



DLP

Policy and Practice for Developmental
Leaders, Elites and Coalitions

DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

Research Paper 19

Emerging and non-Emerging African Countries: A Statistical Exploration of the Leadership Factor

Monique Theron
February 2012



The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) is an international policy initiative informed by targeted research and directed by an independent steering committee. DLP is supported by a global network of partners and currently receives its core funding from the Australian aid program.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Australian Government or any of DLP's other partner organisations.

Table of Contents

Abstract	2
Executive Summary	3
1. Aims and Objectives	5
2. Introduction	7
3. Selection Principles and Methods	8
3.1 <i>Emerging, Threshold and Non-emerging</i> countries	8
3.2 <i>Emerging and Threshold</i> countries	8
3.3 <i>Non-emerging</i> countries	9
4. Leaders from <i>Emerging and Threshold Countries</i> versus <i>Non-emerging Countries</i>	10
4.1 Educational qualifications	10
4.1.1 Level of education	10
4.1.1.1 Exceptions	13
4.1.2 Fields of study	14
4.2 Age at which leaders first came to power	15
4.3 Career history / career trajectory	16
4.4 Political background	19
4.5 Types of ruler	21
4.5.1 Military rulers in post-1990s <i>Emerging and Threshold</i> countries	21
4.5.2 Personal rulers in post-1990s <i>Emerging and Threshold</i> countries	22
5. Incumbent Presidents 2010 / 2011	23
5.1 Educational qualifications	23
5.2 Age at which leaders first came to power	23
5.3 Types of occupations held during leaders' career paths	24
5.4 Political background	24
6. Reflection: The South African Example of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma	26
7. Conclusion	28
References	29
Annex	30

Abstract¹

This paper builds on Steve Radelet's (2010) distinction between *Emerging*, *Threshold* and *Non-emerging* Sub-Saharan African countries. The seventeen *Emerging* countries analysed by Radelet have seen rapid economic growth and political reform since the mid-1990s. His study also includes six *Threshold* countries and sixteen *Non-emerging* countries, which have seen moderate or no change in economic growth, democratic reform or other social indicators. This paper aims to contribute to Radelet's analysis by exploring whether the changing profiles of African executive heads of state can be considered as a contributing factor to the positive change in the *Emerging* countries he has described. By comparing the biographical characteristics of leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries with those of the leaders from *Non-Emerging* countries before and after the mid-1990s, this paper finds that there is a statistical correlation between the biographical characteristics of leaders in these groups of countries and the changes observed in *Emerging* countries after the mid-1990s. This study makes use of the Developmental Leadership Programme's (DLP) African Heads of State database, which allows researchers to compare the biographical details of leaders, and it compares and analyses the level of education, fields of study, age, career history and political background of leaders from both *Emerging* and *Non-emerging* countries. The analysis indicates that the leaders in Radelet's category of *Emerging* countries have more years in education², are more mature, have a different and more diverse career history and less military experience than (a) their counterparts before the mid-1990s and (b) leaders of *Non-emerging* countries. This shows that leaders' empirical biographical characteristics are variables that should not be ignored when studying development and could be relevant variables affecting whether and how soon a country makes the transition from *Non-Emerging* to *Emerging* status.

¹ Monique Theron is Senior Researcher, Growth and Development, at the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, Johannesburg, South Africa. The author acknowledges the invaluable contributions made while researching and writing this paper by the DLP's Director of Research, Adrian Leftwich; the DLP Database manager, Fraser Kennedy; and Heather Lyne de Ver.

² Primary to tertiary level.

Executive Summary

A descriptive study conducted by Steve Radelet (2010) indicated that there are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that have seen rapid political and socio-economic development since the mid-1990s. Radelet refers to those countries as *Emerging* countries, as opposed to *Non-Emerging* countries that have seen little or no development since the mid-1990s. The trajectory of *Emerging* countries was supported by various internal and external forces. Although all countries were most likely affected by these same forces, not all of them reached the status of an *Emerging* country. Therefore there must be other variables that ignited and supported the emergence of such countries. Leaders in post-1990s *Emerging* countries differ significantly from their predecessors in the pre-1990s era, and from leaders in *Non-Emerging* countries, with respect to their levels of education, fields of study, age, career histories and political backgrounds. This paper argues that the biographical profiles of African Executive Heads of State are variables to take into account when explaining paths of development.

Key findings emerging from this paper are:

The following was observed with regards to leaders from *Emerging* countries in the post-1990s:

- Leaders from post-1990s *Emerging* countries have more years in education³ (with an average level of education score of 9.6⁴) compared to their counterparts (with level of education scores ranging from 5 to 6).
- 67.4% of post-1990s *Emerging* leaders hold an undergraduate degree or higher, compared 42.1% of leaders from pre-1990s *Emerging* countries. Of the leaders who were in power in *Non-emerging* countries before the mid-1990s, 28.3% held an undergraduate degree, where in the post-1990s *Non-emerging* countries that figure stands at 52.2%. Therefore, the rapid development of *Emerging* countries after the 1990s goes alongside an increase in educational qualifications of its leaders. These leaders are therefore also more educated than their counterparts in *Non-emerging* countries.
- Although there are leaders from post-1990s *Emerging* countries who do not have any qualifications beyond secondary education, it evidently did not imply that they were not able to make a positive contribution to the development of their countries. Several of those leaders' studies were interrupted by political turmoil or liberation wars (in particular cases from former Portuguese countries). Valuing the importance of education and having the drive to develop as a leader might also be viewed as characteristics of a successful developmental-minded leader.
- The most popular fields of study of leaders from post-1990s *Emerging* countries were Law, Economics and Education (in that particular order). The number of leaders holding degrees in these subjects increased almost three-fold from pre- to post- the 1990s. Before the mid-1990s, none of the leaders from *Non-emerging* countries held degrees in any of the above-mentioned subjects. Since the 1990s, leaders from *Non-emerging* countries for the first time studied Law, Arts and Humanities and Economics amongst other subjects, although the number of degree holders in this group remains small in comparison.
- Leaders from post-1990s *Emerging* countries were on average 55.47 years of age when they first came to power; compared to 47.02 years pre-1990s. Leaders from *Non-emerging* countries were on average 45.64 years of age (pre-1990s) and 47.43 years (post-1990s).

³ Primary to tertiary level.

⁴ When scoring level of education in terms of attainment of primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education. The full scoring system is explained in section 4.1.1 on page 10

The career experience of leaders from *Emerging* countries changed from before the mid-1990s to after the mid-1990s. The major observations are as follows:

- Experience in the civil service has remained relatively constant at just over 30% of the leaders.
- The percentage of leaders who had experience in the Legal and Political professions⁵ has increased.
- The percentage of leaders who had experience in the military decreased by almost 50%.
- For the first time since the mid-1990s, leaders had experience in fields such as Business, Research and NGOs; which indicates an increased variety of fields in which leaders have experience.

With regard to changes in the career experience of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries since the mid-1990s, the following observations can be made:

- The percentage of leaders with experience in the civil service has decreased by almost 50%.
- The percentage of leaders with experience in the military has remained relatively constant.
- The percentage of leaders with experience in politics has also remained relatively constant.
- Post the mid-1990s, there was a slight decrease in the variety of fields in which leaders have experience.

Data on the political background of leaders found no link between the extent of leaders' political experiences and the status of the countries that they have led.

⁵ Political positions include minister; member of legislature, mayor / governor; head of opposition, etc.

1.0

Aims and Objectives

The first paper in this two-part study found that there is an overall positive trend in the types of Sub-Saharan African executive heads of state who came to power between the 1960s and the current decade. Post-1990 leaders are older, more educated, have more experience and expertise in critical fields such as economics and have greater respect for democracy (Theron, 2011). This second paper departs from the first paper but is also based on data recorded in the Developmental Leadership Programme's (DLP) Leadership Database. The database recorded biographical details of African executive heads of state (the selection criteria for the leaders who form part of the study are outlined in the first paper and the leaders included in this study are listed in the annex).

This second paper tracks whether this change in the overall profile of Sub-Saharan African heads of state and government can be statistically correlated with the wave of democracy and development that has swept the continent over the past two decades. Making use of Radelet's (2010) study of *Emerging* and *Non-emerging* sub-Saharan African states, this paper aims to contribute to the study of development by tracking whether leaders' profiles have seen a parallel change with the political and economic change in countries identified by Radelet (2010).

Therefore this study also aims to contribute to Radelet's (2010) work by looking at leaders' profiles. Whether a particular political and socio-economic situation in a country can be attributed in part to a leader's profile, or whether the type of leader who comes to power is a function of the political and socio-economic situation in a country, is another question that this paper investigates.

According to Radelet (2010: 51-55), the positive developments and reform in the 17 *Emerging* countries are related to several internal and external forces. These include autocratic governments running out of resources to manoeuvre their continued stay in power; domestic pressures and protests from civil society coupled with international pressures; and the end of the Cold War and apartheid. *Emerging* countries have therefore seen accelerated economic growth, a shift toward democracy and improvements in governance. These three components are "connected in a virtuous circle in which improvements in one area help support improvements in the other" (Radelet, 2010: 66). Furthermore, Radelet (2010: 66) observed that there has been a fundamental shift in the quality of leadership in *Emerging* countries, although he does not elaborate on what "quality leadership" entails.

Since the majority of the internal and external forces listed above must have influenced all sub-Saharan countries in one way or the other, according to Radelet, the question arises as to why is it that only 17 of the sub-Saharan states reached the status of an *Emerging* country? There must therefore be other factors that contributed to these states' emergence; and to date, their sustained development. Radelet (2010: 20) believes, and rightly so, that there is a new generation of political and other leaders emerging in Africa. These are leaders with "a globalised outlook" and who had the opportunity to live and attend universities abroad which "exposed them to international ideas". The next question therefore is: What does the profile of a "new generation" leader look like? This paper continues to unpack the empirical

biographical characteristics of those individuals leading and igniting development in their countries.

2.0

Introduction

The statistical data in this paper points to a correlation between the profile of a country's leader and the state of development in a country. Although a leader's profile is definitely not the ultimate determinant of the level of development in a state, it is clearly a factor that should be considered. Apart from the link between these two variables as illustrated by the statistics presented in this paper, further evidence for the argument that leaders' profiles do matter in development can be found when studying possible political and economic changes that occur when a new leader comes to power. These changes could be actively affected by the new leader or could be an indirect consequence of the new profile. A change in profile when a new leader enters a country's national political arena could be a catalyst for change (whether positive or negative change, directly or indirectly).

Research conducted by Jones and Olken (2005: 835) indicates that there is a correlation between countries that experience dramatic reversals in growth and changes in national leadership. The question however is whether changes in growth is driven (or hampered) in part by new leadership, or whether the emergence of new leaders is driven by causal economic (and political) conditions. Jones and Olken (2005: 836) mention examples from research to illustrate the latter. For example, high growth rates in a country could inhibit military coups; also incumbent presidents are more likely to be re-elected during periods of economic boom.

This paper argues that both considerations are valid, in that the political and economic environment at a certain time could influence the type of leader that emerged, but it is also the leader who will have an influence on whether a particular environment will be sustained or transformed. This forms part of the broader structure-agency debate in social science.

3.0

Selection Principles and Methods

3.1 Emerging, Threshold and Non-emerging countries

This paper uses Steven Radelet's (2010) classification of African countries in terms of their developmental status in the 21st century. Radelet (2010) categorised African countries as being *Emerging* countries, *Threshold* countries, "Other" (*Non-emerging*) countries or oil exporters. This paper will in turn group the heads of state and government studied in the first paper according to the first three of these categories and in doing so, will compare the overall profile of the leaders of these three groups of countries.

3.2 Emerging and Threshold countries

Emerging countries are countries that have since the mid-1990s begun to undergo dramatic changes in economic growth, poverty reduction and political accountability. There are seventeen sub-Saharan countries⁶ categorised in this group. There are a further six countries⁷ that have seen promising developments, but not as dramatic as the *Emerging* countries. These countries are classified as *Threshold* countries. For the purpose of this study, *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries are grouped together, simply because there are so few *Threshold* countries, which does not make them viable to study for statistical purposes as a group on its own.

None of these countries are oil-exporters and their rapid development is not as a result of commodity booms (Radelet, 2010: 12). Radelet (2010: 13-14) based his categorisation of these countries on changes in their economic growth rates, level of poverty, trade and investment, school enrolment and literacy rates, health indicators and population growth. Although he did track changes in governance and the development of democracy, he did not look in detail at the leaders involved in this process. This study therefore explores whether the profiles of the executive heads of state in these countries should also be considered as a variable that contributed to the introduction of more sensible economic policies and, in turn, the turnaround of these countries.

Emerging and *Threshold* countries share a clear break from the past. The developmental trajectory of these countries changed significantly during the mid-1990s (Radelet, 2010: 13). In light of this, leaders from this group of countries are divided into two separate groups, namely leaders from the 1960s to mid-1990s in one group and leaders post the mid-1990s in another.

⁶ Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (Note that the profiles of the leaders of Seychelles are not in this paper, since the leaders of Seychelles were not included in the Developmental Leadership Programme's Leadership Database).

⁷ Benin, Liberia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

3.3 Non-emerging countries

Sixteen other non-oil exporting countries⁸ were identified. These are the countries that still have not yet met the standards of the *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries and can also be described as failed, fragile or soft states. These countries have “shown relatively little change in income levels, social indicators and governance” since the 1990s (Radelet, 2010: 31). For the sake of this analysis, the leaders from these countries are also divided into two groups, namely leaders from the 1960s to mid-1990s in one group and leaders post the mid-1990s in another. This allows us to see whether the leadership profiles of these countries changed during the time when the *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries embarked on their developmental path during the mid-1990s.

⁸ Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe (Note that the profiles of the leaders of Comoros are not in this paper, since the leaders of Comoros were not included in the Developmental Leadership Programme's Leadership Database).

4.0

Leaders from Emerging and Threshold Countries versus Non-emerging Countries

4.1 Educational qualifications ⁹

4.1.1 Level of Education

In order to measure how leaders' level of education changed from before the mid-1990s to post the mid-1990s, numerical values were assigned to each type of qualification:

Primary education or basic education = 1

Secondary education = 2

Vocational or technical qualification = 3

Diploma or teaching qualification = 4

Undergraduate degree = 5

Post-graduate degree = 6

PhD = 7

The value of each qualification accumulates to make up a leader's final score. For example, a leader who holds a PhD would therefore be awarded a score of 20 (2+5+6+7). A leader who holds a post-graduate degree as well as a teaching degree would be awarded a score of 17 (2+4+5+6). Note that a leader who completed secondary school is not awarded the additional 1 point allocated for primary or basic education. The 1 point score in that regard is reserved for leaders who have very limited education simply to indicate that that leader has basic literacy.

Emerging and Threshold countries: 1960 to mid-1990s

The average score of the 38 leaders who were in power in *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries during the period 1960 to the mid-1990s amounted to **6.76**. The highest six scorers in this group were Hastings Kamuzu Banda - Malawi (24), Kwame Nkrumah - Ghana (22), Milton Augustus Strieby Margai - Sierra Leone (20), Julius Nyerere - Tanzania (17), Seretse Khama - Botswana (13) and Seewoosagur Ramgoolam - Mauritius (13).

Of the 38 leaders in this category, 16 (**42.1%**) held an undergraduate degree or higher. Their fields of study were Law (4), Social Sciences (5), Economics (3), Health Studies or Medicine (3), Arts and Humanities (2), Administration or Management (2), Languages (1) and Education (1)¹⁰.

⁹ Note that only qualifications obtained by leaders before they came to power were considered in this study.

¹⁰ Note that the number of fields of study does not correspond with the number of leaders holding an undergraduate degree or higher. This is due to the fact that some leaders might have done their post-graduate degrees in a different field of study or that some leaders hold more than one undergraduate degree. This applies to the following sections as well.

Emerging and Threshold countries: mid-1990s to 2010

The average score of the 46 leaders who were in power in *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries during the mid-1990s to 2010 amounted to **9.6**. The highest scorers in this group were Abdoulaye Wade - Senegal (27), Thomas Yayi Boni - Benin (27), Bingu wa Mutharika - Malawi (20), Antonio Manuel Mascarenhas Monterio - Cape Verde (20), Alpha Oumar Konare - Mali (20), and John Evans Atta-Mills - Ghana (20).

Of the 46 leaders in this category, 31 (**67.4%**) held an undergraduate degree or higher. Their fields of study were Law (12), Economics (10), Education (4), Social Sciences (4), Medicine (2), Arts and Humanities (1), Business (1) and Sciences (1).

Non-emerging countries: 1960 to mid-1990s

The average score of the 21 leaders who were in power in the *Non-emerging* countries during the period 1960 to the mid-1990s, amounted to **5.04**. The highest scorers in this category are Dawda Kairaba Jawara - Gambia (13) and Félix Houphouët-Boigny - Cote d'Ivoire (11). Of the 21 leaders in this category, 5 (**23.8%**) held an undergraduate degree or higher. Their fields of study were Engineering (1), Medicine (1), Sciences (1), Theology (1) and Business (1).

Non-emerging countries: mid-1990s to 2010

The average score of the 23 leaders who were in power in the *Non-emerging* countries during the mid-1990s to 2010 amounted to 7.65. However, should Robert Mugabe (who has an exorbitant score of 43 and whose qualifications are disputed) not be included in the calculation then the average score reduces to **5.78**.

Of the 23 leaders in the category, 12 (**52.2%**) held an undergraduate degree or higher. Their fields of study were Law (3), Arts and Humanities (2), Economics (1), Social Sciences (1), Business (1), Sciences (1), Education (1), Agriculture (1) Engineering (1). Note that again Robert Mugabe's fields of study are not included for the reasons stated above.

Table 1 below summarises the average educational score of leaders, as well as the percentage of leaders who held undergraduate degrees or higher. In both cases the leaders from the post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries have higher scores than their counterparts in the other three groups.

Table 1: Average Educational Qualification Score: Emerging and Threshold Countries versus Non-emerging countries 1960-2010

Emerging and Threshold Countries 1960 to mid-1990s		Emerging and Threshold Countries mid-1990s to 2010		Non-Emerging Countries 1960 to mid-1990s		Non-Emerging Countries mid-1990s to 2010	
Average Score	% of leaders holding an undergraduate degree or higher	Average Score	% of leaders holding an undergraduate degree or higher	Average Score	% of leaders holding an undergraduate degree or higher	Average Score	% of leaders holding and undergraduate degree or higher
6.76	42.1%	9.6	67.4%	5.04	23.8%	5.75	52.2%




Figure 1: Average level of education of leaders: *Emerging and Threshold* countries compared with *Non-emerging* countries




Figure 2: Percentage of leaders holding an undergraduate degree of higher: *Emerging and Threshold* Countries compared with *Non-emerging* countries

From Figures 1 and 2 it can be observed that the level of education of leaders from the *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries (throughout the five decades) has been on average considerably higher than that of leaders from the *Non-emerging* countries. There has been an increase in the level of education of leaders from both groups of countries from the mid-1990s onwards, yet the leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries maintain a higher average than the leaders from *Non-emerging* countries.

From the data provided in Figure 1, it could be argued that the significant increase (from 6.75 to 9.7 points) in the level of education of leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries could have been a contributor to the positive turn in development of those countries during the mid-1990s. This corresponds with the very small increase (0.71 points) in the level of education of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries that did not see any positive new development during the mid-1990s. Although both groups of countries saw a significant increase in the percentage of degree holders from the mid-1990s onwards (refer to Figure 2), it should be noted that in the *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries group there are 11 post-graduate degree holders and 5 PhD holders. In the *Non-emerging* countries group there are however only one post-graduate degree holder and 3 PhD holders.

4.1.1.1 Exceptions

The conclusions drawn above are based on averages and therefore do not exclude the possibility of exceptions. In the post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* group, 11 (23%)¹¹ of the 46 leaders did not study beyond secondary school. Those leaders are Joaquim Alberto Chissano and Armando Emilio Guebuza (Mozambique), Pedro Pires (Cape Verde), Blaise Compaore (Burkina Faso), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), Jerry Rawlings (Ghana), Seretse Ian Khama (Botswana), Sam Nujoma (Namibia), Amadou Toumani Toure (Mali), Jacob Zuma (South Africa) and Mathieu Kerekou (Benin).

Chissano was one of the first black children in Mozambique to graduate from the Liceu Salazar (Salazar High School). In 1960 he went to Portugal to study medicine at the University of Lisbon. His studies were however interrupted by his political activities and he was compelled to leave Portugal and go into exile in Tanzania (Rake, 1992: 205). Guebuza, while in high school, was an active member of Mozambique's student movement, Núcleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundários de Moçambique (NESAM). This led to his arrest by the Portuguese colonial police and he was imprisoned for six months at the age of 19. Upon his release he fled to Tanzania to join FRELIMO in the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule (Rake, 1992: 208). It could be argued that due to the nature of the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, there was perhaps less time to pursue studies while in exile. Time was rather spent receiving military training in anticipation of a protracted and violent armed struggle against the Portuguese.

So these Mozambican leaders were in exile under different political circumstances, when compared to leaders such as Uganda's Yoweri Museveni who did complete his degree in Social Sciences at the University of Dar-es-Salaam while in exile in Tanzania. Unlike Chissano and Guebuza, Museveni was preparing to overthrow the military regime of Idi Amin in Uganda. It could therefore be argued that a particular colonial power (in this case Portugal more than the British or French) could have hampered leaders' opportunities to pursue tertiary education. Cape Verde's (also a former Portuguese colony) Pires' studies were similarly hampered by the Portuguese. Pires commenced his studies in Science at the University of Lisbon in 1956, but was called to serve in the Portuguese Air Force before completing his degree.

Although Pires, unlike the majority of his counterparts in the post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* group,

¹¹ Note that the percentage of 23% of leaders who do not hold any qualifications beyond secondary school does not amount to 100% when added to the 67.40% who hold undergraduate degrees or higher (as indicated in Figure 2). The remainder of the leaders (approx. 10%) hold diplomas or teaching qualifications, which do not fall in the two categories as discussed.

did not obtain any tertiary qualifications, he was still awarded the Mo Ibrahim African Leadership prize in 2011. The Chairperson of the Prize Committee, Salim Ahmed Salim, stated that Pires was awarded the prize for transforming Cape Verde into a model of democracy and increased prosperity. Salim added that during Pires' ten years in power, "Cape Verde became only the second African country to graduate from the United Nation's least-developed category and has won international recognition for its record on human rights and good governance" (Tran, 2011).

Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that it is not simply whether a leader has obtained a tertiary qualification, but rather whether he or she has valued the importance of education and has shown a drive to develop as a leader that should be viewed as a characteristic of a successful developmental-minded leader.

4.1.2 Fields of study

The fields of study of leaders from post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries correspond with the fields of study of civilian rulers, as identified in the first paper in this series (Theron, 2010: 14). Law, Economics and Education – in that particular order – are overwhelmingly the most popular fields of study. These fields of study also saw a significant increase from pre- to post mid-1990s (Refer to Figure 3). The fields of study of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries changed considerably from pre- to post mid-1990s; although noting that so few of these leaders obtained degrees one can not necessarily make any conclusions based on the data. Since the 1990s, leaders from *Non-emerging* countries for the first time studied Law, Arts and Humanities and Economics amongst other subjects (Refer to Figure 4). These fields of study were already studied by leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries even before the mid-1990s, which could perhaps have helped to form a foundation for leadership in policy-making even before the rapid development started in the mid-1990s.




Figure 3: Fields of study of leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries: pre- and post the mid-1990s




Figure 4: Fields of study of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries: pre- and post- the mid-1990s

4.2 Age at which leaders first came to power

As outlined in Figure 5 below, the average at which leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries first came to power has increased by almost 8 years (from 47.02 years of age to 55.47 years of age) since the mid-1990s. The age which leaders from *Non-emerging* countries first came to power has however remained relatively constant, with an increase of just under 2 years since the mid-1990s.

It could be hypothesized that the increase in the leaders' age when they first come to power is an overall positive development. Not only do older leaders bring more experience to office, but they are also less likely to hold on to power after their presidential terms expire, since they would be closer to retirement age. Leaders who were in power in *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries from the mid-1990s onwards, were on average the oldest of the four groups of leaders outlined in Figure 5 below. There could therefore be a correlation between the age of leaders and the extent to which they promote development and good governance in their countries.




Figure 5: Age at which leaders first came to power

4.3 Career History / Career Trajectory

The graphs in this section outline the different occupational sectors in which leaders gained experience at some point during their career before coming to power as head of state. It indicates the percentage of leaders who have had experience in the respective sectors; noting that the vast majority of leaders had experience in more than one sector during their careers.

Figure 6 below indicates how the career experience of leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries changed from before the mid-1990s to after the mid-1990s. The major observations are as follows:

- Experience in the civil service has remained relatively constant at just over 30% of the leaders.
- The percentage of leaders who have had experience in the Legal and Political professions¹² has increased.
- The percentage of leaders who have had experience in the military decreased by almost 50%.
- For the first time since the mid-1990s, leaders have experience in fields such as Business, Research and the NGO sector; which might indicate an increased variety of fields in which leaders have experience.

¹² Political positions include minister; member of legislature, mayor / governor; head of opposition, etc.




Figure 6: Types of Occupations held by leaders from *Emerging and Threshold* countries: 1960 to mid-1990s compared with mid-1990s to 2010

With regard to changes in the career experience of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries since the mid-1990s (refer to Figure 7), the following observations can be made:

- The percentage of leaders with experience in the civil service has decreased by almost 50%.
- The percentage of leaders with experience in the military has remained relatively constant.
- The percentage of leaders with experience in the field of Politics has also remained relatively constant.
- Post the mid-1990s, there was a slight decrease in the variety of fields in which leaders have experience.




Figure 7: Types of occupations held by leaders from *Non-emerging* countries: 1960 to mid-1990s compared with mid-1990s to 2010




Figure 8: Types of occupations held by leaders from *Emerging and Threshold* countries compared with *Non-emerging* countries: mid-1990s to 2010.

When directly comparing the post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* country leaders with those from *Non-emerging* countries (refer to Figure 8), it is clear that leaders from *Non-emerging* countries have less experience in all fields, apart from the military profession where double (40% as opposed to 20%) the percentage of leaders have experience in the military. This corresponds with the 40% of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries who were at some point classified as military rulers. In the post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries, only approximately 10% of leaders were at some point classified as military rulers. When compared to the 20% of leaders in these countries who have experience in the military, it shows that not all of these leaders directly used their experience in the military to gain power. This may suggest that some of these leaders have greater respect for civil-military relations that maintain civil supremacy.

More leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries have held occupations in the fields of civil service and politics. It could be that experience in these fields has provided leaders with an understanding of challenges relating to public administration and service delivery which might have assisted them when they had to guide policy-making once they came to power.

Lastly, leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries have experience in a wider variety of occupations, which most likely enabled those leaders to bring more knowledge and skills with them once they assumed the executive head of state position.

4.4 Political background

The graphs in this section indicate the percentage of leaders who at some point during their life (before becoming head of state) participated in, or experienced, particular political activities such as being in exile, fighting in civil or liberation wars, being imprisoned or participating in other non-legal political activities. A leader could have been part of more than one of these activities.

As illustrated by Figure 9 below, the percentage of leaders from post-1990s *Emerging* countries who experienced, or participated in, the listed political activities, have seen a slight increase (apart from the percentage of post-1990s leaders who were jailed or house-arrested). Overall there has not been a significant difference in the political background of these two groups of leaders.

However, the opposite is the case when comparing the political backgrounds of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries pre- and post-1990s (refer to Figure 10). With all the types of political activities, the percentage of leaders who experienced, or participated in, these activities has increased significantly. This phenomenon is an interesting paradox when compared with the data presented so far. The biographical characteristics of leaders from *Non-emerging* countries have in general not changed significantly, as opposed to leaders from *Emerging* countries whose biographical characteristics changed significantly post-1990s.




Figure 9: Political background of leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries: 1960 to mid-1990s compared with mid-1990s to 2010




Figure 10: Political background of leaders from *Non-Emerging* countries: 1960 to mid-1990s compared with mid-1990s to 2010

Figure 11 below shows that the disparity between the percentage of post-1990s leaders of both *Emerging* and *Non-emerging* countries involved in political activities is smaller than during the period 1960 to mid-1990s. As discussed by Theron (2011: 24-25), at this stage one can only speculate what this data means and whether a rich political background could translate into better leaders who are equipped to make sound policy decisions. In depth interviews with these leaders could assist in understanding how leaders' political background might have influenced them on a personal and public level.




Figure 11: Political background of leaders from *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries compared with *Non-emerging* countries: mid-1990s to 2010

4.5 Types of ruler

In the previous paper the specific characteristics of civilian, 'personal' and military rulers were compared (Theron, 2011: 7-8). In light of the typical profile of each of these leaders, it is assumed that a civilian ruler is the type of ruler that will most likely lead or support good governance (and in turn the development) of their countries. Civilian rulers are rulers who have come to power through legitimate means (elections) and who respect the presidential term limits as required by the constitution of their country. In the case of post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries, 38 (83%) of the 46 leaders are classified as civilian rulers. Of the remaining leaders, three were initially classified as military rulers who came to power through a military coup, but later retired from the military and participated in elections as civilians, through which they were re-elected as presidents. Those leaders are Mali's Amadou Toure, Benin's Mathieu Kerekou and Ghana's Jerry Rawlings.

4.5.1 Military rulers in post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* countries

Mali's Amadou Toure briefly took power in a military coup (1991 to 1992) and then voluntarily handed over power to civilians. Toure was one of the very few military rulers to voluntarily step down as a military ruler and support a transition to democracy. Toure executed a coup against President Moussa Traore who ruled Mali from 1968 to 1991. Traore brutally suppressed Mali's pro-democracy movement

and refused to relinquish power. The military intervention by Toure was therefore a “guardian coup” based on the watchdog model of civil-military relations (Schraeder, 2000: 249). Such a coup is executed with the aim of returning the country to democracy, rather than taking power for the sake of ruling the country indefinitely (as was the case with the vast majority of military coups in Africa). Toure retired from the military in 2001 and in 2002 he was elected President in free and fair elections. He was later re-elected for a second term in 2007.

Benin's Mathieu Kerekou came to power in a military coup in 1972 and ruled until 1991. Following the end of the Cold War and the wave of democracy sweeping the African continent during the early 1990s, elections were held in Benin and Kerekou was voted out of office. He, however, made a comeback and was re-elected as president in the 1996 and 2001. This return to power of a former military ruler (who ruled for 19 years as opposed to Toure's one year), is perhaps one of the indications why Benin is classified as a *Threshold* country instead of an *Emerging* country.

Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, on the other hand, is a bit more controversial. Rawlings also executed a “guardian coup” in 1979 and facilitated the transition to civilian rule. When elections were held in that same year, Rawlings voluntarily relinquished power. However, he again took power by means of a coup in 1981 until 1992 when a new constitution providing for free elections was promoted in 1992. During this time Rawlings launched a large scale “house-cleaning exercise” clearing up corruption, introducing a measure of participatory democracy, and promoting economic recovery, but in doing so he took harsh reprisals against corrupt officials (Rake, 1992: 129). Democratic elections were held in 1993 and Rawlings was elected president of Ghana's fourth republic. He was re-elected again in 1996. He did not run for re-election in the 2000 elections, since the constitution only allowed for two presidential terms. So although Rawlings started out as what could have been perceived as a military dictator, he ended his career as a democrat.

4.5.2 Personal rulers in post-1990s Emerging and Threshold countries

Apart from the three military-turned-civilian rulers in the post-1990s *Emerging* and *Threshold* group, there are five rulers that can be classified as ‘personal’ rulers. Personal rulers are usually civilian rulers who do not respect presidential term limits. For example, they might manoeuvre illegal amendments to the constitution to extend their time in office, or ban opposition parties and declare themselves president-for-life. Personal rulers often treat political and administrative affairs of the state as their own personal affairs and their rule is often arbitrary (Thomson, 2000: 107). Therefore personal rulers are more likely to emerge in soft and poorly institutionalised states. Despite this conceptualisation, there are still five ‘personal’ rulers in the post-1990 *Emerging* and *Threshold* country group. They are Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, Senegal's Abdou Diouf and Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi. Of these leaders, two are from *Threshold* countries (Senegal and Kenya).

Although only three *Emerging* countries had (or have) personal rulers post the mid-1990s, it still brings to the fore the question of whether it is only civilian rulers (who adhere to term limits) that can lead a country on a path of economic growth and development? Despite the negative characteristics often attributed to personal rulers, it could be argued that personal rulers, in selected cases, can bring long-term stability to a country, which in turn could facilitate growth and development.

5.0

Incumbent Presidents 2010/2011

The following section compares the profiles of incumbent African Presidents based on leadership rankings allocated to them by the *East African Magazine's* 'African Presidents Index' (2010). Incumbents were graded and rated based on several respected international indices, such as the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Freedom House's Press Freedom Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and the UN Human Development Index. The leaders' scores in these indices were then weighted and combined to produce a score out of 100. Based on these scores, leaders were then given grades – 'A' for the best performers, 'B' for good performers, 'C' for passable leaders and sub-standard performance received 'D', 'E' or 'F'. The compilers of this index humorously added two additional categories for the extraordinarily oppressive and corrupt leaders namely the 'ICU' (Intensive Care Unit) and the Morgue (Spooner & Davis, 2010: 2).

Based on these grades, the remainder of this section compares leaders' profiles by dividing the incumbent leaders into two groups, namely the A+ to C group¹³ and the ICU and Morgue group¹⁴.

5.1 Educational qualifications

According to the scores allocated for educational qualifications earlier in this paper, leaders in the A+ to C group's score amounts to an average of **10.13**. In stark contrast, the leaders in the ICU and Morgue group's average education score amounts to **5.31** (Note that, again, this average does not include Robert Mugabe's score of 43).

Of the 15 leaders in the A+ to C group, 10 (66.6%) of the leaders hold an undergraduate degree. Their fields of study are Economics (7), Law (2), Social Sciences (1), Business (1) and Education (1). Of the 16 leaders in the ICU and Morgue category, 8 (50%) of the leaders hold an undergraduate degree or higher. Their fields of study are Law (3), Engineering (2), Social Sciences (2), Business (1), Medicine (1), Economics (1) and Military Science (1).

5.2 Age at which leaders first came to power

A striking difference between the two groups is the age of leaders when they first stepped into office. The average age at which leaders in the A+ to C group came to power is **60.93** years of age. On the other hand, leaders in the ICU and Morgue group were on average **42** years of age when they first

¹³ This group comprises of Anerood Jugnauth (A+), Pedro Pires (A), Ian Khama (A), John Atta-Mills (A), Hifikepunte Pohamba (A-), Jacob Zuma (B+), Amadou Toumani Toure (B), Ernest Bai Koroma (B), Jakaya Kikwete (B-), Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (B-), Rupiah Banda (C+), Bethuel Mosisili (C), Thomas Yayi Boni (C), Mwai Kibaki (C) and Bingu wa Mutharika (C). Note that although James Michel from Seychelles was awarded a 'B', he is not included in this analysis, since the leaders from the Seychelles were not included in the Developmental Leadership Programme's Leadership Database. The same applies to King Mohammed VI from Morocco (who was awarded a 'C'), since this study only includes leaders from Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹⁴ This group includes the following 'ICU' leaders: Blaise Compaore, Denis Sassou Nguesso, Faure Gnassingbe, Meles Zenawi, Yahya Jammeh, Ismail Omar Guelleh, Joseph Kabila and Jose Eduardo dos Santos. It also includes the following 'Morgue' leaders: Paul Biya, Francois Bozize, Robert Mugabe, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, Idriss Deby, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, Omar al-Bashir and Isaias Afwerki. Note that although Ali Ben Bongo (ICU), Malam Bacai Sanha (ICU) and Andry Rajoelina (Morgue) were included in the *East African Magazine's* index, they are not included in the analysis, since they were not included in the Developmental Leadership Programme's Leadership Database.

came to power.

5.3 Types of occupations held during leaders' career paths

As with the other characteristics mentioned above, these two groups of leaders also differ significantly in terms of their career background and past occupations. All of the leaders in the ICU and Morgue group's past occupations are limited to only four fields, namely, military, political, civil service and education. The A+ to C leaders have career experience in a much wider variety of fields.




Figure 12: Types of occupations held by leaders from both groups

5.4 Political background

As with the earlier discussion on the political background, it is difficult to draw correlations between the percentages of leaders in each of the two groups who were involved in a particular political activity at some stage. Figure 13 below illustrates that a higher percentage of leaders in the ICU and Morgue group were, at some stage during their life, in exile; were involved in a civil or liberation war; or participated in non-legal activities. The only exception is that there is a higher percentage of leaders in the A+ to C group who were at some point jailed or placed under house arrest.




Figure 13: Political background of both groups of leaders

6.0

Reflection: The South African Example of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma

This section makes use of the case study of South Africa, albeit in a very basic and superficial manner, to illustrate how we can look at the dynamics between the biographical characteristics of leaders, the political and economic environment in their countries and the reciprocal effect these two variables may have on each other.

During the decades of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa (especially from the 1960s to 1990s), the political environment prompted and facilitated the emergence of leaders like Nelson Mandela. Mandela played a vital role in driving the struggle forward and once apartheid came to an end in 1994, Mandela led the country through a peaceful transition to democracy. He therefore responded to the need for establishing human rights and political freedom. Mandela's biographical profile corresponds with the profiles attributed to civilian rulers of *Emerging* countries (refer to part one of this study – Theron: 2011). Mandela held a post-graduate degree in Law; came to power at a very mature age of 76 and had a striking political background, having spent 27 years as a political prisoner.

Once the foundation for democracy and human rights was established, the environment called for economic freedom, development and transformation. This is when Thabo Mbeki, in 1999, became the second democratically elected president of South Africa, following the retirement of Mandela. Mbeki responded to the need for economic development in the country. Mbeki holds a post-graduate degree in Economics, also has a vibrant political background, but came to power at a much younger age of 57. This economist and prominent intellectual vigorously drove not only South Africa's, but also the African continent's, economic agenda. Mbeki believed that the creation of stronger black middle class, through its policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) would assist in addressing economic inequality in South Africa. Mbeki also drove the country's Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy. On a continental level Mbeki spear-headed the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Mbeki spent over two decades in exile, during which he acted as a representative of the African National Congress (ANC) lobbying support for the struggle against apartheid. His experience in this regard helped him to develop diplomatic and negotiation skills that assisted him in driving South Africa's "Africa agenda".

Although Mbeki led the strengthening of South Africa's neo-liberal economic framework, he was criticized for neglecting social democratic economic policies that the masses called for during his time in power. This was possibly one of the reasons why Mbeki was not re-elected as the ruling African National Congress' (ANC) president, which in turn led to his resignation as the President of South Africa in 2008 (before his presidential term was due to expire in 2009).

In the 2009 national elections, the new ANC president Jacob Zuma was elected President of South Africa. Zuma's profile is somewhat different to the biographical profile of his predecessors. It remains

to be seen whether he will steer the course of development in South Africa in a different direction and whether he can respond to the call for greater economic equality. Zuma, just like his predecessors, has a rich political background, having spent ten years as a political prisoner and 12 years in exile while fighting in the struggle. Zuma's profile however differs from his predecessors in other aspects. Mandela and Mbeki came from prominent and influential families. Mandela's ancestry dates back to the traditional Thembu dynasty and his father was the traditional chief of the town of Mvezo. Mbeki came from a prominent political family, with his father Govan Mbeki having been one of the stalwarts in the apartheid struggle. Zuma has no formal education and came from a very poor background. His mother was a domestic worker and his father was a policeman who died when Zuma was a young child.

This discussion above is by no means a comprehensive analysis of South Africa's post-apartheid heads of state and development in South Africa. It simply serves to illustrate how the biographical profiles of leaders should not be disregarded when studying development.

7.0

Conclusion

The data presented in this paper show that there is a statistical correlation between the biographical characteristics of leaders in relation to the state of development in the countries where they are in power. It has therefore suggested that the hypothesis set forth in this paper is a valid subject for study. However, further studies need to be conducted to prove that there is a causal relationship between leaders' profiles and the extent to which they influence development and governance under their rule. This will require researchers to study key policy changes that were made by leaders while in power and determine whether there is a causal link between those policy changes and leaders' biographical attributes. For example, research could track whether leaders with a degree in law promoted changes to their country's constitution; or whether leaders with a degree in economics promoted policies to transform the economy. Other aspects such as leaders' career experience could also be studied in this regard. For example, did a leader's experience working for the World Bank and his networks within this institution assist him to build a beneficial relationship between his country and the institution? The outcome of such a study could assist in exploring the hypothesis that there is in fact a causal relationship between leaders' profiles and development.

References

Developmental Leadership Programme, (2011). *Leadership Database*.

Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2005). 'Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 120:3, pp. 835-864.

Radelet, S. (2010). *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way*. Washington, DC: Centre for Global Development.

Rake, A. (1992). *Who's Who in Africa: Leaders for the 1990s*. London: The Scarecrow Press.

Schraeder, P.J. (2000). *African politics and society: A mosaic in transformation*. New York: St Martin's.

Spooner, S. & Davis, J. (2010). 'The African Presidents Index: The Good the Bad and the Ugly'. *The East African Magazine*, 27 December, pp. 1-13.

Theron, M. (2011). 'African Trends and Transformation: The Profiles of Sub-Saharan African Heads of State and Government since Independence'. *Developmental Leadership Programme*. Available at: <http://www.dlprog.org/news-events/trends-and-transformations-in-african-political-leadership-since-1960-some-evidence.php>

Thomson, A. (2000). *An Introduction to African Politics*. London: Routledge.

Tran, M. 2011. "Cape Verde's Pedro Pires wins Mo Ibrahim African leadership prize". *The Guardian*. 10 October. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/oct/10/pedro-pires-african-leadership-prize> Accessed on 15 November 2011.

Annex

List of leaders from Emerging and Threshold countries included in this study:

1	Benin	Thomas Yayi Boni	2006-present
2		Mathieu Kérékou	1996-2006 and 1972-1991
3		Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo	1991-1996
4		Coutoucou Hubert Maga	1960-1963
5	Botswana	Seretse Ian Khama	2008-present
6		Festus Gontebanye Mogae	1998-2008
7		Ketumile Masire	1980-1998
8		Seretse Khama	1966-1980
9	Burkina Faso	Blaise Compaore	1987-present
10		Thomas Isidore Noel Sankara	1983-1987
11		Aboubakar Sangoule Laminzana	1966-1980
12		Maurice Nawalagmba Yaméogo	1960-1966
13	Cape Verde	Pedro Verona Rodrigues Pires	2001-present
14		Antonio Manuel Mascarenhas Monterio	1991-2001
15		Aristides Pereira	1975-1991
16	Ethiopia	Meles Zenawe	1991-present
17		Tafari Benti	1974-1977
18		Haile Mariam Mengistu	1974; 1977-1991
19	Ghana	John Evans Atta-Mills	2008-present
20		John Agyekum Kufuor	2001-2008
21		Jerry John Rawlings	1979; 1981-2001
22		Ignatius Kutu Acheampong	1972-1978
23		Kwame Nkrumah	1957-1966
24	Kenya	Mwai Kibaki	2002-present
25		Daniel Arap Moi	1978-2002
26		Jomo Kenyatta	1963-1978
27	Lesotho	Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili	1998-present
28		Ntsu Mokhehle	1994-1998
29		Justin Metsing Lekhanya	1986-1991
30		Joseph Leabua Jonathan	1965-1986
31	Liberia	Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf	2006-present
32		Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor	1997-2003
33		Samual Kanyon Doe	1986-1990
34		William Richard Tolbert Jr	1971-1980
35		William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman	1944-1971
36	Malawi	Bingu wa Mutharika	2004-present
37		Elson Bakili Muluzi	1994-2004

38		Hastings Kamuzu Banda	1964-1994
39	Mali	Amadou Toumane Toure	1991-1992 and 2002-present
40		Alpha Oumar Konare	1992-2002
41		Moussa Traore	1968-1991
42		Modibo Keita	1960-1968
43	Mauritius	Seewoosagur Ramgoolam	1968-1985
44		Anerood Jugnauth	1982-1995 and 2000-2003
45		Navinchandra Ramgoolam	1995-2000 and 2005-present
46	Mozambique	Armando Emilio Guebuza	2005-present
47		Joaquim Alberto Chissano	1986-2005
48		Samora Moises Machel	1975-1986
49	Namibia	Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba	2005-present
50		Samuel Daniel Shafiishuna Nujoma	1990-2005
51	Rwanda	Paul Kagame	2000-present
52		Pasteur Bizimungu	1994-2000
53		Juvenal Habyarimana	1973-1994
54		Grégoire Kayibanda	1961-1973
55	Sao Tome & Principe	Fradique de Menezes	2001-present
56		Miguel dos Anjos Trovoada	1991-2001
57		Manuel Pinto da Costa	1975-1991
58	Senegal	Abdoulaye Wade	2000-present
59		Abdou Diouf	1981-2000
60		Léopold Sédar Senghor	1960-1980
61	Sierra Leone	Ernest Bai Koroma	2007-present
62		Ahmad Tejan Kabbah	1998-2007
63		Valentine Esegzagbo Melvine Strasser	1992-1996
64		Joseph Saidu Momoh	1985-1992
65		Siaka Probyn Stevens	1968-1985
66		Albert Michael Margai	1964-1968
67		Milton Augustus Strieby Margai	1961-1964
68	South Africa	Jacob Zuma	2009-present
69		Thabo Mbeki	1999-2009
70		Nelson Mandela	1994-1999
71		Frederick Willem De Klerk	1989-1994
72		Pieter Botha	1978-1989
73		Hendrik Verwoerd	1958-1978
74	Tanzania	Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	2005-present
75		Benjamin William Mkapa	1995-2005
76		Ali Hassan Mwinyi	1985-1995
77		Julius Nyerere	1964-1985
78	Uganda	Yoweri Kaguta Museveni	1986-present
79		Apollo Milton Obote	1962-1971 and 1980-1985

80		Idi Amin Dada	1971-1979
81	Zambia	Rupiah Bwezani Banda	2008-present
82		Levy Patrick Mwanawasa	2002-2008
83		Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba	1991-2002
84		Kenneth David Kaunda	1964-1991

List of leaders from Non-emerging countries included in this study:

1	Burundi	Pierre Nkurunziza	
2		Pierre Buyoya	
3		Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	
4		Michel Micombero	
5	Central Africa Republic (CAR)	Francois Bozize	
6		Ange-Felix Patasse	
7		Andre Dieudonne Kolingba	
8		Jean-Bedel Bokassa	
9		David Dacko	
10	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Joseph Kabila	
11		Laurent Desire Kabila	
12		Mobutu Seseko	
13		Joseph Kasavubu	
14		Patrice Emery Lumumba	
15	Cote d'Ivoire	Laurent Koudou Gbagbo	
16		Aime Henri Konan Bedie	
17		Félix Houphouët-Boigny	
18	Djibouti	Ismail Omar Guelleh	
19		Hassan Gouled Aptidon	
20	Eritrea	Isaias Afewerki	
21	Gambia	Yahya Abdul-Azziz Jemus Junkung Jammeh	
22		Dawda Kairaba Jawara	
23	Guinea	Lansana Conte	
24		Ahmed Sékou Touré	
25	Guinea-Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira	
26		Luís de Almeida Cabral	
27	Madagascar	Marc Ravalomanana	
28		Philibert Tsiranana	
29	Niger	Tandja Mamadou	
30		Ali Saibou	
31		Seyni Kountche	

32		Hamani Diori	
33	Somalia	Sharif Sheikh Ahmed	
34		Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	
35		Abdiqasim Salad Hassan	
36		Muhammad Siad Barre	
37		Aden Abdullah Osman Daar	
38	Swaziland	Makhosetive Mswati III	
39		Ngwenyama Sobhuza II	
40	Togo	Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe	
41		Gnassingbe Eyadema	
42		Nicolas Grunitzky	
43		Sylvanus Olympio	
44	Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	

DLP Publications

Research Papers

1. Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2009) "Cadres, Capitalists and Coalitions: The ANC, Business and Development in South Africa".
2. David Sebudubudu with Patrick Molutsi (2009) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the Development of Botswana".
3. Eduard Grebe with Nicoli Nattrass (2009) "Leaders, Networks and Coalitions in the AIDS Response: A Comparison of Uganda and South Africa".
4. Deborah Brautigam with Tania Diolle (2009) "Coalitions, Capitalists and Credibility: Overcoming the Crisis of Confidence at Independence in Mauritius".
5. Jo Beall with Mduduzi Ngonyama (2009) "Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Developmental Coalitions: The Case of Greater Durban, South Africa".
6. Adrian Leftwich (2009) "Bringing Agency Back In: Politics and Human Agency in Building Institutions and States".
7. Junji Banno & Kenichi Ohno (2010) "The Flexible Structure of politics in Meiji Japan".
8. Marine Destrez & Nick Harrison (2011) "Leadership Training and Network Formation: The evolution of the LEAD process".
9. Michael Bratton & Eldred Musunungure (2011) "The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980-2010".
10. Laura Brannelly, Laura Lewis & Susy Ndaruhutse (2011) "Higher Education and the Formation of Developmental Elites: A literature review and preliminary data analysis."
11. Heather Lyne deVer & Fraser Kennedy (2011) "An analysis of Leadership Development Programmes working in the context of development."
12. Mariz Tadros (2011) "Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and agency in a comparative study of women's coalitions in Egypt and Jordan".
13. Rebecca Hodes, Jennifer Thorpe & Orly Stern (2011) "Structure and Agency in the Politics of a Women's Rights Coalition in South Africa: The Making of the South African Sexual Offences Act, 2007".
14. Sarah Phillips (2011) "Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State".
15. Eduard Grebe & Minka Woermann (2011) "Institutions of Integrity and the Integrity of Institutions: Integrity and Ethics in the Politics of Developmental Leadership".
16. Andrew Rosser, Ian Wilson & Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (2011) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The politics of free public services in decentralised Indonesia"
17. Monique Theron (2011) "African Trends and Transformation: The Profiles of Sub-Saharan African Executive Heads of State since Independence".
18. Laura Brannelly, Laura Lewis & Susy Ndaruhutse (2011) "Learning and Leadership: Exploring the linkages between higher education and developmental leadership".

Background Papers

1. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2007) "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The case for leadership and the primacy of politics in building effective states, institutions and governance for sustainable growth and social development".
2. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2008) "The Politics of Institutional Indigenization: leaders, elites and coalitions in building appropriate and legitimate institutions for sustainable growth and social development".
3. Heather Lyne de Ver (2008) "Leadership Politics and Development: A Literature Survey".
4. Heather Lyne de Ver (2009) "Conceptions of Leadership".
5. Adrian Leftwich & Steve Hogg (2010) "The Leadership Program: Overview & Objectives".
6. Adrian Leftwich (2010) "An Overview of the Research in Progress for the Leadership Program: Developmental Leaders, Elites and Coalitions".
7. Isabelle van Notten (2010) "Integrity, Leadership, Women's Coalitions and the Politics of Institutional Reform. Bringing Agency Back In. Mid-Term Workshop Report, Cape Town 25-26 May 2010".
8. Edward Laws (2010) "The 'Revolutionary Settlement' in 17th Century England: Deploying a Political Settlements Analysis".



The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) addresses an important gap in international thinking and policy about the critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of development. This growing program brings together government, academic and civil society partners from around the world to explore the role of human agency in the processes of development. DLP will address the policy, strategic and operational implications of 'thinking and working politically' - for example, about how to help key players solve collective action problems, forge developmental coalitions, negotiate effective institutions and build stable states.

The Developmental Leadership Program

E: info@dlprog.org

W: www.dlprog.org