



DLP

Policy and Practice for Developmental
Leaders, Elites and Coalitions

DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

POLITICS, LEADERSHIP AND COALITIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

Policy Implications of the DLP Research Evidence

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Background Papers



The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) addresses an important gap in international thinking and policy about the critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of development. This growing program brings together business, academic and civil society partners from around the world to explore the role of human agency in the processes of development. DLP will address the policy, strategic and operational implications of 'thinking and working politically' - for example, about how to help key players solve collective action problems, forge developmental coalitions, negotiate effective institutions and build stable states.

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Introduction

This document has been prepared for the DLP Research Policy Workshop, held on 10-11 March, 2011 in Frankfurt. It consists of all the Executive Summaries from the first phase of research of the DLP, plus an introductory analysis.

The fuller and more detailed research papers, on which these Executive Summaries are based, may all be found (or shortly will be available) on the DLP website at: www.dlprog.org

This document would not have been possible without the help of a number of people. So we would like, first, to thank all the researchers for their hard work in preparing both these Executive Summaries and their final research papers. In addition, invaluable help in refining these Summaries has been provided by Sue Martin and Isabelle van Notten, while Heather Lyne de Ver has supervised the preparation of this document.

Appreciation of the work done to arrange the workshop must also be extended to our partner, the **Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)** and, especially, Julia Langendorf, Dr Ulrich Mueller and Manuel Neumann, and also to Liz Coventry of Stantons International in Perth, Australia, and Philippa Davies of AusAID, Canberra.

Thinking and Working Politically

What does it mean, why is it important and how do you do it?

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Introduction

The purpose of this short note is:

- To frame the presentations that follow
- To suggest ways we might usefully conceptualise what it means to think and work politically in a developmental context, where development is understood as the processes which shape and reform locally appropriate and legitimate institutions that promote sustainable economic growth, foster political stability, enhance progress on key issue areas (such as gender, service delivery or emissions reduction) and facilitate inclusive social development, at national and sub-national levels.
- To outline some of the preliminary findings about the role of leadership, politics and coalitions in development as a platform for the central question of the workshop: how research evidence can be transformed into policy, programme and operational messages.

This note unpacks the idea of '*thinking politically*' by summarising some of the working assumptions and building blocks of the DLP's research and it suggests how we might think about '*working politically*'.¹ The paper closes by indicating some of the emerging findings about what makes for an effective politics of development and reform and hence leads to the central question for the workshop – what policy, programme and operational implications flow from this evidence?

Politics, as the term is used in the DLP, does not refer simply or solely to national level 'state-centric' activities about who's in or out, up or down, winning or losing, in and around the 'government'. Rather, we detach the idea of politics from its very narrow conventional and everyday association with the sites and activities of 'the government' and the 'state', and the competitive electoral and other processes involved when groups compete for power. Instead, while politics is certainly at the core of those processes, we understand politics as an activity to be a much wider and more general phenomenon. It consists of the pervasive and unavoidable (and necessary²) activities of conflict, negotiation and compromise involved wherever and whenever human beings in groups have to take decisions about how resources are to be used, produced and distributed. This is not confined to the so-called public domain but extends to

¹ Thinking around this issue has benefitted greatly from the DLP association with the Asia Foundation.

² Only the most optimistic of Marxists and some religious believers envisage a human society where there will be 'the end of politics'. For some, a society of government dominance and its 'political rule over men' will be transformed into the simple politics-free 'administration of things', in Engels' words (Engels, 1877/1958:123).

all spheres of collective human life – in federations, firms and families; in businesses, schools, NGOs and churches, and to all the complex relations between them. All politics takes place in a more-or-less structured context, constituted by both formal and informal institutional contexts of constraints and opportunities, and by relations of power. Some institutional environments are relatively stable contexts, while others are insecure and shifting rapidly, or may consist of multiple (and sometimes) conflicting institutional forms. All parties to an issue bring different ideas, interests and preferences, and forms and degrees of power. Politics occurs at national governmental level and at village level, but also in sectors – like agriculture or health or education; it occurs at local level, and in the private sector as well as in the relations within and amongst organizations of the public, private, sacred and secular sectors.

A fuller paper would have to cover a very wide field – ranging from the principles and practices of the variety of approaches and schools in political analysis and methods to questions about whether bilateral or multilateral agencies in the international community are capable of working politically and whether they have the workforce to do it – and much more. But in this short paper I shall seek to summarise some key issues by way of a series of points and questions which may help us to focus on the policy implications of our work. In doing so, I hope also to indicate how some quite complicated theoretical and explanatory issues in political science and political theory can be made *relevant and usable* for the understanding and promotion of human development, and how understanding them is a key condition of both thinking and working politically.

‘Thinking Politically’ (about development) – What does it mean?

A number of elements, assumptions and propositions make up the mind-set that underpins ‘thinking politically’ – and the evidence to support this is contained not only in the research findings of the DLP but in much other work as well.

1. The first element in thinking politically is the recognition that **politics matters** crucially for developmental outcomes at all levels and in all sectors. There is nothing especially original in this view.³ The scientific evidence is overwhelming. Informally, policy-makers have understood this for more than 20 years and have discussed it – quietly – over coffee and in corridors.⁴ However, it is now widely admitted, and publicly so, amongst thoughtful policy-makers. It is, for instance, unequivocally stated in the most recent DFID synthesis of its funded governance/politics research (DFID, 2010) over the last decade. But although there is now acknowledgement of the critical importance of politics, and although some effort has been given to devising ‘tools’ for political analysis, the main bilateral and multilateral donors have not given much attention to formulating practical policies, strategies and practices for *working* politically.

It follows that equally thoughtful policy-makers ask the question: so what? What do we do about it? How do we operationalise insights and evidence about the centrality of politics? What do we do on Monday? **This is the key question which the DLP in its work is hoping to help answer** with its focus on the role of agency – leaders, elites and coalitions.

2. The second element is the important qualifier - **not by politics alone**. In short, effective and sustained development and change does not happen successfully by politics *alone*. Technical, administrative and practical components – as well as political processes - are just as essential for the successful building and maintenance of a deep tube-well or a waste management system, as for the establishment and

³ It is a view about human society that can be traced back to Confucius in the East and Aristotle in the West.

⁴ In its earliest manifestation, recognition of the importance of politics was expressed as an interest in ‘governance’, largely to avoid the p-word.

consolidation of a constitution or a piece of legislation concerning rights, gender inequalities, health and safety, or institutional reform concerning, say, competition or aviation policy. Both political and technical dimensions are central to developmental outcomes. There is no technical solution to a problem without a political solution; and the resolution of political problems will always require technical support and implementation (for instance in drafting water-tight legislation or regulations to an Act).

3. Third, it follows that, if one is taking politics seriously, **agency matters**. By 'agency' is meant the choices, decisions and actions of individuals, groups and organizations and, in particular, their leaders and 'elites'.⁵ They have the potential to change things. Just as structures (institutions, rules, cultural norms) have 'causal power' (that is, they have power to influence what we do), so too do agents, though their causal power is different (Archer, 2003). Recognising the importance of agency in thinking politically is influenced by the interesting literature on the relationship between structure and agency in social theory and political science, but it is also influenced by what we observe empirically (in every day events) and from the research evidence.

It is also noteworthy how little attention is given to the role of agency in much of the developmental literature and policy announcements. Apart from appeals to the need for 'ethical' leadership or 'developmental integrity',⁶ the emphasis in the policy literature is on supporting, recommending and sometimes insisting on 'structural' or 'institutional' solutions for a wide range of development problems, not on agents or agency or on the political processes which shape the design and content of institutions. Of course institutions matter. But if one accepts that structural and cultural factors do not woodenly 'determine' how people behave, and that it is people who both (a) make or reform institutions and (b) also implement and make them work, or not as the case may be, then there must be 'room for *manoeuvre*', that is for 'agency'. It is not without significance that one of the DLP research papers has the word 'manoeuvre' as the central active word in its excellent title – '*Manoeuvres for a low carbon state*' (Harrison and Kostka, 2011 and in this document). They use the term to describe how sub-national leaders in China and India operate politically in very different political and institutional environments – where the 'room for manoeuvre' is different - to achieve emissions reduction targets. That 'room' is filled by what has been called the 'properties and powers' of agents themselves (Archer, 2003: 1). While all agency (like politics) occurs within structural contexts, which contain both constraints and opportunities, the evidence from DLP research and elsewhere is that agents (people and their organizations, leaders and followers alike) act in different ways within those contexts and can make a considerable difference. Moreover, people think, strategise, intend and attempt to resolve problems in different ways in the same contexts.

From the point of view of thinking politically about the role of agency in development, what therefore matters is:

- (a) How and under what conditions do *developmental agents* emerge (and in particular leaders at all levels and in all sectors), rather than predatory or corrupt ones?
- (b) How they can be helped to emerge?
- (c) What factors shape the success of their efforts?

5 The key concepts of 'elite', 'politics', 'leadership' and 'coalitions' - and others - as we use them in the DLP, are defined on the website at : <http://www.dlprog.org/contents/about-us/our-core-focus/key-concepts.php>

6 This is discussed in one of the DLP research papers (Woermann and Grebe, 2011).

These, too, have been key questions of the DLP research and for which some important answers are emerging.

4. Fourth, **leadership matters**. There is now some acknowledgement of this. For instance, Michael Spence (the economics Nobel Laureate), and David Brady (2010: 1) pointed out in their synthesis of the work of the Commission on Growth and Development that the evidence from the country studies showed that politics and leadership 'were centrally important ingredients in the story'.⁷ Yet, despite a considerable literature on 'leadership' (predominantly in the corporate context, from where there have been efforts to leverage it out into the developmental context), there has been little serious attention given to analysing the role of leadership – as agency – in the politics of development, and even less to the factors that make for 'ethical' leadership or 'developmental integrity'. The LDP has a number of papers on this, all available on the website at www.dlprog.org

What they show – and what the evidence from other DLP research findings also shows – is that if we are to *think politically* about leadership we should **not** think about 'leaders' in the 'great man or woman of history' tradition, focussing on an individual – though individuals matter and can make a difference (consider and contrast Pol Pot, Nelson Mandela, Muhammad Yunus). Rather, thinking politically about leadership requires treating and analysing it as a process, a political process, which involves mobilising people and resources in support of a particular goal or goals. An individual leader may matter, but the extent to which s/he is able to pursue a 'vision' (of a material and concrete developmental kind) and promote the achievement of a goal will depend very much on his/her capacity to mobilise an alliance or coalition of other people, organizations or interests in support of that goal, whether good or bad. And it will also depend critically on the structure of constraints and opportunities they face in the institutional and political context; the interests, strength and nature of the political opposition; the strategies they adopt; the networks they exploit; and the manner in which their tactics and communications are 'framed'. That's politics. The evidence from the DLP research – and other academic studies – is overwhelming on this point.

For instance, the very different strategies adopted by the leaderships in the Indonesian case study (Rosser, et al., 2011, and in this document), and the factors that shaped their strategies and the outcomes, illustrate not only the salience of leadership, as a key agential variable for developmental results, but also how the interaction of structure and agency should always be at the core of how we think and understand politically.

The final point here, of course, is that the 'leadership' issue is often closely identified (as the Commission and Growth and Development did) with the narrowly *political* leadership at the national, governmental or regime level. That is far too limiting a view – and the role of leadership at sub-national levels, in the private sector, in organizations and NGOs and in functional sectors or issue areas is just as important for developmental outcomes.

5. Fifth, **coalitions matter**. Elsewhere coalitions have been described as 'central to the everyday politics of all societies and ... fundamental for security, state building, economic growth and political stability' (Leftwich, 2009: 15). This is clearly crucial in developmental contexts. Developmental agents,⁸ or developmental leaders, as with predatory ones, seldom can or do work on their own on the 'great

⁷ They point out that in each of 13 'growth states', as they call the successful economic performers, leaderships chose growth models, built coalitions and established a stable political environment in which policy choices could bear economic fruit.

⁸ Which are sometimes referred to as 'reform agents', 'development entrepreneurs' (Faustino and Fabella, forthcoming) and 'institutional entrepreneurs' (Pierson, 2004).

man or woman of history' model of leadership or agency. Minka Woermann and Ed Grebe (2011) in their research on 'developmental integrity' for the DLP refer to this latter model as the 'agential model' and counter-poses it to their preferred and more realist conception of leadership as 'systemic'. The 'systemic' model points to effective leadership as a collective process of mobilising people and resources. The mobilization may be for developmental ends, or it may be for rather more predatory and non-developmental ends as in the recent history of Zimbabwe. As Eldred Masunungure and Michael Bratton have shown in their work (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011, and in this document) the story of the Zimbabwean tragedy is not the story of Mr Mugabe alone. In all the DLP research, and at all levels – from China to Cape Town – the really very important role of coalitions - both formal and informal, inclusive or narrow - of individuals and organizations in the politics of development (or its opposite) has become very clear.

6. And here is an important link to another key element in thinking politically about development. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that overcoming **collective action problems** constitutes one of the major challenges of development. Collective action problems are best understood as those pervasive problem situations in which people or groups with diverse (and often competing) interests find it hard to agree on an institutional or organizational arrangement from which they would all benefit and without which they would all be worse off. Work from almost all the research papers shows how coalitions (formal or informal) represent a crucial *political mechanism* for the resolution of such problems. As Sarah Phillips shows in her paper on Yemen (Phillips, 2011, and in this document), the failure to build a sufficiently inclusive coalition across a major divide appears to be the single most important factor explaining the inability of Yemen elites and leaders to resolve a series of critical economic, political and social problems facing that country. While there are complex structural issues here, it is also clear from this work on Yemen – and indeed all the other research of the DLP – that agency is critical, and that understanding how agents have interacted with structures helps to explain when, where, whether and how difficult collective action problems have been resolved.
7. It follows from this that thinking politically - and especially about the role of agency - requires us to focus on and **understand the micro-politics** of the phenomenon with which we are concerned. Understanding the structural and institutional contexts, and what is loosely called the 'political economy' is important, of course. But for working politically, there is simply no alternative to understanding, in detail, who the players are, what they do, where they come from, their organizational affiliations, networks, ideologies and interests and the political dynamics of the issue or sector. Detailed political ethnography is needed.

What stands out from all the DLP research papers is the grip which each of the research teams have had on the micro-politics of their cases. The detailed analysis by Eldred Masunungure and Mike Bratton (2011) of the anatomy of the Zimbabwean regime; the fine-grained grasp of the inner workings of Yemeni regime in Sarah Phillips' work (2011); the deep understanding of the detail of the Egyptian, Jordanian and South African women's coalitions in the work of Rebecca Hodes and Mariz Tadros and their teams (Hodes et al, 2011 and this document; Tadros, 2011 and this document); the work by Genia Kostka and Tom Harrison (2011 and this document) on emissions reduction politics in India and China, and Andrew Rosser's team's analysis of service delivery in 4 Indonesian districts (Rosser, et al., 2011 and this document), all illustrate the critical importance of understanding the micro-politics. Many (though not all⁹) of the existing 'tools' or frameworks for political analysis circulating in the international community, have a predominantly structural, institutional and macro-level

⁹ An interesting example of the attempt to systematise an analytical framework for making sense of sectoral micro-politics is by Moncrieffe and Luttrell (2005).

focus, which are not calibrated to pick up the detailed politics of each case.¹⁰ More often than not, the analyses undertaken through these frameworks are quick and, consequently, while they often provide a useful orientation to the broad political, economic and institutional contexts, they seldom reach an understanding of the **detailed inner politics of regimes, sector or issue areas**. Yet, where reform and development are concerned, where agency comes into its own, this is fundamental, especially when it comes to 'working politically'.

8. Thought it may be implicit in what has gone before, it is important to stress that the notion of politics used here, and our interest in the role of leaders and coalitions in institutional reform and innovation for development, is not confined to the national or central level of analysis. Thinking politically about development applies at all levels, from village to the top and across sectors. Research done by the DLP, for example in both the present and earlier phases (as well as work done by the Asia Foundation) has focussed on many of these.¹¹ In these cases, both successful and unsuccessful outcomes have been explained with reference to the structural context, the path dependent historical legacies and the political environment by focussing critically on the way in which agents (individual and organizations) have interacted with those structural properties, manoeuvred politically, built on networks, forged coalitions and both framed and strategized their campaigns or practices.
9. Finally, thinking politically means recognising that **processes are just as important as projects** in development and change, and that their evolution and forms, and their institutional expression, will vary from context to context and will require both support and time to consolidate. Respecting, supporting and encouraging local leaderships in the endogenous shaping or reform of institutions that promote positive developmental outcomes, represents the bridge that links thinking politically to working politically.

'Working Politically': What does it mean?

There is understandable caution and reserve about the idea of 'working politically', or for donors trying to address 'the political dimensions of development' – and for good reason. The phrase itself is easily misinterpreted as insensitive interference, as an invasion of sovereignty and a disregard for principles of ownership and endogenously driven developmental processes. It may sound like 'regime change'. Given those many cases of bullying or intervention by conditionality of the international community in developing countries, there is good reason for such caution, as the very idea of working politically might seem to suggest a flagrant violation of the principles of Accra and Paris.

To make clear that this is not the meaning or intention, a preliminary definition may be useful. Working politically in development means supporting, brokering, facilitating and aiding the emergence and practices of developmental or reform leaderships, organizations, networks and coalitions, in the public and private fields, at all levels, and across all sectors, in response to, and in concert with, initiatives and requests from local individuals and groups. It means **investing in processes** designed to support the formation and effectiveness of developmental coalitions, sometimes over long periods, committed to institutional reform and innovation by enhancing not just technical skills (the conventional domain of capacity building) but also the political capacity of organizations in areas such as negotiation, advocacy, communication and the generation of constructive policy options. It may involve supporting processes which lead to 'political settlements' whether these be at the macro-levels or in specific policy sectors

¹⁰ These include Drivers of Change, Political Economy Analysis, Power Analysis, Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGA-CA). For reviews of these approaches see AusAID (September, 2010) and Haider and Rao (2010) and DFID (July, 2009).

¹¹ See earlier research papers on Botswana, Mauritius, the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa, all available in the Publications section of the DLP website at: <http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/>

(for example education or agriculture).

Working politically can be about very prosaic but important matters: helping groups campaign for waste management systems or feeder roads; or it may involve 'strengthening broad-based and democratically run national education coalitions, with active membership across the country, to enable local voices and experiences to influence national-level policy and practice' as in the case of the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF), funded by DFID but *managed* by Oxfam, Save the Children and Action Aid (CEF, 2009). It may involve rethinking and re-working scholarship and higher educational support programmes so that they supplement a technical and skills focus with strategies that help to build networks, encourage the understanding of collective action problems and the importance of the provision of public goods.¹²

Working politically will take different forms in different countries, contexts, issue areas or sectors. It will require deep and detailed knowledge of the country, the sector, the issue area and the 'players'; it will require respectful and sensitive understanding of the local political dynamics and cultural norms; it will require long-term exposure to the country or issue concerned; it will require more social scientists and a well-trained, politically savvy workforce, both local and international, with the capacity to 'read' the politics, and knowing when and how to seize opportunities.

Working politically, in other words, directs attention, support and facilitation to the agents of reform and development – the leaders and the organizations – so as to invest in the local processes that will help resolve collective action and other problems through the work of alliances and coalitions and hence drive the formation and consolidation of the locally appropriate, feasible and legitimate institutions that are most likely to advance development outcomes.

Some Preliminary Findings

What evidence has emerged about the factors that shape the emergence, activities and relative success or failure of developmental leaderships and coalitions? Here is a provisional and preliminary list of some emerging findings

- Developmental leaderships and coalitions often emerge in response to a critical juncture – a threat, a challenge or a danger – or a new opportunity.
- Seizing the moment to initiate a reform or campaign can be critical and hence 'reading' the politics so as to be able to identify such 'openings' or opportunities is important.
- What matters is whether leaders have the capacity to respond and seize the opportunities. Do they have the knowledge, vision, prior experience and networks that will facilitate and shape such a response?
- This ability to exploit existing or new opportunities is important. For instance, democratisation and decentralization in Indonesia provided *bupati* considerable openings to adopt different strategies of service delivery. A similar opening occurred in South Africa after democratization.
- Prior or existing networks often facilitate the formation of developmental coalitions in unfolding situations of this kind.
- Prior knowledge and experience of 'working politically' extends and enriches the tactical and strategic repertoire of such leaders and elites.

¹² The DLP has commissioned a long-range study of the relationship between investment in higher education and good governance (Brannelly, et al, 2011, and this document).

- 'Well-educated' and – sometimes – well connected individuals regularly play an important part in directing and driving coalitions for reform.
- There is some evidence from this research and from elsewhere (Brannelly, Lewis and Ndaruhutse, 2011, and this document) to suggest that experience of higher education is a critical factor in the emergence of developmental leadership, in both the public and private spheres. More work is needed and has been commissioned by the DLP on this, where the hypothesis to be tested will be that there is a positive correlation between higher education and good governance as mediated by developmental leaders and elites or, to put it slightly differently, does higher education have a role to play in facilitating the emergence of developmental leaders and elites?
- How leaders and coalitions 'frame' their campaigns, strategies and communication can turn out to be very important, as the evidence from the South African, Jordanian and Egyptian women's coalitions demonstrates.
- Likewise, depending on the structural (political and institutional) context, strategic decisions about whether and to what extent to campaign publicly for institutional change, or whether to exploit 'contacts' and engage in 'backstairs' politics, can turn out to be decisive.
- The salience of the issue to enough people plays a significant part in influencing the level of support which developmental leaders or coalitions can expect and mobilise.
- The position of the central government on the issue can shape strategy but also influence outcomes.
- Identifying individuals within the government apparatus, or departments of state, that may be more amenable, sympathetic or simply appropriate for pressure and/or dialogue is a necessary political skill. Knowing where and how to connect with them is important.
- The nature, position, power and networks of the opposition to a reform initiative will influence both strategy and outcomes.
- Drawing on previous experience and/or learning from external experience, and adapting it to local contexts, can give sophistication, appropriateness and sharpness to a reform coalition.
- The character and conditionality of funding by donors or supporters can make or break a coalition. Are tight conditions applied? Are funding arrangements transparent?
- The internal organization of a coalition committed to reform is important. Are procedures and financial arrangements transparent? Are roles and responsibilities clear, understood and accepted?
- How does the size of a coalition affect its effectiveness? Is there a trade-off between inclusiveness and effectiveness?
- Does a coalition share a common vision, programme and commitment, or is its programme a compromise between a number of interests and ideas, reducing the area of agreement to the lowest common denominator?
- How does a coalition 'navigate' between the formal and informal institutional environments?

When it comes to some of the measures of success of reform coalitions, and indeed what their goals may be, there are at least four that deserve mention.¹³ Coalitions can be successful with respect to

- Achieving a specific policy goal (e.g. getting a law changed)
- Opening up debate on an issue that had hitherto been taboo

¹³ We owe these insights to Amanda Tattersall (2010).

- Deepening and strengthening the coalition's internal organization and relationships for future purposes
- Increasing the capacity of constituent organizations

Each of these is a legitimate objective of a coalition and all contribute to the political processes and experience that drive the endogenous politics of developmental reforms.

Conclusion: What is to be done?

This short paper stops where the discussion of the workshop should begin. It has sought to distil briefly at least some of the common findings that have emerged from the research. The rich detail of each of these research papers is summarised in the Summaries which follow. These are the Executive Summaries of the full papers.

If the approach outlined about what it means to think and work politically has any value, and if the emerging findings about where developmental leaderships and coalitions come from and what seems to make for their relative success are useful points, then three questions are central for our discussions:

- What are the policy, programme and operational implications for the international community of both official and non-official aid agencies?
- Do the bilateral and multi-lateral agencies have the capacity or work-force to work politically in support of developmental agents and coalitions?
- If they don't, then who can, and how?

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Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State

Sarah Phillips

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Executive Summary

When the Chinese revolutionary leader, Zhou Enlai, was asked about the impact of the French Revolution of 1789, he allegedly quipped “it is too soon to say.” As Yemen and the Middle East experience major shifts in early 2011 it is important to examine the underlying drivers of these changes. This paper looks behind the scenes at the Yemeni regime’s opaque internal politics and at the nature of the neo-patrimonial system that it has entrenched over the past 32 years. Yemen is at a critical juncture, and the calculations and strategies of the country’s key actors may shift rapidly and on the basis of unpredictable factors, but it is important to keep in mind that deeply patrimonial systems are not transformed overnight.

This paper offers an analysis of that system and the dynamics that have brought Yemen to this critical juncture. It asks why the leaders and elites of some countries are so ineffective in addressing serious threats to the viability of their states and to the wellbeing of their citizens? Is failure primarily attributable to individual leaders – that is, to agency – or are leaders and elites constrained by structural factors beyond their control? How important are external actors?

Yemen is facing a series of deepening economic and political challenges, including declining oil reserves, budget shortfalls, civil conflict, a burgeoning civil protest movement, foreign military intervention, pervasive poverty, and an increasingly aggressive militant jihadi movement. Theory suggests that such threats often provoke the formation of developmental elites and coalitions, but to date this has not occurred in Yemen.

This paper considers what the situation in Yemen tells us about domestic and international impediments to reform in developing states. It examines the relations between the structures and agents that constitute the Yemeni polity to try to determine:

- Why Yemeni elites have been unwilling and/or unable to take effective action against the threats facing the state and that, therefore, simultaneously threaten their individual survival as elites?
- Whether this failure is primarily a matter of decisions and preferences that elites make as human agents, or a function of structural and institutional circumstances beyond their control?
- Whether these actors perceive that the threats are not serious enough to warrant systemic change and, if so, the basis for this perception.

Methodology


This qualitative study combines data gathered from semi-structured questionnaires of political actors within Yemen, interviews with Western donors and local actors, government records, media reports, and observations made during several years of previous field research. With a few notable exceptions it was not possible to interview members of the regime's 'inner circle'. This study has therefore used the observations of other elites, analysts, and the regime's public record of behaviour to determine the reasons for its apparent unwillingness to act against the threats that have built against the state for the past several years.

Key Players and Yemen's power elite

As in many developing polities, the most noteworthy feature of Yemen's formal institutions is their relative lack of salience compared to informal institutions. This study examines four main groups:

- Yemen's 'regime' (an informal network of elites, predominantly tribal and military personalities, whose interests are considered on an ad-hoc and fluid basis by President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his inner circle in political decisions)
- The regime's 'inner circle'
- The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) (Opposition coalition party)
- The General People's Congress (GPC) (Governing party)

Figure 1



- The most important players in the Yemeni system are the regime's **inner circle**, a power elite of approximately 50 people that surround President Ali Abdullah Saleh, drawn from his family and tribe – the Sanhan. Members who serve as military commanders are well known to the Yemeni public, but the rest of this group are shrouded of secrecy.
- Expanding outwards from this core group are the fluid networks that constitute **the Yemeni regime**, starting with highly influential tribal elites that may still be considered part of the regime's core.
- Significantly further down in this hierarchy of political influence are **the technocrats and political party elite**. Players in the system, their interests are not considered critical to the regime's decision-making processes and they are therefore unlikely to be able to drive a process of systemic reform.

The Rules of the Game- the Yemeni patronage system

- The Yemeni patronage system constitutes the basis of the political settlement between the elites outside the inner circle. Without a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the inner circle needs to complement its coercive power with the ability to co-opt, divide, reward, and punish other elites through patronage.
- The rules of the game are based on the inclusion of relevant elites and the exclusion of others, perpetuating the ability of elites to capture wealth, generate further rents, and distribute benefits on a discretionary basis (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009: 38). The system is highly inclusive of elites, because patronage politics are so much more relevant in determining political influence and resource allocation than are the country's formal institutions.
- To be included, a person or group must be able to demonstrate their relevance to the maintenance of the political status quo. This is an ongoing negotiation, and those who fail lose their positions within the system. Not all elites are included equally or permanently and the system is not open to those whom the regime does not consider influential within a given constituency.
- With some important exceptions, most members are not individually influential in key political decisions, but are included as a means of maintaining stability, regional diversity, and to prevent elites from challenging the regime's inner circle.
- These informal mechanisms are critical to the regime's ability to contain violence and maintain its centralised rule but also limit competition, economic growth and the regime's incentives to enforce the rule of law.

Structural Impediments to Change

The fact that so many people are enmeshed in the patronage system suggests that the structural constraints facing Yemeni elites are, in fact, the sum total of the agents who maintain the system. However, several political and economic structures form the basis for these individuals' beliefs about what is politically possible, including:

- **Historical coincidence.** In the 1970s and 80s, north Yemen was largely a remittance-based economy. At the same time as almost one million Yemeni workers were expelled from the Gulf as punishment for Yemen's stance on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the country's oil exports began to increase dramatically. The balance of power rapidly switched from a remittance-rich (and therefore relatively autonomous) citizenry and a poor state, to a poor (and relatively economically dependent) citizenry and an oil-rich state (Clark, 2010: 139). This shift was reflected in the renegotiation of the political settlement, favouring the regime rather than Yemeni social forces.

- **Ongoing access to external rent.** The implicit message from Western donors and Yemen's neighbours is that Yemen poses too serious a security threat to be allowed to descend into chaos, and that the regime must be supported politically and economically against that outcome. For example, in 2009, Saudi Arabia made a direct payment of \$US2.2 billion to the Yemeni president, and the United Arab Emirates followed suit with a payment of \$US700 million. This makes the total known to have been received by the regime in direct support around 70 percent of what Yemen earned from oil exports when revenues peaked in 2008. In this context, the depletion of oil revenues appears far less threatening, and the perceived need for the regime to plan for a post-rentier economy greatly reduced.
- **Hasty and inclusive political settlements.** Yemen's political settlements have been hastily forged, and are highly inclusive of elites. It suggests that the higher the level of inclusiveness in a political settlement, the lower the common denominator between its constituents can be, making it more difficult to negotiate changes to the status quo. Instead, the political settlements become geared towards the distribution of rents and favours, with dissent focused on that rather than on development issues.

Agential Impediments to Change

There is a divide between Yemen's formal political and technocratic elite (irrespective of party membership), and the power elite (President Saleh and his inner circle), regarding the perceptions of threat facing the country:

- The formal elite perceive the most fundamental cause of Yemen's problems in strongly agential terms.
- 75 percent of questionnaire participants nominated "leadership" as the cause of Yemen's most serious problems, with a further six percent nominating it as one of the causes. President Saleh is thus seen as the primary cause of the government's malaise.
- The collective belief that Yemen faces a serious crisis suggests that the president's preference for tone-deaf yes-men over the political and technocratic advisors that he once favoured has left him without a nuanced understanding of the changes underway in Yemeni society.
- In seeking to cement a power-hierarchy that protects the political settlement of the inner-circle, the regime has little agility to deal with scenarios that do not fit within its narrow model of expected behaviours. If society deviates from that model, the institutions built by the regime are poorly equipped to adapt to it.
- Structural restrictions are perceived to be tight for those outside the regime's inner circle, but the room for agency within it is perceived to be high.

President Saleh is seen as largely unconstrained by his circumstances and it is widely held that he could decisively alter the country's political and economic trajectory if that was his goal.

President Saleh's position

President Saleh may have less freedom to make changes than is assumed, since he is structurally constrained by a collective action problem within his inner circle:

- Lacking constitutional or legitimate power, the biggest threat the inner circle faces is the possibility of changes to the predatory and collusive rules of the game from which they all individually benefit.

- Their collective perception is that their interests are better served by maintaining the economic status quo. This paper details several instances of apparently intentional sabotage against Yemen's prospects for economic growth.
- If the president were to increase his reliance on the rule of law to foster private investment and economic growth, the inner circle would forgo their short-term financial interests and risk becoming less politically relevant to the president in the longer term.
- President Saleh, therefore, exercises almost absolute control when maintaining the status quo that benefits his inner circle, but is constrained in his ability to implement reforms that would disrupt the political settlement that keeps the group together.
- This presents a clear problem for him if the political environment changes rapidly and unpredictably, as it has in the fallout from the uprising in Egypt. Yemen's political settlement is built to maintain the status quo, but if things change and the status quo becomes untenable it is not equipped with significant feedback mechanisms to monitor and respond to that change.

Messages for policy makers

- **Yemen needs change more than stability.** The political settlement in Yemen is in a dysfunctional equilibrium that exacerbates economic malaise and cycles of violence. Change is already underway, and its direction is being widely debated within Yemen, among both average Yemenis and elites. The notion that stability can be achieved simply by reinforcing the regime seems disingenuous to many in the country.
- **Understand the disconnections between problems and solutions.** The regime's inner circle (the informal state) dominates political decision-making and resource allocation. However, Western donors expect the government (the formal state, not empowered by the regime to make major changes) to deliver systemic changes in exchange for greater support. Such disconnections can also be seen at local level, where donor interventions often prioritise aggrieved tribal communities at the expense of the traditional commercial centres, where levels of entrepreneurship and education are highest, and the likelihood of facilitating national economic regeneration is greatest, particularly in the governorate of Ta'izz (see below).
- **Directly engage Yemen's inner circle.** President Saleh and his inner circle could conceivably lead a process of systemic reform if they collectively perceive genuine change to be in their self-interests. At the time of writing, this perception was uncertain, but as foment spreads throughout the Arab world, their calculations may shift, presenting reformists with an opportunity. The challenge is to access the inner circle directly, and then to persuade them that change is as inevitable as it is in their longer-term interests. Their actions to date do not suggest that they see such incentives. Opening these lines of communication needs to be a priority.
- **Use narratives from Tunisia and Egypt.** The recent political upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt provide an obvious narrative for donors to use in encouraging Yemen's power elite to think about its longer-term self-preservation.
- **Invest in commercial incentives.** The regime could reduce the political hurdles that currently impede investors – such as the insistence that they partner with members of the inner circle, or the unwritten requirement that they evade taxation in order to be competitive – in exchange for their ability to deliver economic growth. With the level of risk facing investors in mind, donors might attempt to shift the balance of economic power towards society by offering venture capital insurance programs for local private investors who are willing to risk investing in Yemeni projects. Stimulating economic development in this manner is a long-term process, but should be part of a package aimed to

develop the greater interdependence of Yemen's merchants with Yemen's political leadership.

- **Donors should consider prioritising the search for economic opportunities in areas that have a history of a production-based economy**, rather than focussing assistance so tightly on the areas where al-Qa'ida has gained traction but which are detached from nationwide commerce. The study looks at the governorate of Ta'izz as an example of how to identify players that are most likely to represent interests that would benefit from a developmentally inclined system of governance.
- **Direct engagement at the highest levels with Saudi Arabia will have to be part of the strategy**, to stem the disincentives to deep reform. Such engagement will need to be conducted at the highest diplomatic levels to have the necessary weight, and to some extent this is already occurring.
- **International legitimacy is a bargaining chip**. Without international legitimacy, President Saleh is less valuable to his inner circle, and may become more vulnerable to a coup if they fear that their wealth and status are consequently under threat. International legitimacy is thus an Achilles heel for President Saleh, which makes the West's policy options look quite different to the ones currently being pursued, in which the Yemeni regime is to be 'stabilised'.

The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980-2010

Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure

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Executive Summary

This essay offers an interpretation of the rise and fall of Zimbabwe's political economy through the lens of leadership. Of special interest are the actions of elite coalitions that link political parties, the state bureaucracy, and the security sector. We argue that, in Zimbabwe, a predatory civil-military coalition – even when participating in negotiated political settlements – always placed its own political survival and welfare above broader developmental goals.

Research Questions

The paper addresses two main research questions:

- (a) Why, after independence, did a ruling political elite resort more to predation than development?
- (b) Why, even in the face of a current political and economic crisis, have rival elites failed to forge a common developmental coalition?

Overview of the Argument

In addressing the first question, we show that, in consolidating state power, civilian rulers and their military allies violently suppressed political opposition, engaged in corruption, and challenged the economic interests of commercial farming and business elites. In so doing, leaders undermined the institutions of the state and the rule of law. Politically, they alienated the labor movement and civil society, which went on to form a rival opposition coalition.

Our proposed answer to the second question casts light on the limits of negotiated political settlements. At critical junctures in the country's history – notably at independence in 1980 and with a Global Political Agreement in 2008 – leaders accepted power-sharing arrangements that restricted their freedom of maneuver. Lacking strong leadership commitments, however, the rules underpinning these externally driven, hastily negotiated and reluctantly accepted political settlements in Zimbabwe have never taken root.

Other factors also help to explain Zimbabwe's post-colonial trajectory:

- (a) The inherited structure of a diversified economy enabled an increment of development in the early years of independence. But, by the same token, the legacy of a strong state provided ready-made instruments for repression.
- (b) The political culture of militarized elite, which was forged in the crucible of a national liberation war, led rulers to feel entitled, not only to rule Zimbabwe in perpetuity, but to seize the nation's wealth as they saw fit.

The paper takes the form of an analytic narrative organized chronologically by historical periods. The narrative is framed in terms of key concepts of leadership: namely how elites, as agents operating within inherited structures and negotiated political settlements, form coalitions for development or predation.

The Independence Decade (1980-1989)

At independence, a favorable institutional legacy and an influx of foreign aid enabled the ZANU-PF government led by Robert Mugabe to deliver development benefits to its rural political base. A constitutional settlement imposed by the departing British government and influence from white farming and business elites initially led to moderate economic policies, for instance on land reform. At the same time, the president pardoned political allies involved in corruption scandals in an early signal that that the rule of law would be sacrificed to predation. Indeed, far from concentrating on broad-based economic development, the rulers gave priority to the consolidation of state power by installing party loyalists in the armed forces, civil service and local government. As part of this process, rulers cracked down violently on nationalist rivals in Matabeleland, ultimately absorbing the leaders of PF-ZAPU into the elite coalition.

The Adjustment Decade (1990-1999)

The second decade of independence began with leaders pushing for a de jure one-party state, a move ultimately made unnecessary by ZANU-PF's easy de facto dominance at the polls. The regime grew increasingly intolerant of dissent and ever more willing to use violence as a campaign tool. The party asserted supremacy over the state by politicizing the bureaucracy and army and turning a blind eye to rent-seeking. Yet, faced with deficits and debts, the government had little choice but to accept reforms to structurally adjust Zimbabwe's outdated economy. Under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, the ZCTU reacted with a series of strikes and stay-aways and, in coalition with civic associations bent on constitutional reform, formed the MDC, an opposition party. For his part, Mugabe was only able to hold together his splintering ruling coalition by using unbudgeted state resources to buy off the militant war veterans.

The Crisis Decade (2000-2008)

The millennium marked the onset of Zimbabwe's descent into political terror and economic collapse. The turning point was a constitutional referendum, in which the opposition scored its first electoral victory. The incumbent elite struck back with land invasions, purges of judges, and the mobilization of militias. A Joint Operations Command (JOC) of security chiefs usurped key policy making functions from the Cabinet and the Reserve Bank became a slush fund for the ruling party and armed forces. The predictable results of these ill-advised policies were economic contraction, disintegrating public services,

runaway inflation, and widespread public discontent. After MDC leaders were assaulted at a peaceful rally, external actors from the Southern Africa region stepped up pressure for a political settlement. When a June 2008 presidential election – the most violent in Zimbabwe’s history – was blatantly stolen by Mugabe, SADC forced Zimbabwe’s rival elite coalitions into an awkward power-sharing settlement.

A Period of Transition (2008-present)

The Global Political Agreement (GPA) of September 2008 led to the formation of a transitional “government of national unity” (GNU) in February 2009. This new settlement was no leader’s first choice; both Mugabe and Tsvangirai entered reluctantly. On one hand, the elite accord restored a welcome modicum of peace and economic stability. On the other hand, it papered over key issues, especially how to divide executive power, manage the economy, and ensure civilian control of the armed forces. In practice, the GNU has been unable to implement the central provisions of the GPA, leading to repeated breakdowns in communication and cooperation between President and Prime Minister. The roots of the impasse lie in the Mugabe’s unwillingness to share power and resistance to political reform by senior military elements in the dominant coalition. But the divisions, inexperience and organizational weaknesses of the rival MDC coalition are also to blame.

The Way Forward?

The occurrence of a new political settlement marks a critical juncture in Zimbabwe’s political evolution. Even if flawed, the current power-sharing agreement signals a break in the monopoly of the ZANU-PF party-state and the onset of some sort of regime transition. Over time, the politics of survival have led the decadent ZANU-PF elites into an increasingly narrow coalition, which now constitutes little more than a cabal of 200 or so military and civilian leaders targeted by Western sanctions. MDC leaders appear to have less self-serving and more broadly developmental aspirations. But the constraints of power-sharing – obstacles imposed by incumbents, a prostrate economy, and lukewarm reengagement by international donors – limit the ability of these inexperienced leaders to blossom into a fully-fledged development coalition.

Results and Lessons

- Like developmental leaders, predatory leaders rely on elite coalitions. In the case of Zimbabwe, the top echelons of the ruling party have always been deeply fused with leaders from military and intelligence backgrounds. This legacy from the liberation war carried over into the postcolonial period.
- As governments mismanage the economy, and as patronage resources shrink, so political elites tend to coalesce around a smaller and smaller set of players. In Zimbabwe, a civil-military coalition radiated hostility to all other sectors, including both business and labor. Over time, it contracted inwardly into the very antithesis of a developmental coalition.
- Political settlements that are externally driven by international actors, hastily negotiated under pressure of time, and reluctantly accepted by the principal parties are unlikely to prove durable or legitimate. Such pacts may quell violence in the short run but they are unlikely to resolve the root causes of political conflict over the long term. One lesson of the Global Political Agreement of 2008 in Zimbabwe is that power-sharing agreements imposed from above by international third parties upon unwilling domestic partners are destined for deadlock, even stalemate.
- Narrow settlements that focus on political power sharing alone are less likely to endure than comprehensive settlements that also address the stakeholders’ economic and military interests.

- In a political culture of predation, civil society organizations can sometimes reproduce the pathological characteristics of state organizations. For example, CSOs or opposition political parties may display a founder's syndrome, a lack of leadership accountability, and reliance of rents and patronage. In this regard, civil society is not always a viable source of an alternative developmental coalition.
- Reformers, whether external or internal, are likely to have most influence over political and developmental outcomes during critical junctures. At moments when old political regimes begin to break down, but before a new set of political rules is put in place, there is room for assertive leaders to mobilize people and resources.
- By the same token, the window of opportunity for reform usually opens only for short periods. The beneficiaries of old political and economic regimes, who are loath to abandon structures that have served them well, can be expected to mount rearguard actions to protect privileges. Unless developmental leaders act quickly and decisively, they can soon find themselves hemmed in by familiar obstacles that permit few points of leverage over outcomes.
- There is need for external actors to undertake informed political analysis in order to understand structural, cultural and institutional contexts and to be able to recognize both the limits of the possible and the political opportunities that sometimes present themselves.

Policy Implications

In Zimbabwe in 2010, the international community should consider the following policies:

- Insist on the full implementation of the terms of the 2008 Global Political Agreement.
- Continue to offer "humanitarian plus" aid programs that help improve the conditions of life for ordinary Zimbabweans (mainly through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and NGOs).
- Resist the temptation to back particular leaders or coalitions (i.e. picking winners) but, instead, favor the construction of rules, procedures and institutions.
- Working through the new SADC contact group – South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia – require a free and fair election and a transfer of power to the winner.
- Selectively offer support to civil society organizations, independent media, and democratic political parties that can help ensure that the next national elections are administered freely and fairly. Help build the organizational, professional, analytical, diplomatic and advocacy skills and potentials of these prospective partners.
- Without promising unconditional amnesty to human rights abusers or corrupt predators, provide assurances to ease potential political spoilers out of power.
- Recognizing the West's limited leverage, carefully consider the appropriate time to relax, suspend, or remove targeted sanctions on the ZANU-PF elite. Require prior compliance with a SADC roadmap for political progress toward a durable democratic settlement.

Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and agency in a comparative study of women's coalitions in Egypt and Jordan

Mariz Tadros

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Executive Summary

How can the international community advance gender equality in politically closed and socially conservative contexts through effective support to women's coalitions? This report presents the findings from a study of how six collective initiatives in Egypt and Jordan have formed and worked politically to advance the gender agenda in a number of key areas. The study involved in-depth interviews with coalition leaders and members, donors and locally based gender and development experts.

The key findings from this study are here presented under the following headings:

- Critical overarching themes regarding women's coalitions in politically closed and socially conservative contexts
- Factors that facilitate the formation of coalitions
- Factors that facilitate the relative 'success' of women's coalitions
- Coalition strategies for greater influence
- What donors should avoid doing
- Key elements of effective donor support

Critical overarching themes regarding women's coalitions in politically closed and socially conservative contexts

- Coalitions to advance women's equality are rare in the Middle East, challenged by a restrictive and professionalized political culture that discourages collective forms of agency.
- A constellation of factors, rather than a single factor, accounts for the emergence of coalitions. This constellation includes (but is not restricted to): a cause that touches on people's lives, a politically opportune moment, and local actors that respond by mobilizing to form a collective initiative.
- Given that the space for influencing policy is restricted to a closed circle of elites, it is not the agency of the coalition alone that leads to policy influence. The key finding is that engaging in informal 'backstage' politics is equally, if not more, important than formal channels of engagement in these 'closed' political spaces. Policy influence heavily relies on informal relationships rather than strictly formal

citizen-state engagements. The “formal” faces of advocacy [such as through petitions, conferences and media advocacy] play a secondary role to informal processes in eliciting change, which is often facilitated by informal, backdoor processes of negotiation and mediation between coalition leaders and key players.

- Moreover, informal networks and, often, prior relationships, are crucial for building the internal cohesion of a coalition; and they also help to reduce their vulnerability to external political threat.
- Influential coalitions are those that are able to build formal as well as informal links with the appropriate actors, establish the right kind of image locally and secure the right kind of support from international official and civil society actors.
- In all of the six case studies studied, strong linkages existed between international and national actors, hence highlighting the importance of understanding how international actors can play an enabling role to support coalitions. In five out of six coalitions studied, donors played a critical role at some point in the life of the coalition, in both positive and detrimental ways.

Factors that facilitate the formation of coalitions

- Coalitions for advancing gender equality commonly emerge in ‘openings’ created by some international event or local happening, activity or initiative (including funding).
- Such occasions tend to occur at those times when strict control on participation in political space has been relaxed by the government and hence where women’s leaders recognise the urgency of seizing the opportunity before political spaces are closed again.
- Understanding those openings, ‘seizing the moment’ and defining the realistic limits of the possible is a key political analytical skill required by leaders and donors alike.
- Coalitions sometimes also form in response to perceived threats that are seen to seriously undermine women’s choices.
- Organizations join coalitions because of the incentives to increase their visibility, their networks and their sphere of influence. But they also join coalitions because of fear of social or political marginalization if they do not become part of the “in-group”. Pre-existing social networks between individual leaders commonly form the basis for successful coalition formation.
- The members of these coalitions are very aware that in order to have policy influence they need to rely significantly on the social and political networks that are often based on their common class, professional and educational backgrounds. Without such political and social clout and protection, they can face difficulties in withstanding the often-harsh realities of unpredictable political conditions.
- The availability of foreign funding has served as a major incentive for the participation of different leaders and organizations in collective initiatives and the formation of some coalitions was either facilitated or driven by available funds

Factors that facilitate the *relative ‘success’* of women’s coalitions

- **A legal umbrella:** In the light of the restrictions on freedom of association and freedom on citizen-led collective action in both Jordan and Egypt, having a legal umbrella is crucial for the viability of a coalition’s organizational form and the continuation of its activities.
- **Cultural and national authenticity:** As both countries have politically and culturally complex relationships vis-a-vis the West, the question of positionality (or perceived identity) is as important as

the cause, framing and the timing. The public perception of the cultural and national authenticity of the leaders of a coalition serves to significantly enhance prospects for its success and to facilitate its ability to mobilize wider support for its work. More importantly, it can help to withstand fierce opposition from those who label the members of the coalition as agents of the West.

- **Official and unofficial support:** Successful coalitions are able to combine official support that openly supports their cause, as well as unofficial, informal support from other key figures in the regime or wider society which - if publicly announced - would be counter-productive for the coalition.
- **Framing or avoiding sexuality:** In view of the conservative culture in both Jordan and Egypt, and the particular sensitivities associated with sexual politics, successful coalitions were either able to avoid choosing issues associated with sexuality altogether or were able to frame them in completely different terms.
- **Outmanoeuvring the opposition:** Coalitions are effective when they are able to outmanoeuvre the opposition by appropriate framing and securing support from politically powerful actors.
- **Internal consensus building:** Coalitions are most effective when they are able to withstand fragmentation and ensure a sense of ownership among their leading members through institutionalized internal mechanisms of consensus-building and conflict mediation.

Coalition strategies for greater influence

- Strategies to elicit change through collective action need to be tailored from within, and according to the local context.
- Strategies based on international blueprints are awkward to implement and sometimes backfire. However, local leaders do and can borrow strategies from their exposure to international experiences and ideas, and they learn to adapt them appropriately to local conditions.
- Framing an issue involves not only finding an appropriate way of representing the cause to the outside world, but also ensuring that the 'packaging' of the message is acceptable to the collective leadership.
- Having to deploy multiple framings for multiple audiences means that coalitions have often had to frame their campaigns in a variety of ways to ensure the compatibility of their messages with international conventions or with religiously prescribed frameworks or national constitutions.
- Securing effective engagement with the media, which at times requires securing positive coverage while at other times means maintaining anonymity and protecting the coalition and its activities from media coverage.

What donors and high-level officials should avoid

- **Creating local coalitions themselves:** When international donors seek to 'create' local coalitions, and are seen to do so, these coalitions can often be perceived by the public as 'creatures' of the donors or as being driven by financial or professional incentives rather than commitment to the cause. Their work and legitimacy can hence be severely undermined by questions regarding their integrity and commitment to the cause.
- **Criticizing gender inequality without careful consideration:** Donors, political spokespersons and officials need to be sensitive to the wording and timing of criticism of gender inequalities locally in order not to undermine local efforts.

Key elements of effective donor support for women's coalitions

The international (donor) community plays an important role supporting women's coalitions as a means of furthering gender equality. While some positive support has been provided by donors, there is room for improvement. Below are the key elements this study has identified that can make the contribution of donors more effective.

- Detailed understanding of the local history and politics of gender. Knowing and listening to the key players and organizations, identifying the windows of opportunity.
- This requires donors to have a trained workforce, both local and international, with political analytical skills in the gender field that enables them to 'work politically', with understanding and sensitivity, with women and their organizations.
- The ability to create an enabling environment, mood and momentum for the emergence of coalitions. This might involve promoting and supporting international and especially regional activities and events which often create a ripple effect on an issue locally. Such events need to be carefully 'framed' and positioned so as not to provoke local opposition or antagonise possible allies.
- Brokering and convening opportunities for women's leaders to meet, to articulate and aggregate their aims and agreements.
- Organizational memory within the donor communities about previous experiences, endeavours, relationships and an analysis of their successes and failures.
- Local and international staff that have developed previous local relationships and networks across a long period of time, amounting to a repertoire of social and political capital.
- Understanding the political constraints but also being able to identify openings for engaging with both government and civil society actors.
- Making sure that any proposal presented by an organization is one that reflects the vision, internal division of roles and planned activities of the key leaders of the coalition, who are likely to come from more than one organization.
- Ensuring that there is a high level of transparency regarding all parties vis-a-vis the budget and its components.
- When monitoring the work of a coalition, it is important to consult with as many of the coalition's leaders as possible, rather than relying on the feedback given by the member that received the funding.
- During the evaluation of coalitions, attention needs to be given to processes as well as outputs or outcomes, as internal governance and decision making can affect performance on the ground.

Finally, this study has found that successful donor support for emerging coalitions was characterized by a deliberate policy of making a number of important diversions from the typical project cycle. These include:

- Ongoing investment in, and commitment to, the process of building internal cohesion and organizational and political capacity rather than focusing solely on delivery of outputs.
- A recognition that coalitions need time to discuss and debate the division of roles, appropriate strategies, relationships with stakeholders, government and non-governmental actors and consequently do not function well with three-five year funding cycles.

- A conscientious effort on the part of donors to remain low key and neither claim the formation of the coalition as their “success” nor any policy change to which the coalition has contributed as an outcome of their own intervention.
- A willingness to think outside the box and take risks in supporting unconventional forms of collective agency – and nurturing their collective leadership: in other words, a focus on the actors rather than strictly the project.
- **An understanding of the complexity of policy-influencing processes and the fact that while local actors can and do have an impact in many instances, there is no linear causal relationship between a coalition’s actions and the policy change itself.**

Structure and Agency in the Politics of a Women's Rights Coalition in South Africa

The Making of the South African Sexual Offences Act, 2007

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February 2011

Executive Summary

How do women's rights groups campaign for vital institutional reform of archaic laws on sexual violence in new democracies? How can they best 'work politically' to achieve positive outcomes? What lessons are there for donors and supporters?

This research paper presents the findings from a study of a women's coalition in South Africa. The National Working Group on Sexual Offences (NWGSO) was established to influence the progressive reform of national rape laws and it became the largest civil society coalition to have collaborated on law reform in South Africa. The Working Group emerged at a time of profound change in South Africa's political settlement, and was a product of the new political processes and institutional arrangements that unfolded in the early years of the democratic transition. The research thus represents a case study that explores the relations between structure and agency in the politics of reform. In analysing the successes and setbacks of this groundbreaking coalition, this study offers lessons for civil society leaders, policy makers and developmental partners in how best to support developmental coalitions and strengthen their capacity to promote long-term, sustainable social change.

Key findings are summarised as:

- Critical overarching themes from the research
- Factors that facilitate the formation of coalitions
- Potential success factors for women's coalitions
- Coalition strategies for greater influence
- Key elements of effective donor support for women's coalitions and more widely across civil society
- The identifiable successes of this particular coalition.

Eleven overarching themes

- 'Critical junctures' such as national political change may provide opportunities for civil society to redefine its rules of engagement with the state. Knowing when and how to seize such opportunities is crucial.
- Many factors account for the emergence of coalitions, including: new opportunities for political

engagement during political transition; how local actors form collective initiatives and their motivation to initiate meaningful social change; the existence of prior networks and experience; the ability to mobilise popular civil society support; donor support.

- New spaces for policy influence may be opened through engaging in law reform. This study shows how the coalition's extensive experience in women's advocacy and in-depth understanding of the law contributed to their success.
- Strategies of 'judicial/legislative advocacy' can assist the process of legal reform, but success depends on the existence of a relatively free judiciary.
- Women's coalitions may draw on and expand their elite networks and exploit political and institutional arrangements to build developmental partnerships.
- Co-operative networks between elite actors that span both civil society and government may initiate new processes of legal reform.
- The building of elite networks between national and international advocates at high-ranking meetings (such as UN Conferences) may have positive developmental outcomes - if the right people are involved.
- 'Soft advocacy' or 'backstage politics' may be more effective strategies where co-operative relationships exist between high-ranking state actors and civil society leaders.
- In dominant one-party states such as South Africa, 'adversarial advocacy' such as monitoring government's fulfilment of laws and policies or criticising political elites in the media may antagonise the party and reduce engagement.
- A coalition's leadership structures and functioning must be determined through consensual processes and not automatically assumed or enacted by its key figures.
- Competition over funding may lead to disruptive tensions and there are strong grounds for ensuring transparency about a coalition's funding.

Factors which facilitate the formation and evolution of civil society coalitions

- Democratic transition may create 'triggers' for the emergence of coalitions. These may include retrogressive state actions, such as implementing policies that violate the rights of women, or progressive state actions, such as the opening of new spaces for engagement with the government.
- Civil society leaders and donors need key political analytical skills in order to systematically scan the political landscape, identify and seize opportunities for political participation and define realistic limits.
- Prior networks between individuals, civil society organizations and parliament often play a key role, helping to establish synergy between influential state actors and civil society elites. Newer coalitions can learn from such past strategies.
- 'Rolling triggers' - new, high profile events (in this case study, the rape allegations and court case against South Africa's Deputy President, Jacob Zuma) may galvanise greater action by civil society, often inspiring changes in strategic direction.
- Organisations join coalitions to increase their own capacity and skill base, establish wider networks (regionally and/or nationally) and expand their sphere of influence. Pre-existing social networks between individual leaders may help but, if the leadership and organisation of the coalition are not seen as accountable to all of its members, they may also hinder.

- Organisations with the greatest expertise, broadest networks and strongest resource base are more likely to drive the establishment and evolution of coalitions.
- Donors should make funds available specifically for promoting collective action between sectors within civil society. Funding earmarked by international development agencies and other funders for the establishment of a coalition, and early consensus-building between members, played a crucial role in the formation of the Working Group.

Factors that facilitate the *relative* 'success' of women's coalitions

- **Expertise within the fields of legal advocacy and women's rights:** Understanding parliamentary procedures and demonstrable experience and understanding of advocacy on women's issues, concrete legal and policy recommendations, and an ability to 'speak the language' of parliamentarians and law-makers all strengthen a coalition's potential impact.
- **Demographic diversity:** Where state elites value affirmative action and the empowerment of previously marginalised populations, the issue of positionality (or perceived identity) is vital. Their perception of the 'authenticity' of a coalition's leaders, and their 'true' representation of their 'constituents', may enhance prospects for success.
- **Establishing a broad support base:** This can, potentially be an important factor, given that civil society has historically had the greatest impact when campaigns have been expressed as mass social movements. However, maintaining solidarity across a large coalition may reduce its objectives to the 'lowest common denominator'. There may thus be a trade-off between inclusion and extensiveness of the coalition, on the one hand, and the ability to agree on a clear program, on the other hand.
- **Building internal consensus:** Accountable and transparent leadership is essential for maintaining the solidarity, motivation and active participation of a coalition's members. For example, distribution of clear, accessible information helps to encourage participation and build consensus.
- **Invoking the 'human rights' framework:** The coalition in this study situated (hence framed) rape law reform within the broader framework of human rights and constitutional imperatives – areas prioritised by leaders of the transition. It was thus able to link rape law reform symbolically with democracy, constitutionalism and modernity.
- **Maintaining and deploying political alliances** and appropriate advocacy strategies (ranging from 'soft advocacy' to more direct legislative advocacy).

Coalition strategies for greater influence

- Strategies to elicit change through collective action must be determined from within a coalition, and according to the local context.
- Building consensus and solidarity among members, and innovative techniques to empower 'weaker' organisations within a collective, enable a coalition to better represent all its partners.
- Past collaborations with elite political actors, particularly those with 'activist sympathies', can provide valuable political leverage.
- Civil society participation in state ratification of international conventions may instigate increased political commitment to fulfilling its tenets. However, civil society leaders may need to tread a fine line between collaborating privately with state elites and publicly opposing state inadequacies.

Key elements of effective donor support for women's coalitions

This study has identified key elements that could make the role of donors in supporting coalitions – particularly women's coalitions - more effective:

- Detailed understanding of local gender history and politics. Donors that emphasise monitoring and oversight of state entities may be eager to fund 'adversarial advocacy' without enough consideration of negative impacts.
- Engaging with a diverse range of key players and understanding the political landscape. Donors need a trained workforce, both local and international, with political analytical skills in the gender field that enable them to 'think and work politically'.
- Brokering opportunities for women's leaders to meet and to articulate and aggregate their collective objectives. Providing operational costs for community-based organisations is vital to ensure their continued inclusion and active participation.
- 'Donor transience' has a negative impact on developmental coalitions. Donors should sustain commitments to organisations that continue to deliver on their indicators, rather than shifting attention and resources to more currently fashionable causes.
- Donors need to change their focus from being 'project oriented' to being 'goal oriented', investing less in supporting short-term projects with sharply delineated boundaries and more in promoting systemic social change through innovative funding mechanisms.
- It is important for donor evaluation to focus also on processes as well as outputs or outcomes, as internal governance and decision-making may affect performance on the ground.
- Donors need to collaborate with each other to avoid duplication, conflict or gaps in funding women's coalitions, and to ensure more strategic direction for specific sectors of civil society.
- Donors need to ensure that there is a high level of financial transparency regarding all parties involved in funding contracts.

Evidence and indicators of the successes of this coalition

- Substantive improvements achieved on rape laws and attendant policies in South Africa.
- 'Elevated organisation' of civil society – that is, an establishment and expansion of collaborative networks within the women's sector.
- Strengthened alliances across the women's sector, and new alliances with other sectors. However, disagreements over funding and strategic direction, leading to the departure of some key actors, were detrimental to the coalition.
- Cultivating knowledge of legislative reform processes and of civil society's opportunities (or lack thereof) for political participation in these.
- Deepening and extending public discussion and debate on issues about sexual offences.
- The creation of future opportunities for judicial/legislative and other forms of advocacy to challenge the inadequate aspects of Sexual Offences Law and attendant policies. The coalition has already developed a new monitoring campaign called *Shukumisa* ('Shake Things Up') which oversees the state's delivery of services mandated by the Act and related policies.

Manoeuvres for a Low Carbon State: The Local Politics of Climate Change in China and India

Tom Harrison and Genia Kostka

Executive Summary

Background and Context

How do leaders in government departments in China and India manoeuvre to achieve emissions reductions goals in very different institutional and political contexts? How do they try to balance and align these actions with other competing interests and policy priorities? What strategies do they use to build informal and formal alliances or coalitions with other elites, from both government agencies and wider society? What lessons can be drawn about how best to implement or support progressive manoeuvres for low carbon states?

The discussion about how to respond to climate change has focused on the difficulties in agreeing on national targets for emissions reductions. By assuming that the main obstacle to reduction lies in the inability to reach agreement internationally, the current debate takes for granted that governments would be able to deliver emissions reductions if only they could agree on credible binding targets. Yet the implementation of mitigation strategies is far from straightforward, and delivering emissions reductions requires creative manoeuvres to bring together competing interests and priorities. These manoeuvres include strategies to bundle different interests and policies, and build informal and formal alliances or coalitions with elites from both within and outside the state.

By focusing on the role of leaders, elites and informal coalitions, this paper unpacks the neglected question of what forms of state capacity and political strategy are needed to pursue climate change mitigation measures in the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy. We examine how government agencies in China and India manoeuvre within differing structural contexts - institutional, organisational and political - to maximise their influence, by making the most of limited organisational capacity and restricted scope for policy influence. In both cases, we see agencies tailoring their approach to the particular nature of competing policy priorities and the organisational structures through which the policies are to be implemented.

Key findings

- **‘State signalling’ and ‘market-plus’:** contrasting approaches from China and India. The findings illustrate how national and sub-national governments work strategically and politically to achieve emissions reductions by using approaches and practices tailored to their specific contexts.

We describe China's approach as '**state signalling**'. In this approach, the national government provides guidelines and concrete energy efficiency targets for local governments to pursue. These 'signals' from the national government act as observable indicators of policy preferences, indicating to local governments how much emphasis they should place on climate change mitigation as compared to other policy priorities. The confidence that these signals will be taken seriously by local government has enabled the national government to take a hands-off approach to how the targets are met.

By contrast, national agencies in India are less able to have confidence that national policies will be implemented at the local level and therefore are more closely engaged with the question of exactly how implementation takes place. Their approach has been to pursue what we describe as a '**market-plus**' approach. Rather than the centre setting targets, it draws on the high price of energy to incentivise energy users to improve their energy efficiency and thereby make savings on their energy bills. While this approach emphasises price incentives, the state has been intensively involved in seeking to build the players and rules that enable these market mechanisms to operate.

Both the 'state signalling' and the 'market-plus' approaches require intelligent, creative, and painstaking political work to achieve results.

- **Competing policy priorities and institutional frameworks.** In both China and India, agencies have tailored their policy approach to the particular nature of their competing policy priorities and the organisational structures involved. The 'state signalling' and 'market-plus' approaches therefore emerge as responses to differing local contexts.

It is vital to understand climate change as one of a number of **competing priorities and interests**, some of which may be in line with mitigation strategies and some in conflict.

- In China, mitigation is a prominent policy issue, motivated by the government's belief that climate change policies can promote energy security and an internationally competitive green technology sector; but also prevent politically destabilising environmental problems.
- For India, lower levels of development mean action on climate change is primarily treated as desirable where it is compatible with more pressing domestic concerns relating to economic growth and poverty reduction. For example, energy efficiency measures are pursued as much for their potential to alleviate chronic energy shortages as for their contribution to climate change mitigation.
- In both countries, the relevant state agencies and their leaders promote their agenda within the constraints presented by **limits on their organisational capacity**.
 - In China, a system where decentralisation and authoritarianism work hand in hand, the state provides 'signals' of its policy preferences by setting incentives and rewards for local officials. These include regular binding targets with concrete figures, incentives such as promotion and bonus payments through an annual evaluation system and punishments such as expulsion from office. These ensure that officials at every level have incentives to at least partially fulfil national mandates from Beijing.
 - In India, by contrast, national agencies responsible for leading climate change policy face greater obstacles to the implementation of national objectives on mitigation. This is partly because the national agencies have limited presence at the sub-national (state) level. The designated agencies in each state have evolved from organisations set up to address earlier policy priorities and, being largely confined to the state capitals, lack the capacity to promote mitigation strategies throughout their states. Furthermore, climate change mitigation has to be balanced with competing policy priorities such as chronic energy shortages, persistently high levels of poverty and the high proportion of rural households with no access to

electricity. Agencies have therefore had to be creative not just in order to maximise their impact, but to have any impact at all. In particular, they have sought to broaden their reach by using the 'market-plus' approach to incentivise private actors to engage with mitigation strategies.

Wider comparative themes

- The comparative analysis in this research illustrates **the importance of understanding the detailed politics of climate change in any country**, and in particular the constraints and opportunities embedded in the relations and tensions of the local context.
- In countries where economic growth and poverty reduction present pressing competing priorities, **the international donor community cannot expect 'the state' to give its undivided attention to this issue**. Rather, particular segments of the state are responsible for climate change mitigation and they may have to compete with other government agencies for policy space.
- **Agencies do not just seek to implement policy, they also look to bolster their own position within the state** in order to enhance their limited capacity and further their objectives. Thus, in thinking about these agencies' work, it is vital to examine the ways in which their ability to further their objectives is both facilitated and constrained by the context within which they operate. This makes it necessary to consider not just the immediate impact of mitigation strategies but also how they can be used to increase the influence of these agencies in the longer term. Given the limited scope of current actions in relation the scale of mitigation that will ultimately be required, this may be the most important contribution of current initiatives.
- **Manoeuvres for a low carbon state**. In both China and India, the designated government agencies and their leaders need to be creative in order to promote their agenda in spite of the constraints they face. Forms of manoeuvre may vary, but **two points** emerge consistently from both countries.
 - First, effective leadership is not just about formulating policy, but maximising the agency's influence so that policies are taken seriously.
 - Second, the challenge of formulating policy is distinct from the even greater challenge of ensuring policies are implemented. In order to ensure their policies take effect and ultimately lead to reductions in emissions, effective leaders therefore manoeuvre actively and continuously to build and maintain coalitions, and align interests through 'bundling' (see below).
- **In both countries the ability to build and sustain coalitions is central to the effectiveness and sustainability of climate change policy**. For different reasons, state strategies in China and India have focused on the need to bring different parties with otherwise divergent interests on board to build a coalition in favour of energy efficiency measures. In China, coalition formation has been motivated by the need to alleviate potential opposition to ambitious energy efficiency measures. In India, the need for coalition formation arose from the severe limitations in the state's capacity to pursue its objectives in this area.
- **Aligning interests through bundling**. Bundling is a common political tactic that combines distinct policies or interests to strengthen the pursuit of a policy goal. It is often used where the implementation of policies is uncertain given their costly or otherwise contentious nature. The ability to identify and create possible 'win-win' situations is an important political skill. We consider the benefits of 'interest-bundling' (where parties with distinct interests are brought together around a particular policy) and 'policy-bundling' (where one initiative is used to pursue multiple policy priorities). Such tactics can form the substantive core of informal coalitional politics, enabling multiple players to

achieve ends they could not achieve on their own. For example, in China, local governments have informally bundled measures to promote energy efficiency together with other policies in order to reconcile national targets with local priorities (see box). With its low per capita emissions, India has justified actions on climate change mitigation in terms of the 'co-benefits' they bring in other areas such as promoting energy security through renewable energy or financial savings made from achieving greater energy efficiency. Given China's reliance on 'state signalling', bundling occurs most often during policy implementation as individual leaders seek to find ways to meet the targets that have been set. In India, by contrast, policy-bundling plays a central role in the formulation and justification of policies at the national level as national agencies seek to demonstrate how mitigation measures can be brought into line with wider developmental priorities.

- **Creating and using professional and personal networks:** The use of creative manoeuvres as outlined above mean that leaders and donors need to be able to identify and align major interest groups. This is an important political skill that takes leaders and donors well beyond their formal technocratic skill-set. Leaders who are embedded in their localities may be better placed to draw on existing professional and personal networks in making the context-specific policy adaptations that underpin such coalitions.

Policy-bundling and interest bundling in Shanxi Province, China

Shanxi Province is well-known for its coal production and large concentration of energy-intensive industries. Government officials in Shanxi were faced with a challenge as to how to comply with the ambitious energy efficiency targets set by national agencies without fostering potentially destabilising resentments of state agents and business interests at the local level.

Policy-bundling: In order to address this challenge, local officials informally bundled the implementation of costly energy efficiency measures together with a greater campaign across China to upgrade the size and technology of heavy industry and the need to respond to scandals over labour standards at a handful of small enterprises. These three distinct policy issues were bundled together in Shanxi as officials closed many small, inefficient and polluting coke, cement, steel and coal mining enterprises.

Interest-bundling: Alongside using policy-bundling to provide multiple justifications for closing energy-inefficient firms, officials used interest-bundling to bring larger enterprises on board. Large and politically important enterprises in Shanxi benefited from the closure of some small plants because it decreased low-cost competition and increased their market share. Officials used this benefit to encourage large enterprises to improve their energy efficiency in return for not having their own plants closed, and in order to win approval for the closures of the smaller enterprises. Large enterprises thus benefited from increased production capabilities, while local officials achieved a higher energy efficiency performance record, which was good for them politically. The divergent interests of the two groups were therefore advanced through this strategy of interest-bundling.

Major economic drawbacks of the small enterprise closures are that they decrease local GDP, tax revenue, and employment numbers. Local officials partially remedy these effects by adding capacity at large, relatively efficient enterprises.

Policy implications

- This research highlights the need for policy-makers working on climate change mitigation to approach energy policy not just as a technical issue but also as a political issue. To do this, they need to take account of the history and politics of the specific local context in order to devise pragmatic

policies with a realistic vision of how obstacles can be overcome. To be pragmatic, climate change policy needs to balance and align climate change actions with other competing interests and policy priorities. The chances of successful implementation depend on how far these policies are tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the organisational structures through which the policies are to be implemented.

- Devising pragmatic and tailored programs requires a detailed understanding of government agencies' capacity to implement policy, the obstacles they are likely to face and the ways in which such obstacles can best be overcome or circumvented.
- Agencies need to be able to combine technical and political skills in order to devise effective strategies.
- The findings of this study provide examples of how creative manoeuvres help to maximise national and sub-national governments' ability to bring about emissions reductions.
- The local specificity of these manoeuvres means they cannot be standardised and a key lesson is that donors and international processes need to allow sufficient flexibility for such manoeuvres to take place. Nevertheless, donors may be able to play a facilitative role by forging links between different actors. This could include:
 - Supporting coalition formation and maintenance of coalitions through helping actors to identify overlapping interests.
 - Such support can include sponsoring events that create room for forming formal and informal coalitions and networks.
 - Helping to identify bundling opportunities through bringing together different stakeholders to identify common interests.
 - Creating bundling opportunities through financial support to reduce the cost of specific mitigation measures, thereby making them more attractive.
- While it is important for policy-makers and international donor organisations to operate politically and pragmatically to support or implement progressive manoeuvres for low carbon states, such practices need to be conducted in sensitive and appropriate ways. In particular, donors need to be aware of limitations on their own scope for manoeuvre.
 - Donors who represent high income countries with high per capita emissions may be seen as having limited legitimacy to intervene in favour of climate change mitigation measures in developing countries.
 - If their input is to be constructive, donors therefore need to tailor their intervention not only to the local context but also to be sensitive to the forms of intervention that are likely to be locally acceptable. This may require donors themselves to bundle their interventions with other policy issues rather than approaching climate change mitigation in isolation.

Finally, in countries with low per capita emissions, but where emissions are rising rapidly, mitigation strategies should be formulated and judged as much for their role in building the organisational, institutional and political capacity that will be needed to scale up mitigation strategies in future as for their immediate impact on current emissions levels. In these contexts, it is therefore particularly important to pay attention to the interplay between the political and technical dimensions of climate change mitigation policies.

Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The politics of free public services in decentralised Indonesia

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Executive Summary

What factors have shaped the way district governments in Indonesia have responded to their newly acquired responsibilities with respect to the delivery of basic education and health services?

This paper explores this question, focusing on the issue of user fees for these services. Since decentralization was implemented in Indonesia in 2001, district governments have had primary responsibility for education and health policy. Many have done little with this authority to support the provision of free basic education and health services in their districts, but a small number have adopted well-funded programs with this objective. By focusing on the role of leaders and how they work politically to advance their careers, this study seeks to explain this cross-district variation in four Indonesian districts and to assess the policy implications for donors and other development actors interested in improving access to basic education and health services.

Main Findings

- The key determinant of district governments' responses to the issue of free public services has been the nature of district leadership—in particular, the nature of *bupatis*' (district heads') strategies for maintaining and advancing their political careers.
- Where *bupati* have pursued strategies of 'political entrepreneurship'—that is, where they have sought to develop a popular base among the poor—and become dependent upon their electoral support to remain in power, district governments have been more likely to promote free public services than where political leaders have focused on consolidating patronage networks.
- *Bupati's* choices in relation to their political strategies have in turn reflected the incentives created by their respective personal networks, alliances, and constituencies.
- Where *bupati* have been relatively autonomous of predatory interests or more closely aligned with other groups in society, they have incorporated political entrepreneurship into their strategies because it has helped them generate the popular support needed to promote their political careers and bolster their positions *vis-à-vis* local parliaments, political parties and elites.

- By contrast, where *bupati* have relied on the backing of predatory business and criminal interests, they have been more likely to pursue strategies of patronage distribution because of their need to provide special favours to these elements and use party machines and patronage networks to mobilise votes.

Evidence

To support this argument, we analyse the politics of free public services in two pairs of Indonesian districts: Jembrana and Tabanan in Bali, where we focus on the issue of free health care, and Sleman and Bantul in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, where we focus on the issue of free basic education.

We show that:

- There has been significant variation in the policies adopted in these districts *vis-à-vis* free public services.
 - In Tabanan, there has been minimal interest or investment in providing free health services outside of national programs that are subsidized by the central government. Government priorities and resources have instead been focused upon contentious 'international standard' hospital project.
 - Likewise, in Sleman, the district government was until recently unwilling to invest significant resources in providing for free basic education and was resistant even to endorsing the notion of free basic education.
 - By contrast, the government of Jembrana adopted an innovative and well-resourced local health insurance scheme that provided significant benefits for the poor; while the government of Bantul pumped substantial resources into providing free basic education to poor children.
- In all of these cases, predatory elements associated with the bureaucracy, military, privately-owned business groups, and/or criminal gangs have dominated politics, suggesting that these policy differences have not reflected differences in the structure of power and interest within these districts. Nor have they reflected differences in the nature of political institutions—i.e. the formal laws and regulations governing the policy-making process—because these have been constant across all cases, reflecting the fact that they have been set via changes to the country's 1945 Constitution and national laws and regulations. Finally, they cannot be explained in terms of the ideological differences of ruling political parties since, in all four cases, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), has dominated the local parliament and been the main base of support for the *bupati*.
- Rather, the key determinant of policy differences across districts has been the nature of *bupati*'s strategies for advancing their political careers which in turn have reflected the nature of their personal networks, alliances and constituencies. In short, politics and agency have shaped their different strategies.
 - In Tabanan, Adi Wiryatama, a shady figure with links to protection racket gangs and local toughs who provide security in the markets and parking zones in Tabanan city, has pursued a strategy centred on the cultivation of clientelist networks and the building up of the local arm of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).
 - Similarly, in Sleman, Ibnu Subianto, a former accounting professional and lecturer with close

links to local business groups, has pursued a strategy of patronage distribution founded on providing business with privileged access to government licenses and contracts. In neither case have these strategies allowed much room for policies of free public services.

- By contrast, Idham Samawi in Bantul and Gede I Winasa in Jembrana have pursued strategies of political entrepreneurship, reflecting, in the former's case, the fact that he has had some autonomy from predatory interests by virtue of backing from the Sultan of Yogyakarta and his own personal wealth and, in the latter's case, his base of support among lower caste Jembranans, NGOs, and ethnic and religious minorities. In both cases, the provision of free public services has been a key element of their attempts to develop a mass base among the poor in their districts.

Policy Implications

- Much recent analysis on the issue of user fees for public services in developing countries has suggested that eliminating these fees is largely a question of funding and management. For instance, health economists have argued that the key to providing free health services in developing countries is to ensure that the removal of legal user fees is accompanied by a larger package of reforms that includes increases in funding to public health facilities and measures that prepare health workers for the consequences of increased utilisation rates in order to prevent the emergence of new illegal fees. This research, by contrast, suggests that providing free public services is in fact primarily a matter of politics and, in particular, the nature of political leaders' strategies for promoting their careers and, in turn, their personal networks, alliances, and constituencies.
- Specifically, the report suggests that proponents of free public services in developing countries need to find ways of encouraging the political leaders to incorporate political entrepreneurship into their respective strategies for promoting their political careers.
- We suggest that democratization will not be enough on its own to ensure political entrepreneurship because the incentive for leaders to pursue this strategy may be outweighed by competing incentives to engage in patronage distribution, particularly where they rely on the backing of predatory elements in business, the military, the bureaucracy and criminal gangs.
- However, our cases suggest two ways in which proponents of free public services in developing countries, including donor organizations, can potentially promote political entrepreneurship in these countries without breaching sovereignty, breaking international law, or running the risk of being thrown out of the country by governments for over-stepping the mark:
 - Promoting awareness of 'success stories'—i.e. cases where leaders have introduced free public services to their political benefit—among the political elite so that leaders casting for policy ideas to inform a strategy of political entrepreneurship will include free public services on their menu of options.
 - Donor support for anti-corruption NGOs and agencies by providing them with adequate funding to carry out their activities.
 - Domestic proponents of free public services need to collaborate with such NGOs and agencies to produce the evidence required to bring down leaders who pursue strategies of patronage distribution. The removal of one 'bad' leader does not guarantee that the next one will be 'good,' particularly if s/he too is backed by predatory business or other elements.

However, 'good' leaders cannot emerge until 'bad' leaders are gone, so there is potentially something to be gained by pursuing the former for corruption.

- In addition, our analysis suggests that proponents of free public services and, in particular donor organizations, should be selective about where they put their effort and money and draw on political analysis in determining whether to engage in particular countries or regions. The point here is that some countries or regions are more likely to be receptive to attempts to promote free public services than others and their degree of receptivity will in turn reflect the nature of their leaders' political strategies.
- Accordingly, to get the biggest development bang for their buck, proponents of free public services need to carry out analyses of potential recipient countries/regions' political contexts, focusing on leaders' political strategies, and in turn build these analyses into their decision-making and planning processes.
 - For donor organizations, the most obvious times to do this are when preparing country or sector strategies. However, the constantly changing nature of politics and, in particular the fact that political leaders come and go and change their strategies over time as new threats and opportunities arise, means that it will be necessary to carry out such analysis on a routine basis.
 - There is thus a need for a much more professional and extended capacity for political analysis by both domestic and external development agencies of the key players, contexts, constraints and opportunities in these sub-national districts and sectors.

Higher education and the formation of developmental elites: A literature review and preliminary data analysis

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Executive Summary


Does higher education have a role to play in facilitating the emergence of developmental leaders and elites? There is increasing recognition that overcoming the challenges of security and development will require leadership across the public and private sectors. But how do developmental leaders emerge and acquire the necessary skills and values to lead? How might higher education influence this process and how can it contribute towards improved governance?

This paper is the product of the first phase of a Development Leadership Program (DLP) research study exploring the hitherto neglected question of whether and how higher education may contribute to the emergence of developmental leadership. The paper undertakes data analysis mapping higher education gross enrolment rates (GERs) with a 20-year lag against the Worldwide Governance Indicators, used here as a proxy for the existence of developmental elites. This first phase of research has identified a positive correlation between higher education and good governance. While at this stage no definitive causation can be established, a review of literature has enabled the study to illustrate ways in which higher education can contribute towards the formation of developmental elites. It also suggests some themes for future consideration, both for the international community and in planning the next phase of this research.

Key findings

- **Higher education has multiple purposes:** from developing technical skills (in order to meet the skills needs of the economy) to influencing individual behaviours, values and attitudes. As a result, higher education is associated not only with the creation of a skilled workforce, but also with the creation of elites, a middle class, and individuals who are socially engaged. The literature also reflects that the purpose of higher education is not static, rather it is adaptive and changes according to the systems of provision and the vision of different institutes of higher education.
- **The purpose and scope of higher education** has broadened from an original focus on elite development to a system of mass or universal education in many Western countries, as the diagram below illustrates.

The role of higher education in supporting developmental elites



Source: CfBT Education Trust 2010

Developing countries are still mostly at the 'elite formation' stage, but have found their higher education systems largely under-funded, both nationally and by the international donor community.

- Both the data analysis and literature review found evidence for a positive correlation between higher education and good governance.** Within the data analysis a general pattern of positive correlation was seen, indicating that increased levels of tertiary enrolment are positively linked with indicators of good governance. Whilst this pattern held true globally, there is some regional variation. Stronger positive correlation was seen in East Asia and the Pacific, whilst trends were sometimes negative in Central and Eastern Europe largely linked to countries where high levels of tertiary enrolment have not been associated with improved levels of governance. The data analysis also highlighted some countries where there had been significant improvements in tertiary enrolment, were not associated with changes in governance indicators. This suggests that **whilst tertiary education may be an influential factor in improving governance, the mechanisms through which any improvement takes place are complex, and are likely to be influenced by the political, economic and social context.** It is important to consider which other factors are influencing improvements in governance and/or driving improvements in higher education reforms.
- Donor support for higher education has varied over recent decades.** During the 1960s, higher education was highly valued as an important driver of development and accompanied by significant levels of support. However, since the 1980s greater emphasis has been placed on other levels of education, most notably primary and basic education. This was originally linked to research demonstrating higher levels of social and economic returns for investments at primary level, and more recently has been reinforced by the Millennium Development Goals and the focus on universal primary education. Yet this has been countered by evidence emphasising the social returns of higher

education and its importance in political and social development, as well as its contribution to economic growth. **In particular, research indicates that the norms, values and attitudes fostered within higher education are highly influential in the development of civil society, social cohesion and democratic reforms.**

- **Whilst higher education by itself may not be a sufficient pre-condition for democratic processes and improved governance, evidence does indicate that it is a contributory factor.** The extent to which higher education institutes achieve this 'value-added' is dependent upon their structure, teaching methods and curricula. Moreover, while such institutes are in a position to encourage the development of positive attitudes and values, this is not normally their primary function. However, they will play a role in developing a 'critical mass' of highly educated individuals who can support and encourage state-building processes and developmental outcomes.

Considerations for future developmental planning

The research identified four key areas in which higher education can be influential in the formation of developmental elites and improved levels of governance:

- (i) **Creation of a growing middle class**, that is better positioned to hold government to account and to shape the institutions that foster good governance. Expanding access to higher education and facilitating the growth of a middle class, and a network of professional associations commonly associated with it, helps to broaden civic participation, to consolidate democratic reforms and to promote economic growth.
- (ii) **Meeting the needs of the labour market.** Higher education will need to continue to change in order to meet the new demands of, and skills needed for, the knowledge economy and globalisation. There is increasing recognition that the role of universities in research, evaluation, information transfer, and technology development is crucial to national social progress and economic growth.
- (iii) **Focus on skills as well as increasing access.** It is important to recognise the role of higher education institutes in developing non-technical, cross-sectoral skills such as creativity, teamwork, problem-solving, adaptability, critical reasoning, perseverance, social ethics and service. Such skills help to develop individuals who are both better placed to meet the needs of the changing economy, and more likely to be engaged and responsible citizens.
- (iv) **Financial support to developing countries wishing to expand higher education opportunities is critical**, to enable them to address the three issues outlined above. This requires donors to recognize the significant external benefits of higher education.

Broader demands are being placed on higher education, with the expectation that it is no longer focused on the development of elites, but on creating a skilled workforce that can respond to the rapidly changing needs of the new knowledge economy and positively contribute to the societies in which it lives.

This does not mean that higher education no longer has a role to play in elite formation. Rather, that the nature of forming elites requires a two-fold strategy:

- firstly, to create the very small elite who will be the **strategic players at the top of society**;
- secondly, to create a **wider elite that occupies key positions** in the public, private and third sectors, and who constitute a growing middle class that has knowledge, skills and capacity to hold the smaller exclusive elite to account.

The emerging findings of this research, whilst still tentative, offer some strong indications on the potential role of higher education and the emergence of developmental elites. This paper concludes by identifying a number of ways in which this initial phase of the research programme can be built upon in later stages. In particular, it suggests further and more detailed country-level analysis to explore issues of causation and the relationship between higher education and other factors affecting elite formation.

An Analysis of Leadership Development Programmes Working in the Context of Development

Heather Lyne de Ver and Fraser Kennedy
The Developmental Leadership Program
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Executive Summary

This paper reviews leadership development programmes¹ as a tool for development policy. We argue that donor and recipient organisations need to be much more critical when choosing or designing programmes; that most programmes fall short if their aim is to contribute to development; and that understanding the 'political' nature of leadership is key to choosing or designing a good programme.

Methodology and Overview of the Argument

The main body of the paper consists of a review of 67 leadership development programmes (LDPs) that aim to build or enhance leadership capacity in the developing world. It primarily reviews LDPs with an online presence. These were identified and reviewed using a variety of means, including: online search and selection, scans of academic material, information from evaluation units of major development organisations, questionnaires to all surveyed LDPs providing contact information on their websites, and some semi-structured interviews. Despite constraints (such as limiting the review to organisations with some online presence, or those that responded to enquiries), this sample provides a useful basis for identifying the most important issues and themes for policy makers to take into account with regard to funding, selecting or creating leadership development programmes.

To review the programmes we asked five questions:

- Does the programme have a clearly articulated understanding of what it means by 'leadership'?
- Does the programme have a theory of change?
- Who is the programme aimed at?
- What are the programme's training methods and contents?
- • What kind of impact assessments or evaluations does the programme carry out?

The review is followed by a summary of the Developmental Leadership Program's (DLP) view that

¹ **Disclaimer:** Information contained in this report is intended for general information purposes only. DLP and the authors make no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied, about the completeness, accuracy, reliability, suitability or availability of the programmes described. Any reliance you place on such information is therefore strictly at your own risk.

leadership for *development* is more than leadership for *organisational development*, and thus requires different kinds of programme.

The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) argues that leadership is 'political' in nature, especially in developmental contexts. As such, leadership, in addition to individual skills, is a process that involves the fostering and use of networks and the formation of coalitions as a means of overcoming the many collective action problems that define the challenges of development.

Programmes based on 'Western' organisational leadership training models tend to focus on the individual attributes of alleged 'good' leaders and presuppose the existence of robust institutions in the context in which participants work. These programmes tend to overlook the importance of the 'political' and 'shared' nature of leadership, particularly in contexts where institutions are weak or absent.

Effective 'leadership for development' programmes should include giving participants the understanding, tools and experience to foster networks, form coalitions and work politically in a positive sense.

Key Findings

We have grouped the key findings of the review according to the five questions asked:

Does the programme have a clearly articulated understanding of what it means by 'leadership'?

- **Same words, different meanings:** Leadership programmes use the same language and words, such as 'leadership', but the terms can mean very different things from one programme to another. In addition, their aims, target audiences, teaching methods and contents vary greatly. In order to be able to compare and choose between different programmes, it would be helpful if they were explicit about their definitions of leadership.
- **Most programmes do not define leadership:** Only 9 out of the 67 programmes reviewed clearly articulate their understanding of leadership.
- **Leadership as individual attribute rather than shared process:** When analysing the programmes more closely and looking at their teaching methods and content, it becomes clear that most programmes implicitly define 'leadership' as an individual trait or quality rather than as shared process between leaders and others.
- **Leadership for organisational development, rather than leadership for development:** Most LDPs are based on 'western' organisational leadership models, originally developed in the context of company management to increase efficiency and performance, rather than oriented towards leadership for institutional formation and for development.
- **Growing acknowledgement of leadership as a process.** Although very few programmes look at leadership as a 'political' process, there is a growing acknowledgement of the importance of working 'politically', forming networks and shaping coalitions in order to achieve positive outcomes.

Does the programme have a theory of change?

A theory of change should show how the programme will lead to changes in the behaviour of participants and how these changes in turn will contribute to development. The theory of change should underpin and guide the programme's methods and contents and enable the programme to evaluate its effectiveness.

Only 10 out of 67 programmes reviewed have some sort of theory of change. Of those, most do not adequately explain the processes through which leadership is developed, and how this leadership then creates change. In general, among the LDPs reviewed, there is a disconnection between a programme's development goals and its actual practices. However, the review identified four programmes that did provide strong, research-based and fully explained theories of change that trace their impact through the processes of development and change: Oxfam International Youth Partnerships (OIYP), Vital Voices, Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, and the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Leadership for Results.

Who is the programme aimed at?

There is a considerable variety of LDPs and of types of participant aimed at. There is also much variety and the types of participant aimed at for such programmes. These include: existing leaders, potential leaders, high-level leaders, grass-roots leaders, women leaders, or leaders connected to a specific sector or issue (such as agriculture, climate change or civil rights). There is no hard and fast rule about which kinds of participant such programmes should be aimed at. The key is to look for the programme that best matches the needs of the participants identified, or to identify the most promising programme for the development issue at hand, and then select the right participants.

One interesting finding is that, compared with LDPs in general, those programmes which are aimed at women's leadership show greater understanding of leadership as political process, are more often based around concrete objectives, and work together more frequently as a movement.

What are the programme's training methods and contents?

Once again, a wide variety of methods, content and practices are used to develop leadership. These vary from traditional classroom-based teaching to action-learning and from individual competency-based training to supporting entrepreneurship for development. Most programmes use a combination of training methods and content.

Overall, there is a strong tendency to base methods and content on 'Western' organisational leadership training models, which often overlook the importance of learning about networks and coalitions and are universalist rather than specific to the context of the participants. More than half (52%) of the programmes reviewed are based in Northern Europe or North America.

What kind of impact assessments or evaluations does the programme carry out?

The LDPs that were selected for review all assert the aim of contributing to development. Accordingly, one might reasonably expect such programmes to evaluate not only participant satisfaction, but also any wider impact on the participants' organisation or on society.

The majority of programmes reviewed here, however, only evaluate at the individual level. Most of those only provide anecdotal evidence of participant satisfaction. As such, they have no way of knowing whether they contribute in any way to development. However, a few programmes do track change at the individual and organisational levels (examples are Centre for Creative Leadership, Technoserve and Avina), or even at the societal level (Chevening Scholarship Programme, Institute for Sustainable Communities and Ashoka), showing that it is possible and, we argue, important to do more.

Policy messages

When deciding whether to support, fund or design leadership development programmes, donors and funders need to consider the following policy messages.

- ***Make sure to articulate your own understanding of 'leadership' and its role for development first. What do you mean by 'leadership', why do you want to support it and to what end?***
- ***Be critical and discriminating when supporting or commissioning programmes.*** Ask:
 1. What is the definition of leadership used by the programme?
 2. What is the theory of change of the programme?
 3. For whom is this programme intended?
 4. What methods, contents and practices are likely to be consistent with the theory of change?
 5. How effective is the programme and how is this measured?
- ***Choose programmes that understand that leadership for development is more than leadership for organisational development.*** Leadership programmes oriented to development should have an understanding of the 'political' nature of leadership and should train in the use of networks, the formation of coalitions and how to work politically in a positive sense.
- ***Choose programmes that are appropriate for the context and sector.*** Considering the importance we attach to facilitating the use of networks and formation of coalitions, context and sector specific programmes may be more appropriate than generic ones.
- ***Make sure you have the right participants.*** As described in the review, there is an enormous range of programmes and approaches to choose from. Make sure you select the right participants, or the right programme for the people you have in mind.
- ***More can and should be done to evaluate the effectiveness of leadership programmes.*** A small number of programmes show it is possible to evaluate beyond the satisfaction at the individual participant level. Evaluations should be required to be carried out over time, at least at the individual and organisational level, and, where possible, at the societal level, to assess the appropriateness of LDPs as a tool for development policy.

Conclusion

With important and encouraging exceptions, many leadership programmes fail to have a clearly articulated understanding of 'leadership', and few have a theory of change that could underpin and guide the methods and content of their courses. A strong tendency to base programmes on 'western' organisational leadership training models and methods is common, as is the failure to emphasise the inescapably 'political' nature of leadership in all, but especially in developmental, contexts. By focusing largely on the alleged individual attributes of 'good' leaders, such programmes often overlook the importance of leadership as a process. This process involves the fostering and use of networks and the formation of coalitions as a means of overcoming the many collective action problems that define the challenges of development. There is a need to evaluate leadership programmes beyond participant satisfaction to verify leadership development as a policy tool for development. A minority of programmes shows that it is possible to evaluate much more than is currently the case.

The Institutions of Integrity and the Integrity of Institutions:

Integrity and ethics in the politics of developmental leadership

Eduard Grebe & Minka Woermann

Executive Summary

Context and Background

In current debate, many developmental problems are attributed to the failure of leadership and, in particular, to the absence of either 'ethical leadership' or 'integrity in leadership'. But what is 'ethical leadership'? What makes for the integrity of leaders in a developmental context? How is it achieved? And what are the conditions for sustaining it?

The primary objective of this research has been to develop a conceptual framework for thinking about integrity in developmental contexts, not only at the level of individual behaviour, but also at the level of institutions, and especially in the relations between them. By institutions we mean the formal and informal 'rules' that govern social, political and economic relations—ranging from the political system to cultural values.

While the work is primarily conceptual, it will also help policy-makers think about these questions in relation to developmental issues.

The question of integrity becomes especially vexed when rival and competing institutions and normative expectations are in force, and when people are therefore torn between two or more 'codes' of behaviour, without access to a universal ethical system that can resolve the conflict. Accordingly, this project explores the interaction between individual ethics and the institutions that embody social norms.

Core Argument

The key finding from this work is that in order to think seriously about ethical leadership or developmental integrity, it is important **not** to simply focus on codes of conduct, individual behaviour, enforcement mechanisms or even 'picking individual winners'. Rather, ethical leadership and developmental integrity in practice is a function of the more complex interaction of *individual integrity*, the *institutions of integrity* and the *integrity of institutions*.

Key Points

Specifically we argue that:

- **There is a dearth of serious analysis about the idea of integrity in development. In order for policy makers to think seriously about integrity it is necessary to make a clear distinction between three closely linked aspects of integrity:**
 - *The institutions of integrity*, which refer to the institutionalised norms and codes of behaviour (both formal and informal) that 'bind' individual behaviour, and shape the context of individual integrity, including that of leaders. Such institutions define the moral boundaries that affect individual behaviour. Policing or auditing agencies and oversight mechanisms are merely one manifestation of the institutions of integrity and do not by themselves produce developmental integrity or ethical leadership.
 - *Individual integrity*, which relates to the traditional understanding of integrity as honesty; appropriate behaviour ('doing the right thing' according to the norms and rules); or, consistency between words and actions. Individuals do not respond as automatons to the institutional incentives they face. Individual agency matters and leaders sometimes emerge who have transformative effects (for good or bad), e.g. Nelson Mandela or Pol Pot.
 - *The integrity of institutions*, which means whether an institution functions correctly; is robust and legitimate; and, is fit for purpose. In the present case that means institutions that promote development. It is an important factor in development outcomes. An institution which does not work or which is haphazardly enforced or routinely evaded has little integrity.
- **Understanding developmental integrity necessitates a deeper and more thoroughgoing analysis of both *individual and institutional issues*, and the *relation* between these issues. In other words, one must investigate the complexities generated by the interplay between an individual leader's choices and behaviour, on the one hand; and the context in which they operate, on the other hand (that is the relationship between agency and structure; or leader and institutions).**
- **The complexity of these relations is further compounded by the nature of institutional arrangements and leadership processes:**
 - The *institutions* that make up this 'structure' may be *multiple and in conflict*.
 - *Leadership* is a *systemic and relational process* with a strong *political dimension*. It involves both the mobilisation of people and resources in support of goals and institutional stewardship that foster the institutionalisation of appropriate behaviours.
- **The idea of *congruence* is central to understanding developmental integrity. Developmental integrity depends on whether the institutions of integrity and individual integrity function in such a way as to support the integrity of institutions. Congruence is therefore contingent upon:**
 - *Appropriate and agreed rules* that govern political systems and/or organisational culture.
 - *Individual choices and behaviours* that are *consistent* with these *rules*.
- **Congruence allows for the *possibility of differences and disagreement* that arise when stakeholders cooperate and compete with regard to the distribution of resources. However:**
 - When these differences are *at odds with institutionalised rules or organisational culture*, indi-

viduals and coalitions are unlikely to achieve their goals.

- When *institutionalised rules or culture no longer provide a useful frame* for making sense of individual actions and interpersonal processes, the institution becomes brittle and fails to provide the needed legitimacy for directing individual actions and interpersonal processes.
- ***Institutional robustness and legitimacy therefore results when individual actions (leader behaviour) and interpersonal processes (coalitions) are aligned or congruent with shared institutional goals.***

Leadership, Coalition-Building and Development

Very frequently in development contexts, institutional arrangements lack congruence. This means that individual leaders may be pulled in different directions by competing ethical frameworks. Therefore, development policy and development programmes must take account of three important implications that flow from this insight:

- Leadership often takes place in the *uncertain interplay* between the individual leader's choices (agency) and the brittle or insecure institutional context within which those choices are made (structure).
- Institutional development is '*path dependent*', which implies that programmes that rely on incorrect assumptions about the institutional arrangements in a specific country or region, or that are naïve about the difficulty of altering institutional structures, are likely to fail.
- Developmental interventions must be *appropriate* to the institutional contexts in which they operate.

Unfortunately, this also implies that there is no set of simple guidelines that will help policy-makers to foster developmental integrity. *A deeper and more thoroughgoing analysis* of the individual and institutional dimensions of integrity is essential for understanding where and how ethical developmental leadership can be enhanced or supported in a specific country or context.

It is also important to recognise that leadership has a strong political dimension and that *power* is therefore a key factor. Different individuals and groups (including 'coalitions') exercise power and seek influence over the system. The 'rules of the game' are therefore frequently contested terrain and partisan (even predatory) interests are usually present.

For this reason fostering *congruence* is a key element of effective leadership, as when this is achieved to the requisite degree, *successful and sustainable development* is more likely to occur.

An important manner in which to achieve congruence is to *build and mobilise coalitions* around appropriate goals and appropriate institutions, even hybrid ones.

- This requires that leaders *sustain dialogue* amongst stakeholders, so that shared goals and practices can emerge through a process of cooperation, competition and consensus-building.
- However, ethical leaders must also manage institutional conflict and divergent interests by *promoting tolerance and openness* in decision-making processes, without expecting that all difference will be resolved.

Brokering or facilitating processes or coalitions that can align institutions and promote congruence is an important role for leaders, donors or supporters.

Leadership and Developmental Integrity

At the heart of this approach is a 'systemic model' of leadership. This is distinguished from the more common 'agential model' of leadership, which places the responsibility for ethical behaviour or integrity largely on the individual leader (who purportedly controls the behaviour of followers and shapes institutional forms and practices).

By contrast, while recognising that there is always room for manoeuvre by leaders, the 'systemic' model places emphasis on the processes that give rise to developmental outcomes, including the institutionalisation of norms, values and practices and how leaders interact with these. As such, *leadership integrity* in the systemic model is determined, in part, by whether leaders:

- *Encourage inclusive stakeholder dialogue and foster congruence* when setting developmental goals.
- *Develop successful strategies* for balancing institutional requirements, organisational demands and the interests of individual stakeholders.
- *Assess the intended and unintended consequences* of actions taken in pursuance of collective goals.
- *Assume responsibility for, and undertake corrective action* to address strategies that do not promote or that may even undermine collective goals.

Whilst it is recognised that leaders influence 'followers' and others (mostly by providing the appropriate frames for thinking about developmental goals and outcomes), it is also acknowledged that followers influence leader behaviour through complex political processes. These political processes are determined, in part, by dynamic formal and informal relations of power, which are distributed across various institutional levels. Therefore *politics and power* lie at the heart of the systemic model, and profoundly affect ethical behaviours and developmental integrity.

In the systemic model of leadership, *institutions of integrity* are understood as the product of development paths that may be highly resistant to change. In order to understand the nature of effective and responsible leadership processes, it is therefore important to acknowledge the *historical nature of institutions*, which give rise to the multiple and conflicting institutional constraints and obligations that are simultaneously in force, and that impact on leadership processes.

We argue that the insights gleaned from this systemic conception of leadership can help us to better understand and promote ethical leadership practices that foster developmental integrity.

Summary of Insights

- Developmental integrity is a *complex process* that must be conceptualised in terms of the *political landscape*, in which various actors (with varying degrees of power) cooperate and compete in order to achieve their goals.
- This complex, political processes between actors should not however be incongruent with larger institutional rules and culture, as this undermines the legitimacy of institutions. Otherwise stated, institutional integrity is dependent on the establishment and maintenance of a degree of *congruence* between individuals (agents) and institutions (structures).
- In this regard, *leaders* play an important *sense-making function* in providing appropriate institutional frames for thinking about developmental goals, and for mobilising people and resources.
- Furthermore, *leaders* are responsible for *brokering or facilitating processes or coalitions* that can align

institutions and promote congruence. Leaders are also responsible for the consequences arising from coalitions' actions.

- *Developmental integrity*, defined in terms of the systemic model, therefore refers to the ways in which *leadership integrity* gives rise to, challenges, and reinforces the *institutions of integrity*, thereby facilitating *institutional integrity* (i.e. institutional robustness and legitimacy).

DLP Publications

Research Papers

1. Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2009) "Cadres, Capitalists and Coalitions: The ANC, Business and Development in South Africa".
2. David Subudubudu with Patrick Molutsi (2009) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the Development of Botswana".
3. Eduard Grebe with Nicoli Nattrass (2009) "Leaders, Networks and Coalitions in the AIDS Response: A Comparison of Uganda and South Africa".
4. Deborah Brautigam with Tania Diolle (2009) "Coalitions, Capitalists and Credibility: Overcoming the Crisis of Confidence at Independence in Mauritius".
5. Jo Beall with Mduduzi Ngonyama (2009) "Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Developmental Coalitions: The Case of Greater Durban, South Africa".
6. Adrian Leftwich (2009) "Bringing Agency Back In: Politics and Human Agency in Building Institutions and States".
7. Junji Banno & Kenichi Ohno (2010) "The Flexible Structure of politics in Meiji Japan".
8. Marine Destrez & Nick Harrison (2011) "Leadership Training and Network Formation: The evolution of the LEAD process".
9. Michael Bratton & Eldred Musunungure (2011) "The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980-2010".
10. Laura Brannelly, Laura Lewis & Susy Ndaruhutse (2011) "Higher Education and the Formation of Developmental Elites: A literature review and preliminary data analysis."
11. Heather Lyne deVer & Fraser Kennedy (2011) "An analysis of Leadership Development Programmes working in the context of development."
12. Mariz Tadros (2011) "Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and agency in a comparative study of women's coalitions in Egypt and Jordan"..
13. Rebecca Hodes, Jennifer Thorpe & Orly Stern (2011) "Structure and Agency in the Politics of a Women's Rights Coalition in South Africa: The Making of the South African Sexual Offences Act, 2007".
14. Sarah Phillips (2011) "Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State".

Background Papers

1. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2007) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The case for leadership and the primacy of politics in building effective states, institutions and governance for sustainable growth and social development".
2. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2008) "The Politics of Institutional Indigenization: leaders, elites and coalitions in building appropriate and legitimate institutions for sustainable growth and social development".
3. Heather Lyne de Ver (2008) "Leadership Politics and Development: A Literature Survey".
4. Heather Lyne de Ver (2009) "Conceptions of Leadership".
5. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2010) "The Leadership Program: Overview & Objectives".
6. Adrian Leftwich (2010) "An Overview of the Research in Progress for the Leadership Program: Developmental Leaders, Elites and Coalitions".
7. Isabelle van Notten (2010) "Integrity, Leadership, Women's Coalitions and the Politics of Institutional Reform. Bringing Agency Back In. Mid-Term Workshop Report, Cape Town 25-26 May 2010".
8. Edward Laws (2010) "The 'Revolutionary Settlement' in 17th Century England: Deploying a Political Settlements Analysis".



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