



# DLP

Policy and Practice for Developmental  
Leaders, Elites and Coalitions

DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

**A Research and Policy Workshop Report**

## Coalitions in the Politics of Development

Findings, insights and guidance from the DLP Coalitions  
Workshop, Sydney, 15-16 February 2012

**April 2012**





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The Power-Point presentations from the workshop may be found on the DLP website at:  
[www.dlprog.org/ftp/](http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/)

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# Key Workshop Themes

## Coalitions and Development

- **Why Coalitions?** Development is a political process, and involves not just technical aspects of governance and administration, but also the *inner politics* of change, which requires a focus on actors, or agency: that is, how individuals and groups work politically in different institutional contexts. Leadership is an important part of this focus, but leaders need coalitions (whether formal or informal) in order to get things done. Coalitions are particularly important for overcoming collective action problems, and can both advance social change and build capacity within civil society and other organizations. Development agencies should thus pay more attention to the developmental role of coalition-building at national and sub-national levels and in all sectoral and issue areas.

## Building Effective Coalitions

- **Key Questions:** In forming a coalition, organizers and facilitators must address a series of central questions: Who will be invited to join the coalition and how large should it be? How will issues and goals be determined? Will the coalition be short or long-term? How much long-term planning will be done and how will the coalition adapt to changing circumstances? Will it focus on building relationships between its members or taking immediate action? How will the coalition deal with distrust between its members and ensure credible commitments? Where will resources come from and how will they be shared? Who will get recognition for coalition successes?
- **Success Factors:** An effective coalition must be highly adapted to both its local political and institutional context and its objectives, and there are few clear best practices. Effective coalitions nevertheless appear to share certain features. These include agreement around a common goal and on the rules of the game, a coalition size as small as possible to achieve its goals, clear understanding among members of their role and interest in the coalition, and the inclusion of members who can fill different roles (e.g. leaders, connectors, gatekeepers, enablers, change champions and links to key players outside the coalition). Membership in a pre-existing network can help coalition members build trust, but it can also often be valuable to reach out to non-traditional partners. Effective coalitions also require mechanisms for dealing with distrust and inequality among members, credible and enforceable commitments, sufficient planning to anticipate strategic opportunities balanced with the flexibility to adapt to unexpected events, and learning through evaluation.

## Donor Assistance to Coalitions

- **How Do Donors Change the Dynamic?** Donor-supported coalitions face the same issues as other coalitions, but they must also deal with several additional challenges. Donors are outsiders with often incomplete understanding of local context and actors. They have their own development priorities, which might not align with local priorities and interests. Donors also have their political interests and thus the internal political economy of each donor organization shapes its outlook and policies.
- **Donor funding** can also deepen inequality of resources among coalition members and skew participant incentives or attract members who are primarily interested in the money. The availability of donor funding can initiate a competitive funding feeding frenzy amongst organizations and thus frustrate rather than promote collective action.
- **Operational Challenges:** Supporting coalitions requires donors to operate differently from traditional aid programs. Development actors will require detailed political context knowledge to identify the right issues, partners, people and methods. They need to determine how willing they are to engage with sensitive issues such as the underlying political settlement and what level of political involvement is appropriate. Donors also need to reconsider their role, and often serve as brokers of local change rather than doers. This requires more flexible mechanisms for delivering aid and

evaluating results.

- **Donors and other development actors**, local and external, need to be vigilant and on the *que vive* to be able to identify and seize key openings, windows of opportunity or critical junctures when support for coalitions can gain traction, or to adjust strategies, activities and framing to fit the new conditions.
- **Success Factors:** Development agencies have productively supported coalitions for change in developing countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tonga. These efforts benefited from planning based on political analysis, flexible aid modalities, a willingness to take risks, effective local partners and strong local ownership, a quiet role for donors, and leadership support within donor agencies. The cases discussed here all involved working through an intermediary organization with strong local knowledge and flexible funding mechanisms such as grants.

# Introduction: Coalitions in the Politics of Development

Adrian Leftwich

Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)

These Notes report the main proceedings and messages of a workshop on coalitions held by the **Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)** in Sydney on 15-16 February, 2012. But why a workshop on coalitions? And what's the link with development? The answer is simple. The DLP research findings, plus many other studies, show that coalitions are fundamental but poorly understood players in the politics of development. The purpose of the workshop was therefore to bring together practitioners and scholars to develop a better understanding of the factors that shape the formation and functioning of successful coalitions. This Introduction offers some preliminary explanation.

## Politics and coalitions

It is now widely accepted that politics profoundly influences all aspects of development, everywhere. Individuals and formally or informally organized social, economic and political groups and movements, each deploying more or less and different forms of power, interact with each other in pursuit of their interests and ideas in very different economic, political and institutional environments. Some of these environments are conducive to advocacy, innovation and reform processes; others are less so; some, hardly at all. This interaction (often competitive but also sometimes cooperative) amongst more or less formally organized groups, on the one hand, and between them and the political, economic and institutional structure, on the other hand, shapes the direction and dynamics of development and change – or frustrates it. That's politics. And its outcomes are decisive for development.

At the heart of the politics of everyday life, and especially the politics of development, are coalitions. These are best understood as ***individuals, groups or organizations that come together to achieve social, political and economic goals that they would not be able to achieve on their own.*** What differentiates coalitions from organizations is that their constituent parts retain their separate identity (unless they later merge to become one organization). They may be short-lived and transient or longer-lasting. Coalitions are also therefore time-bound, their end-point determined by the achievement (or not, as the case may be, and hence disbandment) of a particular goal, policy shift or institutional change, though some coalitions recycle their memberships into other causes, issues or coalitions.

Coalitions take many forms. Some may be formal and regard themselves as a constituted coalition (perhaps even with a name). Others may be less formal (and nameless) but nonetheless conscious of themselves as groups of players with a common objective. And yet others may simply be loose networks groups with similar interests and ideas. Coalitions may occur within or between organizations in civil society or public agencies of the state, or they may link organizations, interests or individuals across the public-private divide. And there are many other forms.

But wherever you choose to look, and to dig a bit, formal or informal coalitions populate and jostle each other in politics everywhere. They are not simply governmental coalitions, but can be found nationally and sub-nationally, in the private and the public domains, and in all sectors or issue areas, wherever individuals, groups or organizations come together to pursue a common goal.

The essential point here is that whether they are well-structured or loose, coalitions are part and parcel of the normal politics of every-day life in all organizations and societies and thus should be central to our understanding of the politics of change and development. Analysing how coalitions work in different circumstances often provides a powerful lens for getting to the heart of the inner politics of change and development in any particular society or sector. Moreover, the importance of coalitions in a developmental context cannot be under-estimated where the central issue is that of establishing and consolidating - locally - the institutions that will promote sustainable growth, political stability and social inclusion.

Yet donors and others in the international community have paid far too little attention to these key political processes. Rather, they have tended to concentrate on recommending (or even insisting on) broad state-level institutional or policy solutions to the scandals of poverty, instability or exclusion. And they have generally failed to recognize that the institutional and policy solutions that will work locally to address these problems will need to be shaped and sustained by endogenous political processes, and that leaders and coalitions of interests and ideas will be central to these processes. This is true in all sectors and issue areas, from agriculture to gender and from climate change to political stability.

If donors and others in the international community want to know how they can encourage and support progressive developmental leaders and coalitions, then getting to know more about the configurations of power and politics – as often reflected in the composition and interaction of coalitions – must be one of the key analytical starting points irrespective of sector or issue area.

### **Varieties of coalition**

Though there is no standard classification of coalitions, most people interpret the term to mean 'governmental coalitions' that are created when two or more political parties come together to form a government when one party cannot command a majority; or perhaps to form a government of 'national unity' to deal with a major crisis, as in war time. But the practice of coalitions is far wider than this conventional understanding, and coalitions take diverse forms and pursue varied goals. These include what have been called 'advocacy', 'protest' and 'event' coalitions, in civil or political society, that seek to protest against or campaign for a particular issue or institutional change. Then there are 'reform', 'growth' or 'policy' coalitions, often consisting of formally or informally organized individuals and interests, (both public and private) that seek to direct and push through a strategy for national growth and development, or to effect significant institutional or policy change in key areas of public policy (such as economic liberalization, social and welfare reform, agricultural modernization or constitutional or electoral reform). Electoral or legislative coalitions are more narrowly focused on passing a particular piece of legislation or electing a specific candidate. The term coalition is also sometimes used descriptively to identify a loose and *de facto* (but not necessarily organized) 'alliance' or network of associated interests and ideas that constitute a 'ruling coalition' (perhaps reflecting a class, ethnic or regional interest) without it being organized as such. These, sometimes called 'ruling coalitions', may represent a (perhaps shifting) range of allied interests that seek to sustain their power against rival coalitions by aligning formal governments in informal coalition with economic, military, landed or other such interests.

Coalitions are by no means necessarily progressive or developmental: they may be predatory or collusive, and distinctly anti-developmental. Coalitions form around both sides of major political debates and the same coalition might be embraced by one sector of society and denounced by another.

### **Coalitions and collective action problems**

Coalitions constitute one of the key political mechanisms for overcoming the pervasive collective action problems that are at the core of all politics, and especially the politics of development. Collective



action problems are those 'social dilemmas'<sup>1</sup> that arise almost everywhere when the *rational* pursuit of narrow, individual or sectional interests results in collective *irrationality*. These problems require institutional solutions that could be achieved, at least in part, if those involved were able to devise, agree and enforce an institutional arrangement (a set of rules) that would require each of them to restrain in some degree their immediate and short-term pursuit of self-interest so that they would all be better off in the medium term. Traffic rules and rules that at least attempt to restrict CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are two good simple examples of attempts to resolve collective action problems.

Collective action problems are pervasive in almost all areas of social, economic and political life and especially in a developmental or reform context where change is often quite rapid and sometimes quite radical. Coalitions (as with political settlements) can thus be crucial for helping to devise, agree and enforce institutional arrangements that can promote, sustain and ensure sustainable economic growth, political stability and inclusive social development at all levels of society and in all sectors and issue areas. For all these reasons we need to know how effective developmental coalitions emerge, and how to avoid collusive or predatory ones. Despite the frequent use of the concept, little is understood about what factors shape the more or less successful formation, management and achievements of such coalitions in different institutional and political environments.

In the light of this, perhaps the simplest starting distinction<sup>2</sup> that might be offered is between two broad categories of coalition: (a) governmental, regime, or ruling coalitions – that is coalitions of the dominant political and economic forces in a society (or sub-region) and the contending oppositional coalitions, on the one hand; and (b) the policy, advocacy or protest coalitions that seek to influence or change institutions, policies and ideas, on the other hand.

### The focus of the workshop

The focus of the coalitions workshop in Sydney was on the latter kind of coalitions:<sup>3</sup> those many examples of advocacy and reform coalitions that have sought to promote important policy or institutional change across a wide range of issues and sectors in both developing and developed countries, including the United States, Nigeria, Burma (Myanmar), the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. We reckoned that by bringing together scholars and practitioners of such coalitions we would quickly discover whether there were any common factors that shaped their relative success or failures, despite the obviously varied institutional, structural and political contexts in which they operated. We fully expected that some important understandings and messages would emerge for those donors and practitioners who plan to work more politically to advance the many objectives of their development agendas. That is what happened and that is what this Report will hopefully provide. It is the first in a series of publications by the DLP on the question of coalitions – a stream of work that will continue through 2012-2103.

What follows is a concise summary of the evidence and argument that emerged when practitioners and scholars discussed their own and each other's work and experiences. The questions that came up in the course of the discussions were many and varied and included the following: How important is the size of a coalition for its success? Should it be inclusive or perhaps somewhat selective? And what are the political costs of exclusion? Should a coalition focus on one issue, a narrow set of related issues, or adopt a broad inclusive platform? How do the members reach agreement on policy and what happens if the differences are too large? Does a 'lowest common denominator' policy emerge? How effective is

1 Ostrom, E. (1998) 'A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action', *American Political Science Review*, 92:1, pp. 1-22.

2 I owe this useful distinction to Sam Hickey.

3 Although she could not be present, a very useful contributing paper by Jennifer Widner of Princeton University's Innovations for Successful Societies program, "Coalitions, Conditions, and Pathways," dealt more with the former category. That paper can be accessed on the DLP website with the other presentations from the workshop.

that? And how should the coalition act politically; what tactics should it use? And how should it 'frame' its goals, publicity and campaign? Do they work 'under the radar', quietly, and use the backstairs of politics? Or can and do they campaign openly and publicly? Who is the key audience to be targeted? What is the balance between public campaigning and targeted pressure on key decision-makers in, say, government or the legislature? How much does that depend on the political and institutional context? How important are prior networks in the formation of successful coalitions, and what role does trust play in its affairs? How is the coalition funded? By contributions from members, or from outside the coalition, perhaps abroad, or both? Does the source of funding affect the structure and functioning of the coalition? And who manages the funds, and how? How are decisions taken within the coalition and how do the members reach and interact with policy-makers? Do they work through links, contacts, networks, gatekeepers and 'champions', whose influence they can exploit? And, in the case of a coalition of organizations, how does the leadership of each constituent organization ensure that their followers support the common platform they have agreed with other organizations in the coalition? In short, how best can leaders relate to both the leadership of other organizations in the coalition in shaping policy goals and strategies and also to their followers?

Finally, given that reform or developmental coalitions are such critical players in shaping the institutions and policies that can promote locally sustainable growth, political stability and social inclusion, what, if anything, should or can external players – donors and other intermediary organizations – do to facilitate, broker, fund and in other ways support the emergence and activities of such coalitions and their leadership without damaging or compromising their integrity, credibility and reputations?

These are a few of the complex questions addressed; some of the emerging answers are contained in what follows. We don't have all the answers, not yet: but the work continues.

# The Issues, Aims and Challenges of the Workshop

Adrian Leftwich

Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)

## 'Rules of the game and games within the rules'

There is a growing recognition that politics matters for development, but what does this mean for development practice? The initial response by donors over the last 25 years has been to retreat into 'governance' as a technical and administrative process and focus on capacity building and best practice institutions that are not endogenously evolved. What has been left out is a focus on the *inner politics* of development, and especially the formal and informal coalitions of progressive and developmental leaderships and coalitions that can shape locally legitimate and appropriate institutional arrangements, and hence the role of human agency: in short, the 'games within the rules.'

## The Developmental Leadership Program working hypotheses

In developing its research and policy work, DLP seeks to explore the following working hypotheses:

1. Robust institutions and development policies are shaped by local political processes and actors
2. The key players are leaders, elites, and coalitions at all levels and in all sector and issue areas
3. Coalitions can be developmental or predatory
4. Development outcomes are shaped by how actors (agents) work politically in different structural contexts.

## Central questions

In exploring these hypotheses, DLP is examining a series of over-arching questions:

1. What factors shape the emergence of developmental leaderships and coalitions?
2. What principles and practices enhance their chances of success?
3. What can the international community do to support the emergence and success of developmental leaderships and coalitions?

## Workshop objectives

The objectives of this workshop are to:

1. Develop a better understanding of what makes for effective developmental coalitions
2. Draw on best practice to inform theory and policy and draw on theory to inform practice
3. Develop policy and operational messages and guides to inform policy and practice
4. Use the coalition focus to better understand the relationship of agency and structure in development and the role of coalitions in overcoming collective action problems.

## Key questions to address in examining coalitions

1. What are the specific problems that each coalition is addressing? What is the solution? How does the coalition choose its issue and methods? How does it frame the issue?
2. What is the nature of the coalition? Is it civil society, business, or state? Is it transient or long lasting? Does the size of the coalition matter? Its level of inclusiveness?
3. How do pre-existing networks affect coalitions?
4. Who are the champions?
5. What is the role of contingency? How can coalitions take advantage of windows of opportunity?
6. How important is the internal organization and management of a coalition? How do funding issues affect coalition?
7. What is the role of external players in brokering, facilitating and supporting developmental coalitions at any level or in any sector or issue area?

## Section A

# Coalitions in Theory and Practice in Stable Institutional Environments

## 01

## 'Power in Coalitions': experiences and challenges

Amanda Tattersall  
Sydney Alliance

### Why coalitions?

Coalitions between community organizations, unions, religious groups, and other members of civil society increase community power and help hold market and government forces to account. Successful coalitions both advance social change and strengthen community organizations, though these two goals are in constant tension.

### Coalitions in action

#### *New South Wales Public Education Coalition*

This coalition began when the teachers' union joined with the parents' association in response to a state government plan to reform schools. It conducted a mass-based and highly participatory inquiry into the public education system and benefited from strong leadership support within both organizations, agreement around an issue of mutual interest in reducing class sizes, and a strategic timetable around elections. Three weeks before the state election, the government announced a policy to reduce class sizes.

#### *Sydney Alliance*

The Sydney Alliance was set up to represent the entire city of Sydney and works on multiple issues. Organizations were invited to take part based on a power analysis of the key players in Sydney civil society. It began with 13 organizations in 2007 and launched in 2011 with 50 organizations, including a range of religious organizations, unions, and others. The Alliance initially prioritized relationship-building between the diverse member organizations and community training programs. It then ran listening campaigns to ask citizens what issues they cared about most, and chose to work on three main topics: transport, social inclusion, and community care and health. It is now working to identify specific winnable demands.

### Principles of strong coalitions

1. **Less is more:** Power comes from the quality of organizational commitment rather than quantity, and restricted membership usually leads to higher levels of commitment. A coalition's size should depend on its goals, as broader goals may require more members and more investment in relationship-building.
2. **Individuals matter:** It is crucial to have leadership buy-in within member organizations, as well as champions who make things happen, and coalition coordinators and bridge builders.
3. **Build an agenda:** It is important to find overlap between organizational self-interest and social justice.
4. **Plan, plan, plan:** Conscious long-term planning is required, which means thinking in advance about political opportunities, such as election cycles, rather than simply the next event.
5. **Multi-scaled action:** Coalitions are more powerful if they can work at multiple levels, assembling power and developing skills at both local and national levels.

# 02

## 'Health Coalitions' in the United States

Larry Cohen  
Prevention Institute

### Coalitions in action

Prevention Institute works to prevent illness and injury before they occur in the first place, with a focus on promoting health equity and advancing strategies to prevent chronic disease, unintentional injuries, and violence. Health-oriented coalitions can play an important role in advancing community wellbeing. Many issues influencing health and safety are impacted by decisions and policies of other fields and it is thus critical that health leaders engage and support the participation of people in multiple sectors in order to achieve success. Additionally, the Prevention Institute moves beyond approaches that target individuals to those that create systematic, comprehensive strategies that alter conditions that impact health. Their campaigns have sought to reframe issues such as nutrition and physical activity from simply a matter of individual choice to one of corporate and government responsibility. For example, it is critical for people to understand not only the importance of being physical active and eating healthily, but also whether the community environments in which people live, work, play and learn support health-promoting behaviors.

The first successful multi-city campaign in the U.S. to promote no-smoking laws was led by the Smoking Education Coalition, created by the Contra Costa County (CA) Department of Public Health with the Lung Association, the American Cancer Society, and the Heart Association. The three latter organizations often competed for funds, but they were able to find a common ground in their interest in promoting smoke-free environments in order to prevent heart and lung disease in the first place. The tobacco industry was a powerful force at the national level, but the coalition focused on strategies to change local-level regulations, which could be adapted from community to community, and which the industry was less prepared to battle. The Board members of the Cancer, Heart, and Lung Associations included influential physicians and donors whose credibility and connections were pivotal in achieving local political success. The initial local policy changes, while small (such as a mandate that 40% of restaurant seating be non-smoking), sparked significant changes in local, national, and international norms.

### Steps to effective coalitions

1. **Start out with a clear set of objectives.**
2. **Recruit the right people.** Consider who has influence, who will be supportive, and who is likely to be opposed. This requires a detailed analysis and understanding of the political landscape; one needs to understand the key players, their views, and their formal or informal sources and forms of power.
3. **Think about the objectives of the coalition and the needs and skills of each member and their added value.** Work on multiple levels (local, state, and national) to see where momentum is possible. Think about influencing policy, changing organizational practice, and strengthening individual knowledge and skills of members.
4. **Convene the coalition through an invited meeting.** Consider how to attract busy people.

5. **Anticipate the necessary resources.** Think of what you will need and then double it.
6. **Devise a successful coalition structure.** Will the coalition be ad hoc or ongoing? Advantages to ad hoc are that it has a clear sense of purpose. How are decisions made? Is membership official? How much will members realistically contribute?
7. **Maintain coalition vitality.** Anticipate challenges due to poor group dynamics, inadequate membership participation, ineffective activities, unexpected external changes, and turf issues. Multi-field collaboration is hard work but possible and valuable because the determinants of health are beyond the capacity of any one practitioner or discipline.
8. **Make improvements through evaluation.** Ask for feedback and know when it is time to dissolve, disband, or change the structure of the coalition.



## 03

## Messages for Theory

Reflections so far: what works for institutionally stable environments? And why?

Jared Raynor  
TCC Group

### Conceptualizing coalitions

Coalitions are defined as organizations that commit themselves to shared purpose to influence shared targets while maintaining their own autonomy. They are different from networks because they have a goal destination. A coalition can be conceived as a *strategy* that individuals or organizations employ or as an *entity* which itself implements a strategy. The focus here is on coalitions as actors.

### Key aspects of coalition capacity

There is very little agreement in the literature about exactly what makes for an effective coalition, but there are a number of key aspects to consider in evaluating both the capacity of coalition members and the coalition as a whole.

### Coalition member capacity includes:

1. **Niche:** Do members see how their organization fits into the broader network and can they articulate what they bring to the table?
2. **Needs:** Can members understand and articulate what they need from the coalition, how it will help them achieve their missions, and why it is better than going alone?
3. **Manners:** Are members willing to share resources and dedicate staffing? Do they have the skills and knowledge to work collaboratively and share credit?

### Overall coalition capacity:

1. **Leadership:** Does the coalition have the ability to strategize and mobilize? Two main parts of this are goal destination (what does the coalition want to achieve?) and value proposition (why is the coalition the right approach to achieve that goal?).
2. **Adaptability:** Does the coalition have the ability to monitor, assess, and respond to internal and external changes?
3. **Management:** Does the coalition use resources efficiently and effectively? Frequent and productive communication is important, as well as task and goal focused activities, clarity of member and staff roles, conflict management, and careful record-keeping.
4. **Technical:** Does the coalition have resources and the ability to acquire resources? What is the role of coalition staff? It can be dangerous to delegate too much to staff because it can lead to reduced member commitment. Membership diversity can be both a strength and weakness.
5. **Cultural characteristics and capacities:** Is there trust, respect, safe dissent, and sensitivity to power differentials within the group? Do members present a unified voice to the outside world?

## 04

## Messages from Theory: What messages does political theory have for coalition formation and success?

Margaret Levi  
University of Washington

### Coalition types and transformations

Coalitions can be *event* or *ad hoc* coalitions, which are short-lived and usually created for a particular protest or lobby, or *enduring coalitions*, which are long-lived. Event coalitions can transition into enduring coalitions when the issue requires a long-term campaign. For example, protests around a specific company's labor practices turned into a sustained coalition for improved labor rights across supply chains and the establishment of the Fair Labor Association. To make this transition successful, coalitions need to keep their eye on the central goal, develop acceptable and respected processes for adjudicating internal disputes, and develop strong social networks and interdependencies.

Coalitions are also influenced by whether they exist in stable or unstable institutional settings. Coalitions in developing countries can face additional challenges due to ineffective governments, repression, and more extreme inequality of resources. Yet even in developed countries with stable institutions, coalitions need to be prepared for significant shifts in the environment. Some coalitions also bridge developing and developed countries, such as transnational coalitions around human rights and health.

### Determinants of effective coalitions

Coalitions can contribute to building a virtuous cycle between governments and citizens with governments delivering what they say they will and citizens supporting them. Coalitions should reform what needs to be reformed, and support and help make stable what should be supported.

### Coalitions require:

1. Identification of a common goal.
2. Identification of individuals or organizations who share that goal.
3. Enforceable commitments to contribute resources and undertake actions to achieve that goal. Sometimes this requires punishing those who don't meet promises or committing resources upfront to show good faith.

Conflict can arise within coalitions for a variety of reasons, including unequal resources and the potential for free-riding, disagreements over strategy, and betrayals by coalition members. Coalitions can develop mechanisms to adjudicate conflict by:

1. **Keeping their eye on the central goal.**
2. **Dealing with inequality.** This can sometimes require selective incentives to win over people who would otherwise not participate, credible commitments, and information sharing.
3. **Dealing with distrust.** Have members pre-commit resources, take advantage of networks with pre-

existing trust, build deliberation mechanisms to give all members real voice and alleviate fears of cooptation. Encourage conversations among leaders of member organizations.

4. *Permitting and understanding different public and private stands.*
5. *Recognizing the important role of leaders.*

# 05

## Coalitions in the politics of economic reform: emerging themes and patterns from literature

Caryn Peiffer  
DLP Researcher

### Features of economic reform coalitions

In examining coalitions between business and government, there is a perceived dichotomy between collusive, rent-seeking arrangements that are bad for economic growth, and cooperative reform coalitions that can be the backbone for pro-growth reforms.

Reform coalitions are groups of loosely aggregated individuals from both state and business communities that work together for various growth inducing economic reforms.

#### *Necessary features of reform coalitions:*

1. *Common understanding of the problem among coalition members.*
2. *Incentives to support coalition.* Actors have a shared perception that they can reap benefits from the coalition that they could not obtain alone. Businesses feel that reforms will lead to better results and state elites believe that adopting growth-friendly reforms will lead to political benefits.

#### *Common features:*

- *Coalition includes top state officials.* Alliance with top officials can heighten the credibility of a coalition and is sometimes necessary to achieve the coalition's goals.
- *Coalitions are influenced by crises.* Economic crisis can spur the creation of coalitions, though it may also serve as a catalyst for a coalition's demise. 'Critical junctures' or 'windows of opportunity' have often been seized to facilitate a reform initiative.

#### *Important factors to consider on the business side:*

1. *Organizational strength of business associations, if they exist.* Broad and dense membership and the ability to discipline members are signs of high quality associations.
2. *Concentration of business.* Moderately concentrated business settings are optimal to induce economic actors to participate in growth inducing reform. Monopoly settings are likely to result in collusion while fractionalized business interests may not be able to cooperate on reform.

#### *Important factors to consider on the state side:*

1. *Embedded autonomy.* Weberian bureaucracies give state actors autonomy and incentives for pro-growth rather than collusive relationships.

2. *Select benefits and disciplinary mechanisms.* States can tailor reforms in such a way as to benefit key players in reform coalitions and win their support. They can also enact mechanisms to ensure business partners are held accountable.

### Messages to donors

1. *Provide space* for actors to meet and find common ground.
2. *Let go of a full participation model.* Top elites and key stakeholders are the most important players.
3. *Target assistance to pre-established networks and coalitions.*
4. *Assist business organizations in ability to negotiate with state.* But this is context specific; sometimes need to build state capacity to negotiate with business associations.
5. *Recognize donor weakness.* Coalitions require endogenous political commitment and cannot be constructed from the outside. Donors need in-depth contextual research on key players and relationships.

## 06

## Reflections on Key Themes

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### Building theory from practice

Several issues need to be addressed in order to build theories on effective coalitions:

- *Commensurate categories.* A typology of coalitions is needed.
- *Routes to theory.* An inductive route to theory would require looking at examples of failure in addition to success. A deductive route requires road-testing current hypotheses.
- *Best practice or best fit?* Coalitions need to be adapted to context, how can a theory of effective coalitions take context into account? Need a typology of contexts.

### Contextual/structural analysis

Context analysis needs to look beyond institutions to the underlying political settlement. Political settlements represent the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and classes on which any state is based. Coalitions can flow from underlying political settlements and they can also change them, in part, through helping to establish new economic and social settlements.

*Context analysis should also consider:*

- *Role of collusion.* Collusion is generally seen as a bad thing, but collusive relationships can sometimes form the basis for transitions to more democratic relationships. Protected strategies might be required to get certain types of growth.
- *Role of ideology and beliefs.* Actors are not fully rational, and ideology matters, as well as how issues are framed in light of political discourse.

### Building effective states

The focus thus far has been on coalitions in a civil society context, but it is also important to think of how coalitions can contribute to effective states. Coalitions can be a way for the state to operate, manage relationships, and discipline capital. State-society coalitions can also serve as substitutes where effective and accountable forms of governance have yet to emerge.

### Implications for donors

Donors should consider:

- Which coalitions and relationships matter most? Ministers spend significant time dealing with donors and this can diminish their interaction with their own civil societies.

- What are the implications of reshaping interventions with reference to political settlements?
- Can donors be brokers rather than doers?
- Political economy analysis is important, but often thin and with a tendency to be a-historical. What kinds of analysis are really useful?

# Discussion

## Evidence base for coalition effectiveness

- There is no consensus in the literature on coalition best practices, apart from agreement on the importance of clear goal definition. Coalitions need to be highly adaptive to the structure of their specific institutional and political context.
- On a broader level, it should be possible to argue that coalitions are required to get fundamental social and political change. Politics shapes how things change. The focus is often on leaders, but leaders need to form coalitions to get things done.

## Coalition composition and dynamics

- Size needs to be fit for purpose, and it is usually best to have smallest size necessary to achieve goal.
- Coalition members need to be able to communicate effectively and speak the same language.
- Coalitions are not only made up of those who show up at meetings. Some supporters can contribute significantly without ever attending formal meetings.
- Assembling a multi-sector coalition is difficult, but can spark transformational change.
- Participants expressed varying views on the role of staff. There is some danger that members turn over duties to staff and disengage from the coalition's work. But staff can also play a key role in organizing, advocating, and giving cover to organizations that don't want to step forward.
- Who initiates the coalition? One participant argued that business-government coalitions are less likely to be collusive if initiated by a government or donor. But another participant noted that governments can also try to co-opt business associations.
- How important are prior relationships between members? If organizations are already in the same networks, they are more likely to come together but they may also have some problematic pre-existing power relationships. It can also be very valuable to reach out to new and powerful partners such as religious groups even if organizations do not have prior history of cooperation. A history of conflict between organizations can create difficulty working together. Yet even organizations with past problems can become allies if context changes, for example under circumstances of sudden threat, challenge or new opportunity.
- Political affiliation needs to be taken into account. Unions or other groups with strong ties to political parties can bring important connections to power holders, but their loyalties are sometimes unclear. Many coalitions involve government actors, which can be useful but can also increase the probability of inequality among members and distrust.
- When should coalitions reach out to perceived opponents? There are dangers of inviting enemies to the table, particularly if they can co-opt the coalition. But some key actors need to be involved for change to occur and it can be possible to find common interests even with people who are not friends.

## Capacity-building goals

- Coalitions often seek to build organizational capacity in addition to pursuing policy change. It may be possible to get a policy changed quickly without strengthening member organizations, but that is unlikely to shift the fundamentals of state-society relations. Yet some participants argued that organizational strengthening alone is not a sufficient goal for coalitions.
- Can coalitions strengthen state capacity? The focus is often on strengthening civil society (or, better still, political society) but coalitions can also help governments. Prevention Institute is working with large cities in the United States on violence prevention, helping them clarify their goals and objectives, think about the issue differently, and advance strategies and roadmaps. Coalitions can strengthen the capacity of governments to provide health services by helping them work with communities



and understand their health concerns. Enhanced civil society capacity can also help state capacity if civil society people later work for government.

- Capacity needs are context specific. In some cases the state is very strong and civil society weak, but not always. In some low capacity states, such as Yemen and Somalia, civil society organizations have significant space to engage but there is no basic social contract with the state. In these cases the focus should be on building capacity for constructive engagement between state and society on the basis of what is already there.

## Issues and framing

- Coalitions do not need to be organized around a specific issue, but they need to have a common interest. Multi-issue coalitions such as the Sydney Alliance can be successful.
- Participants presented varying views on whether coalitions should always have positive demands or whether it can also be useful to organize *against* a particular policy or issue.
- How does the coalition present its cause? Are issues taken up in the name of the coalition or individual members? Campaigns in the name of particular members can get more traction because the organizations are better known, but there may also be a need to brand the coalition.
- Ideology and beliefs affect coalition dynamics and issue selection. The ideology of leaders is important, but they need to bring members along and usually need to produce deliverable results.

## Planning

- Effective coalitions are often opportunistic and responsive, seizing a moment or 'critical juncture'; and it is possible to overemphasize planning. Coalition work can be like following a road map in the midst of a storm where paths are obstructed and the direction keeps changing.
- At the same time, some coalitions do not plan at all and need to be reminded of the need to look to the future and anticipate how key events such as elections will affect the coalition. It is also important to anticipate the strategies opponents will deploy to stop coalitions.

## Funding and the role of donors

- Coalitions can get funding from various sources. Sydney Alliance gets its funding from its member organizations. Prevention Institute funding comes mainly from government or philanthropic sources, as well as proceeds from consulting and training.
- Are coalitions something donors should be supporting directly? Or should they instead focus on the enabling environment for coalitions? How can donors deal with inequality of resources and the need for extensive local political knowledge? It can be difficult to articulate what development agencies are willing and able to support given their political constraints and interests.
- For this reason donors need to reflect more deeply and strategically about how to work with and through intermediaries.
- Donors need to be aware that not all reforms promote inclusive development. Business-government coalitions focused on growth could exclude the community.
- Most participants agreed that donors should fund coalitions. They also agreed that community groups and interests require more than just an enabling environment to be successful. But donors need to recognize power differentials and find ways to structure funding and support coalition development that minimizes problems and avoids unhealthy competition and rent-seeking.
- Are donors able or willing to engage at the level of political settlements and the macro rules of the game? Should the focus be on trying to change little bits of social power instead? Even relatively small scale programs can seek to change state-society power relations by empowering certain actors and thereby enabling them to work politically when (for example) greater democratic space opens up.

## Section B

### Case Studies: Donor Experiences with Coalitions in Developing Countries

## 01

## The Coalitions for Change experience and lessons from Nigeria

### Origins of program

DFID conducted a Drivers of Change study in Nigeria in 2006 looking at the interaction of structure, institutions and agency in the country. It found that while Nigeria has a viable civil society, prospects for meaningful developmental change were low unless organizations and individuals came together and overcame collective action challenges. As a result of the analysis, DFID developed the Coalitions for Change program. The program was run by an intermediary Nigerian C4C management team and developed eight issue-based coalitions. These were around issues to do with the rights of persons with disabilities; anti-corruption/accountability; climate change; constitution review dialogue mechanisms; the extractive industries transparency initiative; gender-affirmation action; monitoring the virtual poverty fund; and the Northern Nigeria water governance initiative.

### Work of the coalitions

**Planning and issue selection:** The program began with a socioeconomic scoping study to map context and power. The team then came up with a draft change strategy, which was adapted from the Drivers of Change and negotiated with DFID. Issues were selected based on potential for traction, replication, and ability to show progress within two years. The management team stressed that process is as important as ends and set up milestones to measure intermediary progress.

**Composition and size of coalitions:** Coalitions included government, affected communities, media, civil society, and private sector as well as connectors, enablers, implementers, and change champions. Coalitions ranged from 3 to 11 members and the size varied depending on issue and goals.

**Management and funding:** Each coalition was led by a Secretariat who set down the rules. DFID played a quiet role, linked to the coalitions only through the C4C management team. The program was tagged as high risk by DFID and given three years to do its work. DFID provided funding but coalitions were also encouraged to raise other funds and provide in kind resources and staff time. Money creates risk, and the program emphasized transparency and used context analysis to identify good partners.

**Impact:** The coalitions were successful in coalescing through an issue-based approach and in passing legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities and on climate change.

### Lessons learned

#### Success factors:

- Nigerian ownership of the project allowed DFID to step back and immunize itself from potential political fallout. DFID was also willing to take risks, which was helpful.

- Inclusive methodology that planned with minority voices and issues was important. It was useful to build on natural coalitions of people who were already comfortable working together.
- Deliberate communication strategy was key, as well as the ability to work flexibly in an unpredictable environment. Annual review processes helped identify problems.

**Challenges:**

- The two coalitions that were based on issues inherited from DFID rather than developed on the ground did not do as well as the others, because there was no prior energy or traction around them. These were the Anti Corruption and the Monitoring Virtual Poverty Fund issue-based projects. They did not fit the C4C methodology of coalescing around issues which had potential for traction, leading to engagement, then ownership and lesson learning. However, a third coalition, inherited from DFID - the Northern Nigeria Water Governance Initiative - was a huge success because it had been running for 3 years and had traction around it.
- It is hard to coalesce around politically toxic issues.
- It is important to manage expectations and understand that fundamental change takes time. Though DFID was willing to take some risks, the three-year time frame was a very short period within which to expect significant results.

## 02

Lessons from Burma/  
Myanmar**Origins of program**

DFID wanted to do more to address serious humanitarian needs, poverty, and inadequate basic services in Burma but did not want to give direct assistance to the government, which was under international sanctions for human rights abuses. A Drivers of Change study in 2005 and 2006 concluded it was possible to promote low-level change in the country by supporting a stronger and independent civil society.

DFID developed the Pyoe Pin program to strengthen social capital in Burma and help civil society play a stronger role in shaping the future of the country. The goal was primarily civil society strengthening, but because this was done through support to issue-based coalitions, there was also expected to be secondary impact in the form of policy change, access to resources and improved service delivery. The program was run by the British Council, an international organization with a local presence which appeared neutral.

**Work of the coalitions**

**Planning and issue selection:** The program manager was given six months to identify potential partners and issues, based on prospective partners' priorities and agreed criteria, which included potential to build social capital, potential to achieve positive change, and manageable risks. Political economy analysis was built in at the beginning and as the program evolved. Coalitions were formed around HIV/AIDS, the rice market chain, disaster risk reduction, community forestry, livelihoods, and informal education.

**Management and funding:** The program was managed by the British Council and the majority of funding was in grants to local partners, with some funds for mentoring and coalition building by the British Council. Coalitions were supported by media and communications work to communicate both to donors and to a local audience.

**Adapting to the unexpected:** Cyclone Nargis was a major event (a 'critical juncture', or 'window of opportunity') which led to significant activity by local organizations and greater recognition of the importance of civil society. Some of the coalitions, such as the Mangrove network on disaster risk reduction and the livelihoods network, grew out of the cyclone response even though the original Pyoe Pin program didn't include these issues.

**Impact:** The program improved work between local organizations and positioned civil society actors to respond to political changes. The HIV/AIDS coalition was able to raise support for more efforts to combat the disease. It influenced Global Fund funding in Myanmar and gave civil society a greater voice in the process. Coalitions also had an impact on rice market and credit policy.

## Lessons learned

### *Success factors*

- The program gave the right support to civil society at the right time and was able to flexibly respond in critical moments such as the cyclone or recent elections.
- A focus on specific issues helped manage risk to DFID in supporting specific organizations, as well as distrust between organizations. It makes sense to take up issues that are not toxic and where there is potential for productive work with the government. It is nevertheless possible to get traction on issues that seem very difficult.

### *Challenges*

- Building coalitions takes significant work and proactive management was required.
- It can be difficult to develop a clear story of impact and change and find intermediate measures of progress that don't skew the efforts of project managers. A new monitoring framework is trying to focus on qualitative changes and develop a rudimentary scoring system around them.
- In the future the program hopes to improve linkages with other DFID programs in Burma.

## 03

## The challenge of building civil society coalitions in Indonesia

### Origins of program

In the early 2000s, Indonesia undertook a process of simultaneous democratization and decentralization. Decentralization has given significant authority and resources to district governments and poverty reduction has become a central government priority. DFID decided to fund the Asia Foundation's Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty to promote pro-poor policies at the local level. The program hypothesized that advocates needed to combine technical assistance with political incentives for policy-makers. It also emphasized partnerships with constituent-based organizations and, particularly, Muslim organizations.

### Work of the coalitions

**Management and funding:** The program was funded by a DFID grant to the Asia Foundation in two phases from 2004 to 2010 (three year initial program then extended). The Asia Foundation supported local civil society organizations in 38 districts. DFID was flexible and allowed local partners to choose what they wanted to work on within the areas of good governance and public services. The program had a loose logframe but clear targets (i.e. passing 20 new local regulations).

**Semarang:** The program supported the NGO Pattiro in the district of Semarang. Semarang was led by an unpopular and corrupt mayor who was not pro-reform, but the legislature was looking for ways to be more active. Pattiro mapped the stakeholders and worked with constituent groups, academics, media, a bureaucratic ally in the local planning board, legislators from Islamic parties, and various civil society organizations to help pass pro-poor legislation.

**Pekalongan:** A different branch of Pattiro worked in the district of Pekalongan, where a reform-minded mayor had an innovative poverty alleviation program and little political opposition. Pattiro was included in the mayor's advisory group and worked with young ambitious staff within the bureaucracy and other societal groups to help pass pro-poor legislation.

**Impact:** Health allocations increased in both districts and funding for the local health insurance system increased. Poverty reduction policies have lasted past the 2010 district elections.

### Lessons learned

#### Success factors

- A loose, issue based, and selective coalition was effective. Use of a trusted intermediary helped. The Asia Foundation and Pattiro both had good local knowledge and helped insulate DFID from political sensitivities.

- Political analysis was effective. Site selection for development assistance should be based on a well-designed mapping of the politics of governance and the capacity of civil society.
- Working politically in addition to providing technical support was crucial. It is possible for civil society to work politically while remaining politically neutral.
- Relatively small numbers of champions across civil society, the executive, the bureaucracy, and the parliament were able to mobilize political support for reform. NGOs that support transparency and accountability can be very useful partners.
- Strengthening linkages between constituents and policy makers is an effective advocacy strategy, and opportunities for citizens to practice holding their elected officials accountable are relevant.
- DFID flexibility and continuity of support and approach.

### **Challenges**

- Better evidence is needed of why social reform has been possible in some places and why other efforts have failed.
- More analytic tools are needed to examine political processes, as well as more use of political analysis in the initial program planning and design stages.
- Efforts are very dependent on the quality and capacity of civil society partners.
- The line between working politically and political interference can be difficult to gauge.



## 04

## The Coalitions for Change program plans in the Philippines

### Origins of program

The Philippines is a middle income country with economic growth and a long history of civil society activity but it struggles with increasing poverty, government capacity issues, and antagonistic relationships between civil society and government. Without productive engagement between civil society and government, it will be difficult for developmental change to occur.

President Aquino, elected in 2010, has pushed for more engagement with civil society. AusAID has 25 years of experience providing grants to civil society in the Philippines and wants to take advantage of this political moment to help facilitate a process of reform. Key leaders within AusAID with significant Philippines experience and a mix of internal and external advisers have supported this project, which aims to support coalitions around a number of policy issues. AusAID has entered into a strategic partnership with the Asia Foundation to implement this program.

### Plans for work of coalitions

**Planning and issue selection:** The process of design and review took twelve months and has tried to meet AusAID requirements while allowing space for the iterative nature of the program. The program has decided to support coalitions around basic education, sub-national governance, disaster risk reduction and climate change, and peace and security in Mindanao. Criteria for approval were alignment with country assistance strategies and the Filipino government's development plan, consistency with Asia Foundation program areas and AusAID delivery strategies, and level of implementation risk. The program plans to identify existing coalitions working on these areas.

**Management and funding:** The program is managed through a partnership rather than a contract and its guiding principles are partnership, shared objectives, recognition of contributions and comparative advantage, trust, mutual accountability, commitment, and professionalism. Coalitions will be issue based, outcome-oriented, constructive, temporary, and facilitated. AusAID will provide core funding for three years with the potential for more. Funding will be for initial exploration of coalitions, internal capacity building of coalition members, evidence creation, and other coalition activities. Coalition members will be expected to contribute as well.

**Expected impact:** The program hopes to support interaction between government and civil society in order to facilitate reforms in policy or implementation for better service delivery. It expects to improve policy and implementation processes through increased transparency, voice, accountability, and responsiveness and to improve the knowledge and networking skills of members. It could also illustrate to AusAID more broadly how political and institutional issues can be brought into development thinking and help inform a review of the framework for civil society engagement.

## Challenges

- Does AusAID have the capacity to understand and process the implications of political analysis?
- What are the implications of working in a politically informed way? How can a vibrant civil society sector spark long-term transformative change?
- The program seeks to create space for coalitions to operate without tying them down to an overly prescriptive structure. It needs to ensure that the drive comes from Filipino civil society rather than external actors.
- This program represents a change in how aid is usually designed and delivered. Both AusAID and the Asia Foundation have a strong commitment to this project, but it will be a challenge to put the partnership model into practice.
- There are high expectations for this program within a short time frame, and it will require methods to measure progress as well as embracing risk and the possibility of failure.

# 05

## Leadership Coalitions in the Pacific: The Tonga Initiative

### Origins of the program

Tonga is a conservative monarchy with clear social divisions between nobles and commoners. Pro-democracy protests and riots in 2006 led to an election in 2010 when for the first time a majority of seats were open to anyone. This helped spark discussions about leadership.

The Pacific Leadership Program (PLP) is an AusAID program, based in Fiji, which supports influential Pacific leaders to shape and lead developmental change. It is run primarily by local staff, including prominent local citizens. PLP asked the Tongan member of its advisory panel of Pacific Islanders, who is the chair of the Tonga public service commission, and other local leaders to convene an eminent group of Tongans to prioritise leadership challenges, develop strategies and (via PLP) fund leadership action around key issues for the future of Tonga.

### Work of the coalition

**Composition of coalition:** The group picked its own members, including a cabinet minister; nobility and members from church, youth, private sector, education, civil society and other areas. AusAID played some role in encouraging diversity in the group. They formed the Tonga National Leadership Development Forum.

**Planning and issue selection:** The group started out without a defined plan, but asked to conduct a baseline survey. The survey highlighted issues including:

- The lack of women in leadership positions
- The role of education in leadership development
- Leadership in the Church
- Bringing up-to-date a Tonga leadership code (cultural code) established in 1830s which emphasizes respect for elders and for rank.

They chose to focus initially on the leadership code.

**Management and funding:** The group was a forum, not an organization. PLP/AusAID wanted to give them maximum ownership over the project, so gave the group a flexible small grant. Terms of reference are loose.

**Impact:** The forum held wide consultations with communities on the leadership code, which led citizens to think about their own roles and responsibilities within the community and learn to question leaders.

The forum has developed a draft code, which will eventually go to the Tongan cabinet for approval, but they feel that the participatory process has been more important than the specific language of the final code.

## **Lessons learned**

### ***Success factors***

- Local ownership. AusAID kept a low profile and local staff ran program.
- Right people on the forum gave gravitas to the process.
- Program was highly flexible and took advantage of critical junctures such as elections.
- Outreach to key actors. Got the support of the prime minister and key cabinet members.

### ***Challenges***

- Turf issues. Media reports giving credit to one member of the forum and not others created some tension.
- Risk of capture by Tongan government or claiming by AusAID.
- AusAID had very little control over the program, which created some risk.
- Managing expectations of people in the forum and those involved in consultations, some of whom thought AusAID would fund them as well.
- Measurement. It is hard to find someone who is available, speaks Tongan and has action research expertise.

# Concluding Discussion

## Central themes

- **Coalitions and politics matter for development.**
- **Context is king (or queen).**
- **Goal definition.** Clear goal definition is often cited as a key element of an effective coalition. Some coalitions, such as Sydney Alliance or Tonga leadership forum, did not start out with a particular issue, but they did have a clear purpose and worked towards defining their agendas.
- **Coalition size.** A coalition should be as small as possible to achieve its ends. Coalition size may not be constant; sometimes a coalition can expand or contract over time.
- **Role of coalition members.** Leaders are important, but are not the only relevant actors. Coalitions also need change champions, connectors, enablers, gatekeepers, and others beyond the coalitions.
- **Choice of issue.** Some coalitions begin around a specific issue and recruit members, while other times a group comes together first and then picks which issue it wants to focus on. The right strategy depends on context, but it can be dangerous to pick an issue before determining whether there is a natural coalition to support it. Coalitions are likely to be stronger if the issue emerges internally rather than being imposed from outside, one participant noted. At the same time, member commitment to the issue may be more important than ownership over its conception.
- **Types of issues.** Non-threatening ('non-toxic') issues can help coalitions gain traction. Focusing on small changes can lead to broader outcomes. It is good to work on issues that resonate with excluded members of society.
- **Framing.** Coalitions can adopt various strategies to pitch their issue to the world, from subtle to very public. It is important that the choice of approach is strategic and adapted to local circumstances.
- **Management and rules of the game.** Coalitions need to balance planning and adaptability, as well as develop mechanisms to ensure commitment of members and deal with distrust. Formal rules are not always necessary but members should agree on the (if necessary informal) rules of the game, particularly around funding and resources.
- **Impact.** Social change and organizational strengthening are dual and sometimes competing goals of coalitions. Coalitions should be action-oriented and if possible work on multiple levels.
- **Short-term and long term results and benefits.** While coalitions may be started to achieve a particular policy or institutional change, the experience for the participants or organizations of working in that way can produce other important benefits in the longer term, whether the coalition is successful in achieving its goals or not. For example, in currently limited or authoritarian political contexts, the experience of coalition work can prepare such groups to play an active part in an emerging pluralistic democracy, as and when political space opens up.
- **Sustainability.** Coalitions do not need to be permanent and in many cases should not be. Coalition members retain their own identities and have right of entry and exit. Sustainability can happen if the coalition feels it has accomplished its goals and dissolves, if the idea takes on a life of its own, or if the issue is redefined. At the same time, if the coalition has long-term goals then sustainability requires continued access to funds.

## Key questions for donors

- **How much political knowledge do donors have and what tools do they need?** There is a tendency to think about politics in specific and narrow ways, such as looking at which politician can be trusted. It is a bigger challenge to embed political thinking and analysis into the design and implementation process.
- **Do donors need to approach goal definition differently from locally-sparked coalitions?** Is organizational strengthening a sufficient goal? Donors have an obligation to support developmental goals, but that means more than simply supporting the Millennium Development Goals. Organizational strength-

ening can be a developmental goal, though participants disagreed about whether it is a sufficient one.

- ***Is there an additional responsibility for donors to be inclusive?*** Individuals forming coalitions in their own societies have the right to be as narrow as they like, but should outside donors usually make an effort to be inclusive? This does not mean including people seeking to undermine the coalition.
- ***How does donor involvement shift coalition dynamics?*** Donors are actors with their own interests and agendas and will inevitably affect coalition dynamics. How can local ownership be maximized? Maybe by only supporting civil society organizations with deep roots. Or by being transparent about donor agendas. Donor funding can also skew participant incentives, and one participant noted that donors should put in enough money to help people who have a vision but not enough to attract those without a vision. Coalition members should still feel there is some cost to participating.
- ***Who are the leaders within development agencies making these programs possible?*** Who are the individuals designing the programs? Who are the implementers and how are they chosen? How much staff continuity exists across the life of the program?
- ***How can coalition needs for flexibility fit with donor procedures?*** Are there always intermediate milestones to evaluate progress? When is it acceptable and possible to change the plan?

# Workshop Participants:

Sydney 15-16 February, 2012

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## DLP Publications

### Research Papers

1. Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2009) "Cadres, Capitalists and Coalitions: The ANC, Business and Development in South Africa".
2. David Subudubudu with Patrick Molutsi (2009) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the Development of Botswana".
3. Eduard Grebe with Nicoli Nattrass (2009) "Leaders, Networks and Coalitions in the AIDS Response: A Comparison of Uganda and South Africa".
4. Deborah Brautigam with Tania Diolle (2009) "Coalitions, Capitalists and Credibility: Overcoming the Crisis of Confidence at Independence in Mauritius".
5. Jo Beall with Mduduzi Ngonyama (2009) "Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Developmental Coalitions: The Case of Greater Durban, South Africa".
6. Adrian Leftwich (2009) "Bringing Agency Back In: Politics and Human Agency in Building Institutions and States".
7. Junji Banno & Kenichi Ohno (2010) "The Flexible Structure of politics in Meiji Japan".
8. Marine Destrez & Nick Harrison (2011) "Leadership Training and Network Formation: The evolution of the LEAD process".
9. Michael Bratton & Eldred Musunungure (2011) "The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980-2010".
10. Laura Brannelly, Laura Lewis & Susy Ndaruhutse (2011) "Higher Education and the Formation of Developmental Elites: A literature review and preliminary data analysis."
11. Heather Lyne deVer & Fraser Kennedy (2011) "An analysis of Leadership Development Programmes working in the context of development."
12. Mariz Tadros (2011) "Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and agency in a comparative study of women's coalitions in Egypt and Jordan".
13. Rebecca Hodes, Jennifer Thorpe & Orly Stern (2011) "Structure and Agency in the Politics of a Women's Rights Coalition in South Africa: The Making of the South African Sexual Offences Act, 2007".
14. Sarah Phillips (2011) "Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State".
15. Eduard Grebe & Minka Woermann (2011) "Institutions of Integrity and the Integrity of Institutions: Integrity and Ethics in the Politics of Developmental Leadership".
16. Andrew Rosser, Ian Wilson & Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (2011) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The politics of free public services in decentralised Indonesia"
17. Monique Theron (2011) "African Trends and Transformation: The Profiles of Sub-Saharan African Executive Heads of State since Independence".
18. Laura Brannelly, Laura Lewis & Susy Ndaruhutse (2011) "Learning and Leadership: Exploring the Linkages between Higher Education and Developmental Leadership".
19. Monique Theron (2012) "Emerging and Non-Emerging African Countries: A Statistical Exploration of the Leadership Factor".
20. Iván Égido, Friedhelm Guttandin, Gustavo López, Jana Leutner, Ulrich Müller, Lena Lázaro (2012)



“Between Hope and Resignation: Perceptions and practices of politics and leadership among the poor in southern South America”.

21. Caryn Peiffer (2012) “From Islands of Integrity to Understanding the Politics of Corruption Reduction: Phase One - Statistical identification of positive outliers”.

## **Background Papers**

1. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2007) “Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The case for leadership and the primacy of politics in building effective states, institutions and governance for sustainable growth and social development”.
2. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2008) “The Politics of Institutional Indigenization: leaders, elites and coalitions in building appropriate and legitimate institutions for sustainable growth and social development”.
3. Heather Lyne de Ver (2008) “Leadership Politics and Development: A Literature Survey”.
4. Heather Lyne de Ver (2009) “Conceptions of Leadership”.
5. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2010) “The Leadership Program: Overview & Objectives”.
6. Adrian Leftwich (2010) “An Overview of the Research in Progress for the Leadership Program: Developmental Leaders, Elites and Coalitions”.
7. Isabelle van Notten (2010) “Integrity, Leadership, Women’s Coalitions and the Politics of Institutional Reform. Bringing Agency Back In. Mid-Term Workshop Report, Cape Town 25-26 May 2010”.
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The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) addresses an important gap in international thinking and policy about the critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of development. This growing program brings together government, academic and civil society partners from around the world to explore the role of human agency in the processes of development. DLP will address the policy, strategic and operational implications of 'thinking and working politically' - for example, about how to help key players solve collective action problems, forge developmental coalitions, negotiate effective institutions and build stable states.

The Developmental Leadership Program

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