family on both sides) explained how her father wanted his daughters to be involved in leadership (their brothers did not want to take on this role). But it was her mother that gave her the appropriate style: not an aggressive attitude and pushing for complete equality between men and women, but following the saying that 'honey catches more flies than vinegar'. A. saw her in action in the Senate and realised she was right. This had 'tempered' her own approaches and the advocacy for a broad democracy, not a narrower focus on women's rights (A, PCID, f). Other women with less social capital had to struggle for influence, for example in different interpretations of the Koran:

> "When you advocate for a new way of thinking and a new way of looking at things, you always want to get the conventional respect, the customary way of looking at things and this has always been a difficult thing for us to overcome, especially when you are talking to people who consider themselves authorities." (C, Inst. Islamic Studies, f)

Another female leader (H, PPCRV, f) felt that the Philippines was fortunate compared to some other Asian countries in that there were more vocal women coming out in leadership and in public positions of note. There were increasing numbers of representatives and women in the Senate. Yet women's voices among the poor were still not heard, and domestic violence and trafficking were still rife. The importance was having women in positions of leadership who are not just interested in entrenching themselves in power or benefitting materially, but who would take up the cudgels for poor women to stop them being exploited or battered.

Ethnicity is still a very strong determinant and influence, and ethnic identity is apparently revealed on the first meeting between people: "That also seems to influence the pattern of leadership that Muslims usually display." (S, government peace panel, m). Experience of discrimination, covert or overt, galvanised some Muslims into wanting to break the stereotype and to gain influence. The female Muslim GK leader already referred to mentioned acquiring leadership skills through creating and leading a movement in her Catholic school that promoted equal rights for Muslims.

Leadership style might have come from one's family or from the cause that was being advocated. It could also come from mentorship, and within GK there is a strong tradition of this with mentors choosing mentees and future leaders (similar to the grooming process mentioned above) but also potential leaders choosing their mentors:

> "I have a mentor who is younger than me, I have a mentor who is older than me, and I have a mentor who is my peer…it's really important to have people that you almost beg to help you reflect because you will always have blind spots." (I, GK leader, f)

Charismatic leadership is an important part of the Philippines political landscape, where the prevalence of already public figures such as film actors or relatives of former leaders is significant. A different kind of charisma was prevalent in GK. Some of the top GK figures operate with moral authority and gain a following through projecting this effectively. Within GK, a term that leaders often used to describe themselves and other GK activists was 'outliers': they were self-consciously outside of the Philippines mainstream in their outlooks and their ways of working. Interestingly within GK a combination of charismatic leadership and hand-picking of mentees by the top leaders is common. Once leaders are in place, the responsibilities of leadership are distributed equally, and leadership legitimacy emphatically does not stem from status. People laughed when asked what their job titles were and what these entailed. As one noted:

> "We don't really care about positions – we laugh at positions – we invent them all day long. I really think we can keep inventing positions, but what makes you stay in GK is really how you earn the respect and the friendship of people because if you don't have that nobody will care here what their position is." (I, GK leader, f)

In a highly status-oriented society, this is another way that the GK team were self-consciously outliers. Keeping this outlier outlook also gave them permission to work outside of the normal channels in a highly bureaucratic society. As one leader noted:

> "The power of bureaucracy requires people who are able to work around it…going against the tide for me is very important, always shaking the water, just to put people on their toes." (GK HE leader, m)

This outlier placement was useful in sustaining the fine insider-outsider balance that has allowed GK to prosper through three different presidencies in a volatile political climate: "We work with everyone…we say that GK is not political, but that is not true, we are very political, we work with all of the politicians in the country…but we are non-partisan." (GK HE leader, m). The same interviewee noted that GK and universities are the most stable institutions in the shifting political landscape of the Philippines.

Individual trajectories are also affected by historical events that influenced a generation. Across the three reform areas, for older leaders, the People Power Revolution (I) had a huge effect not only in professional terms but also at a personal level. As one PSRP leader noted: "Mrs Aquino gave us hope" (B, PSPR government, m). One respondent in MER/CAB talked of how "In my younger years where I experienced war, in fact in a sense I could consider myself as one of those children of war in the '70s. I consider myself a 'Jabida Massacre baby',"[13] (J, Inst. Islamic Studies, m). For younger leaders, the People Power Revolution II made them realise that they were sharing values with other people and that something could be done to change the country. "Leaders from different sectors joined to think alternative solutions." (V, PSPR non-government, m).

Leadership *opportunity* perhaps stems from an educational environment of activism, intermixed in some cases with previous family reputation and, for all, putting oneself in the right place at the right time. An education that enabled mixing with others was also seen to influence leadership thinking, both as a subordinate and as a leader, having experienced the perspective of other faiths, sectors and socio-economic groups. The service orientation, mentioned earlier, whereby leadership was in the service of the poor or disenfranchised, would hone particular advocacy and persuasion skills.

Networks

Networks in (and after) higher education institutions are linked to broader political coalitions and alliances, including the role of fraternities and sororities (see below). Networking in the Philippines is as often about self-serving goals and reproduction of existing privilege as about developmental leadership. Perhaps because of these and related phenomena, interviewees involved in anti-corruption or pro-equity movements did not readily talk about individuals with whom they worked to make change happen. They were more likely to talk in 'people power' terms, referring to the 'thousands of volunteers' (for those involved in the Marcos era reforms). As described above, GK leaders keep a very carefully managed distance from traditional, political and religious elites and maintain a self-consciously non-hierarchical structure and language about the organisation. This fits well with theories of horizontal, self-organising networking, whereby leadership becomes subsidiary to the power of information flows and the sense of belonging, or of mission, that maintain the network.

For other participants, particularly those linked to ARMM reforms, other networks formed in education were far more important than fraternities which many did not join at all. Experience in the various activist movements forged lifetime bonds and fellowship. One participant was Chair of the National Union of Students and is still in touch with both the 'younger crop'

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13 The Jabidah massacre was the alleged killing of Moro soldiers by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on 18 March 1968. The story and alleged plots behind it sparked deep divisions in Philippine society and was pivotal in the insurgency.

who ask him to speak, and with contemporaries who are pressing him to run for Senate, saying "We can help you." (T, NCMF, m). Another revived an organisation called the Political Science Club with other majors in political science, and these alumni are now in Mindanao UP having created a similar organisation. Such participants did cite particular classmates who are now part of their networks for reform, and the fact that people were classmates means "the network is still there and it's easy for us to build alliances". (L,NCMF, m). Existing family networks are capitalised on: one mentioned involvement in her mothers' campaign but also that her she and her husband were originally classmates in the School of Economics, and her husband's vast business and physical management network could be drawn on: "I can cross over and ask them to help." (A, PCID, f). She had also maintained an e-group from her time in the Kennedy school, which was particularly valuable "because many of them have been in cabinet, so that is a very strong network and when they support the peace process for instance it makes ripples all over the place".

Experience of higher education overseas therefore had a mixed effect: one felt they lost out on the social network in the Philippines, because those remaining were already positioned to take over leadership. Others formed new networks and movements during their Master's programs overseas, which still remain.

The functions of networks are equally complex. Funding is one function: the Chair of the PPCVR related how she still has lunch with her high school mates once a month and "begs for money for projects". She also "learned to network" a group of Congressmen in the South for funds post-typhoon (H, PPCRV, f). Other functions of networks included political support in terms of standing for an individual political position, others for more general support for advocacy and reform. There seems little embarrassment about tapping into one's networks, and the culture of the Philippines seems to expect it. There is of course mutual benefit, and favours returned. Members are "lifetime friends":

> "You never really move. You just expand. They are everywhere also, I mean the people in the university, my contemporaries…can be found everywhere, in government, in the private sector; also some of them are still in the movement…But we keep in touch: it's part of the fellowship that you feel for each other even if you don't agree on many things." (M, Govt Peace Panel, f).

The network approach therefore demanded skills in working across different groups and using existing as well as creating new networks. Fr Nebres of GK described leadership as 'brokerage' and was able to draw on his connections to the Jesuits, his academic standing and leadership of an elite university, and the trusting followers he gained as a charismatic leader and top figure in GK to bridge different groups during the turbulent times of the end of the Marcos era. As in the case of the PPCVR Chair above, on a more intimate level, several respondents noted how they came across their 'batchmates' (university program classmates) in different walks of life. For GK leaders, their multisectoral operations made it valuable to not only have the skills to be a boundary crosser, but also to have the networks, and this is where an elite education could be an asset. 'Batchmates' go on to become leaders in government, in the private sector and in social circles, and the schooling ties are a form of bond that can be used to bridge these into something bigger. "It's only now", reported C, a female GK leader, "that I'm seeing these relationships intertwine with my professional life…I think now is the time that our batch is settling into their specific roles so now they are at a level where they could influence some decisions."

As the quotations above demonstrate, in a small country one knows where to find people, but it is also expected that one keeps in touch. More than one respondent mentioned 'trust'. Social network theory shows how the greater the number of people who use a network, the more useful it becomes to each user. The 'network effect' is the creation of a 'third thing' from the interaction of two people, and it comes for free (Mason 2012). Leaders will be well aware of the amplifying power of networks.

Theoretically, then, networks provide a range of social capital. A distinction is often made between bonding and bridging capital, with bonding referring to networks between homogenous groups and bridging to interactions across different or heterogeneous groups, building consensus among diverse interests (Putnam 2000). Bonding capital among kinship networks or the disenfranchised can be important in post-conflict societies where there is declining trust in political institutions (Fukuyama 2002). The moves towards electoral reform attempt to restore this trust, and the reform process itself generates networks across many different interests.

In the Philippines, and among our sample, there are examples of both bonding and bridging capital. The political family clans are classic examples of bonding capital, relatively exclusionary and even semi-criminal at times. But they can be breached by bridging capital. A network can start off as a bonding one, a safety net within a family, or comradeship in a school class, but then morph as members diverge and spread to occupy different networks of their own. There is boundary crossing, with networks not just among the elites, but drawing on members across different socio-economic, religious and gender divides. Of particular interest are the bonds but also bridges concerning religion: religious networks and movements, particularly for Muslims, have been crucial in the struggle for independence; but the quest for autonomy has meant the peace process and the organisations supporting it cut across faiths. It is a Catholic organisation that is spearheading electoral reform in Mindanao.

Even if coming from an existing political dynasty, in a democracy (however flawed) leaders have to engage with a wide range of people to ensure legitimation and support. In explaining their involvement in reforms, many participants talked about how education had enabled them to mix with people. One pointed out how Muslims have around 30 ethnic groups, each with their own languages and cultures; he had had to navigate ways to build friendships, which had been nurtured by early experience of appreciation of Islamic, Catholic and Chinese friends: "I would say that my early years were really defined by

the multicultural settings in Mindanao and that taught me tolerance and even a comprehensive perspective of issues and things." (J, Inst. Islamic Studies, m). For another, the Jesuit motto of 'being a man for others' influenced activities and community work. The culture and values of UP as a politicised institution were always referred to by those who had been there. Meeting students from all over the country as part of a 'democratised culture' was seen to open minds.

The amplifying power of networks depends largely on the capacity of the members of the network to mobilise resources of different types. In highly stratified societies, movements that are better connected to the centres of economic, political and symbolic power will be more able to achieve their goals than those that are not so well positioned in this hierarchy. On the other hand, the connections with established powers imply compromises of different kind that those that promote structural or radical changes might be reluctant to accept (Tarrow and Tollefson, 1994). This is why social movements like GK, which aim to transform the values of society and dominant views on development, have to be very selective in their relationship with established powers. Other reformers who pursue less ambitious and less controversial aims, such as PSPR people, just need to make sure that they have the most powerful allies in their network to defeat potential resistance from other powerful actors. In the case of the MER/CAB, where the actors are transitioning from disruptive politics towards reformism and steady integration within the political structures of the system, the connections between the movement and the political authorities are crucial for the advancement of the dialogue and the peace building process.

In the case of the PSPR, one individual that played a very important role in creating the network that made reform possible. All the actors interviewed identified Ed Campos, the Filipino national who had worked as senior advisor for the World Bank and USAID, as the key promoter of the PSPR at international and national level. He mobilised resources from the World Bank to support the reform and put together an alliance of national governmental and non-governmental actors to make the reform happen. Ed Campos combined two sources of legitimacy of great importance for Filipino political actors. He was working for a very influential international organisation with great financial power. Secondly, he came from one of the most important families in the Philippines and was able to use this social capital and prestige to garner support from national actors. In the words of a Filipino national working for USAID: "You need really good people that are national in order to deal with government agencies, there is less friction, it is easier this way. […] The previous senior advisor was an American, a total redneck type of a guy […] and I felt that he did not respect the Filipino people." (T, PSPR non-government, f).

The alliance between global and national actors in the PSPR had to face resistance from local powers. Local governments wanted to have access to their funds and use them at their own discretion. This collided directly with the interests of donor countries and international organisations which were constantly putting pressure on national actors to make the use of development funds more transparent and accountable. In general, and in relation to PSPR, national policymakers seem to agree that most of the support (technical support, resources, training) came from the global sphere, while most of the resistance came from the local level. "The resistance came from local governments and through the connections of the local government with some of the congressmen. Congressmen have local constituencies so the governors and the mayors were talking to their congressmen. At the same time, local contractors were people of the politicians in the local scene." (C, PSPR government, m). These local structures of power had close links with traditional oligarchical powers in the country. "We had to deal with congressmen and senators that are very well-known. The Philippines is a very small country, they all come from the same school, the same family." (T, PSPR non-government, f). The resistance from these powers obliged policymakers to make compromises, for instance allowing local governments to give preference to local bidders for the first five years before conforming to the full reform. As a result, some study participants argued that while the effects of the reform had been very clear at the national level, not much had changed at the local level.

At the national level, the promoters of the PSPR had to create links with very powerful individuals and organisations in the political (politicians), symbolic (the press and the Catholic Church) and economic (public sector contractor) domains. Although the PSPR was presented as a technical reform, its approval and implementation was not free of politics. In fact, the World Bank has presented the PSPR as a paradigmatic case of successful involvement of global actors in national politics of reform (Campos and Syquia, 2005). The process of negotiation in parliament was complicated and several strategies had to be deployed in order to get the law passed. "The reform does not end with a piece of paper. You start with a piece of paper but then you need to make sure the law gets passed…I mean it is really hard and frustrating." (T, PSPR non-government, f). The rules of the political game had to be followed to push the legislation through. Promoters of the reform were particularly successful in mobilising the press against those that tried to oppose the new law in the parliament. "Nobody wants to be labelled as opponent to an anti-corruption reform, not even congressmen and senators, so they all wanted to show that they were supporting the project." (T, PSPR non-government, f). Some of the technocrats working for the reform were sent for training by the World Bank to learn how to deal with the press and public opinion. Ed Campos and his team managed to create coalitions[14] within Congress and Senate and within the press and civil society organisations, building support for approval of the new law. Once approved, the coalition focused on identifying and convincing champions in the bureaucracy to implement the new legislation in different departments of government.

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14   DLP has engaged in extensive work on coalitions. See http://www.dlprog.org/publications/reform-coalitions-patterns-and-hypothe-ses-from-a-survey-of-the-literature-.php and http://www.dlprog.org/publications/coalitions-in-the-politics-of-development.php

For many of those working in MER/CAB, change came also through the law. This related to involvement in the large-scale legal reform of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, but also their work in legal advocacy for the poor or dispossessed. One participant had established legal assistance programs for Muslims illegally harassed by the police. Our sample included human rights lawyers who educated the poor on their rights. On a large scale, the interviewee who was the commissioner for human rights had worked on the repeal of the death penalty, the anti-torture bill, the international gun-carrying law and compensation for victims of martial law. This person was also central to the early drafting of the Freedom of Information bill, part of the reforms that attempts to redress the grievances of 'the disappeared' and their families. Yet, as with the fight against corruption, this legal work is not just technical and it springs from a deep concern about equity and rights. Various respondents recounted how they had done para-legal work with farmers or had slept with workers on the picket line in order to understand them. This legal activity is specifically "pro poor", to "make sure the rules are not skewed to make the poor more disadvantaged". Making change happen is therefore not just about legal knowledge, but about having credibility with those affected by the law and the law-makers.

> "I was giving para-legal training to the Unions and farmers, so I would think because of all my experience in different sectors, I was able to establish some sort of network, they look me up, it is easy in the sense that I might be acceptable to the different shades of the left, or even not the left, maybe a fair person to talk to."
> (T, Congressman, m)

Many of the technocrats involved in the implementation of PSPR did not however consider themselves as having a strong political profile. Either they learned to do this kind of work or they used the authority of powerful politicians in their network to protect their work. "I am not a political person but you need political people to protect you and your work." (A, PSPR government, f). "You need to be isolated from political pressure, someone that protects you. You also need to be high in the agenda in order to deal with other areas in government." (D, PSPR government, m).

In many ways this echoes the networking tactics used by leaders from the ARMM and GK. However, in the case of GK the tendency is to draw on personal and institutional moral legitimacy as a form of influence and arguably capital, as in the case of the GK 'mover and shaker' Tony Meloto. Even so, while avoiding the family name as a source of social capital themselves, they were quick to work with others who could draw on this kind of influence and also to work with politicians who were able to move things in those circles. One GK leader in HE was quick to state his admiration for a particular 'political wheel' who facilitated action.

MER/CAB respondents often talked of their positioning within government as a conduit for change. They may have started out in opposition or even as revolutionaries, but became co-opted into government – and rather than seeing this as a sell-out, used their position to advocate for reform. L. (NCMF, m) recounts how as a student he was activating for youth, and for the ARMM's autonomy, and was highly critical of government; but then he was appointed by President Aroyo himself as a Director of the Office for Muslim Affairs, and he suddenly joined the government just as he was taking his final bar exams. "I realised if I really wanted to effect changes in society, being in the government would give you the authority and the power to do that." L recounted how he was able to 'pull strings' to get a new office and equipment for his previously marginalised 28 staff because the head of the agency was his brother-in-law (see networking, below). Here is where political and social capital merge in effecting change.

The power of religious organisations cannot be underestimated. In their conservatism, they may be a barrier to change; but if religious leaders are on the side of reform, then this is powerful. M (MILF, m) recounts how the MILF has a strong Islamic ideology and this makes it difficult to split the group. S (government peace panel, m) managed to get the 'Muslim slot' in the Commission elections, and use his influence there. For H (PPCRV, f), change came through her senior positioning in the Catholic Church, her role as Ambassador, and unashamed use of the Philippines' strongly religious society to lever funds and influence people around voter education. Local government was weak but there was a strong infrastructure of parishes in Mindanao, so the poor would always go to their parish priest for help. But change also came through ideology. Part of her campaign was a voter education booklet with a section on 'How the church views elections'. It says that democracy and participation in civil community is a key principle of the church's social teaching: "It is the teaching of the Church that representative bodies must be subjected to effective social control and scrutiny and that the people must know that it is their duty and responsibility to subject our leaders to such." It includes a 'Prayer for Clean, Honest, Accurate, Meaningful and Peaceful elections adapted from the Prayer of St Francis of Assisi which begins:

> *Where there is coercion and violence*
>
> *Let me sow the seeds of love*
>
> *Where there is bribery and vote buying*
>
> *Let me sow seeds of integrity*

The prayer later continues:

> *O Divine Master, grant that I may not so much*
>
> *Think of my selfish motives when I vote*
>
> *Instill in me a deep sense of communal solidarity in my critical choice of candidates that would rise above the traditional politics of PAY-OFF, PERSONALITY and PATRONAGE.*

This is quoted in detail as it demonstrates the forceful and highly open political role that the Catholic Church plays – not unique to the Philippines, but illustrative of the backdrop against which leaders operate. It can be seen how developmental leaders within both Catholic and Muslim organisations (cited earlier) are using their religious influence to promote democracy and challenge power.

One of the successes of the PSPR was the ability of the coalition to present the reform as a technical solution that did not enter into conflict with existing ideologies or interest groups. "Procurement is a very technical subject. The more people understand it, the more people will support it." (A, PSPR government, f). The PSPR is a very clear example of top-down reform that was imposed by very important actors at global and national level. It was designed by international organisations, negotiated among national and international stakeholders, and implemented by local authorities under the supervision of national technocrats. Local governments and civil society actors had no option to modify the national law. They were instructed and trained in how to implement the reform in their own setting. While this strategy proved to be very effective to curb resistance from some national and local powers, this kind of reform approaches leave no space for local actors and implementers to take ownership of the reform. They end up being more concerned with complying with the new regulation than with making the most of the opportunities it brought.

GK is in a very different position. It does not need to change laws or negotiate regulatory compromises to function. Rather than setting a legal framework for its operations, it works by example and through distributed and flat leadership. Motivation is high through a communal sense of moral commitment. The level of volunteer involvement both evidences this and helps to reinforce it.

The relation of networks to education is therefore two-edged. Elites using bonding capital send their children to the same institutions as each other, thus reinforcing the bonds and ties. On the other hand, meritocratic forces in education mean that these children are then exposed to other networks and other influences. In a country like the Philippines, political elites and leaders can reproduce across generations with or without education; but to be a leader of a developmental reform requires bridging capital, which a heterogeneous educational culture can foster – particularly if the networks are activist and themselves reformist. The Philippines appears an almost unique mix of strong, self-reproducing dynasties alongside a tradition of radical protest – often within the same individual and within the same institutions. A network approach reminds us that social reality should be conceived from the view of relations between people, not the characteristics of the people themselves. Furthermore, the relationships between these individuals are mediated by inequalities of economic, political and symbolic kinds that affect their opportunities to effectively contribute to development and social change. Hence an investigation of leadership must focus on relations and power inequalities, not just personalities, however important these might be in the Philippines context.

Education

Education is one of the mediating factors between the formation of developmental leaders and their participation in the national processes of change. Ultimately, the research has concerned itself with how all of the above are affected by, and affect, education in the Philippines. The previous sections have uncovered parts of the story of education with regard to people's concepts of development, their trajectories into leadership and their participation in networks. In this section we drill down to examine in finer detail their concrete experiences in specific educational institutions. We are concerned in particular with questions of **access** (who attends particular institutions, and why and how?), **processes** (how do people learn through their educational experiences in ways that shape their personal trajectories as developmental leaders?) and **outcomes** (how does education reproduce or interrupt cycles of social reproduction, and facilitate or hinder development?). We also asked these leaders about their visions for the future of education in the Philippines. We focus particularly on higher education. However, as the earlier phases shape an individual's access to, experiences of, and outcomes from higher education, primary and especially secondary schooling are also important parts of the bigger picture.

Table 5. Levels and sites of interviewees' education

	Gawad Kalinga	Electoral Reform ARMM	Procurement
PhD	1	2	4
Masters	5	6	7
Bachelors	3	5	6
No HE		1	
Institution			
Elite	7	10	11
Sub-elite, regional	2	7	3
Lower	0	0	0
International	5	4	11

All but one of the respondents had at least a Bachelor's degree, and many had MAs or PhDs. The majority had attended elite institutions (one of the top four HE institutions in the country – UP or one of three private Catholic universities) and 20 had studied elsewhere in the world either exclusively or, in most cases, in addition to studies at Filipino institutions.

Access

In terms of access, the system of education in the Philippines is horizontally and especially vertically differentiated (Teichler 2006). It is horizontally differentiated in that there are different types of institutions; for example, higher education institutions of different religions, both public and private, and with particular subject or disciplinary foci. While the vast majority are Catholic, even within this there is differentiation, with different Catholic orders running particular institutions. So, for example the three private Catholic universities in the Philippines are Dominican (Santo Tomas), Jesuit (Ateneo) and Brothers of the Christian (de la Salle). While to an outsider more accustomed to a secular system these differences may seem academic, they affect not just the particular religious focus but also the institutional ethos and even the epistemological foundations of teaching and learning. Respondents showed acute awareness of these differences, with one even noting that in a major political scandal during the Aquino regime, "the perpetrators came from [institution A] and the whistle-blowers came from [institution B]". Selecting a particular higher education institution is a key part of envisioning a career and a future place in society.

As noted above, private higher education is an important part of the Philippines educational scene. Fees vary. Ateneo de la Salle, for example, charges in the region of PHP 80,000 (GBP 1,130) for one term and so without scholarships only the wealthy can afford to attend. These same wealthy elites choose to, and can afford to, send their children to private feeder schools for their chosen institution, and so the child's learning path and networks are established early in life. For most of the respondents within the GK and ARMM reforms, their family backgrounds did not make access to elite institutions a natural option. Scholarships or uncomfortably high levels of family investment facilitated access. Sometimes a scholarship was gained because of the family name; for instance, because close relatives had been members of Congress. In the case of PSPR reformers, most came from middle class and upper middle class families with high cultural capital and high educational aspirations. While their family background and nurturing helped them to access prestigious elite universities, in many cases they also demonstrated strong academic ability to gain scholarships to complete post-graduate studies abroad.

Universities serving predominantly Muslim populations are generally less well funded. Muslim families that hope to see children admitted to well-funded elite institutions commonly send them to Catholic schools which are seen as offering a superior education and better life chances. The quality of Muslim or non-denominational schools in the ARMM is low and they are viewed as unlikely to be a sound first step on the education and career ladder. Many of the Muslim participants from the ARMM had gone to Catholic schools which, although hardly multicultural in ethos, were seen by Muslim participants as having given them the opportunity to mix with others and gain cultural capital. One talked of a 'dual' education – secular (i.e. Catholic) in the week and Madrassa at the weekend. Another participant from an elite political Muslim family had been sent to Chinese state school, to ensure she mixed with people of all classes. However, once at an elite institution, fitting in was less straightforward than for those who were always 'destined' to study there: "…there was a small group of us from the provinces who thought we were dressing properly, but you can see that no matter what you do you don't fit in because the rich and the poor, the way you act, the way you do things is very different." (GK leader). The 'contamination' and 'compromising' that comes from being part of the elite drove a high-level GK leader to assert that he "prefers to work with the brightest people from lesser schools".

A relevant example of a specialist HE institution is the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) which was set up specifically to provide "elegant solutions to development problems" (DAP 2011). "DAP seeks opportunities to enhance development as mandated, in the areas of good governance and productivity…With the end in view of attaining an improved quality of life and reduced poverty for the nation, DAP begins by conducting programs and projects in the key areas of education and training, policy action research…and technical assistance and consulting." (DAP 2011:1)

Although the missions of this and similar specialist institutions align so well with the careers of respondents, all of them attended traditional universities, and the majority attended elite private or national institutions. Public administration officials involved in the PSPR acknowledged that it was possible to study public administration in contemporary HE institutions but said that when they chose their studies these options were not yet available. Many of these officials studied law in Ateneo or economics in the UP, which for a long time were the reserve of high-level technocrats for public administration.

Vertical differentiation is particularly pertinent to the issue of access, and shapes the educational and life chances of individual Filipinos as well as setting the parameters for who is likely to have the kind of education that places key roles in governance within their reach. As outlined above, the system is highly stratified with acute status and quality differences. These status differences are very well understood in the Philippines and both the advantages of attending elite institutions and the non-meritocratic normal routes of access were noted by interviewees. One GK leader summarised it in this way: "Here in the Philippines we have first, second and third class universities."

All but one of our participants had completed higher education, with several attaining Masters or Doctoral degrees at different institutions. The interviewees were virtually unanimous in their call for greater meritocracy in schooling and greater access to good institutions for those from poorer backgrounds. Linked to this, there was also a strong call for diversity in higher education. These 'common sense' references to greater meritocracy made by the interviewees were quite often based on different conceptions of what fairness in education means. Some of the PSPR respondents advocated for the increase of tuition fees in the UP and the strengthening of scholarship schemes. They argued that the state should not subsidise the higher education of privileged families while students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds had to pay for studying in private higher education institutions of dubious quality. Tensions around the financing and equity of access to higher education in the Philippines are being fuelled by the expansion of demand for education and the prevalence of the private sector (non-for-profit and profit-oriented) over the public sector.

Processes within education

Few of the interviewees were impressed by the formal education they had in schools and higher education institutions in the Philippines. For many of them, it was a case of developing higher order skills – leadership, critical thinking, analytical skills – *despite* the formal pedagogy they experienced, rather than because of it. Rote learning was the normal order of things across a full range of institutions ("what I remember most is just a lot of memorisation") although there were isolated examples of more engaging forms of pedagogy. One respondent, still actively engaged in HE at high levels, noted disparagingly that "80% of what we did is useless". In terms of what was taught, more than one respondent used the term 'exposed to' when talking about key texts or ideas they learned while studying at university. In other words, they were not encouraged to engage critically with texts, but having them on a particular course syllabus meant that they were discovered by those who were inspired by them, rather than anything inspiring happening with them as part of their studies. Their own reading, and motivation to learn, were major shapers of learning. As one GK co-founder and HE leader said:

> "I had always been interested in social reform from way back so I had read about the People's Revolution, then I had actually read a lot of Lenin and Mao Zedong and so forth beforehand, so I had some understanding both historically and theoretically of these things."

This particular leader was actually educated first in the seminary and then studied Mathematics overseas, and so this important reading was not part of his formal education. A leader within the Mindanao reform process mentioned how his Catholic college had suppressed liberation theology rather than discussing it. Only at UP, it was said, did lecturers ignore the official curriculum and "wouldn't teach us anything, just argue their advocacies", albeit then telling students what to study for the exams. Self-education through reading was much more part of the picture "rather than listening to a lecture because I get bored".

The GK leadership is particularly scathing about the learning that takes place in formal institutions in the Philippines, and promotes instead 'unlearning' and experiential learning. Tony Meloto notes the 'genius of the unschooled' and their expertise in "happiness, hospitality, generosity, spirituality and the greatness of the human spirit in the midst of grave deprivation and material want" (foreword by Meloto in Graham 2014: vi). In contrast, he noted that the educated "have been brainwashed for 350 years".

The school experience is not always inclusive. Among the Muslim leaders interviewed, despite the quality imperative and the chance to mix with others, the lack of inclusion in the processes of schooling was noted. One GK leader from Mindanao reported experiencing bullying and spent most of her time at her Catholic school in the library avoiding confrontations that she believed were inevitable. Another way in which schooling processes perpetuate disadvantages and reinforce divisions is through language. Respondents who came from homes where English was regularly used noted the advantages this gave them in elite schools and higher education, where English is the medium of instruction. Another GK leader noted: "I was very thankful that my family spoke English at home, but for kids who had trouble speaking English they were really bullied." Many schools are also segregated which, as one respondent remarked, means that young people do not learn to deal with the opposite sex early in life and which may therefore impact on networks and networking skills. Interestingly, a number of the Muslim participants in the MER/CAB reforms not only went to Catholic or Chinese schools, but valued their experiences of mixing there: the understanding of others' cultures and the need to listen and learn became a form of social capital which stood them in good stead in their advocacy work across different ethnic or religious groups.

The leaders interviewed for this study come from a very wide range of disciplinary backgrounds, including economics, business, law, engineering, mathematics, and theology (see Table 6).

Table 6. Subjects studied in higher education

Reform	Discipline / subject studied in higher education
MER/CAB	• BSC/MsC Community development • Psychology, maths, BA philosophy, MA South East Asian Studies • Engineering then political science then law • Engineering then political science then Masters in Islamic Studies • Political science and law, then Masters in Public Administration, then PhD • Economics, then Masters in public administration, then business management • Philosophy, journalism then law • History, Philippines Studies • Political science • Law • Political science then law • Medicine, MB, Chem • No degree
PSPR	• Economics • Public administration and political history • Public administration and economics • International law • Computer data processing management and business administration • Law • Information technologies • Journalism • Sociology • Law • Civil engineering • Commerce and business administration • Mathematics and economics • Business administration • Law • Law • Economics and political science • Accounting
GK	• Economics • Mechanical engineering, then industrial management • Computer studies, then development studies • Chemical engineering • Business economics • Science, then accountancy • Management, then philosophy, then business studies • Seminary, then mathematics • Political Science

While there was no particular pattern across the entire group, clustering can be seen, with GK leaders more likely to be from business or engineering backgrounds. Within the MER/CAB reforms, if interviewees did mention subjects of influence, it was political science, economics, history or philosophy which did give a basis for understanding the political situation and grounding in questioning and solid investigation. Yet it is difficult to discern whether activist personalities choose relevant subjects or whether these subjects converted people into activism. One said his Islamic Studies curriculum was important – 'but also [his own] determination'. For T (congressman, m):

> "What dictates [leadership] is not schooling, but growing up, dreams, ambitions, and you take the paths that lead you to your dreams. I always wanted to be a lawyer, you can have influence, make changes possible."

A law degree was therefore a sound platform for some, both in providing a discipline of learning and also enabling advocacy work later on. For the MER/CAB reform group, legal affairs are especially important in the new Bangsamoro Constitution. The one participant who came from a very humble background and went to night school to study law was able eventually to set up his own Law Office, "and that is how I was able to gain the confidence of the people and politics" (B, Commission on Elections, m).

As can be seen from the table, many people changed disciplines after starting their studies, or when they went on to post-graduate work. Overall disciplinary focus was not a major driver, although some did link it to particular talents in themselves or to the development of particular skills. For example, among GK leaders engineering was seen as promoting logical thinking, mathematics as instilling discipline, a background in business ensured that accounting systems were efficient and well-governed within the organisation, and marketing helped in 'building movements'. As one GK respondent who had worked in the private sector as well as studying business noted: "You need people from different sectors who see things in the same way."

Many PSPR participants studied law, economics or public administration. This does not mean that they chose these studies because they all knew that they wanted to work for government, but this choice influenced their future professional trajectory. "Having a PhD in economics opens some opportunities in the private corporations, mainly banks, but I would say that there are more opportunities in the public sector." (D, PSPR government, m). In a similar vein: "Many of my colleagues from the school of law work now in government." (J, PSPR government, m). In some cases the choice of studies was very strategic: "If all the leaders are lawyers then I will study law" (A, PSPR politician, m). One participant who never thought that he would work for government said: "I studied computer science to get the best paid job." (M, PSPR government, m).

International study for many of the interviewees was a life-changing experience as it opened their minds and made them see the Philippines in a new light. On a basic level, coming from a highly family-oriented culture, for many this was their first experience of living independently and making their own day-to-day decisions. The exposure to new ideas and ways of life made the familiar strange, and helped to change stereotypical views about both the Philippines and the outside world. One GK leader became aware of how 'insular' the Philippines can be, and how diverse the outside world is. Some also experienced new modes of teaching and learning which facilitated the development of critical thinking. A PSPR respondent compared law studies between The Philippines and the US: "Here you write the facts, the issue and the verdict because the Supreme Court is giving you the facts, the issue and the verdict. In the US they will give you the case and you will spot the issue, issue-spotting, and then you provide a solution for the issues that you identify." (D, PSPR government, m). These wider experiences and allowed them to "test your theories, reject theories, and tell them straight to their face: what you are teaching is nonsense, have you looked at the real world?" International education was mentioned because of the exposure to different ideas and people, but it can have ambivalent relationship with individuals' involvement in public issues. Going abroad may prepare some better for contributing to the development of their country but some participants thought that if one was to stay abroad for too long, there might also be a risk of losing the Filipino identity.

Many interviewees were quite dismissive of the formal curriculum, traditional teaching and learning, and the extent to which schools were inclusive in their processes; in contrast, extra-curricular activities were seen as platforms for personal development and conscientisation, as well as exposure to political or even underground movements. This took a range of forms. Even cheerleading (in the case of one GK leader) helped respondents to develop leadership skills and team building. Several served as year, disciplinary or student body presidents, or were involved in campus journalism or charitable organisations. As one GK leader put it, such activities could be the first independent expression of one's own interests and potential:

> "I think definitely my extracurricular (activities) developed the most important aspects of myself that would help me as a leader…Everything is applied…and it is something that you choose. Education in the university, of course you choose your course, but the requirements of that course are more or less imposed upon you and typically anyone would choose to want to go to college because that's what society dictates or expects of one, but your parents are not exactly pushing you to join the student council, which meant that if it's your own choice then you have to follow through on that decision." (C, GK leader, f)

Several leaders were heavily involved in student politics and wider political activism. One GK leader, for example, set up his own new student political party at university to avoid getting co-opted into traditional elites and all that was associated with them. Within the Mindanao group, rallies or protests about the ARMM, women's advocacy organisations, chairing the Bangsamoro Student Alliance or joining a group called Samaha Propogandista (the movement of propaganda in the Philippines) were examples. Even the Catholic Association was politicised, with prayers for democracy. References to the impact of unrest during the martial law era cut across the reforms, as many of the older respondents were studying during that period. Student activism was a crucial period of socialisation in public issues: "It is difficult not to be an activist when you are in the UP." (V, PSPR non-government, m). Engagement with the People Power movement was central to their developing understanding of justice and how to create change. As previously mentioned, UP was particularly engaged as an institution and protected student and staff rights to protest. "Everyone", said one GK leader, "was an activist at UP."

Many of these activities fostered a community orientation and also gave experience of mixing with other people from different strata of society – seen as important in their leadership orientation and sense of mission as well as the development of bridging capital. The one participant who did not finish college, getting married instead, nonetheless had a legacy from her Catholic school times of community work and 'active compassion'. But this was not just one-way charity, but also involvement: "It was explained to us that the mission of social change cannot happen without lay people, not just the top elite." (H, PPCRV, f) Participants in PSRP also mention the educational extra-curricular activities as an important causal factor of their interest in social issues. Meeting and being exposed to the poor is seen as a good preparation for working for government: "I really want our students to experience how it is working for government. It is much like the Jesuit volunteers. The Philippines experience." (A, PSPR government, f).

However, not all extra-curricular activities necessarily lead to a stronger sense of justice, leadership skills, or greater independence, and the powerful role of sororities and especially fraternities at elite institutions is salient here. Initiation rites for some of these involve physical abuse ('hazing'), promises of unquestioning loyalty, and vows of silence. These can then thwart anti-corruption measures later in the careers of the initiates. For the majority (but not all) of the developmental leaders in this research, fraternities were viewed as potentially non-developmental coalitions operating in the Philippines' political and

social landscape. It is interesting that at a recent GK volunteer event involving a range of fraternities and sororities, the leaders symbolically presented their ritual hazing paddles to the GK leader in the opening ceremony, indicating that in that space, those associations were abandoned for a wider solidarity.

Outcomes from education

To what extent were the outcomes from study what the interviewees had hoped for? Did they play a role directly or indirectly in helping them to become developmental leaders? How closely did their disciplinary studies align with their professional needs? Were the institutions more likely to reproduce existing privileges, or did they ultimately have a transformative role?

While none were from poor families, neither were any of the GK leaders interviewed from elite backgrounds, although some of them had attended elite schools and/or universities either through family investment or meritocratic scholarships. Given their status within an important organisation, and, in some cases, beyond it, one might argue that getting a good education at a good institution made the difference to their life's trajectories.

However, given the views that the GK leaders have expressed about their education and about how their leadership was shaped, it is important not to assume that their experiences of education and the learning they took from the formal aspects of it are what made the difference. The most significant learning for their leadership was accounted for as experiential, extra-curricular, or self-taught, and so the direct role of institutions was relatively negligible except insofar as they were the venues where extra-curricular activities took place along with exposure to ideas and texts.

Similarly, for MER/CAB leaders the degree they took (such as political science or Islamic Studies) was a facilitator rather than a driver of the impetus to lead reform. That impetus came from experience of their own or others' marginalisation; the knowledge gained in education provided a platform and legitimacy for their advocacy. They mentioned other 'training' as equally significant to HE in their skills for leadership; for example 'on the job training' in the revolutionary movement (in terms of producing, distributing, organising and negotiating); or media education and doing exams for broadcasting. It is likely that having graduated from a reputable institution acts as a 'signal' to employers about the underlying qualities of the individual, and the networks they have. The same can be said about PSPR leaders. Other actors will screen national leaders to decide if they support them in their initiatives. A post-graduate higher education degree is a necessary precondition to demonstrate intellectual and technical competence, but it is never a sufficient reason for getting support from other actors. Higher education operates as the first stage of the selection of national leaders but further stages follow during and after the educational trajectory of these leaders.

7

Conclusion and implications

Individual agency is a key driver of developmental reforms but this agency interacts with selective structural constraints and unequal opportunities that influence the possibility of individuals to become effective contributors to development. On the one hand, ideologies, coalitions and opportunities for change are not arbitrary. They are the result of pre-existing structures of inequality and power that affect the actual possibilities for change. On the other hand, these opportunities will not be transformed in an effective process of social change without the participation of national leaders who share these ideologies, have the ability and resilience to move these processes forward and have intrinsic motivations to get involved in the reforms.

Education in the Philippines does not seem to have a direct effect on preparing individuals for developmental leadership, at least among these respondents, but it seems to have an effect in an indirect way. Universities are very strong socialising institutions not only because of the education they formally provide but also for their extra-curricular activities and the opportunities they afford for mixing with different kinds of people, one's 'own' and others. Formal education offers developmental leaders technical knowledge and expertise of great importance for accessing high positions in government, but this is only part of the picture. In extracurricular activities, future national elites shared and discussed different conceptions of development, and developed mutual recognition and networks that were later mobilised to make change happen. The respondents' views of the pedagogy and curriculum they experienced are not as positive. Inevitably, it left us wondering what might have been if they had been encouraged to think critically, and had studied more meaningful curricula in more stimulating ways.

We have seen that participants in different types of reform had diverse but overlapping priorities for development – whether modernisation and knowledge, pro-poor grassroots mobilisation and capacity building, an effective democracy and human rights, or transparency and anti-corruption. Underpinning all this would of course be the need for peace, which all these reforms would support. Higher education for our developmental leaders facilitated their trajectory into reform in three main areas: knowledge/skills; attitudes/values; and opportunity/networking. Expertise and qualifications gave know-how and status – whether in economics, engineering, law or political science. Yet the desire to *use* this knowledge for reform as opposed to just personal interest related often to experience of wider social problems before, during or after HE. The facility to tackle such problems derived in part from participation in student activism as well as knowing how to use networks to support the change desired. The relative emphasis of these three areas (knowledge, attitudes, opportunity) varied somewhat according to the type of reform: not all participants saw themselves as 'political' even if it could be argued that all reform has a political base. Differences emerged in at least two ways: firstly, whether developmental leaders looked to the wider world and situated their reform in a global economy or global politics, or whether they saw themselves as focusing on national/local transformation; and secondly on how far they directly pinpointed families/dynasties/warlords as sources of stagnation and how far they preferred the more neutral emphasis on rules and regulations in order to control dysfunctions for development.

Suggestions from participants

We asked our respondents what they would recommend for future higher education in the Philippines, and here there was a great deal of consensus. There seemed to be several linked themes.

- Firstly, higher education should be **equitable**, offering equal opportunities for all groupings – whether of socio-economic class, gender, ethnicity or religion. This was especially true for the Mindanao context, where it was felt that there needed to be a greater tranche of educated Muslim professionals to participate in Filipino development and to determine its direction.

- Secondly, higher education should provide access to a **mix of people and ideas**. Our participants had often profited from close networking, but admitted that this could be exclusionary for others. They had benefitted particularly from experience in their extra-curricular activities, their student activism, their community work with disadvantaged or workers' groups - whether starting legal assistance, or engaging in literacy work or joining picket lines. Even before higher education, many participants were schooled 'in both worlds', learning to mix with others of different faiths and ethnicities, and felt this had helped them. There was a priority given to accepting diversity, "recognising others' gifts even if you don't agree with their views".

- Thirdly was the call for a **holistic and wide HE curriculum**. Our participants related how learning about good governance is not just done through political science, but can be done through art, music, poetry or drama. Leadership was cited as being not just the technical skills but 'social artistry'; politics as not being a separation from the 'whole person'.

Leaders need to be honed in humanities or arts or social science, so that they are a 'domestic persona' who can deal with real people. HE should therefore not be a funneling exercise, but should provide an inclusive education, with students becoming aware of what is happening in other parts of the world so the Philippines can learn and can compete. HE should also be a place to learn skills of leadership, negotiation and advocacy.

Research questions: summary answers

What are the main features of the educational experiences of development leaders, from their perspectives?

For the development leaders we interviewed, their educational experiences were mixed and were a necessary but not sufficient part of their preparation for leadership. On the positive side, their education gave them the technical skills to fulfil various aspects of their work, even if their disciplinary focus was not directly useful. It also gave them the opportunity to mix with people both similar to and different from themselves. The environment, however, was rarely consciously inclusive, and religious minorities and the less privileged faced challenges. The formal taught provision was less important to many than the other experiences they gained through the extra- and para-curricula. Many of them had managed to navigate a highly elitist system through their own talents, determination and opportunities (especially scholarships) but they were clear on the need for greater meritocracy to provide the same opportunities to a wider group.

In their views, to what extent and how has their education generated the knowledge, skills and attitudes that facilitate developmental leadership, as manifested in key periods and movements in national development? What were the roles of pedagogy, the curriculum, institutional selectivity, school ethos, values and the hidden curriculum, mobility (if relevant), extracurricular activities, student (dis)empowerment?

Education provided access to knowledge but it was the personal drive of the respondents that facilitated engagement with ideas beyond essential technical knowledge and skills. Both the engagement with politics and the skills and drive to be active in it were facilitated for many by experiences of campus activism. For many who were either studying or teaching during the People Power years – most of the senior leaders in our study – this was a crucial period for conscientisation and for developing a sense of solidarity and possibility.

Respondents' views on the pedagogy they experienced were largely negative – they had learned despite teaching norms that relied heavily on uncritical rote learning. They were 'exposed to' the curriculum rather than encouraged to engage with it, and again it was their own independent study that took them beyond this. However, the curriculum facilitated the development of technical competences. Arguably, it also had a role in shaping their views of development, including whether those technical skills were the foundation of progress or whether something entirely new was needed.

The stratified system of the Philippines means that institutional selectivity has an important role to play in controlling access. Most of our respondents were outside of the traditional elites who are able to secure access to top institutions through the expensive channels of private feeder schools and through the bonding capital of family influence. Scholarships (for lower middle class or poorer respondents) or family sacrifice (for those from middle classes) made access possible but respondents were aware of how many others were excluded from such opportunities.

The Philippines is a very religious society and the Catholic religion plays a substantial role in all things, including, inevitably, school ethos and values. On the one hand, the Catholic and Muslim values of charity and living 'for others' were shapers of social commitment, but on the other hand, those who were Muslim had experienced exclusion, and wanted greater recognition of Islam. The (officially secular) University of the Philippines has traditionally had an ethos that encouraged political activism, especially during the years of protests against the excess of the Marcos regime and martial law. For those who attended UP, this was central to their development.

Many respondents had experienced study abroad which was eye-opening in many ways, "making the familiar strange" and allowing them to see their own country in a new light. It also developed skills of independent and critical thinking, and was part of a new level of network building. However, some respondents noted the risks of being outside of the Philippines for too extended a time, including the danger of losing one's Filipino identity and disengaging from networks and political action.

Given how often extra-curricular activities are overlooked as an important dimension of the higher education experience, it was remarkable how these proved to be developmental and life-changing for our respondents. They learned there to lead and what leadership meant. They cut their political teeth in student politics and activism. They met the people who later helped them to be the movers and shakers they have needed to be to get things done.

Student councils and other organisations were a source of empowerment, mainly for the leadership opportunities they afforded rather than for any concrete changes that councils were able to bring to the universities. There was not a strong sense from the respondents that they had much power to change their own institutions when they were students, but they developed skills and drive that helped them later to bring about wider social changes.

To what extent were the networks formed during their education influential in later life and drawn upon in political and social movements? How and when were these networks formed, and how is their influence expressed?

These networks were important, but not necessarily in the way predicted by the DLP's underpinning assumptions about networks or the findings of the study on Ghana. It was less a case of people within a given movement meeting each other at university, and more about individual change agents being able to draw on their university networks across a range of relevant sectors in order to gain broad-based support of all kinds, as 'batchmates' settled into important roles in national and local politics, the civil service, higher education, the private sector, the third sector, and the 'glitterati' of elite society. The role of bridging capital in facilitating this is one of the key findings of this research.

Were particular institutions central to individual and network development? If so, what characteristics do they share and what was the nature of their influence?

We have already mentioned above the very different roles of elite private Catholic institutions, and the University of the Philippines. UP's unique placement is one to consider in recommendations, given the relatively meritocratic admission policies made possible by government funding, and also its history of breeding and protecting activism. Ateneo de Manila has been important in the service learning opportunities afforded to elite students, and other institutions have had important roles in developing and offering specialist programs for leaders with developmental goals in mind, although interestingly none of these respondents came through that (relatively new) route.

What were the barriers to the above?

Cooption of educational opportunity by elites – including predatory ones - has been a feature of the Philippines. These elites also accrue benefits from higher education, particularly adding to an already high level of bonding capital. The developmental elites we studied are operating in the same arenas as these networks – the same networks that can make successful developmental reform difficult when it does not serve their interests.

How do these compare to the findings of the case study of Ghana?

This question requires further unpacking by the DLP Higher Education Research Group,[15] and our methodology requires a further stage of discussion to give this the attention it deserves. Contrasts are obvious, but some of them are attributable at least in part to the fact that the Philippines is a middle-income country with a longstanding, large and highly developed (but also highly stratified) system of higher education. The Ghanaian findings highlighted the importance of a particular meritocratic institution with a singular ethos and excellent pedagogical and curricular provision, and the role of the networks formed there in constituting a cohesive political elite. Higher education in Ghana is very different from the diverse Philippines system and the oligarchical democracy in which it is situated.

Implications

While the implications below stem from research in the Philippines, many are applicable to similar contexts, or at least deserve testing in them. They are relevant for national governments, institutional governance, aid agencies and researchers.

It is apparent that higher education needs to be seen in the round, beyond the current emphasis on its teaching and learning functions. Extra-curricular activities, the development of bridging capital in a context of diversity, the importance of research to inform government policy, and the potential of institutions as sites for advocacy and social engagement all came through very strongly in this research. This has implications for how HE institutions work and how they are supported and funded, as well as for how they and their effects are researched.

In order for higher education to play its essential role in the development of bridging capital, diversity and therefore less elitist admissions and tuition fee policies are prerequisites. This has major implications for the funding of higher education and the screening function of the entire education system. All national systems of education are pyramid-shaped, with some degree of elitist selection at the top; the Philippines has a particularly steep pyramid. Even if it were desirable to fully de-stratify the education system, it would not be possible, not least due to the long history of the elite institutions in the Philippines and their role in producing elites, both developmental and non-developmental. However, the effects of this can be mediated in at least two ways.

Firstly, broadening participation through providing opportunity in elite education to those who cannot afford tuition fees either for higher education or its earlier feeder stages would be a positive step. It would not only move toward greater equality of opportunity but also toward the building of development capacity and the interruption of pernicious cycles of power cooption by existing elites. Scholarships are an obvious solution, but of course the provision of these opens a complex set of issues about how to select in a meritocratic way and at what stage of the education cycle.

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15 The Higher Education Research Group within the Developmental Leadership Program is looking across national cases at broad comparative patterns – differences as well as similarities – and at global lessons for higher education in terms of its relationship to development. A synthesis paper will be produced.

As the section on education in the Philippines has outlined, there are concrete policy steps being taken toward offering greater access to higher education. However, while adding more rungs to the bottom of the educational hierarchy may provide more people with qualifications, quality needs to be sustained throughout the system for this to make a difference given the stratification of the system, and the relationship of the elite institutions to the corridors of power. A larger system of higher education with unequal opportunity to learn will not solve the problem of domination by self-serving elites.

So, secondly, attention to the question of quality throughout the system could help to release the exclusive hold on power of graduates from elite institutions. It would also ensure that the democratic system is buttressed by a well-educated population ready for civic participation and able to hold officials accountable. For example, the provision of more high quality HE institutions in Muslim Mindanao was proposed as a solution, not just to problems of access, but to the need for a thorough understanding of Islam and to enhance the contribution of Muslim scholars to the Philippines' knowledge base.

Higher education should be part of a lifelong learning system with capacity to respond to the education and training needs of leaders at different points in their lives. Given that research participants' motivation and opportunity to act as a developmental leader often came later in life, after an 'ah-ha' moment or careful deliberation, it is important to consider the potential of lifelong learning to reframe knowledge and skills. In most of the cases, national leaders did not make linear and incremental transitions from disciplinary studies to specific high-level positions in government or other non-governmental organisations. In most of the cases these leaders tried different subjects of study in different phases of their lives. They combined experience in the private sector with other experiences in civil society or government, and performed very different roles in their careers. To contribute further to the preparation of these leaders, higher education institutions could offer opportunities for adult education and professional development.

The teaching and learning processes at all stages of education in the Philippines have been criticised by these developmental leaders for their emphasis on rote learning and the avoidance of critical thinking. Independent, creative and critical thinking is at the heart of development, particularly where stagnation has been an issue, as in the Philippines. Transforming pedagogy to meet these needs is a tall order. But a starting point is providing higher education teachers and leaders with personal experience of teaching that enhances these skills – and so those who work in these institutions need to be treated as lifelong learners as well.

Higher education institutions – particularly the UP – have played a very important role in the transition and consolidation of democracy in the Philippines. These institutions should preserve their links with society and strengthen their outreach strategies. Many scholars in these institutions have benefited from a tenure system that supports shifts between university and government roles. This has contributed not only to the quality of the workforce in government, but has also allowed scholars to incorporate the professional and practical experience acquired in government into their research and teaching on their return to the university. This kind of collaboration could be promoted and incentivised, not only with government, but also with civil society organisations and the private sector.

Given that the Philippines has more than 20 million poor people and extreme inequalities in access to higher education, its universities need to strengthen their commitment to civic engagement and social responsibility. Poverty eradication and development issues could be mainstreamed across the different areas of study, be prioritised in the public funding of research, and could guide these institutions' expansion of community work and local service provision. This could nurture a mixture of technical knowledge and skills, and the motivation of a moral imperative.

In conclusion, this study serves to nuance and perhaps question the perennial emphasis on human capital as an outcome of higher education. For those who go on to be changemakers, such as these developmental leaders, the formation of both bonding and especially bridging capital are highly significant for successful leadership of democratic reform and pro-poor movements.

Finally, it is worth noting that this is one of a series of reviews and case studies funded by DLP on these themes. So far it is evident that, while some of the more predictable findings are common across cases – such as the direct effect of HE on the formation of developmental leaders through skills acquisition, and its indirect effect through the establishment of networks – there are considerable differences. The particularities of each case require careful consideration. Even within this one country there are different visions of leadership and development between the three reform groups, each with different potential implications for education: developmental leadership has different meanings in each context. Across the reforms all the leaders believed that greater educational equity is needed for successful developmental leadership, but the flavour and pathways ranged from liberal to radical to distributional. It is apparent that, when it comes to the relationship between national development, leadership and education, the mantra of both Comparative Education and development holds true: context matters.

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Appendix A - Interview Questions

1. What key reforms have you been involved in? What were the achievements of the reform? Any unmet expectations?

2. Tell me about how you became a leader/led in this reform.

3. Tell me about your education background. Where, when? Why? Discipline? Why? Experiences- what do you remember the most?

    *   curriculum

    *   pedagogy

    *   extracurricular activities

    *   social engagement

    *   social structures/societies

    *   mobility issues – study abroad if relevant and how that made a difference

4. To what extent did these affect your leadership development? Skills, values, attitudes, ambitions – any examples from the reform process? Were there any particular moments in your life when you felt that things changed for you? If so, what were they and what were the changes? (eg confidence, open mind, knowledge of how things work)

5. To what extent have relationships or networks been influential in making changes that you felt were important? Where did these networks originate? Any key associations/organisations? Role in network formation? Any at schools/uni and if so what about the institution facilitating them?

6. Who were the others involved with you? Who were the three most important people in your network?

7. Did other networks operate in the same situation, that were supportive (or not supportive) of your efforts? Do you think educational background played any role in those?

8. How do you think your life would have been different if you went to a different institution/had a different education (e.g. others who went elsewhere)? What is the relative importance of education and post education experience (such as on-the-job learning) in determining where you are today?

9. What recommendations would you make to others regarding educational choices?

10. What would be your vision of a higher education sector that prepares the next generation of key actors leading change in the Philippines?

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