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Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The Politics of Free Public Services in Decentralised Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Since the implementation of decentralisation in Indonesia in 2001, district governments—which under the country's decentralisation laws are assigned primary responsibility for health and education policy—have varied considerably in their response to the issue of user fees for basic education and health services. Many have done little to support the provision of free public services in their districts while a small number have adopted well-funded programs to support free basic education and health. The purpose of this report is to explain this cross-district variation and assess the policy implications for donors and other development actors interested in improving citizens' access to basic education and health services. We argue that a key determinant of district governments' varying responses to the issue of user fees has been the nature of district heads' strategies for maintaining and advancing their political careers. Where district heads have pursued strategies of 'political entrepreneurship'—that is, where they have sought to develop a popular base among the poor—and become dependent upon their electoral support to remain in power, district governments have been more likely to promote free public services than where political leaders have focused on consolidating patronage networks. At the same time, we suggest that these strategies have in turn reflected the incentives created by district head's respective personal networks, alliances, and constituencies. In policy terms, we conclude that donors and other development actors need to find ways of enhancing the scope for political entrepreneurship at the local level, that they can make a contribution in this respect by supporting and collaborating with anti-corruption institutions and promoting awareness of successful instances of political entrepreneurship, and that they should draw on political analysis in determining whether to engage in particular countries or, within countries, in particular regions.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What factors have shaped the way district governments in Indonesia have responded to their newly acquired responsibilities with respect to the delivery of basic education and health services?

This paper explores this question, focusing on the issue of user fees for these services. Since decentralization was implemented in Indonesia in 2001, district governments have had primary responsibility for education and health policy. Many have done little with this authority to support the provision of free basic education and health services in their districts, but a small number have adopted well-funded programs with this objective. By focusing on the role of leaders and how they work politically to advance their careers, this study seeks to explain this cross-district variation in four Indonesian districts and to assess the policy implications for donors and other development actors interested in improving access to basic education and health services.

Main Findings

- The key determinant of district governments' responses to the issue of free public services has been the nature of district leadership—in particular, the nature of *bupatis'* (district heads') strategies for maintaining and advancing their political careers.
- Where *bupati* have pursued strategies of 'political entrepreneurship'—that is, where they have sought to develop a popular base among the poor—and become dependent upon their electoral support to remain in power, district governments have been more likely to promote free public services than where political leaders have focused on consolidating patronage networks.
- *Bupati's* choices in relation to their political strategies have in turn reflected the incentives created by their respective personal networks, alliances, and constituencies.
- Where *bupati* have been relatively autonomous of predatory interests or more closely aligned with other groups in society, they have incorporated political entrepreneurship into their strategies because it has helped them generate the popular support needed to promote their political careers and bolster their positions *vis-à-vis* local parliaments, political parties and elites.
- By contrast, where *bupati* have relied on the backing of predatory business and criminal interests, they have been more likely to pursue strategies of patronage distribution because of their need to provide special favours to these elements and use party machines and patronage networks to mobilise votes.

Evidence

To support this argument, we analyse the politics of free public services in two pairs of Indonesian districts: Jembrana and Tabanan in Bali, where we focus on the issue of free health care, and Sleman and Bantul in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, where we focus on the issue of free basic education.

We show that:

- There has been significant variation in the policies adopted in these districts *vis-à-vis* free public services.
    - In Tabanan, there has been minimal interest or investment in providing free health services outside of national programs that are subsidized by the central government. Government priorities and resources have instead been focused upon contentious 'international stan-

dard' hospital project.
- Likewise, in Sleman, the district government was until recently unwilling to invest significant resources in providing for free basic education and was resistant even to endorsing the notion of free basic education.
- By contrast, the government of Jembrana adopted an innovative and well-resourced local health insurance scheme that provided significant benefits for the poor, while the government of Bantul pumped substantial resources into providing free basic education to poor children.

- In all of these cases, predatory elements associated with the bureaucracy, military, privately-owned business groups, and/or criminal gangs have dominated politics, suggesting that these policy differences have not reflected differences in the structure of power and interest within these districts. Nor have they reflected differences in the nature of political institutions—i.e. the formal laws and regulations governing the policy-making process—because these have been constant across all cases, reflecting the fact that they have been set via changes to the country's 1945 Constitution and national laws and regulations. Finally, they cannot be explained in terms of the ideological differences of ruling political parties since, in all four cases, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), has dominated the local parliament and been the main base of support for the *bupati.*

- Rather, the key determinant of policy differences across districts has been the nature of *bupati's* strategies for advancing their political careers which in turn have reflected the nature of their personal networks, alliances and constituencies. In short, politics and agency have shaped their different strategies.

    - In Tabanan, Adi Wiryatama, a shady figure with links to protection racket gangs and local toughs who provide security in the markets and parking zones in Tabanan city, has pursued a strategy centred on the cultivation of clientelist networks and the building up of the local arm of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).
    - Similarly, in Sleman, Ibnu Subianto, a former accounting professional and lecturer with close links to local business groups, has pursued a strategy of patronage distribution founded on providing business with privileged access to government licenses and contracts. In neither case have these strategies allowed much room for policies of free public services.
    - By contrast, Idham Samawi in Bantul and Gede I Winasa in Jembrana have pursued strategies of political entrepreneurship, reflecting, in the former's case, the fact that he has had some autonomy from predatory interests by virtue of backing from the Sultan of Yogyakarta and his own personal wealth and, in the latter's case, his base of support among lower caste Jembranans, NGOs, and ethnic and religious minorities. In both cases, the provision of free public services has been a key element of their attempts to develop a mass base among the poor in their districts.

Policy Implications

- Much recent analysis on the issue of user fees for public services in developing countries has suggested that eliminating these fees is largely a question of funding and management. For instance, health economists have argued that the key to providing free health services in developing countries is to ensure that the removal of legal user fees is accompanied by a larger package of reforms that includes increases in funding to public health facilities and measures that prepare health workers for the consequences of increased utilisation rates in order to prevent the emergence of new illegal fees. This research, by contrast, suggests that providing free public services in fact is primarily a matter of politics and, in particular, the nature of political leaders' strategies for promoting their careers and,

in turn, their personal networks, alliances, and constituencies.

- Specifically, the report suggests that proponents of free public services in developing countries need to find ways of encouraging the political leaders to incorporate political entrepreneurship into their respective strategies for promoting their political careers.

- We suggest that democratization will not be enough on its own to ensure political entrepreneurship because the incentive for leaders to pursue this strategy may be outweighed by competing incentives to engage in patronage distribution, particularly where they rely on the backing of predatory elements in business, the military, the bureaucracy and criminal gangs.

- However, our cases suggest three ways in which proponents of free public services in developing countries, including donor organizations, can potentially promote political entrepreneurship in these countries without breaching sovereignty, breaking international law, or running the risk of being thrown out of the country by governments for over-stepping the mark:

    - Promoting awareness of 'success stories'—i.e. cases where leaders have introduced free public services to their political benefit—among the political elite so that leaders casting for policy ideas to inform a strategy of political entrepreneurship will include free public services on their menu of options.
    - Donor support for anti-corruption NGOs and agencies by providing them with adequate funding to carry out their activities.
    - Domestic proponents of free public services need to collaborate with such NGOs and agencies to produce the evidence required to bring down leaders who pursue strategies of patronage distribution. The removal of one 'bad' leader does not guarantee that the next one will be 'good,' particularly if s/he too is backed by predatory business or other elements. However, 'good' leaders cannot emerge until 'bad' leaders are gone, so there is potentially something to be gained by pursuing the former for corruption.

- In addition, our analysis suggests that proponents of free public services and, in particular donor organizations, should be selective about where they put their effort and money and draw on political analysis in determining whether to engage in particular countries or regions. The point here is that some countries or regions are more likely to be receptive to attempts to promote free public services than others and their degree of receptivity will in turn reflect the nature of their leaders' political strategies.

- Accordingly, to get the biggest development bang for their buck, proponents of free public services need to carry out analyses of potential recipient countries/regions' political contexts, focusing on leaders' political strategies, and in turn build these analyses into their decision-making and planning processes.

    - For donor organizations, the most obvious times to do this are when preparing country or sector strategies. However, the constantly changing nature of politics and, in particular the fact that political leaders come and go and change their strategies over time as new threats and opportunities arise, means that it will be necessary to carry out such analysis on a routine basis.
    - There is thus a need for a much more professional and extended capacity for political analysis by both domestic and external development agencies of the key players, contexts, constraints and opportunities in these sub-national districts and sectors.

GLOSSARY

ADD	Village Allocation Funds (*Alokasi Dana Desa*).
Ansor	Youth organisation aligned with *Nahdatul Ulama*.
Askeskin	Health Insurance for the Poor (*Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin*).
babonisasi	a Bantul government program involving the provision of hens to school children.
Banteng Muda Indonesia	paramilitary youth supporter group of the PDI-P.
bapel	managing agent(s) *(Badan Pelaksana*).
BOP	Education Operational Assistance (*Bantuan Operasional Pendidikan*).
BOS	School Operational Assistance (*Bantuan Operasional Sekolah*).
BOSDA	Regional School Operational Assistance (*Bantuan Operasional Sekolah Daerah*).
BPK	State Audit Agency (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan*).
brahmana	Brahmin/high caste.
bupati	district head.
camat	sub-district head.
dana hibah	grant funds
desa	village.
dewan sekolah	School Council.
DIY	Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*).
DONE	Department of National Education.
DPR	Peoples' Representative Council/national parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*).
DPRD	Regional Peoples' Representative Council(s)/regional parliament(s) (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*).
Forkot	Tabanan Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Tabanan*).
GMNI	National Indonesian Student's Association (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*).
GSNI	Indonesian National Student Organisation (*Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia*).
Jamkesmas	Health Insurance for the Community *(Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat*).
Jamkesda	Regional Health Insurance Schemes *(Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat*).
JKJ	Jembrana Health Insurance Program *(Jaminan Kesehatan Jembrana*).
JKBM	Bali Health Insurance (*Jaminan Kesehatan Bali Mandara*).
JPK-gakin	Health Service Insurance for Poor Families (*Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat Keluarga Miskin*).
JPKM	Community Health Insurance Schemes (*Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat*).
kabupaten	district.
KADIN	Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (*Kamar Dagang Indonesia*).
kecamatan	sub-district.
Kedaulatan Rakyat	a Yogyakarta newspaper.
Kelompok Kerja Pendidikan dan Gratis Konsorsium Basic Social Service for Needy Children	Task Force on Free Education and Consortium on Basic Social Service for Needy Children.
kelurahan	village-level district administered by the lurah.
kotamadya	district-level municipality

ksatriya	knight or noble caste.
KUHP	Indonesian Criminal Code (*Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana)*
kyai	Islamic scholar/leader.
lurah	village head.
madrasah	Islamic boarding schools.
Marhaenisme	political ideology centred on the needs of the poor.
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals.
MPR	People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*)
Muhammadiyah	a leading Islamic organisation.
musrenbang	participatory planning and budgeting process.
NGO	Non-Government Organisation.
Nahdatul Ulama (NU)	a leading Islamic organisation.
Nasionalis Kerakyatan	'people's nationalist.'
PAN	National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*).
Pasek	a Balinese clan.
PDI	Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*)
PDI-P	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*).
pegawai negeri sipil	civil servant.
pengurus	executive.
peraturan bupati	district head regulation.
pilkada	direct elections of regional heads.
PKB	National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*)
PNI	Indonesian Nationalist Party *(Partai National Indonesia*).
PPP	United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*)
Preman	thug/gangster.
P.T. *Askes*	a state-owned insurance company.
puskesmas	community health centres.
PWI	Indonesian Journalist's Association (*Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia*)
raperda	draft regional regulation (*rancangan peraturan daerah*)
RSBI	Pioneering International Standard Schools (*Rintisan Sekolah Berstandar Internasional*)
SBI	International Standard Schools (*Sekolah Berstandar Internasional*)
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Indonesian President).
sekolah gratis	free schooling.
Sekretaris Daerah (Sekda)	district secretary.
Serikat Buruh Pariwisata	Tourism Sector Workers Union.
SJAF	Jembrana Awakening Forum (*Forum Kebangkitan Masyarakat Jembrana*).
SPS	Indonesian Publishers Association (*Serikat Penerbit Suratkabar*)
STIE	College of Economic Studies (*Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi*).
sudra	low caste.
SWA	Indonesian National Business Magazine.
UFBE	Universal free basic education.
WALHI	*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (a prominent Indonesian environ mental NGO).

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Chapter One: Introduction

User fees are widely regarded as one of the main obstacles to increasing citizen's access to public services such as education and health care in developing countries (Creese 1991; CHER 2002; Hillman and Jenkner 2004; Bentaouet-Kattan and Burnett 2004; DFID 2006; James *et al* 2006; Delamonica and Mehrotra 2009; Yates 2009; Hall *et al* 2009) and Indonesia in particular (Achmad 1999; World Bank 2000; 2008). During the 'New Order' years (1966-1998), such fees became an entrenched feature of Indonesia's public school and health systems with the result that millions of people, especially among the poor, were denied access to much-needed schooling and health care. With the shift towards a more democratic political system since the late 1990s, there has been increased agitation for the elimination of these fees on the part of NGO activists and groups representing patients and parents of schoolchildren. At the national level, the central government has responded by introducing a raft of legal and regulatory changes that have served to strengthen the legal basis for free basic education and free health care, particularly for the poor, and introduced new school funding and health insurance programs to help realize these objectives. However, district governments[1]—which have had primary responsibility for health and education policy since the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia in 2001—have varied considerably in their response to the issue of user fees for public services. Many have done little to support the provision of free public services in their districts on the grounds that their citizens are willing to pay for higher quality education and health services or that their districts simply have other budgetary priorities while a small number of exceptional district governments have adopted well-funded basic education and health programs aimed at providing free services.

The purpose of this report is to explain this cross-district variation and assess the policy implications for donors and other development actors interested in improving citizens' access to basic education and health services. We argue that a key determinant of district governments' responses to the issue of free public services has been the nature of district leadership—in particular, the nature of *bupatis'* (district heads) strategies for maintaining and advancing their political careers. Where *bupati* have pursued strategies of 'political entrepreneurship'—that is, where they have sought to develop a popular base among the poor (Kosack 2009)—and become dependent upon their electoral support to remain in power, district governments have been more likely to promote free public services than where political leaders have focused on consolidating patronage networks. At the same time, we suggest that *bupati's* choice of strategy reflects the incentives created by their respective personal networks, alliances, and constituencies. In policy terms, the main implication of these findings is that donors and other development actors who are interested in promoting free public services, particularly for the poor, need to find ways of enhancing the scope for such political entrepreneurship at the local level. We suggest that, while this is extremely difficult in contexts where predatory interests dominate, they can make a contribution by

1 'District governments,' as we use that term here, refers to both governments of *kabupaten* (generally translated as district or regency) and governments of *kotamadya* (generally translated as city or municipality). Hence references in this paper to 'districts' should be understood as referring to both *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* unless otherwise specified.

supporting and collaborating with anti-corruption institutions and promoting awareness of successful instances of political entrepreneurship. At the same time, we argue that these findings suggest that these actors should be selective about where they put their effort and money and draw on political analysis examining leaders' strategies, networks, alliances and constituencies in determining whether to engage in particular countries or, within countries, in particular regions.

In presenting this analysis, we begin in this chapter by examining the nature of user fees for public services, the development problems they have caused in the Indonesian context, and the nature of the central government's response to these problems. We also examine the nature of local-level policy-making processes in Indonesia and suggest that while institutional and structural factors have been major determinants of local-level policies, so too has the quality of district leadership. Indeed, we suggest that the latter factor has been the key determinant of cross-district variation in policy decisions. In Chapters Two and Three, we then examine the political dynamics surrounding the issue of user fees for public services in two pairs of districts—Jembrana and Tabanan in Bali, where we focus on user fees in the health sector, and Sleman and Bantul in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, where we focus on user fees in basic education. In both pairs, we suggest, differences in the nature of leadership between districts has been a key determinant of the different responses of district governments. The final chapter of the report then elaborates on the policy implications of this finding for donors and other development actors.

The Nature and Problem of User Fees[2]

User fees can be defined as *formal* and *informal* charges that are payable at the point of service for publicly provided services. In health care, the most common types of user fees are registration fees, doctors' fees, the cost of medicine, fees for hospital or health centre accommodation, gifts to health facility staff, and bribes to staff to gain access to facilities and services. In basic education, the most common types of user fees are tuition fees, textbook fees, uniform fees, Parent Teacher Association levies, community contributions, exam fees, building/construction levies, maintenance and service charges, excursion charges, gifts to teachers, and bribes for school reports and promotion to the next year level (Bentaouet-Kattan 2006). User fees are not typically considered to include costs such as transport, boarding, meals, and the opportunity costs associated with sending children to school or spending money on health care (Bentaouet-Kattan and Burnett 2004: 6). These costs can be significant barriers to poor people accessing basic education or health services but they do not meet our definition of user fees because they are not directly related to the provision of basic education or health care and in some cases are not charged at the point of service either (e.g. transport). User fees in basic education and health are also not typically considered to include the costs of private tutoring or medical care. However, we include these costs here to the extent that school teachers at public schools pressure students to take tutoring at private institutes in order to earn additional income and doctors, nurses and other medical staff do the same to patients in the public system (Rosser *et al* 2011).

In the Indonesian context, all of these user fees have been a feature of the country's public health and education systems for many decades. The New Order officially abolished formal user charges at government primary schools in 1977, and government junior secondary schools in 1994 (Bray 1996: 20; Kristiansen and Pratikno 2006: 516). But, in practice, it permitted these schools to charge formal fees for a wide range of services, products and activities including enrolments, tuition, building construction, exams, photocopying, uniforms, book purchases, book hire, and extracurricular activities. In some cases, these fees were supported by government regulations and/or decrees (and in this sense had some sort of legal basis notwithstanding the general prohibition on formal fees) while in other cases, they were not

2 This and the following section draw heavily on two previous pieces of work by one of the authors, namely Rosser *et al* (2011) and Rosser (forthcoming).

and the government simply turned a blind eye to their existence (Irawan *et al* 2004: 107). At the same time, many teachers reportedly took advantage of their positions and authority to demand extortion payments for releasing students' grades or granting permission for students to progress to the next year level, took bribes for awarding higher marks to students, and/or accepted gifts from students and their parents (Hardjono and Teggemann 2004: 3-6; Kammen 1995). Likewise, community health centres (*puskesmas*) typically charged not only an official legal user fee, the value of which was set quite low, but also illegal fees worth several times the value of the official fee.[3] At public hospitals, legal fees were also set quite low but large illegal fees meant that household expenditure on hospital admissions could easily be catastrophic. In addition, both *puskesmas* and public hospital staff often unnecessarily referred patients to their private medical practices in turn generating another set of illegal fees.[4] Since the end of the New Order, as we will see below, the central government and some regional governments have sought to reduce user fees for basic education and health care, especially for the poor, through the introduction of legal and regulatory changes and new programs of funding for primary and junior secondary schools and health insurance. But while these have had some positive effect, they have not eradicated these fees.

User fees have had a significant negative impact on people's access to basic education and health care, especially the poor. During the New Order period, enrolment rates at both primary and junior secondary schools improved dramatically as the economy grew, poverty rates declined, and the school system expanded, with the country almost achieving universal primary enrolment by the mid-1980s (Hull and Jones 1994: 161). But the charging of user fees was one of the main reasons why even before the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 (which led to a brief drop in enrolment rates) almost 20 percent of primary school students did not finish primary school and 1.5 million primary school students per year did not continue on to junior secondary school (World Bank 1997: 68-9; 1998: 46). In other cases, it appears that user fees at government primary and junior secondary schools forced poor people to send their children to lower quality private schools, reducing the utility of their education. According to the World Bank (2000: 4), the situation was no better in the health sector. In 1995, it says, households in the top 20 percent of the expenditure distribution were three times more likely to use public health facilities on an in-patient basis than households in the bottom two deciles, suggesting that the costs associated with public health care had a significant negative effect on health care utilisation, especially by the poor. Since the end of the New Order, school enrolment rates and public health service utilization rates have continued to improve as a result of continued economic growth and poverty reduction—following the country's recovery from the Asian economic crisis—and the introduction of new central government (and to a lesser extent district government) programs designed to promote free public services (see below).[5] But the continued presence of user fees is widely seen as one of the main reasons why school enrolment and public health service utilization rates remain at low levels (World Bank 2008; Rosser *et al* 2011; Rosser forthcoming).

To the extent that user fees have prevented poor (or for that matter non-poor) people in Indonesia from gaining a basic education or health care, they have arguably breached their basic human rights. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that everyone has a right to medical care and

3 On this practice, see World Bank (2000: 7) and Achmad (1999: 70).

4 These fees can be regarded as illegal to the extent that they almost certainly breached articles of Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) related to misuse of authority by state officials (e.g. Articles 421 and 423). They also arguably breached Article 53 (2) of the 1992 Health Law which states that 'In carrying out their duties, health workers have an obligation to follow professional standards and respect patients' rights'—although, as far as I can ascertain, the New Order never specified these standards or rights, meaning that any prosecution under this Article would have been difficult.

5 According to figures from the Department of National Education, participation rates among children of junior secondary school age (i.e. 13-15 years) have improved significantly since 2004, while remaining at already high levels among students of primary school age (i.e. 7-12 years). At the same time, drop-out rates at both primary and junior secondary levels declined, particularly at primary school level, as did non-progression rates for primary school graduates (Rosser *et al* 2010). Academic and donor studies suggest that the *Askeskin/Jameksmas* schemes have had a modest positive impact on poor people's utilisation of health services and that this has reflected the pro-poor distribution of the health cards associated with these schemes and the associated price subsidy (Sparrow 2010; World Bank 2009).

security in the face of sickness and disability. On the education side, it states that everyone has a right to education and that education shall be free, at least at the elementary and fundamental stages. As noted in greater detail below, these rights are now also provided for in Indonesia's 1945 Constitution, as amended following the fall of the New Order. At the same time, there is significant evidence from other developing countries that user fees do not promote economic efficiency, generate increased revenue for public health systems, or improve the quality of care, all of which have been identified by supporters of user fees as their supposed benefits (Hall *et al* 2009: 87-89).

The Central Government's Response

Since the fall of the New Order, the central government in Indonesia has responded to the issue of user fees for public services in three main ways. First, it has introduced a raft of legal and regulatory changes that have served to strengthen the legal foundations for free public services. In 2000, the members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest legislative body in the country, amended the 1945 Constitution to provide all Indonesian citizens with (among other rights) the rights to obtain an education and to have access to social security. In 2002, they amended the Constitution again to introduce requirements for the government to fund a compulsory basic education program and to 'develop a system of social security for all people and to empower the weak and incapable.'[6] In 2003-2004, the national parliament (DPR) reinforced these changes by passing Law 20/2003 on the National Education System and Law 40/2004 on a National Social Security System. Article 34 (2) of Law 20/2003 states that the central government and regional governments will between them 'guarantee the implementation of compulsory education at a minimum at the basic education level *without charging any costs*' (italics added) while Article 17 (4) of Law 40/2004 states that social security program fees for the poor and needy will be paid by the government, effectively providing them with free social security. Finally, in 2008, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed off on two Government Regulations—47/2008 on Compulsory Education and 48/2008 on Education Funding—that provided the regulatory framework for national implementation of (not quite universal) free basic education. It was 'not quite universal' in the sense that these regulations explicitly excused so-called 'international standard schools' (SBI) and 'pioneering international standard schools' (RSBI), both of which are mainly attended by middle class children, from the requirement to abolish user fees.[7]

Second, the central government introduced a series of national programs to financially support provision of free public services, particularly for the poor, reflecting the fact that a key cause of user fees has been under-funding of the health and education systems. In the education sector, the most important of these was the School Operational Assistance (BOS) program. Introduced by the Yudhoyono government in 2005, this program provides funds directly to government and private primary and junior secondary schools on a per pupil basis to cover 'operational' costs such as those related to the registration of new students, the purchase of textbooks, the production of school report cards, stationery, teacher development and training, remedial teaching programs, and school examinations. When it was first introduced, schools that collected less in fees than the amount they were entitled to in BOS grants—that is, the vast majority of schools—were required to eliminate fees altogether while schools that collected more in fees were required to eliminate fees by the same amount as they were entitled to receive in BOS funds while giving priority to poor students. Following negotiations between the Department of National Education (DONE) and the Ministry of Finance over the growing size of the national education budget, it was decided to limit free basic education to less well-off students only, significantly reducing the cost of the program. Accordingly, in 2006, DONE revised the Guidelines governing the BOS program such that

6 See Articles 31(2) and 34(2) respectively.

7 SBI are schools that meet officially designated standards of quality regarding curriculum, staff qualifications and so on while RSBI are schools that are in the process of upgrading to international standard but have not yet made the grade

its objective was henceforth 'releasing less well-off students from education costs and reducing the costs for other students,' rather than realising *universal* free basic education. Following the issuance of Government Regulations 47/2008 and 48/2008, DONE again revised the BOS Guidelines to the effect that the BOS program is now aimed at freeing *all* students at government primary and junior secondary schools from the operational costs of schooling *except for* those attending SBI and RSBI (Rosser *et al* 2011).

In the health sector, the most important national programs have been Health Insurance for the Poor (*Askeskin*) and its successor Health Insurance for the Community (*Jamkesmas*). Introduced by the Yudhoyono government in 2004, the *Askeskin* program had three main components: (i) the issuance of *Askeskin* cards to people identified by central government agencies as being poor entitling them to free care at public health facilities and participating private facilities; (ii) the provision of operational funds to *puskesmas* (community health centres that provide primary care) in the form of capitation payments; and (iii) the reimbursement of public and participating private hospitals for providing health services to poor patients on a fee-for-service basis covering third class hospital rooms. The state-owned insurance company, P.T. Askes, was given the responsibility of managing the program in accordance with Law 40/2004's requirement that only four state enterprises (one of which is PT Askes) can implement social security programs. In 2008 this scheme was replaced by *Jamkesmas* which differed from the *Askeskin* scheme in that the Ministry of Health provided reimbursements to hospitals rather than PT Askes. Initially *Askeskin* had a budget of Rp2.25 trillion and provided coverage to 60 million poor people but by 2008 these had risen to Rp4.6 trillion and 76.4 million people (Rosser forthcoming; World Bank 2009: 24).

Implications for Our Analysis

For our purposes, the most important point about these legal and regulatory changes and new national programs is that they have still left district governments with significant discretion in terms of how they respond to the issue of user fees for public services for three reasons. First, while the right to free basic education was legislated for in 2003, it was only with the issuance of Government Regulations 47/2008 and 48/2008 that the central government formally implemented free basic education. From 2001 when decentralization was implemented up to that point, district governments had full discretion over whether or not they provided free basic education within their own districts and, if they did, who was entitled to it. Similarly, prior to the introduction of the *Askeskin* scheme, there were no obstacles to district governments introducing their own health insurance schemes for the poor if they wanted to—indeed, from 1998 to 2004 official central government policy was simply to encourage them to adopt their own Health Service Insurance for Poor Families (*JPK-gakin*) schemes.[8] Second, while district governments have been forced to participate in the BOS and *Askeskin/Jamkesmas* programs since their introduction in 2004-2005, they have had complete discretion over whether to provide additional financial assistance to these programs. The point here is that both programs have been underfunded. For instance, a recent World Bank (2009b) report noted that while the BOS program has increased schools' operational budgets by around 30 percent on average, it has not always covered all operational costs. Likewise, the *Askeskin/Jamkesmas* programs have not covered all people considered to be poor at the local level, only those assessed to be poor by central government agencies, and have only provided for a limited range of services. District governments have had the authority to 'top up' the BOS and *Askeskin/Jamkesmas* programs by providing their own operational assistance grants to schools (generally known as BOP or BOSDA) and setting up their own local health insurance schemes covering uninsured poor people (often referred to as Regional Health Insurance schemes or *Jamkesda*). But they have not been compelled to do so. Finally, district governments have also had much greater capacity to fund their own

8 The purpose of the JPK-gakin scheme was to provide poor people with access to free health care by paying for or subsidizing their membership in Community Health Insurance Schemes (JPKM). In the conventional JPKM model, commercial health insurance is provided by managing agents (*bapel*) in exchange for the payment of a premium, members are issued with membership cards, *bapels* only fund services at designated providers, and providers are funded on a capitation payment basis.

free public service programs than they had during the New Order years, reflecting the fact that a key element of decentralization has been the transfer of a substantial amount of resources from the centre to the districts. The extent to which individual districts have benefitted financially from decentralisation has varied enormously from district to district, with those in resource rich areas and areas where there are good sources of local revenue doing the best. But in general, district governments have been much better placed to provide financial support to free public services than in the past.

As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, the purpose of this report is explore how district governments have exercised this discretion and the way in which political factors have shaped their choices in this respect, focusing on a set of specific case studies. Before we can do this, however, it is necessary to examine the nature of local-level policy-making processes in Indonesia.

Understanding Local-level Policy-Making in Indonesia

Local level policy-making in Indonesia needs to be understood in terms of three broad sets of factors: institutional, structural and leadership-related.

Institutional Factors

Local level policy-making in Indonesia has been shaped significantly by the nature of the country's political institutions and in particular the way in which these have changed since the end of the New Order. During the New Order, the country's political system was highly authoritarian in nature, notwithstanding the holding of national general elections every five years, and policy-making authority and financial power was centralized in Jakarta and in the hands of President Suharto in particular. Following the fall of the New Order, the MPR passed a series of amendments to the 1945 Constitution and the DPR passed a series of new laws[9] that introduced genuinely competitive parliamentary elections at the national and local levels; permitted the establishment of new political parties; introduced direct elections for key executive positions such as President, Vice-President, provincial governor, and *bupati* (from 2004 onward in the case of the President and vice-president and 2005 onward in the case of provincial governors and *bupati*); gave the DPR and regional parliaments (DPRD) new powers over law and regulation-making processes; and shifted significant policy-making authority and financial power from the central government to district governments—in short, that introduced a simultaneous process of democratization and decentralisation.[10] As a number of scholars have pointed out, these changes have affected the respective roles of the central and regional governments in the policy-making process and, within the latter, of local parliaments and local executives (Turner *et al* 2003; Ray and Goodpaster 2003; Buehler 2009). In broad terms, they have produced a shift in policy-making authority away from the central government towards regional (especially district) governments and away from local executives towards local parliaments.

Importantly for our purposes, however, the extent of change in both respects has been less dramatic than some proponents of democratic decentralization in Indonesia had desired. For instance, in one of the most sophisticated institutionalist analyses of local policy-making in Indonesia, Michael Buehler (2009) has shown that while in formal legal terms local parliaments are meant to issue local regulations jointly with *bupatis*, in practice the latter have initiated the vast majority of these regulations and dominated deliberations over their formulation, suggesting that local executives continue to exercise greater authority over the policy-making process than DPRDs despite democratisation. At the same

9 Between them, Lindsey (2008), Schmit (2008), and Crouch (2010: 43-86) analyse the key constitutional and legal changes.

10 In broad terms, there are 5 levels of government in Indonesia: centre, province, district (*kabupaten*), sub-district (*kecamatan*), and village (*desa/kelurahan*).

time, he notes, Law 32/2004 on regional government, one of two laws introduced in 2004 that revised the country's initial decentralization laws, has made it harder for local parliaments to impeach *bupatis*, given *bupatis* the authority to intervene in the work of local parliaments in certain ways, and strengthened the hand of *bupatis* in budget preparation and management (2009: 278-279). Similarly, some have suggested that the introduction of direct elections for *bupati* positions in 2004—prior to this time, *bupatis* were elected by members of the district DPRD—has further enhanced their authority *vis-à-vis* local parliaments by giving them an independent mandate to govern (Schiller 2009: 151-152).[11]

Structural Factors

Local level policy-making processes in Indonesia also need to be understood in terms of the balance of power between major competing coalitions of interest. According to Vedi Hadiz (2003; 2004; Robison and Hadiz 2004), for instance, the key determinant of local level policy decisions in Indonesia since the fall of the New Order has been the fact that 'predatory elements' associated with the bureaucracy, military, privately-owned business groups, and criminal gangs—all elements that exercised enormous influence over policy-making during the New Order period—have survived democratization and decentralization. Reconstituting themselves through new alliances and vehicles such as political parties, he says, they have captured the institutions of democracy at the local level—on the legislative side, regional parliaments (DPRD) and, on the executive side, offices of the provincial governor and *bupati*—and in turn established new networks of patronage built around the enhanced financial resources and policy-making authority of local governments post-decentralisation (Hadiz 2004: 711). Local policy decisions, he says, have consequently come to serve the needs of these predatory networks rather than the interests of poor and marginalized groups. As such, he further suggests that there has been a high degree of continuity in the structure of power and interest between the New Order and post-New Order periods at the local level, notwithstanding democratisation and decentralization.

Leadership-related Factors

Finally, local-level policy-making processes need to be understood in terms of the quality of local leadership. A number of scholars have produced evidence to suggest that districts with 'good' leaders have been more likely to adopt developmental policies than districts with 'bad' leaders (von Luebke 2009; Patunru *et al* 2009; Leisher and Nachuk 2006). In a study covering 8 districts, for instance, Christian von Luebke (2009) has suggested that *bupati* who are ambitious and have strong political and administrative skills—'good' attributes in his view—have been more likely to pursue policies associated with 'good governance' than those that do not have such attributes. Democratization, he argues, has created an incentive for all *bupati* to pursue good governance because it is popular with voters and hence likely to translate into increased support at election time. But only ambitious *bupati* with good political and administrative skills have responded to this incentive and had the capacity to push governance reform through local parliaments and into implementation. *Bupati* who have lacked these attributes have either not pursued governance reforms in the first place or been unable to get such reforms passed and implemented.

There are problems with this argument. It implies that the vast majority of *bupati* have either lacked ambition or political and administrative skills—otherwise they would have adopted and implemented governance reforms—yet, anyone who stands for election as *bupati* in Indonesia can be reasonably assumed to have substantial political ambition and good political and administrative skills, given the substantial authority invested in the office of *bupati* under decentralization and the difficult machinations

11 It should be noted, however, that in the 2004-2007 elections for regional heads, candidates for *bupati* had to be selected and endorsed by one or more political parties that collectively had at least 15 percent of the votes/seats in the local parliament (Sulistiyanto and Erb 2009: 20), meaning that they remained tied to some extent to the interests of political parties.

involved in getting elected. At the same time, even if one assumes that some *bupati* are significantly more ambitious and politically skilful than others, it does not necessarily follow that they will pursue governance reforms—indeed, as we will see, *bupati* who have given little priority to the needs of ordinary citizens have in some cases been just as successful in getting re-elected, ensuring 'dynastic successions' (i.e. successions by a close family member),[12] or otherwise advancing their careers as those who choose to promote pro-poor policies. Nevertheless, the broad point that the quality of leadership matters seems persuasive.

In our view, we need to understand the influence of all these factors—institutional, structural, and agential—in order to explain the dynamics of local-level policy-making in Indonesia. However if our interest is in understanding variation in district governments' policy responses across districts, as it is here, it is the 'quality of leadership' variable that is the most useful. Scholars operating from institutionalist and structuralist perspectives have focused on explaining the broad trajectory of change within Indonesia as a whole rather than differences across regions while scholars operating from a quality of leadership perspective have done precisely the opposite. Accordingly, the 'quality of leadership' variable needs to be given analytical primacy. At the same time, for reasons we outline below, we suggest that this variable needs to be reinterpreted in terms of *bupati's* strategies for promoting their political careers and that these in turn need to be understood in terms of their personal networks, alliances and constituencies.

Approach

In broad terms, then, our approach here is as follows. First, we suggest that *bupati* can be seen as employing strategies that lie along a spectrum ranging from, at one end, 'political entrepreneurship' (Kosack 2009)—that is, the mobilisation of the poor through populist policies—to, at the other end, patronage distribution—that is, the mobilization of the poor and non-poor through the cultivation of clientelist networks. In our view, use of the first of these strategies constitutes better quality leadership than use of the second—at least in relation to the issue of user fees for public services—because it provides greater scope for the introduction of government programs supportive of free public services. Of course, these strategies are not mutually exclusive options—as we will see in greater detail in the following chapters, they can be used in combination. But in broad terms, one can distinguish between strategies that incorporate political entrepreneurship as a key element and strategies that rely predominantly on patronage distribution.

Second, we propose that *bupati's* choices about which strategy to pursue are best understood, not in terms of their respective levels of political ambition and political and administrative skills, but rather in terms of the incentives created by their personal networks, alliances, and constituencies. The point here is that where *bupati* rely on the backing of predatory interests such as business groups, the military and criminal gangs, they have a strong incentive to pursue strategies of patronage distribution because such groups expect a *quid pro quo* for their support and typically have the capacity to retaliate effectively if they do not get what they expected. Conversely, where *bupati* are relatively autonomous of predatory interests, they have an incentive to incorporate political entrepreneurship into their strategies. On the one hand, it can help them generate the popular support needed to get re-elected, ensure a dynastic succession, gain promotion, or otherwise promote their political careers. On the other hand, it can help them bolster their positions *vis-à-vis* local parliaments and political parties by enhancing their popularity to an extent that the latter do not challenge them for fear of alienating the voting public.

In proposing this approach to understanding local-level policy-making in Indonesia, we are not suggesting

12 Under Indonesia's electoral laws, *bupati*—like the President—are limited to two terms in office. In some cases, as we will see in greater detail in the case studies, incumbent *bupati* have sought to extend their control over government beyond two terms by backing a close family member (typically their spouse, son or daughter) to replace them as *bupati*.

that institutional and structural factors do not matter in shaping local-level policy decisions. While some *bupati* have stronger instrumental connections to predatory coalitions of interest than others, they all operate within a context, as Hadiz among others have shown, in which these coalitions of interest dominate local politics. They are all also subject to the constitutional provisions, laws and regulations mentioned above that govern policy-making at the local-level. Rather, we are simply suggesting that there is some scope for agency in local-level policy-making processes, that this centres on *bupati's* choices of strategy for advancing their careers, and that these choices in turn reflect the nature of their personal networks, alliances and constituencies.

The Cases

In the following two chapters, we use this analytical approach to examine district governments' responses to the issue of user fees for public services in four districts: Jembrana and Tabanan in Bali, and Sleman and Bantul in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). In the first pair of districts, we focus on the health sector while in the second pair we focus on the basic education sector.

We have chosen these districts and paired them in this way for two reasons. First, there is significant variation within each pair in terms of our dependent variable—that is, the nature of district governments' policies with regards to free health care (in the Bali cases) and free basic education (in the Yogyakarta cases): in short, the governments of Jembrana and Bantul have taken a much more aggressive approach to eliminating user fees in health care and basic education respectively than their counterparts in Tabanan and Sleman. Second, each pair of districts has key political and social similarities that allow us to hold constant a number of alternative explanatory variables besides the quality of leadership. Specifically, all four districts have been broadly under the control of the same political party, the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDI-P) since the fall of the New Order, have large populations of poor people that are mostly located in rural areas, do not possess large amounts of natural resource wealth and hence face similar fiscal constraints. This means that policy differences *vis-à-vis* the issue of user fees for public services across these districts cannot be explained simply in terms of differences in the ideological orientation of dominant political parties (cf Crook and Sverrisson 2003), the presence of poor constituents who would benefit from the elimination of user fees for public services, or differences in the financial capacities of district governments. Rather what emerges from the case studies is the significance of district leadership—and, in particular, the nature of *bupatis'* strategies for maintaining and advancing their political careers—in shaping policy decisions. Specifically, they suggest that where political leaders have sought to develop a mass popular base among the poor—that is, where they have pursued a strategy of 'political entrepreneurship'—district governments have been more likely to promote free public services than where political leaders have focused on consolidating party machines and patronage networks.

02

Chapter Two: The Politics of Free Health Care for the Poor in the Districts of Jembrana and Tabanan, Bali

This case study examines the politics of free health care for the poor in Jembrana and Tabanan, neighbouring districts in the province of Bali. The chapter suggests that there are significant differences in health policy between the two districts despite their geographical proximity and other similarities and that this is largely due to the political agency and styles of leadership of the districts' respective political leaders. In Jembrana, which has been under the leadership of Gede I Winasa (2000-2010), the introduction of an extensive and innovative program of free and subsidized health services and infrastructure has been a central priority and widely praised achievement of his administration while at the same time being a central part of Winasa's strategy for promoting his political interests in Jembrana and beyond through political entrepreneurship.[13] By contrast in Tabanan, which has been under the leadership of Nyoman Adi Wiryatama (2000-2010), there has been minimal interest or investment from the district government in pro-poor health services and infrastructure outside of those programs already subsidized by the national government. Spending priorities and resources have instead been focused upon a contentious 'international standard' hospital 'mega-project,' reflecting Wiryatama's pursuit of a political strategy centred on cultivation of clientelist networks. Further, in both cases, we suggest, these strategies have in turn reflected the two bupatis' respective political bases among, in the case of Winasa, lower caste members of society, NGOs, and religious and ethnic minorities and, in the case of Wiryatama, predatory criminal and business networks.

Since the end of the New Order regime in 1998 and Indonesia's transition to decentralised electoral democracy, party politics in Bali have been overwhelmingly dominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, or PDI-P), led nationally by Megawati Sukarnoputeri. In the first post New Order elections in 1999 the party secured 79.5% of the vote in Bali, radically reducing the share of the New Order's Golkar party in that province from 93.5 in 1997 to only 10.5%, and has maintained high percentages in subsequent elections (Schulte Nordholt, 2007: 16). Against this background of political dominance by a single party, aspirants for political power have had to negotiate with, placate, circumvent or be coopted by the PDI-P if they wish to secure political power. This has been the case in both Jembrana and Tabanan, with each bupati pursuing highly divergent strategies with dissimilar outcomes.

The chapter is divided into two broad sections, the first focused on Jembrana and the second on Tabanan. In discussing both districts, we begin by outlining their respective bupati's pathway to power, the nature of his political strategy and then concluding with an examination of the district's politics of health policy and services. In both cases, we point to key differences in policy outcomes and suggest that these

13 Winasa has received numerous awards and official recognition for his governance reforms, including in 2005 when he was listed as 'Man of the year' by *Tempo*, an influential national current affairs magazine.

are reflective of the particular styles and modes of leadership within each district.

Jembrana: Gede Winasa's rise to power

Jembrana is a regency covering 841.8 km2 or 14.94% of Bali's total area situated in the far west of the province. It has a population of approximately 235,000, the majority of whom (70%) are farmers (rice, coconuts and cacao). Unlike other parts of overwhelmingly Hindu Bali, Jembrana has a large Muslim population (around 57,000), consisting of recent and long term migrants from East Java and members of an historical community of ethnic Bugis originating from Makassar, South Sulawesi, in the town of Loloan. Existing outside of the main tourist industry areas, it is one of the poorest of Bali's nine districts. In 2001 around 19.4% of the population was officially classified by the regional government as poor, this figure going down to 10.9% in 2003. Official figures in 2009 listed the figure as only 5% though independent sources suggest that the actual figure is believed to still be over 10% (TIFA 2005, Gemari 2010).[14]

Since the first post-New Order elections for bupati in 1999, Jembrana has been dominated by the figure of Gede I Winasa. Winasa was born in Denpasar, Bali on 9 March 1950. His first foray into organisational politics began in high school during the tumultuous period of 1962-68, when as a teenager he held the position of Jembrana branch coordinator of the *Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Student Organisation or GSNI), the high school student organisation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai National Indonesia*, or PNI).[15] He studied dentistry at Airlangga University in Surabaya, East Java, graduating in 1978.[16] On being accepted as a civil servant in 1979 he was stationed as a dentist at a *Puskesmas* health clinic in Benculuk, Banyuwangi, East Java before moving to the Bangli General Hospital in Bali (Dharma Santika Putra, Budhiarta and Nanoq da Kansas 2006). In 1981 he was appointed as section head of the regional office of the Bali Health Department. Aside from his civil service responsibilities he also pursued a career as an academic, beginning as a lecturer in the School of Dentistry at Mahasaraswati University, Denpasar, before later becoming head of faculty (1983-1992) and finally a full professor in 1999. He spent two years in Japan (1990-91) furthering his dentistry skills as a research student at the School of Dentistry, Hiroshima University. During the early 1990s he also pursued, albeit briefly, a foray into business and in 1993 was chairperson of the Patria Group, a Surabaya based trading company specialising in the exporting of antiques and crafts to China, Japan, Europe and the US. He was also prominent in a number of professional organisations, serving as the secretary and later head of the Bali branch of the Indonesian Dentists Association (1980-87) and as head of the Bali Private Clinics Association (1996-1998) (Winasa 2009).

Following in the tradition of the first Balinese governor of Bali, Anak Agung Sutedja, Winasa's experience of studying in Java, away from obligations of Balinese society and amongst Indonesians of diverse backgrounds, helped to develop in him a strong Indonesian rather than Balinese identity. In his semi-autobiographical book, *Steps: Notes on a Life*, Winasa speaks at length regarding the significant impact Surabaya had upon him as a student in the 1970s, in particular its formative role in the consolidation of his 'political ideology' as a 'people's nationalist' (*nasionalis kerakyatan*), associated with the Sukarno derived philosophy of 'Marhaenisme' that rhetorically advocated for the social and economic wellbeing of the

14 The 5% figure is in keeping with Millennium Development Goals.

15 Winasa's father was an active member of the PNI. In Bali, the GSNI were particularly active in attacks on alleged sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party during 1965-66, who had wide support in Jembrana. The Bugis community in the town of Loloan joined forces with *Ansor* militias of the *Nahdatul Ulama* who came across from East Java, targeting in particular the royal house of Puri Negara which was seen as being established in order to counter Bugis influence (Ida Bagus 2008b). There is no data regarding Winasa's level of involvement in the violence of 65-66, other than his comment that it 'affected him deeply' and resulted in his 'apolitical' stance during the New Order (Winasa 2009).

16 According to Winasa, during his time as a student he also pursued his 'passion for business', selling tickets for the inter-province bus service running from Surabaya to Bali via Jembrana's port of Gilimanuk at a stall at the bus terminal. Interview with Gede Winasa, Jembrana, 2010.

'common man' (Winasa 2009).[17] He was also active in traditional clan organisations, in his case associated with the *Pasek* clan, who within Bali's caste system are commoners from the *Sudra* caste (Pitana, 1999).[18] The Hindu derived caste system and associated clan networks still exert considerable influence within Balinese society, in particular in regards to positions of political and religious leadership. Despite the interventionism of the New Order together with the dramatic post-98 democratic reforms, higher caste groups such as *Brahmana* and *Ksatriya* have continued to monopolise many prominent positions within the government administration. It was only in 2008 with the election of former police chief Made Pastika that Bali had its first non *Brahmana* or *Ksatriya* caste governor.[19] Since 1998 there has been a revitalisation of a *Pasek*-led campaign to abolish the caste system, particularly in the non-secular domain of Hindu ritual, but also by extension in contests for political positions (Juniartha 2008).[20] Through the *Pasek* movement, led in Bali by Wayan Wita, a cardiologist and former rector of Udayana University, and those clans with which it has an alliance (such as the *Bujangga Waisnawa* and *Pande* clans), Winasa developed close ties with other like-minded reformers who considered Bali's entrenched caste system, in particular its intertwining with politics, as an impediment to modern development and perhaps, more importantly, as a serious barrier to their own political aspirations.[21]

Aside from Winasa's position within the post-98 *Pasek* reform movement, he also had strong albeit unusual credentials rooted in local Jembrana traditions. In 1988 he married Ratna Ani Lestari, from Panderejo, Banyuwangi, which sits in East Java just across the Bali straits from Jembrana's port, Gilimanuk.[22] Inter-religious marriage between Muslims and Hindus has a long tradition in Jembrana, reflecting its history of relative cultural heterogeneity in comparison to other parts of Bali (Ida Bagus 2008a). In this respect, according to Ida Bagus, Winasa and Lestari (who comes from a politically influential Banyuwangi family), 'represent an idealised historical preference for Jembrana East Java relations' (Ida Bagus 2008b)[23]. This 'bridging' between Jembrana and Banyuwangi, and by extension Hindu and Muslim identities would be crucial in his ascension to the position of bupati in 1999.[24] As the gateway between Bali and East Java, Jembrana has a significant population of Muslim Javanese, Madurese and Bugis.[25] Winasa's Banyuwangi and Muslim connection gave him a significant support base amongst the district's Muslim population, in particular the economically powerful Bugis. This was helped by his profile as a *Pasek* clan leader, considering a history of animosity in Jembrana between the Bugis community and Brahmana royal houses. Winasa's *Pasek* involvement and closeness to the Bugis community initially created deep suspicion from

17 'Marheanisme' was extremely popular in Bali amongst PNI networks during the 1950 and 60s and was crucial to the party's ability to develop an extensive grass roots level of organization (Warren 1995). In this respect it is perhaps unsurprising that Winasa was influenced by it.

18 *Pasek* are the largest clan in Bali, making up around 60% of the total Balinese population.

19 Like Winasa, Pastika is also a *Pasek*.

20 The number of *Pasek* commoners holding *bupati* and regional parliamentary seats in Bali increased significantly from 1999 onwards, to the detriment of nobles and non-Balinese. In districts such as Badung these caste distinctions were highly politicised, with *Pasek* candidates campaigning on a slogan of a choice between 'feudalism and democracy' (Schulte Nordholt 2007, pg.76).

21 These included figures such as the Jembrana Bujangga Wainaswa clan leader Komang Wiasa who would later serve as Head of Communications in Winasa's administration. After Winasa's reform of the bureaucracy this position was crucial, involving responsibility for administering all branches of public service delivery. With a background in IT, Wiasa was also the driving force behind Jembrana's 'cyber-city program', involving the development of extensive online government services and providing wireless internet to remote regions. Most recently Wiasa has been nominated as a candidate for a position on the Indonesian Anti Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) due to his role in introducing anti-corruption measures in Jembrana.

22 According to anecdotal accounts Winasa and Lestari first met at Mahasaraswati University. At the time Winasa was head of the Faculty of Dentistry and Lestari was a sales representative for a powdered milk company that sponsored several events on the university campus. Confidential interview, Denpasar, 2010.

23 According to Ida Bagus, both East Java and West Bali have a number of shared characteristics: 'physical isolation, few employment opportunities, and lack of cohesive authenticity because these areas represent murky cultural zones, in this case the crossover between Islam and Hinduism' (Ida Bagus, 2008a: 3).

24 Winasa and Lestari's inter-religious marriage would later become a political liability for both. In Banyuwangi local clerics mobilized opposition to Lestari on the ground that she was registered as a Hindu whilst in Jembrana, growing suspicion of Muslims following the Bali bombings in 2002 led to questioning of Winasa's 'loyalty' to Bali (Ida Bagus 2008b). Lestari served as *bupati* of Banyuwangi from 2005 until 2010. Prior to this she was a member of Jembrana's regional parliament from 2001-2004, due largely to backing by her husband. Her ascension to the Banyuwangi *bupati* position very much mirrored that of Winasa, gaining the support of a diverse coalition of small parties to challenge the dominant PDI-P, and campaigning on a social reform program many considered to be a carbon copy of Winasa's.

25 Just over a quarter of the population of Jembrana are Muslim. Despite this support, Winasa would later write in a newspaper article in 2003 that Jembrana was deserving of special financial subsidization due to upsurges in migration from Java and attendant increases in crime and social disturbance. See, Gede Winasa (2003), 'Strategi Kependudukan Dalam Menjaga Keajegan Bali', Bali Post, 16 August.

the influential Brahmana priesthood in Jembrana, which he partially appeased by visiting them individually, accompanied by his own non-Brahmana priest, to explain his views on their role in ritual life (Ida Bagus 2008b).

His experience as a civil servant working within the health sector had sensitised him to what Winasa saw as serious deficiencies in the quality and accessibility of public services together with the deleterious effects of entrenched corruption.[26] In particular, Winasa felt that any effective health system must extend coverage to private clinics, an idea he discussed at length with other practitioners within the Bali Private Clinics Association networks.[27] He insists that he was still at this stage 'apolitical,' and that the drive to seek formal political power was in part 'an accident,' in part a desire to address the numerous problems that he had observed in his career as a civil servant, health practitioner and academic (Winasa 2009: 33). While not a member of any political party prior to his appointment as *bupati* in 2000, he volunteered as an on-site medic at the first PDI-P national congress held in Sanur, Bali in 1998. As he explained, 'As I was still a civil servant it wasn't possible for me to be overt, but I always gave support to the struggle of people's nationalists within the PDI-P' (Winasa 2009: 50).[28] Skirting at the edges of the PDI-P he attempted to develop informal links with 'like minded reformers' lobbying them with his ideas regarding 'pro-people' reforms in health, education, finance and administration.[29] In 1998 he established the Society of Jembrana Awakening Forum (SJAF) (*Forum Kebangkitan Masyarakat Jembrana*), an NGO ostensibly concerned with educating the population regarding their civil and political rights in the post-New Order environment, but which also gave him a non-party vehicle by which to further disseminate his ideas on political reform.

Winasa's role as a *Pasek* and NGO leader raised the profile of his ideas regarding pro-people reforms.[30] He realised however that party elites and factions within the PDI-P would never support his nomination, and that 'playing party politics' would restrict the possibility of realising his reform agenda.[31] Instead he used another strategy, which he has referred to as 'zig-zagging.'[32] Drawing on his 'Banyuwangi connection,' he secured nomination from a small parliamentary fraction of only three seats held by two Islamic parties, the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Awakening Party (PKB).[33] With the formal backing of this minority faction, together with the informal links developed through *Pasek* clan networks and his low key lobbying of individuals within the PDI-P, he was quietly confident that he had the numbers within Jembrana's regional parliament to break the PDI-P's hegemony, despite running against the PDI-P's candidate Ketut Sandiyasa, who had the full backing of the party machine. Holding 17 out of 30 seats in the Jembrana parliament the PDI-P assumed Sandiyasa would win without difficulty. However due to a technicality Sandiyasa was not able to gain the 50 +1 % needed to win outright. In a second round of voting held soon after, and to the shock of the PDI-P, Winasa defeated Sandiyasa by 19 votes to 11. Not only did Winasa gain the support of the minority faction that had nominated him but also Golkar and, most controversially, six PDI-P votes. Between the 1st and 2nd round of voting Winasa had managed to undermine the PDI-P's parliamentary majority.

The shock of defeat soon turned into anger, and for several days PDI-P supporters rioted, destroying the

26 Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, 12 February, 2010.

27 Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, 12 Febraury, 2010.

28 Civil servants were barred from membership in political parties.

29 We were unable to find evidence suggesting whether these 'like-minded individuals' within the PDI-P were those who later broke with party ranks to vote for Winasa in the 2000 elections. Considering however that 'Marheanists' have traditionally joined the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) (which was a forced amalgamation of nationalist and Christian parties created by the New Order and the party out of which the PDI-P emerged), this is highly possible. Either way, Winasa's strategy was to develop informal relationships with select individuals rather than enter into the formal party structure.

30 Confidential interview, Jembrana, February 2010.

31 Interview with Komang Wiasa, Negara, 20 February 2010

32 Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, April 2010

33 The PPP faction drew its votes almost exclusively from East Javanese migrants and Bugis. The Nahdatul Ulama affiliated PKB gains its support from ethnic Madurese.

local party headquarters as well as the home of the party chairperson.[34] Rank-and-file PDI-P members together with the party's Bali elites, were convinced that Winasa had bought the support of the six PDI-P 'traitors,' who were subsequently identified and expelled from the party (Zulkifli, Hasan, Anom and Wiremmer 2000). This would certainly fit a familiar pattern found in other parts of the country. However there has, unsurprisingly, yet to be compelling evidence to emerge that could either confirm or deny the allegations of vote buying.[35] It is clear however, that Winasa displayed skill as a political strategist. He worked hard at developing a broad range of relationships and grassroots networks through which he disseminated his plans for reform, while at the same time attempting to secure sufficient elite support to win power without becoming bound to the strictures and constraints of internal party politics. After securing his victory and allowing the dust to settle Winasa joined the PDI-P, later becoming head of the Jembrana chapter in 2005. For its part, despite being stung, the PDI-P was a happy to ride on Winasa's popularity until he quit in 2008 after it nominated Made Pastika ahead of him in the 2008 elections for governor.[36]

Winasa in Power

Coming to power in a climate of suspicion and animosity, within his first 12 months in office Winasa nonetheless managed to push through a range of pro-poor reforms: free education in 2001, a raft of anti-corruption measures, a micro-credit scheme and in 2002 an innovative health services program. He dovetailed freeing up district budget funds for these programs with the sidelining of political opponents within the bureaucracy, significantly reducing the size of administrative departments through layoffs of civil servants, and placing supporters such as Komang Wiasa in newly created key administrative positions.[37] Skilful at publicity and image management, Winasa made sure that he as an individual was indelibly associated with the programs introduced during his two periods as *bupati*, an association he hopes will now be transferred onto his son.[38]

Having entered the political arena as a relative outsider, with a base among lower caste Jembranans, the NGO movement, and the local Moslem community, this political strategy had a clear logic to it. Regarded as an enemy by senior figures within the PDI-P following the controversy surrounding his election, he could not be confident of its continuing support. And without the backing of elite sections of Jembrana's society, major business groups, or criminal networks, he could not draw on their organisational networks and resources to mobilise votes at election time. To advance his political career, Winasa had little option but to build up his personal popularity amongst the electorate via populist policies with which he was personally identified—in other words, to pursue a strategy of political entrepreneurship. In doing this, he displayed an open contempt for the political parties and successfully tried to manipulate them to promote his reform agenda. In interview, he argued that political parties were essentially a 'negative force' with deeply entrenched interests frequently at odds with the needs of society that they needed to be 'played' and strategically negotiated if meaningful reforms were to be enacted. He has argued that his intention was for 'politics' to be sidelined to the "interests of 'management".[39]

34 One person was killed in the violence. It also forced Winasa's official inauguration to be postponed for five months.

35 The most common theories surrounding the shock win held by those opposed to Winasa are that he drew on contacts in Japan to help finance buying out of the PDI-P parliamentarians, or that through his wife he mobilized the financial resources of the 'Banyuwangi connection' and business people linked to the Loloan Bugis community. Confidential interview, Jembrana 2010. It's worth noting in regard to the later that one bupati Winasa introduced a job placement training program for poor residents on shipping vessels owned and run by Loloan Bugis.

36 Without the backing of the PDI-P Winasa stood little chance of securing election. But just to make sure, the PDI-P ran a 'black campaign' on the issue of his religious affiliation candidates. In the end, Winasa, running as an independent, came last out of the three contenders with around 8% of the vote.

37 In his initial restructure of the bureaucracy large numbers of civil servants were sent into early retirement. Asked if this would have created a lot of political enemies, Winasa stated that the package given them was sufficient to 'keep them happy.' Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, April 2010.

38 Throughout Jembrana large billboards, mobile clinic vehicles as well as government promotional material and information pamphlets all prominently feature Winasa's image. However, just days after the official end of his period as bupati on 16 November 2010 groups of protesters roamed the district capital of Negara removing and defacing his image.

39 Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, April 2010

At the same time, however, he recognised the need to co-opt political opponents and stymie opposition through patronage distribution—in other words, to engage in precisely the sort of political behaviour to which he claimed to be opposed. To these ends, he introduced a number of official perks—for example, parliamentarians were allocated generous subsidies to undertake trips and study tours with the condition that they not spend more than two days a month in Jakarta. He also introduced a rewards system for civil servants for meeting performance indicators and regular salary increases for parliamentarians. Religious and customary leaders, including the Brahmana priesthood, were also given a regular salary on top of existing local salaries. Farmers, who make up the bulk of Jembrana's population, were allocated relatively generous subsidies for fertiliser and Village Allocation Funds (*Alokasi Dana Desa*, or ADD). In many respects this mirrors Wiryatama's strategy of buying out customary leaders via the dispersal of social assistance funds (Djani et al 2009), though Winasa insists that it was above board and to 'keep everyone happy', adding 'clearly the state must be of direct and practical benefit to the people'.[40]

This strategy paid quick and decisive political dividends for Winasa. In the 2005 direct elections for *bupati*, Winasa won an unprecedented 90% of the popular vote.

The Jembrana Health Insurance Program

The 'innovation' in health care introduced by Winasa is known as the Jembrana Health Insurance Program (*Jaminan Kesehatan Jembrana* or JKJ). Using a claim system, the JKJ provides cover for all registered residents of Jembrana, including general care, some dental treatment and specified types of specialist treatment for all residents, while the poor are also covered for periods of hospital stay care. The JKJ is administered through a government run health insurance business and covers care provided by private practitioners as well as government health services, including those outside of Jembrana. Any general practitioner, midwife, dentist may sign a JKJ contract to provide services to members which will be subsidised at a standard rate and subject to adherence to set standards.[41] By covering private practitioners as well, competition for patients increased as has the quality of services provided. Reimbursements for services are administered via a management body, which consists of both medical practitioners and civil servants. The premise of JKJ was to provide health services to all Jembrana residents, though specific additional benefits to the poor include coverage for secondary and tertiary care. The JKJ management claims all of the poor in Jembrana have registered with the program, however national surveys suggest only 66% were insured in 2006. This may be due to different criteria for identifying the poor, as well as the prohibitive aspect of registration such as an absence of documentation or difficulty in purchasing JKJ cards. These cards, which were initially allocated per family, are now allocated per individual, increasing the cost of registration. They cost Rp.5000 (65 cents) per person; however despite the low cost many poor residents have still had to borrow money to obtain one, making it not entirely 'poor friendly' (Gaduh *et al* 2006; World Bank 2008: 81).

Allocated subsidies for the procurement of medicines and equipment by health clinics and hospitals were cancelled and the funds then used to pay for insurance coverage. As mentioned the number of civil servants and government offices was also reduced, saving approximately Rp. 2-3 billion annually (Leisher and Nachuk 2006).[42] Remaining funds for the JKJ have come from central government subsidies. Additional budget funds were also allocated to increasing the number of ambulances and qualified nurses. The outcomes in terms of service have been tangible with numerous assessments of JKJ all in

40 Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, April 2010

41 These include strict standards covering medications, fees and services. Compliance has been generally well enforced. For example in 2003-2004 around 40 warnings were issued among the 197 healthcare providers, including 13 contract suspensions (Leisher and Nachuk 2006).

42 In 2003 the Jembrana administration paid an average of Rp.12,500 (Aus$1.56) per resident totaling Rp. 3 billion (Aus$375,000). In 2004 the total cost of the program was 4.5 billion (TIFA 2005).

consensus that the system has had a significant impact upon the use and quality of health services in Jembrana (Gaduh *et al* 2006; YIFA 2005; Sudaarsana, 2006).

The impetus and idea for the JKJ program came directly from Winasa. With a background as a civil servant, practicing dentist and academic, he had, as noted earlier, developed over the years a detailed set of ideas about how Jembrana's health system should be run. The JKJ represented the key manifestation of these ideas. At the same time, it also fit neatly with his use of political entrepreneurship to promote his interests. Indeed, as the flagship of his reform program, and one the key mechanisms by which he sought to reach out to poor voters in Jembrana, the JKJ was a central part of his campaign for re-election as *bupati* in 2005, his attempts to ensure a dynastic succession in 2010, and his campaign for governor in the same year.

Some analysts have suggested that the JKJ is not economically sustainable in the long term. Increased use of services has increased the cost of the scheme significantly resulting in a huge blowout in costs, worsened by a 10% drop in Jembrana's source revenue. The extension of coverage to all Jembrana residents, rather than the poor, has been the biggest source of cost blowouts with figures suggesting that in 2004 up to 95% of JKJ claims were made by those not categorised as poor (Gaduh *et al* 2005). Subsequently, Winasa's government has had to explore a variety of means for making the scheme self-financing into the future, particularly as the JKJ has been central to maintaining his grassroots political support. Winasa has promoted the notion of 'entrepreneur-officials' and of increasing private sector collaboration, highly problematic in the context of a political culture in which corruption and clientelism is still deeply entrenched. This has resulted in allegations of corruption and collusion, with Winasa, who officially ended his second term as *bupati* on 16 November, currently facing charges of embezzlement and money laundering.[43]

At the same time, there has been pressure from the national government for Jembrana to abandon JKJ in favour of its current preferred model for health financing, *Askeskin/Jamkesmas*. When JKJ was introduced in 2003, the then Megawati government supported the development of Community Health Insurance (JPKM) schemes, schemes in which—like the JKJ—commercial health insurance is provided by managing agents (*bapel*)[44] in exchange for the payment of a premium, members are issued with membership cards, *bapels* only fund services at designated providers, and providers are funded on a capitation payment basis. However, following the passage of Law 40/2004 on a National Security System (which compelled the national government to move towards a system of state-provided health insurance for the poor) and the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as President in 2004, the central government abandoned its support for these schemes in favour of state-provided health insurance via the *Askeskin/Jamkesmas* programs. Siti Fadillah Supari, Health Minister during SBY's first term as President and one of the key architects of *Askeskin/Jamkesmas*, has described Jembrana's decision to opt out of the *Askeskin/Jamkesmas* as 'incorrect' (*tidak benar*) and claims that it is in breach of Law 40/2004.[45]

Tabanan: the Rise of Adi Wiryatama

The district of Tabanan is situated to the east of Jembrana covering 840km2 with a population of around 415,000. Like Jembrana, farming is the largest source of livelihood with Tabanan known as the rice growing heartland of Bali, and it also has a significant fish farming industry. Also like Jembrana, it

43 In October 2010 Winasa failed to show up for police questioning for a second over the allegations, with police submitting a request to the President to arrest him, a requirement for a bupati, in early November 2010. The charges relate to the embezzlement of budget funds in the procurement of machinery for a fertilizer factory. Three officials, Jembrana's Environmental Agency head, enterprise director and one other official, together with the director of the contracted company, CV Puri Bening, have already been prosecuted and sentenced to jail terms of between 12-18 months over the case.

44 *Bapels* are essentially the same as the Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) that operate in US managed care systems except that in some cases they are for-profit rather than not-for-profit entities (Thabrany *et al* 2003: 132).

45 Interview, Jakarta, June 2010.

lies largely outside the main tourist locations in Bali, its only major tourist attraction being the ancient temple at Tanah Lot. According to the Tabanan administration in 2006 there were approximately 59,400 (14.62%) residents classified as poor (Dinas Kesehatan dan KB Tabanan 2008).

Just as Jembrana's politics has been dominated by the personality of Gede I Winasa, so Tabanan's has been dominated by that of Adi Wiryatama. Wiryatama's background and political ambitions are somewhat murkier than those of Winasa.[46] Born in Tabanan in 1956, like Winasa he was also active in the GSNI in the late 1960s, later as a university student joining the Indoneswian Democratic Party (PDI) affiliated Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia*). Anecdotal accounts suggest that he started his work career as a bell boy and guest relations staff at the Sanur Beach Hotel in the 1970s and early 1980s, including involvement in the Tourism Sector Workers Union (Serikat Buruh Pariwisata).[47] He then established a garment manufacturing business in Denpasar which expanded rapidly after attracting Japanese investors, as well as running a number of other small companies involved in cargo, tourism and contracting.[48] He was present at the New Order orchestrated attack on the PDI's Jakarta headquarters in 1996 which led to the formation of the PDI-P and from this time he developed close connections with Megawati and the PDI-P's central leadership, networks that would later be crucial to his securing and maintaining power in Tabanan. These included connections to Balinese power brokers such as Ketut Suryadi, Oka Ratmadi and Puspayogya (the current vice-governor of Bali).

Local NGOs in Tabanan claim his background is that of a *preman* (thug, gangster).[49] While this is perhaps misleading, it is true that prior to the beginning of his formal political career Wiryatama forged close links with Komang Sangjaya, a local strongman in Tabanan and leader of the Tabanan Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Tabanan,* or *Forkot*), an ostensive 'community' NGO formed in 1998 which in reality is an amalgamation of a number of protection racket gangs and local toughs who provide security in the markets and parking zones in Tabanan city. Sangjaya also led a number of martial arts groups, and in 1999 became head of the Tabanan branch of the PDI-P supporter youth group *Banteng Muda Indonesia*.[50] His activities also extended to property and development, with Sangjaya responsible for procuring construction contracts and brokering land title for a number of local and German companies.[51]

With his connections to the PDI-P national and provincial elite, capital from his successful business ventures and through Sangjaya, street level support from thug networks and connections to property and contractor companies, Wiryatama was able to gain the PDI-P's nomination for *bupati* in 1999 ahead of more senior figures within the Tabanan branch. With the PDI-P achieving a resounding victory in Tabanan in the 1999 elections, this in turn guaranteed him the *bupati's* job.

Wiryatama in Power

While Winasa's rise to power and maintenance of support rested upon complex networking, a short-term marriage of convenience with the PDI-P leadership, and populist pro-poor policies, Wiryatama sought to consolidate his rule by cultivating the support of criminal and business networks, maintaining the backing of the PDI-P's national elite, and intimidating potential political opponents. As the head of both the Tabanan district government and the local branch of the PDI-P, he had considerable patronage

46 There is a notable absence of biographical material on Wiryatama in either the local or national press, and in interviews even relatively senior civil servants were unclear or reticent to discuss his background prior to becoming bupati.

47 Confidential interview, Tabanan, June 2010.

48 These included PT Permata Soraindah Cargo, PT Intan Sejahtera and CV Sarinadi Utama. After becoming bupati most of these businesses were managed by his daughter Eka Wiryastuti, the current *bupati* of Tabanan.

49 Confidential interview, Tabanan, May 2009. Wiryatama is often referred to as *Bupati Preman*, a 'Thug District head'.

50 *Banteng Muda Indonesia* is one of a number of paramilitary-style PDI-P supporter groups that emerged post 1998.

51 These companies included PT Bintang Artha Wijaya and PT Bali Regency Twenty One, both Denpasar based contractors.

resources at his disposal which he dispensed liberally to reward key supporters. For instance, Komang Sangjaya was placed ahead of more senior party members in the 2009 elections, while his organisation *Forkot* received substantial *Dana Hibah,* budget funded grants.[52] *Forkot* was also integrated into the PDI-P party structure as a militant supporter wing, giving its members access to party resources while at the same time giving Wiryatama an internal party constituency he could mobilise to protect his own interests. Finally, companies linked to Sangjaya secured numerous lucrative contracts in less than transparent tendering processes for development projects allocated regional budget funds, with *Forkot* members over-represented in the Musrenbang (participatory planning and budgeting) consultative process. Key figures from local social organisations and political parties appear to have acted as 'brokers' in these tendering processes, despite having a conflict of interest *vis-à-vis* their participation in the Musrenbang forums, while decisions about who received contracts were taken within the *bupati*'s office (Djani, et al 2009).

At the same time, Wiryatama was able to maintain the backing of the PDI-P's national elite. With sufficient capital to buy the support of party members/voters combined with the intimidatory power of Sangjaya's thugs, the PDI-P under Wiryatama consistently achieved the highest percentage of votes for the party in Bali, endearing him to the PDI-P's national leadership. So strong was his support at the top levels that Megawati reportedly considered him a potential minister in any future cabinet.[53] This high-level support proved crucial towards the end of Wiryatama's reign as he endeavoured to organise a dynastic succession. In 2010 his daughter, Eka Wiryastuti, secured the PDI-P's nomination to replace her father as *bupati* with Sangjaya as her running mate but only after the local branch of the PDI-P had nominated another member, Eka Sukaja, as its preferred candidate. Faced with this situation, Wiryatama drew on his close connections in Jakarta to pressure the PDI-P's national leadership to overrule the nomination of Sukaja. This led to significant splits and rifts within the party, and led to Sukaja leaving the PDI-P in protest and running in the election as a candidate for Golkar. But it also ensured that Wiryastuti was able to run successfully for *bupati* and that Wiryatama's own interests were protected.

Finally, Wiryatama employed Sangjaya's thugs to intimidate potential political opponents and stymie dissent, in both blatant and subtle ways. For instance, civil society representation at musrenbang was dominated by 'social organizations,' NGO's, and martial arts organizations that, in several cases, had close links to political figures and political parties and a history of using intimidation. The presence of these organizations 'created an atmosphere in which many participants reported feeling constrained in their ability to question or criticise' (Djani *et al* 2009: 4). Villages that did not show electoral support for Wiryatama and the PDI-P have been subject to violence, such as Tunjuk village, a Golkar stronghold, which in 2004 was terrorised by so called 'ninjas', masked attackers who were later revealed to be members of pro-Wiryatama groups.[54] Punishment has also manifested in allocations of the district budget, with villages favouring rival political parties routinely receiving significantly less than those returning large majorities for the PDI-P (Djani et al 2009:4). Civil society groups critical of Wiryatama have also faced harassment. For example, on several occasions' attempts by the environmental NGO WALHI to host discussion forum in Tabanan were thwarted after the owners of the venue received threatening phone calls.[55]

52 Other recipients included the Tabanan Football Club, popular amongst Sangjaya's thug networks, which received Rp. 2 billion (BPK, 2009b).

53 Like Winasa, Wiryatama aspired to the governorship, and attempted in 2008 to seek nomination from the PDI-P

54 Confidential interviews with village heads, Tabanan, 2009.

55 Confidential interview with NGO activists, Denpasar, 2009.

Health Services in Tabanan

Despite the relatively high number of poor households in the district, the provision of free and subsided health services to the poor has remained a low political priority for Tabanan's administration. According to Arifianto *et al* (2005), Tabanan first introduced health insurance for the poor in 2003 via a pilot JPK-gakin scheme based on the JPKM model.[56] However, when the national government introduced *Askeskin* in 2005, Tabanan abandoned its JPK-gakin scheme in favour of the *Askeskin* program and its successor, *Jamkesmas*, which was introduced in 2008. Importantly for our purposes, the *Askeskin* and *Jamkesmas* schemes are much less generous in terms of the benefits and coverage they provide than the JKJ. In an interview, village chiefs in the Tabanan subdistrict of Kediri stated that in practice free health care services provided at community health centres (*puskesmas*) often entailed little more than the most basic services, such as general checkups and providing vitamin supplements.[57] At the same time, unlike the JKJ, *Askeskin* and *Jamkesmas* only cover residents officially identified by central government agencies as poor, not all residents within the district or even all people identified as poor at the local level. By 2006 it was estimated that only 40% of Tabanan's population had health insurance, with the majority of the remaining 60% coming from poor households (Bali Post, 2006a). The Wiryatama administration has committed to topping-up central government funding for the *Askeskin* and *Jamkesmas* programs in an attempt to expand insurance coverage. Of the 60,000 Tabanan residents covered by health insurance for the poor in 2007, for instance, 47,000 were nominally funded by the national government through *Askeskin* and 13,000 were nominally funded by the government of Tabanan (Bali Post 2007). But it appears that the government of Tabanan has not always come good on its financial commitment with the result that there has been a severe impacting upon the level of service and insurance coverage (Arifianto et al. 2005).

At the same time, the implementation of community health insurance in Tabanan has been fraught with irregularities and mismanagement (Arifianto et al 2005). Poor families were automatically enrolled in the JPK-gakin scheme: in 2004 this was around 37,780 people, 9% of Tabanan's population (Arifianto *et al* 2005). However criteria for qualifying for the scheme were unclear, meaning that many poor people were not identified and hence were unable to access available free health services. An audit of the Tabanan regional budget by the (*Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan*, or BPK) in 2009 discovered significant irregularities in the allocation of funds for health, for example, 1.5 billion rupiah of funds allocated for the *Jamkesmas* program was dispersed outside of existing protocols (BPK 2009a). This fits with the findings of Indonesian Corruption Watch and the Asia Research Centre that budgets have been routinely used to support clientilist networks linked to Wiryatama and the PDI-P, at the expense of public infrastructure and services (Djani et al 2009).

Rather than focusing on providing free health services to the poor, the Wiryatama government has been obsessed with the construction of an 'international standard' hospital, despite the existing public hospital in the district being one of only four in Bali with general hospital status (Bali Post 2006b). The project, which is in the early stages of construction, has been the subject of controversy with accusations of collusion surrounding the tendering and procurement processes and the land allocated for the hospital being linked to a real estate business owned by Wiryatama's wife. Wiryatama is also alleged to be a major shareholder in a medical supplies business contracted to equip and outfit the hospital, with companies linked to Sangjaya gaining key construction contracts.[58] The significant drain of the project on the regional budget has been rationalised by arguing that Tabanan requires a hospital that can cater to international tourists, despite the fact that the tourist industry in Tabanan, compared to the neighbouring

56 The initial impetus for some form of affordable health insurance for the poor in Tabanan reportedly came from the management of Tabanan's public hospital but both PT Akses and Tabanan's Health Agency have also claimed credit for the shift (Arifianto et al 2005).

57 Group interview with village heads, Kediri, 2009.

58 Confidential interview, Tabanan, April, 2009.

districts of Badung and Kuta, is relatively insignificant in terms of overall district revenue.[59] The hospital is proposed as a semi-commercial enterprise, offering a combination of standard medicine together with traditional and natural therapies in an attempt to attract the 'health tourist' market.

Village and subdistrict heads complained that the international hospital project had dominated debate to the exclusion of more pressing health related issues (most notably the poor condition of existing health centres), had not been subject to consultation with lower levels of government, and that in the context of the specific health needs of Tabanan the hospital project was considered to be a major waste of already limited resources.[60] Proposals from NGOs that Tabanan initiate a scheme similar to JKJ were rejected by Wiryatama on the grounds that it would be economically unsustainable. However despite the 'international standard' hospital being proposed as a semi-commercial project there has been no indication given as to whether this revenue will be put into public health services and facilities. With a power base in party, business and thug networks, Wiryatama was not reliant upon grass roots popular support and hence did not feel compelled to implement populist policies such as pro-poor health services, nor provide sufficient support to national programs. Discretionary budget funds were distributed to key figures prior to elections that were then expected to deliver votes, and networks linked to the PDI-P and Sangjaya were also mobilised, targeting villages supportive of other parties for campaigns of intimidation and terror.[61]

The JKBM

A significant shift in the dynamics of health services in both Tabanan and Jembrana occurred in December 2009 when Bali's governor Made Pastika announced that Rp. 123 billion rupiah would be allocated from the provincial budget to providing free health care for the whole of the province, extending to those not covered by existing insurance programs (approximately 2.5 million people). The *Jaminan Kesehatan Bali Mandara* or JKBM program entitles all those possessing a Balinese identity card to health care at local hospitals with admission into a 3rd class ward with an appropriate referral from a community health centre. Tabanan, which was allocated 25.7 billion rupiah, has been one of the first districts to begin implementation of the JKBM.[62] Jembrana on the other hand, despite the financial difficulties facing the JKJ, was the only district to refuse participation in JKBM. It appears that this is due in part to the intense political rivalry between Winasa and Pastika.[63] Winasa has publicly rejected claims his refusal of JKBM funds is politically motivated, arguing that as it already has a well-functioning free health care service, superior to that of the JKBM, the adoption of it would only create unnecessary confusion (Nusa Bali 2010).[64] In an interview, Winasa also stated his objection to the JKBM's method of allocating funds directly to hospitals and *puskesmas*, which he argued, was inviting mismanagement and corruption if not done in conjunction with more substantive overall reforms of health administration. Another point of contention was that the JKBM did not cover treatment in private clinics.[65]

59 Interview with Wirasana, former vice bupati of Tabanan, Tabanan, April, 2009. Plans for the hospital can be viewed on the contracted architects website: http://globalrancangselaras.com/portofolio/masterplan-rs-internasional-tabanan

60 Group interview with village heads, Tanah Lot, August 2009.

61 Elections in Tabanan have been routinely marred by acts of political violence and intimidation. In 2004 for example, so-called 'ninjas' terrorised villagers in Tunjuk, a Golkar stronghold. Driving vehicles with government number plates, several were captured by police but later released after Wiryatama intervened, convincing the police to release them into his care. Confidential interview, Tabanan, May, 2009.

62 As of 2010 the Bali Health Department estimates that 72% of Bali's population were already covered by JKBM.

63 Some informants in Jembrana suggested that Pastika had 'stolen' elements of the JKJ in an attempt to undermine Winasa's aspirations for the governorship

64 Despite Winasa's rejection of the JKBM funds, Jembrana has still been included in the programs budget, with officials stating that Winasa will "soon be out of office". Fractions within the Jembrana parliament have also called for Jembrana to take part in the program in 2011 (Nusa Bali 2010)

65 Interview with Gede Winasa, Negara, April 2010.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have argued that the different approaches to health policy—and in particular health insurance for the poor—pursued in Jembrana and Tabanan have reflected the different political strategies pursued by their respective *bupatis* and that these in turn have reflected these *bupatis*' different networks, alliances, and constituencies. In both districts, health policy has been formulated within an institutional context forged by processes of democratisation and decentralisation following the end of the New Order and a political and social context characterised by the continued dominance of predatory elites nurtured under the New Order. At the same time, it has also been formulated within the context of the PDI-P's dominance of local politics. But it has been differences in the nature of leadership across the two districts that has been the key determinant of their different approaches to the issue of health insurance for the poor.

In the case of Jembrana, the introduction and promotion of the JKJ reflected Winasa's use of political entrepreneurship to help secure re-election in 2005, engineer a dynastic succession in 2010, and position himself for a tilt at the governorship in the same year, a strategy that in turn reflected his political base among lower caste Jembranans, the NGO movement, and the district's Moslem minority. In Tabanan, by contrast, the Wiryatama government's unreliability in 'topping up' central government funding of the *Askeskin* and *Jamkesmas* schemes while prioritising mega-projects such as the proposed 'international standard' hospital has reflected his preference for an alternative political strategy based on the cultivation of clientelist networks and the building up of party machines. Using elite connections, access to capital and political thugs to secure and maintain power and distribute favours to loyalists and intimidate would be opponents, he was able to maintain his control over the Tabanan government without resort to populist policies. With the weight of the PDI-P party machine and Sangjaya's street thugs behind him populist pro-poor policies were, from his perspective, simply unnecessary.

For both Winasa and Wiryatama, the ending of their second term in office has brought with it issues of 'succession' and protection of their respective political legacies and interests. In Tabanan, Wiryatama successfully managed the transition to power of his daughter Wiryastuti and right hand man, Sangjaya, who together secured 46% of the vote in an election mired in controversy and later subject to contestation in the courts. Now several months into their first term Wiryastuti and Sangjaya have continued construction of the controversial international hospital project while implementing the provincial level funded JKBM. In Jembrana, where elections were held in December 2010, Winasa's son, Gede Patriana Krisna, ran with the nomination of the Democrat Party, the party associated with Indonesia's current President, SBY.[66] Seeing an opportunity to regain its monopoly the PDI-P threw its weight behind their nominee, Putu Artha, hoping to unravel Winasa's power base and return the political dynamics back to one where party interests prevail.[67] Senior national party officials publicly stated the PDI-P's 'authority and prestige' was at stake, and in a speech when visiting Jembrana Megawati said it was time to regain ground lost due to "traitors", a none too subtle reference to Winasa (Antara News, 2010). With his JKJ facing financial difficulties and based only upon a *bupati* decree, together with the introduction of Pastika's JKBM, his son lost the election and there is now a risk that his heralded health reforms will soon be dismantled. But exactly how the election result will affect the nature of health policy in that district remains to be seen.

66 Winasa together with a bupati from Riau, tried unsuccessfully in 2009 to challenge in the two term limit on *bupati*, with Winasa also at one point suggesting he may run alongside his son as deputy (Pasandaran, 2009).

67 This has included the party's central board distributing generous 'tactical funds' to all party sub-branches (Antara News, 2010).

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Chapter Three: The Politics of Free Basic Education in the Districts of Bantul and Sleman, Special Region of Yogyakarta[68]

This chapter examines the politics of free basic education in Bantul and Sleman, two districts in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). It suggests that there are significant differences in basic education policy between the two districts and that this is largely due to the political agency and styles of leadership of the districts' respective political leaders. In Bantul, which has been under the leadership of Idham Samawi (1999-2010), the local government took a progressive approach to the issue of free basic education, providing an early education subsidy to children of poor families, allocating top-up funds to support the BOS program, and responding positively to central government initiatives to implement UFBE. By contrast in Sleman, which has been under the leadership of Ibnu Subiyanto (1999-2008), the government was resistant to the very principle of universal free basic education and only began topping up the BOS program with local funds late in the piece. These different approaches to the issue of free basic education, we argue, have reflected the different political strategies pursued by each *bupati* and in turn their different personal networks, alliances and constituencies. With a political strategy centred on patronage distribution reflecting strong links to predatory business interests, Subiyanto had little interest in providing free basic education to the citizens of Sleman. By contrast, Samawi, whose political strategy incorporated political entrepreneurship and whose personal wealth and links to the local media and the Sultan of Yogyakarta gave him some autonomy from business interests, became a strong champion of free basic education in Bantul, even before the central government introduced the BOS program.

Like the politics of free health care for the poor in the Bali cases, the politics surrounding the issue of free basic education in Bantul and Sleman needs to be understood within the context of PDI-P dominance of local politics. Following the trend at the national level where the PDI-P gained the largest share of the vote in the 1999 elections, the local arm of the PDI-P won many seats in local parliaments within DIY including Bantul and Sleman. It did not achieve the same level of success in these districts as it did in Bali, failing to gain a majority of seats in both districts' parliaments, and, as such, it was necessary for local actors aligned with the PDI-P to make political deals or coalitions with other political actors or interest groups in order to get things done. But its numerical strength meant that it held the upper hand in these negotiations. Notwithstanding the PDI-P's dominance in both these districts, however, the interests and agendas that informed policy were quite different, reflecting their *bupati's* different political strategies and personal networks, alliances and constituencies. As we will see, this had significant consequences for local government policy *vis-a-vis* free basic education in the two districts.

Following the structure of the previous chapter, we have divided the discussion here by district, beginning with Bantul and then moving on to Sleman. In each case, we begin the discussion by outlining the relevant *bupati's* pathway to power and the nature of his political strategies, and then proceed to an examination

68 The names of all interviewees mentioned in the footnotes of this chapter are pseudonyms.

of the politics of basic education policy in his district. As in the previous chapter, we again point to key differences in policy outcomes and suggest that these are reflective of the particular styles and modes of leadership within each district.[69]

Bantul: The Rise of Idham Samawi

Bantul is a poor district located in the southern part of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). It has borders with Yogyakarta city to the north, Kulon Progo district to the west, Gunung Kidul district to the east and the Indian Ocean to the south. The landscape of Bantul district is dominated by lowland areas used mainly for agriculture and other economic activities, and some hilly area. Bantul has about 800,000 people, many of whom live in lowland areas where they work as farmers, traders, home industry workers, and tourism workers. Because of its proximity to the city of Yogyakarta, many people in Bantul commute every day to work in various jobs in the city and this makes a huge contribution to their daily incomes as well as to economic activity in both places.

It was in this social and political setting that Idham Samawi came to dominate local politics in Bantul from 1999 to 2010. He was born in Yogyakarta on 22 June 1950 into a local elite family.[70] During the 1960s, he went to school in Yogyakarta and during the 1970s he studied economics at the Indonesian Islamic University, a local private university with strong links to the local Islamic community. After graduation he went to work at *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, a local newspaper that his father had established during the Independence struggles of the 1940s. He rose steadily through the ranks at *Kedaulatan Rakyat,* becoming one of its top executives by the early 1990s. During the 1980s and 1990s, he also became involved in press industry organizations including the local branches of the Indonesian Publishers Association (SPS) and the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI). His involvement in SPS was particularly extensive: beginning in 1980, he held a series of senior positions within the organisation, becoming its Chairman between 1989 and 1996. Finally, he was involved in a range of organizations outside the media industry including the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN); a range of local professional football clubs; a local private journalism school; Taman Siswa, a nationalist educational movement committed to promoting education as a means of attaining personal and national autonomy; and Golkar, the New Order's electoral vehicle (Samawi nd).

In the mid-1990s, Samawi decided to leave Golkar and join Megawati's faction of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). During the 1980s and 1990s, the New Order's promotion of economic deregulation and privatisation fuelled the growth of large diversified business conglomerates that were owned either by relatives of senior political and bureaucratic figures in Jakarta or ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs who had close links to these figures with the result that these conglomerates increasingly came to dominate the economy (Rosser 2002; Robison and Hadiz 2004). This was no less the case in the media industry, making it hard for regional newspaper businesses like *Kedaulatan Rakyat* to survive. It is possible that Samawi's decision to join the PDI was essentially opportunistic in nature, reflecting a judgment that the New Order was coming to an end and that Megawati and her supporters would be well-placed to assume power once it did. But it is also likely that he felt that declining indigenous regional business enterprises such as *Kedaulatan Rakyat* would fare better under a Megawati-led government than one controlled by Golkar, given Megawati's expressed commitment to populist economic policies and her strong nationalist credentials (she is the daughter of Indonesia's first President, Sukarno).

Prior to entering politics, Samawi also developed a friendship with Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, presently the Governor of DIY. This friendship started during his student days in the 1970s when Samawi got to

69 Thank you to Juli Nugroho for helping us to gather information in Bantul and Sleman and to enlighten us in relation to the complexities of these places.

70 Details about the political life of Idham Samawi can be found in Sulistiyanto (2009) and Rohmaniyati et al (2005).

know the then Prince Mangkubumi. Later on in the 1980s, they became closer as they worked together in a local branch of Golkar in which the Sultan was the head. This connection to Sultan Hamengkubuwono X was to stand Samawi in good stead as he left behind the worlds of journalism and business and entered into politics. The Sultan occupies a special place in the politics of DIY. Under legislation passed early in the post-New Order period, he automatically becomes the Governor of DIY without going through an election. At the same time, as the leading cultural and religious figure in DIY, he can exert significant influence on voters at election time. His (usually implicit) endorsement is a huge boon for prospective candidates for public office (Lindsay 2009: 213; Sulistiyanto 2009: 192-194).

In 1999, then, Samawi was particularly well placed to run for *bupati* of Bantul. As a prominent local figure with extensive local networks, the backing of a local newspaper, good nationalist credentials (by virtue of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*'s history, his status as an indigenous entrepreneur, and his involvement in the Taman Siswa movement), good reform credentials (by virtue of his early conversion to the PDI-P and his background as a journalist), personal wealth, and a close connection to Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, he had all the characteristics that the PDI-P was looking for in a candidate for *bupati*. He thus secured the PDI-P's nomination and, with the PDI-P winning a large number of seats in Bantul's parliament in the 1999 elections, subsequent election as *bupati*.

Samawi in Power

Although Samawi came from an elite background and had significant links to the local business community, once in power he was able to maintain a degree of autonomy from predatory business interests for two reasons, both of which reflect the nature of his personal networks, alliances and constituencies. First, the fact that he had the endorsement of the Sultan of Yogyakarta gave him some protection from any group that may have wanted to unseat him because doing so would have meant taking on not only him but potentially the Sultan as well. Second, his personal wealth meant that he was probably not as reliant on financial support from local business groups as many other local political leaders, making him less beholden to particularistic interests. At the same time, Samawi clearly had much to gain in electoral terms from pursuing a policy agenda that favoured the poor over predatory business interests, given that Bantul has so many poor people. Such an agenda would also help him to consolidate support within nationalist circles, in particular among PDI-P party members ideologically committed to a radical populist economic policy agenda. To be sure, Samawi could not afford to ignore the needs of the local business community; to do so, would have been to risk provoking capital flight and precipitating economic collapse. Accordingly, during his terms as *bupati*, he established dedicated areas for industrial activity in the east and west of the district, introduced a range of new business development programs, and dramatically simplified business registration procedures, all to help improve the local business climate (Kusdarjito 2007; Regional Autonomy Watch and the Asia Foundation 2007: 2). However, when the interests of the business community ran up against his desire to pursue populist initiatives—as they did, for instance in relation to the issue of shopping mall and mini mart construction (see below)—he was able to sacrifice the former. In contrast to Ibnu Subiyanto in Sleman, his government was never captured by the local business community.

Within this context, Samawi devised a political strategy that had two main components. The first was the use of patronage resources to secure and maintain the support of the local political, bureaucratic, religious and cultural elite. Immediately after his election, he gained control of the PDI-P branch in Bantul and stamped his authority on the PDI-P's elected representatives in the local parliament. He also secured the support of politicians from other political parties such as the National Mandate Party (PAN), Golkar, the Nation Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*-PKB), the Unity Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*-PPP), the Democrat Party whose votes were required to pass

local legislation, and gained greater control over the bureaucracy by getting the loyalty of the District Secretary (*Sekretaris Daerah-Sekda*), the person who runs the local bureaucracy and gets things done when the head district has problems. He also worked hard to get the leaders of both the sub-district heads' (*camat*) association and the village heads' (*lurah*) association on his side, a move that would help with implementation of his policies. Finally, he cultivated support within the major Islamic religious organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and within cultural circles by regularly visiting Islamic leaders and donating funds and other education facilities to their schools, attending local cultural activities and implementing government plans to make Bantul a cultural hub.[71]

The second component of his strategy was the introduction of pro-poor economic and social programs aimed at securing the support of Bantul's many poor people. From the very beginning of his rule, Samawi visited villages on a regular basis with the aim of learning about the problems faced by poor farmers whose activities are vulnerable to economic downturns and natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, and so on). He also held regular meetings with NGO activists who advocated pro-poor reforms, sponsored academic fora and seminars at which their ideas were discussed, and sought to incorporate these ideas into policy. The result was a range of pro-poor schemes including ones to provide farmers with subsidies for pesticides, cheap loans, and stable prices for basic commodities; health schemes and educational assistance programs for poor families; and *babonisasi*, an initiative in which every primary school student in the district received two hens each in an attempt to help them save money and improve nutrition levels. His pro-poor policy agenda also included a ban on the building of new shopping malls and mini-marts in places where traditional markets were in operation, a measure aimed at protecting small trading enterprises. In pursuing this component of his strategy, Samawi was able to exploit his good connections to the local media. *Kedaulatan Rakyat* dutifully gave him positive coverage while TVRI, a local government television channel, gave him his own local TV show, a dialogue forum called *Pangkur Jengleng*, which was broadcast around Yogyakarta once a week. This forum usually discussed issues of concern for farmers and small traders living in villages in Bantul district. By exploiting these connections to the local media, Samawi was able to reach out to consolidate support among poor farmers, and small traders, as well as other poor sections of Bantul society.

This two-pronged strategy was enormously successful in terms of helping Samawi promote his political career. It allowed him to simultaneously gain the confidence of the local business community,[72] maintain support with the PDI-P, secure the support of the local parliament and bureaucracy, and achieve widespread popularity among the general public. This popularity in turn helped him win a second term as *bupati* in 2005 on a joint ticket with Sumarno, a career bureaucrat. Both of them were supported by the PDI-P and other small political parties and received about 73% of the total vote. His popularity among the general public also helped him engineer a 'dynastic succession' in 2010. The PDI-P local branch had failed to prepare well for his succession. In this situation, Idham campaigned openly for his wife, Sri Suryawidati (Ida Samawi), securing the support of the PDI-P and a host of other parties.[73] With her husband's support and the backing of these parties, she won about 60% of the vote in the 2010 elections and became the first female *bupati* not just in Bantul but in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Finally, after his term as *bupati* came to an end, Samawi was promoted to an important position in the PDI-P national council in Jakarta, giving him influence in other parts of Indonesia as well.

Of course, not everyone in Bantul has supported Samawi. He has been criticized for ruling Bantul like his

71 An example of Idham's cultural project was to establish an art market in Gabusan village in 2003. This project was not successful because the location was not good and therefore not many visitors come to this market. Interview with Jaya, Bantul, 30 January 2010.

72 *SWA*, a national business magazine, included him in its list of 'pro-business *bupati*' in 2004 (Rafick 2004). Bantul also received a high score in the Economic Governance Index published by Regional Autonomy Watch and the Asia Foundation in 2007. In part, this reflected the fact that respondents' had a positive evaluation of Bantul in terms the integrity and capacity of its *bupati*, one of the indicators that made up the index.

73 'Ida merasa lolos dari ujian berat', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 25 May 2010.

own 'property' and not allowing other local leaders or political parties to take it away from his hands.[74] It is also said that those who are critical of his leadership style either get co-opted or sidelined in parliament. Local anti-corruption NGOs have accused him of corruption in relation to a number of government contracts including those associated with the construction of a sports stadium, a film project, computer purchases, and the provision of funds to 'supporting organizations.' They have organized small periodic demonstrations to make their point (Syaifullah 2010).

Free Basic Education in Bantul

Under Samawi, the government of Bantul introduced a range of initiatives aimed at promoting 'free basic education' in the district, particularly for poor children. Education levels in Bantul are low. In the early 2000s, about 30% of the population had never attended school at all while 24% had completed primary school (24%), 37% had completed middle or upper high school, and 5% had completed tertiary studies.[75] For many residents, the key obstacle to attending school has been the high cost of an education. Among the major education-related costs that parents have faced are school fees, the cost of uniforms, voluntary school donations, the cost of textbooks, and transportation costs. In the early 2000s, before the introduction of the BOS program, the government of Bantul thus introduced a free education scheme under which children coming from the poorest families in rural areas were entitled to attend schools (from primary school up to high school) without paying all fees. Following the introduction of the BOS program in 2005, it then provided additional funding to primary and junior secondary schools to help cover their operational costs through a government grant initially called Education Operational Assistance (BOP) and subsequently Regional BOS (BOSDA). Finally, when it was directed by the Minister of National Education in 2009 to implement the central government's policy of free basic education at all primary and junior secondary schools except SBI and RSBI, it readily accepted this directive. While evidence is scant, these policies appear to have reduced the cost of basic education for poor children in Bantul and, in doing so, probably helped to improve school enrolment rates, even though they have not eliminated all costs that parents face in schooling their children.[76]

The introduction of a 'free basic education' policy in Bantul fit well with the pro-poor component of Samawi's political strategy aimed at mobilizing support among farmers, traders, and other sections of the poor. Indeed, this policy even became a formal part of his 2005 election campaign program known as *Projotamansari* which emphasised empowering farmers, community development, improving human resources, and strengthening the local economy.[77] At the same time, the policy attracted no opposition from the DPRD, reflecting Samawi's control over the PDI-P, co-optation of other political parties and, in all likelihood, their judgment that free basic education would be a popular policy that it would be unwise to oppose. Finally, it also attracted strong support from the local NGO community, particularly following the earthquake that struck DIY on 26 May 2006.

This earthquake killed thousands of people and destroyed many houses, school buildings and other public facilities. Bantul was the worst affected district. With parents unable to work because of injury or not being able to find jobs, they had no money to pay for their children's education needs. In this context,

74 Interview with Jaya, Bantul, 30 January 2010.

75 Quoted from Statistical Bureau of Bantul (Susenas 2000-2002).

76 The case of Mulyodadi village illustrates the nature of the current situation. This village is a part of Bambanglipuro sub-district which is located about 10 km south of the city of Bantul. It has a population of about 13,000 people, many of whom work as farmers, workers and small traders. The village has two primary schools, one belonging to the Bantul government and the other owned by Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), and one middle school. Students who go to high school have to travel to nearby places such as the city of Bantul, Imogiri or Manding. Following the introduction of the BOS and BOP/BOSDA programs, parents no longer have to pay for school fees at primary and junior secondary school level, reducing the cost of sending their children to school. But they still have to spend on average about Rp500,000 to 700,000 (A$60 -90) to meet the other costs of their children's education while the average monthly income of most of people in this village is only about Rp500,000. For many people, then, funding the cost of their children's education remains a big challenge. Interviews with residents of Mulyodadi village, July 2010.

77 Interview with Mustopo, Yogyakarta, 28 January 2010.

a group of education activists, students' organisations and non-government organisations in Yogyakarta initiated a public campaign for 'free schooling' (*sekolah gratis*) across the province, forming a coalition known as Task Force on Free Education and Consortium on Basic Social Services for Needy Children (*Kelompok Kerja Pendidikan Gratis dan Konsorsium Basic Social Service for Needy Children*)[78]. The main points in this campaign were that people have a right to education, the government has to fund it (as stated in Article 31 of the 1945 Constitution), free basic education is the line with the national government's education policy of compulsory education for all citizens from primary to junior secondary school, and free basic education helps to provide social justice for all (Kelompok Kerja Pendidikan Gratis, 2007: 5-6). They further demanded that funding for education be done efficiently and professionally; that corruption be avoided; and that governments pursued short and long-term plans to make the free education policy work, for instance, by introducing regulations that forbade any forms of extra school fees for parents; and supporting inclusion of a free education policy in the draft law on the Special Autonomy Status of DIY which has been under deliberation in the DPR for a number of years (Kelompok Kerja Pendidikan Gratis, 2007: 48-49).

Reflecting the fact that free basic education was a key element of Samawi's political strategy, the Bantul government responded to this campaign with a range of initiatives aimed at supporting implementation of free basic education in the district, notwithstanding the fact that it faced serious budgetary pressures stemming from the need to fund reconstruction efforts. The local Ministry of Education office issued a memo to all school principals instructing them to assist students who were already in school and new students who were about to start. It also abolished extra curriculum fees; increased education funding; made uniforms non-compulsory; and increased financial assistance from School Councils (*Dewan Sekolah*) for students from poor backgrounds. Disaster relief funding was also used to rebuild schools in villages throughout Bantul.

Sleman: The Rise of Ibnu Subiyanto

Sleman district is located in the northern part of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. It has borders with Yogyakarta city in the south, Kulon Progo and Magelang districts in the west, and Klaten district in the east. Sleman has a combination of low and high land areas used mainly for rice and other farming activities. It has about 884,000 people many of whom work as farmers, while the rest are traders, teachers, university lecturers, and also public servants. While a significant proportion of the district's population lives below the poverty line—about 14 percent in 2005 according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (2008)—it is a wealthier area than nearby Bantul. Those who live on the border between Sleman and Yogyakarta have seen the expansion of housing estates and many business and industrial activities in the area. This part of Sleman is urbanised, pluralist, and cosmopolitan. Many schools and universities are established here, including the prestigious Gajah Mada University, attracting many people from all over Indonesia and abroad.

It was in this social and political setting that Ibnu Subiyanto governed the Sleman district from 1999 to 2008. He was born in Yogyakarta on 5 March 1950.[79] He grew up and did his primary schooling in Solo and then studied in high schools in Yogyakarta. He went to university and completed a degree in accountancy at the Faculty of Economics at Gajah Mada University in 1980. During his university days, he was involved in student activism, joining the National Indonesian Students Association (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia-GMNI), a student group associated with the nationalist movement. After graduation, he worked for local accounting firms including the local branch of Hadori and Co, a mid-sized accounting firm that in 1988 became part of the HLB International group. He continued with this firm until the

78 See Kelompok Kerja Pendidikan Gratis (2007).
79 For biographies of Ibnu Subiyanto, see Faidati et al (2005), IANN News (nd), and Pacarkecilku (2010).

mid-1990s. While working in accounting practice, he also became a Lecturer at the College of Economic Studies (*Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi*-STIE) in Yogyakarta, achieving civil servant (*pegawai negeri sipil*) status in 1985 and eventually becoming Director of Academic Studies in 1987. He is also listed among the staff of the Faculty of Economics at Gajah Mada. In 1990, he became an executive (*pengurus*) at the Yogyakarta branch of the Association of Indonesian Accountants, the main representative organization for Indonesian accountants, giving him a role in relation to accounting issues and the internal politics of the local accounting industry. Finally, in the mid-1990s, he became active in party politics, joining the Megawati faction of the PDI.

By the time that Suharto fell and Indonesia began to democratize in 1998, then, Subiyanto had developed good networks within the local, national and international business community, in particular within the accounting industry; good connections within the local academic community; and reformist and nationalist credentials by virtue of his involvement with the PDI-P. He was thus well placed to run for *bupati*. As someone who combined strong nationalist credentials with the potential ability to mobilise resources from the business sector to support the party's electoral campaigns, he was an attractive candidate for the PDI-P. So when the party won the largest number of seats in the Sleman DPRD in the 1999 elections, Subiyanto gained its nomination for *bupati*, and with its numbers in the DPRD, subsequent election as *bupati* (King and Ilkodar, 2001).

Subiyanto in Power

After he won the *bupati* position, Ibnu began to broaden his political base in Sleman. First of all, he gained control of the PDI-P branch in Sleman and secured the support of politicians from the National Mandate Party (PAN), giving him on paper a majority of votes in the DPRD. He also restructured the bureaucracy by appointing his loyal supporters in various important positions from the district to village level. Ibnu also cultivated the support of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Islamic organizations that run many Islamic boarding schools (*madrasah*), non-religious schools, hospitals, universities and orphanages in Sleman. Muhammadiyah is very important in Sleman and many activists of this organisation are also active in PAN. A few prominent PAN leaders such as Amien Rais and Syafii Maarif live in the area.[80] Subiyanto was also close to a number of charismatic Islamic leaders (*kyai*) most of whom have many followers in their respective local areas. He also established good relationships with local business actors especially in the property or housing sector. Many of them supported Ibnu's political campaign and became his 'friends'. In return they got 'special' treatment in the form of licences and approvals to develop housing estates in highly populated areas near Yogyakarta such as Depok, Maguwo, Pogung and Mlati.

By contrast, he gave little attention to the many non-government organizations in Sleman and DIY more generally, regarding them as a source of opposition to and criticism of his policies.[81] He also failed to nurture a relationship with Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, something that is very unusual in DIY. The political support of the Sultan is important in the sense that it provides a degree of protection for *bupati*. One of the reasons, Subiyanto did not want to develop a good rapport with the Sultan was that he did not want to look after the business interests of the Sultan in Sleman, preferring instead to develop his own business 'empire' by making deals with local business actors.[82] Finally, he did not develop a good relationship with the local media in Yogyakarta, rarely talking to journalists to explain his policies or development activities.

80 Interview with Mustopo Yogyakarta, 31 January 2010.
81 Interview with Parman, Sleman, 2 February 2010.
82 Interview with Parman, Sleman, 2 February 2010.

In his first term of office, Ibnu adopted policies which addressed needs of rural people, many of whom lived in strong PDI-P strongholds such as the high land areas at the foot of Mount Merapi. He gave a lot of attention to them, introducing schemes providing cheap credit, subsidised fertilizers, and rural development funds. He also initiated programs designed to help Sleman achieve the millennium development goals (MDGs). For what he did in the first-term, Subiyanto won the 2006 Pilkada (direct elections of *bupati*) on a joint ticket with Sri Purnomo from PAN. They both won more than 30% of the total vote which allowed them to claim a victory, defeating their rivals supported by other coalitions of political parties. Most of the votes for Subiyanto and Purnomo came from rural areas and Muhammadiyah supporters (Faidati *et al*, 2005: 43).[83]

Subiyanto's leadership was tested in 2006 when Mount Merapi erupted causing the death of a more than a hundred people. He faced a lot of criticism from civil society and media because his government was slow in dealing with the victims in affected areas. The coordination of relief efforts was unorganised. In response, he travelled and visited many villages to see for himself the impact the eruption of Mount Merapi had had on the people who lived in highland areas. Some of the criticism of his leadership at that time was that he lost his focus in governing Sleman because he was busy making deals with his business cronies instead of strengthening or expanding his power bases.[84] Not long after this, he was investigated and then charged in a corruption case related to the printing of school textbooks for public schools. He was replaced by Sri Purnomo in 2008 and went to jail in 2009.

The fall of Subiyanto devastated the local leaders and supporters of the PDI-P in Sleman. With the 2010 Pilkada approaching, they had to find a suitable candidate as a replacement. They believed that PDI-P had to put up someone for at least the vice-*bupati* position because it had the largest number of seats in local parliament. The name that came out was Yuni Satia Rahayu who is a member of PDI-P and also a prominent women's activist. She was seen as a clean candidate as she had never been involved in political scandals or political deals in Sleman and therefore could attract votes.[85] The result was that Sri Purnomo and Yuni Satia Rahayu ran together supported by PDI-P and PAN and won about 34% of the total vote which made them the winners in the 2010 election.[86]

Free Basic Education Policy in Sleman

During Subiyanto's first term as *bupati* (1999-2004), he did little to promote free basic education in Sleman, even though he introduced various subsidy schemes to help farmers in rural areas. As we have seen, his focus was more on supporting local business actors many of whom invested their money in the property and housing sector within the district.[87] Public and political debate about the 'free basic education' policy became more pronounced after Subiyanto won his second term of office and the central government introduced the BOS program, both of which occurred in 2005, and the NGO campaign on free basic education began following the 2006 earthquake. Initially he remained resistant to the notion of free basic education, believing that it would create budgetary problems for the government of Sleman. He also felt that parents should make a financial contribution to their children's schools in order to generate the funds needed to maintain or improve education quality. This position accorded strongly within the interests of middle class residents in Sleman, who could afford school fees and whose main concern was thus to ensure that their children received a quality education; the interests of business, which wanted to minimize government spending and in turn local business taxes; and the interests of the local civil service, whose salaries or positions might need to be cut to free up the required funding

83 Interview with Mustopo, Yogyakarta, 31 January 2010.
84 Interview with Parman, Sleman, 2 February 2010.
85 Interview with Parman, Sleman, 2 February 2010.
86 'Hj Ida, Sri Purnomo, Sumpeno Unggul', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 24 May 2010.
87 Interview Mustopo, Sleman, 31 January 2010.

for free basic education given that their salaries dominated local government spending. But his position contradicted the interests of poor residents for whom the maintenance of school fees potentially meant reduced access to schooling. A free basic education policy, at least as it was being operationalised by the central government through the BOS program, potentially stood to benefit such residents in as much as it would make education more affordable not only at government schools but also the low-fee private religious schools run by Muhammadiyah and NU, which were eligible for BOS funding. In opposing free basic education, Subiyanto was thus potentially picking a fight with these religious organizations and the political parties to which they were linked.

It was in this context that that a debate on education issues emerged in the DPRD in 2008. In the beginning two Islamic political parties, PAN and PKS, took the initiative by introducing a draft regional regulation (*Rancangan Peraturan Daerah, Raperda*) on education, but later on PDI-P joined in. During the local parliamentary hearings that took place in March 2008, education experts and the public were invited to give their views on the draft regulation.[88] 'Free basic education' emerged as the most controversial issue. On one side, PAN and PKS supported this notion very strongly while, on the other side, the Sleman government showed a lack of commitment, at least at this point.[89] The point of difference was that the government claimed that it did not have financial resources to implement a 'free basic education' policy because it was going to be expensive. It was also said that it would be difficult to establish financial accountability along the way as there was no proper mechanism yet for implementing the policy. As a compromise, the Sleman government proposed that instead of adopting a 'free basic education' policy, attention should be given to creating 'affordable and better quality education' (*kebijakan pendidikan yang tergapai dan berkualitas*).[90] However, by the end of the hearings, no agreement had been reached, with both sides refusing to budge. At this point, Subiyanto proposed to the DPRD that the government should take over the legislation for further improvement. It agreed, in doing so making a tactical error because the draft legislation was never reintroduced by the Sleman government. Not long after that Subiyanto ended his political career in disgrace, as noted above.

Following Subiyanto's fall from power, the government of Sleman, now under PAN's Sri Purnomo, changed tack to some extent on the issue of free basic education. While the executive and the DPRD have still yet to approve the draft regional regulation on education,[91] Purnomo was able to find money to support the BOS program, introducing new BOSDA grants for primary and junior secondary schools from 2009.[92] This, combined with Subiyanto's fall from power, served to reduce the intensity of public debate about 'free basic education' policy in Sleman.

88 The details of hearings and the draft legislation can be found in Sekretariat Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (2008).
89 Interview with Mustopo (31 January 2010).
90 Interview with Mustopo (31 January 2010).
91 'Raperda Pendidikan Dipecah', Harian Jogja, 22 April 2010.
92 See *Peraturan Bupati Sleman Nomor 26 Tahun 2009 Tentang Bantuan Operasional Sekolah Daerah Untuk Sekolah Dasar dan Sekolah Menengah Pertama.*

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the role of leadership in shaping government policy *vis-à-vis* 'free basic education' policies in the districts of Bantul and Sleman, DIY. The two *bupati* examined in the chapter have both operated within a context characterised by the political dominance of predatory interests nurtured during the New Order period and an institutional environment defined by the country's particular approach to democratic decentralization. At the same time, they have been members of the same political party, the PDI-P headed by former President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Yet governments in the two districts have responded in quite different ways to the issue of free basic education. In Bantul, the Samawi administration reacted positively by putting in place an education subsidy for children of poor families and supporting central government initiatives to promote UFBE. In Sleman, by contrast, the Subiyanto administration did not prioritise 'free basic education,' reflecting his administration's capture by predatory business interests, notwithstanding efforts by PAN and PKS to introduce a regional regulation for free education. Further, we have argued that these different approaches have reflected the different political strategies pursued by each *bupati* and that these in turn have reflected their different personal networks, alliances and constituencies. For Samawi, free basic education fit well with his strategy of political entrepreneurship, a strategy that was facilitated by his relative autonomy from business interests. For Subiyanto, by contrast, it fit poorly with his attempts to promote his career through a strategy of patronage distribution reflecting his strong links to predatory business interests.

In both districts, it is important to note that the future of free basic education rests to a significant extent on the views of the current and future *bupatis*. In neither district has the policy been supported by a regional regulation passed by the DPRD. In Bantul, Samawi has developed a reputation for making decisions by executive fiat rather than with the formal approval of the DPRD, reflecting his dominance of the latter (Sulistiyanto 2009: 200). Free basic education appears to have been no different in this respect—we could find no evidence that Samawi and the Bantul DPRD had produced a regional regulation on free education. As we have seen in Sleman, the draft regional regulation on education produced by the DPRD has still not yet been signed off by the *bupati* and the government's provision of BOSDA rests on a *bupati* regulation (*peraturan bupati*) that could easily be revoked by the current or future *bupati* down the track. As such, a shift in policy *vis-à-vis* free basic education in both districts only requires a change in strategy on the part of the *bupati*. In this environment, district leadership will remain an important determinant of government policy *vis-à-vis* free basic education in both districts for the foreseeable future.

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Chapter Four: Policy Implications

This report has suggested that the decisions of district governments in Indonesia *vis-à-vis* the issue of free public services have strongly reflected the quality of political leadership, defined here in terms of the nature of leaders' strategies for promoting their political careers. Where district leaders have pursued strategies of political entrepreneurship, we have shown, district governments have provided funding and adopted policy frameworks to support provision of free public services, especially to the poor. By contrast, where they have pursued strategies of patronage distribution, district governments have been reluctant to provide such funding and policy frameworks. Indeed, in some cases, they have actively resisted the very principle of free basic education on the grounds that it was unaffordable and that citizens are willing to pay school fees in order to secure higher quality basic education for their children. At the same time, this report has suggested that the key determinant of district leaders' choice of strategy has been the nature of their personal networks, alliances and constituencies. Where leaders have been relatively autonomous of predatory interests or backed by other groups, they have incorporated political entrepreneurship into their strategies because it has helped them generate the popular support needed to promote their political careers and bolster their positions *vis-à-vis* local parliaments, political parties and elites. By contrast, where leaders have relied on the backing of predatory business and criminal interests, they have been more likely to pursue strategies of patronage distribution because of their need to provide special favours to their supporters and mobilise votes through party machines and existing patronage networks. As we have seen in the cases of Sleman and Tabanan, these strategies have in turn allowed little room for policies of free public services because government time and resources have been consumed serving predatory interests.

What are the policy implications of these findings? Much recent analysis on the issue of user fees for public services in developing countries has suggested that eliminating these fees is largely a question of funding and management. In recent years, several developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have introduced universal free basic education (UFBE) including Malawi (1994), Tanzania (2001), Kenya (1974/2003), and Uganda (1997/2003), yet these changes have not always had a positive impact (CHER 2002). While the introduction of UFBE has generally led to large initial increases in school enrolments, in a number of cases, user fees have re-emerged, contributing to high drop-out rates. Explaining this outcome, Bentaouet-Kattan and Burnett (2004: 4) have argued that 'in cases where fees are an effective contribution to school access or quality, there is a need to ensure replacement of fees with revenues of equal effectiveness and size' to ensure that quality is maintained and user fees do not reappear (see also Hillman and Jenkner 2004: 256). Reinikka and Svensson (2004) have gone further suggesting that eliminating user fees requires not only the provision of replacement funds but also efforts to ensure that these funds reach the school level. In Uganda, they note, it was only after a Public Expenditure Tracking survey found that just 20 percent of financial resources were reaching the school level and the government undertook a newspaper campaign publicizing the grants and amounts that schools ought

to be receiving that they were able to capture the resources required to deliver free education. Similarly, health economists have argued that the key to providing free health services in developing countries is to ensure that the removal of legal user fees is accompanied by a larger package of reforms that includes increases in funding to public health facilities and measures that prepare health workers for the consequences of increased utilisation rates (Gilson and McIntyre 2005; James *et al* 2006; Xu *et al* 2006; Yates 2009; Campbell *et al* 2009). Unless this larger package of reforms is adopted, they suggest, the removal of legal fees will simply produce an increase in illegal fees by creating funding shortages at public health facilities that (i) force public health workers to seek new sources of income for themselves and/or to maintain services (Xu *et al* 2006; James *et al* 2006) and (ii) impact negatively on health workers' workloads and morale (Burnham *et al* 2004; Rosser, forthcoming).

In contrast, this report suggests that eliminating user fees for public services is primarily a matter of politics and in particular that it requires the emergence of political leaders who incorporate political entrepreneurship into their strategies for promoting their political careers. On the basis of an analysis of the origins of free basic education in Brazil, Ghana and Taiwan, Stephen Kosack (2009) has found that that governments in most developing countries are most likely to invest in free basic education when political leaders try to mobilise the poor for their own political purposes, do so successfully, and become dependent upon them for their political survival and, accordingly, has argued that: 'It is this political entrepreneurship that the international community must encourage if it is to realise [Educational for All] for the unfortunate children whose governments do not today possess political will.' Our analysis supports this policy conclusion while at the same time suggesting that it extends beyond the issue of free basic education to free health care as well. Only when leaders pursue strategies of political entrepreneurship will governments have the 'political will' to support both free basic education and health care.

But how can proponents of free public services promote political entrepreneurship? As noted in the introductory chapter, von Luebke (2009) has suggested that democratic decentralization in Indonesia has created an incentive for district leaders to pursue pro-poor policies because such policies promise to enhance their popularity among the electorate and hence their chances of being elected or re-elected or otherwise advancing their political careers. Similarly, Kosack (2009) has suggested that political entrepreneurship may be made easier by democratisation because it increases the scope for the poor and their supporters to organize and participate in the policy-making process, although he also acknowledges that democratization has not always led to favourable outcomes in this respect. There is clear evidence in the cases we have examined here of political leaders, especially in Bantul and Sleman, seeking to enhance their popularity among voters by adopting and implementing policies that provide for free public services. There is also evidence—specifically from the case of Bantul—that democratization can facilitate organization on the part of NGO activists who support a pro-poor policy agenda and that this in turn can increase pressure on government to promote free public services. But, on the whole, our analysis suggests that democratization will not be enough on its own to ensure political entrepreneurship because the incentive for leaders to pursue this strategy may be outweighed by competing incentives to engage in patronage distribution, particularly where they rely on the backing of predatory elements in business, the military, the bureaucracy and criminal gangs.

The key challenge, then, according to our analysis, is to secure the emergence of leaders who either have alternative bases of support outside the dominant predatory networks (as with Winasa in Jembrana, for instance) or who are connected to these networks but somehow have a degree of autonomy from them (as with Samawi in Bantul). Only when such leaders emerge, our analysis suggests, will strategies of political entrepreneurship be politically possible and the potential for democracy to promote developmental outcomes be realised. Unfortunately, significantly enhancing the prospects of such leadership emerging in developing countries in the short-term is extremely difficult particularly where, like

Indonesia, predatory interests dominate the political scene. Indeed, the literature on post-New Order local level politics in Indonesia would suggest that the cases of Bantul and Jembrana are very much the exception rather than the rule. At the same time, donor interventions designed to promote particular types of leadership may breach developing countries' sovereignty, especially if they are targeted at particular leaders. There is only so far that donors can go in terms of attempting to shape the political environments of developing countries before they either break international law or risk being thrown out by developing country governments that are controlled by the interests they are trying challenge.

However, our cases suggest two ways in which proponents of free public services in developing countries, including donor organizations, can potentially promote political entrepreneurship in these countries without breaching sovereignty, breaking international law, or running the risk of being thrown out of the country. The first is by promoting awareness of 'success stories'—i.e. cases where leaders have introduced free public services to their political benefit—among the political elite so that leaders casting for policy ideas to inform a strategy of political entrepreneurship will include free public services on their menu of options. In Bali, as we have seen, Governor Pastika's awareness of the contribution of the JKJ to Winasa's political success and his desire to stymie his run for the governorship appears to have been key factors in his decision to introduce the JKBM. This suggests that there is potential for politically successful free public service schemes to leverage change in other regions or countries if it serves the interests of their latter's leaders. The second is by supporting anti-corruption NGOs and agencies, in the case of donors, by providing them with adequate funding to carry out their activities and, in the case of domestic proponents of free public services, collaborating with them to produce the evidence required to bring down leaders who pursue strategies of patronage distribution. Anti-corruption institutions played a significant role in exposing the corruption that led to Ibnu Subiyanto's removal as leader and prosecuting him in court. While the current charges against Winasa show that 'good' leaders can potentially get caught in the anti-corruption net as well—he has recently been charged in relation to a government contract for a composting facility[93]—domestic proponents of free public services can help stack the deck against leaders who pursue strategies of patronage distribution by concentrating their efforts on them. Of course, the removal of one 'bad' leader does not guarantee that the next one will be 'good,' particularly if s/he too is backed by predatory business or other elements. However, 'good' leaders cannot emerge until 'bad' leaders are gone, so there is potentially something to be gained by pursuing the former for corruption. Both these initiatives will help to change the incentives that political leaders face in favour of strategies of political entrepreneurship and against strategies of patronage distribution.

Other than these two initiatives the main policy implication of our analysis is that proponents of free public services and, in particular donor organizations, should be selective about where they put their effort and money and draw on political analysis in determining whether to engage in particular countries or regions. The point here is that some countries or regions are more likely to be receptive to attempts to promote free public services than others and their degree of receptivity will in turn reflect the nature of their leaders' political strategies. To get the biggest development bang for their buck, proponents of free public services therefore need to carry out analyses of potential recipient countries/regions' political contexts, focusing on leaders' political strategies, and in turn build these analyses into their decision-making and planning processes. For donor organizations, the most obvious times to do this are when preparing country or sector strategies. However, the constantly changing nature of politics and, in particular the fact that political leaders come and go and change their strategies over time as new threats and opportunities arise, means that it will be necessary to carry out such analysis on a routine basis.

As a final (if rather sobering) point, we should note that while political entrepreneurship can promote

93 On this case, see 'Bupati Jembrana I Gede Winasa Jadi Tersangka Korupsi Pabrik Kompos,' available at: http://infokorupsi.com/id/korupsi.php?ac=7441&l=bupati-jembrana-i-gede-winasa-jadi-tersangka-korupsi-pabrik-kompos.

the provision of promote free public services, it may not be enough on its own to ensure this outcome. As Rosser *et al* (2011) have argued based on an analysis of the national-level politics surrounding free basic services in Indonesia, political entrepreneurship can lead to governments providing the funding and policy frameworks required to support provision of free public services. But it does not necessarily ensure that this funding will be used as intended or that these policy frameworks are properly implemented. The point here is that there is a separate politics of implementation and enforcement that is independent of the struggle over policy frameworks and funding and that operates at the level of service provider organisations (e.g. schools and hospitals) and law enforcement institutions rather than the level of parliaments and political leaders. For free public services to be realised, this separate politics must also play out in a way that is favourable to such services. Nevertheless, it is clear that political entrepreneurship that leads to increased funding and policy frameworks supportive of free public services can make a significant contribution to their realization and in turn to the realization of the rights of the poor people in developing countries who currently lack access to basic education and health care.

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